Summary: ----Ss. 39 & 42---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Arts. 91 & 120---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.19 & 19-A---Declaration against void mutations, sought---Question as to whether cancellation or declaration was to be sought against a void mutation---Limitation for seeking cancellation and declaration stated---Mutation is not an instrument, therefore, Art. 91 of Limitation Act, 1908 would not be applicable and instead a declaratory suit should be filed, limitation for which is six years as per Art. 120 thereof---Predecessor of the respondents filed a suit on 07.05.2010 for declaration and permanent injunction, seeking invalidation of different mutations entered in 1998 without his knowledge or consent by claiming the knowledge of the same from 07.03.2007---He claimed he never sold the property nor facilitated the Roznamcha-Waqiati entries---Trial Court decreed the suit, and the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of Trial Court---Petitioner/defendant then filed present civil revision, arguing primarily on the ground of limitation under Art. 91 & Art. 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Core question requiring determination before the High Court was as to "whether the suit for declaration, challenging void mutations recorded without the plaintiff's consent or knowledge, was barred by limitation under Article 91 of the Limitation Act, 1908, or whether Article 120 applied in light of the alleged date of knowledge, rendering the suit within time"---Held: Notably no evidence was brought on record to substantiate knowledge qua impugned mutations, before 07.03.2007, when knowledge qua impugned mutations was alleged---It was important aspect of the matter that the suit was for declaration substantially and not specifically for seeking cancellation of mutations---Multiple causes of action were available and even if cause of action was taken from 07.03.2007, pleaded as the date of having knowledge of impugned mutations, still suit was within six years, and Art. 120 of Limitation Act, 1908 was attracted---With regards to the issue of applicability of Art. 91 of Limitation Act, 1908, same was not attracted to the present case as mutation was not an instrument as per settled law---In another aspect of the matter, facts alleged depicted that declaration was sought against void and unenforceable transaction(s) of sale, which transactions, in wake of denial, were not classifiable as voidable transactions under the scope of Ss. 19 & 19-A of the Contract Act, 1872; factum of extending consent to alleged transactions and execution of mutations in the first place was not alleged---Since declaration, being the primary and fundamental relief, was sought therefore S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and not the S. 39 thereof was attracted---Declaration of rights, allegedly prejudiced upon execution of mutations, was sought and that was within six years of the accrual of case of action, bringing Art. 120 in focus---In the present case, respondent No.1 had rightly sought declaration against void transactions---Even otherwise evidence of official witnesses is not convincing enough to dislodge allegations of fraud and deception exercised for procuring execution of impugned mutations regarding underlying transactions of sale---Petitioner failed to prove underlying transactions, payment of consideration, recording of Roznamcha-Waqiati and execution of mutations; aforesaid requirements become more pressing in the context that respondent No.1 was an illiterate person, who, admittedly, was not accompanied by any of his relatives at the time of noting on Roznamcha-Waqiati and execution of mutations-- -Petitioner produced uncertified copies of Khasra Girdawari's through statement of counsel after completion of evidence and cross examination of the witnesses produced, which were inadmissible in evidence---Once underlying transaction was not proved, simplicitor, impugned mutations were ineffective and insufficient to refute the title of the respondent No.1/plaintiff---Civil revision being devoid of merits was dismissed, in circumstances. Fida Hussain v. Abdul Aziz PLD 2005 SC 343; Thakur Nirman Singh and others v. Thakur Lal Rudra Partab Narain Singh and others AIR 1926 PC 100 and Khalid Hussain and others V. Nazir Ahmad and others 2021 SCMR 1986 rel. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----First Sched., Art.91---Mutation, challenge to---Limitation---Scope---Mutation is not an instrument in the context of Art. 91 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Mutation records the effect of change in the ownership in fact caused by virtue of a legal transaction, effected through written document for the purposes of Art. 91 of the Act, 1908-- -Mutation is not the document of title but evidence thereof---Mutation in-fact embodies a transaction and an effect extended thereto for the purposes of revenue record---In essence mutation is the progeny, cause and effect of the transaction(s) and not predecessor thereto. Fida Hussain v. Abdul Aziz PLD 2005 SC 343 rel. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ---Arts.72, 117 & 120---Document---Proof---Documents tendered through statement of counsel after completion of evidence and cross-examination of the witnesses produced, are inadmissible in evidence. Qamar-uz-Zaman and Muhammad Tayyab Gul for Petitioner. Shaigan Ijaz Chadhar for Respondent No.1. Waheed Alam, A.A.G. for Respondents Nos.2 and 3. Shakeel Ahmad, Ch. Ahsan Gujjar and Malik Rizwan Khalid for legal heirs of Respondent No.5. Hafiz Muhammad Muzammil for Respondents Nos. 6 to 10, 12 to 14. Date of hearing: 21st May, 2025.

Summary: C.P.L.A No. 402-P of 2023 (Against the judgment dated 17.03.2023 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in W.P. No. 4180-P of 2022). Per Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J; Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ. agreeing. (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Appointment, Deputation, Posting and Transfer of Teachers, Lecturers, Instructors and Doctors) Regulatory Act (XII of 2011)--- ----S. 3---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XXVI & O.XXVIII, R.3---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 114---Review jurisdiction---Scope---Appointment, posting and transfer---Imposing of costs---Petitioner sought review of judgment passed by Supreme Court with regard to determination of place of residence for employment purposes---Validity---Power of review, as articulated in Article 188 of the Constitution and governed by Supreme Court Rules, 1980 ('Rules') and C.P.C. is not an open invitation to revisit judgments merely on the basis of dissatisfaction with the outcome---It is a limited jurisdiction, exercised with great caution and circumspection---Conditions for filing a review petition are specifically enumerated and they do not extend to re-arguing points of law or fact that have already been conclusively determined---Petitioner did not disclose any new or important evidence nor pointed any error that was apparent on the face of record---Issues raised by petitioner were mere reiteration of arguments that had already been considered and rejected by Supreme Court---Supreme Court declined to review its earlier judgment, as there was no ground made out for review and petitions were frivolous and vexatious---Supreme Court imposed cost under Order XXVIII, Rule 3 of Supreme Court Rules, 1980 upon petitioner for squandering valuable time of Supreme Court---Review petition was dismissed. District Education Officer (Female) Charsadda and others v. Sonia Begum and others 2023 SCMR 217; Justice Qazi Faez Isa v. President of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 119; Messrs Habib and Co. v. Muslim Commercial Bank PLD 2020 SC 227; Engineers Study Forum v. Federation of Pakistan 2016 SCMR 1961; Government of Pun jab v. Aamir Zahoor-ul-Haq PLD 2016 SC 421; Haji Muhammad Boota v. Member (Revenue) BOR 2010 SCMR 1049; Mehdi Hassan v. Province of Punjab 2007 SCMR 755; Anwar Husain v. Province of East Pakistan PLD 1961 Dacca 155; Ghulam Murtaza v. Abdul Salam Sheikh 2010 SCMR 1883; Haji Muhammad Boota v. Member (Revenue) BOR 2010 SCMR 1049; Abdul Rauf v. Qutab Khan 2006 SCMR 1574; Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. Controller of Estate Duty PLD 1962 SC 355; Pakistan International Airlines v. Inayat Rasool 2004 SCMR 1737; Noor Hassan Awan v. Muhammad Ashraf 2001 SCMR 367; Kalsoom Malik v. Assistant Commissioner 1996 SCMR 710; Abdul Majeed v. Chief Settlement Commissioner 1980 SCMR 504; Inter Quest Informatics Services v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2025 SCMR 257; Mukhtar Mai v. Abdul Khaliq 2019 SCMR 1302; Zakaria Ghani v. Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon PLD 2016 SC 229; Jamshoro Joint Venture v. Khawaja Muhammad Asif 2014 SCMR 1858; Suja A Thomas, 'Frivolous Cases' (2010) 59(2) DePaul Law Review 633; Cooter and Gell v. Hartmax Corp 496 U.S. 384 (1990); Wormer. 765 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1985); Cropper v. Smith (1884) 25 Ch D 700 (affirmed in Prince Abdulaziz v. Apex Global Management Ltd 120141 UKSC 64); De Cruz Lee v. Lee 2015 ONSC 2012; Irmya v. Mijovick 2016 ONSC 5276; British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71; Sanford Levinson. 'Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?' (1986) 24(2) Usgoode Hall LJ 353; Sanjeev Kumar Jain v. Raghubir Saran Charitable Trust 2012 (1) See 455; Bakht Biland Khan v. Zahid Khan PLD 2024 SC 1273; S.M. Sohail v. Sitara Kabir-ud-Din PLD 2009 SC 397; Lutfullah Virk v. Muhammad Aslam Sheikh PLD 2024 SC 887; National Highway Authority. Islamabad v. Messrs Sambu Construction 2023 SCMR 1103; Capital Development Authority v. Ahmed Murtaza 2023 SCMR 61; Javed Hameed v. Aman Ullah 2024 SCMR 89; Zakir Mehmood v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence 2023 SCMR 960; Pirbhai v. Singh 2011 ONSC 1366; Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj (2010) 8 SCC 1; Pandurang Vithal Kevne v. Bharat Sanchar 2024 1NSC 1051 and Ashok Kumar Mittal v. Ram Kumar Gupta (2009) 2 SCC 656 rel. (b) Supreme Court Rules, 1980--- ----O.XXVIII, R.3---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 35 & 35A---Costs, imposing of---Object, purpose and scope---Consistent imposition of meaningful and proportionate costs rooted in statutory authority, judicial discipline and Constitutional imperatives is essential to deter abuse of process and restore procedural integrity. Per Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J. agreeing (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 188---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XXVI---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 114---Review jurisdiction---Scope---Every judgement rendered by Court of law is presumed to be a solemn and conclusive determination of all points arising out of the lis---Irregularities if any which have no significant effect or impact on outcome would not be sufficient to warrant review---If incongruity or ambiguity is of such a nature as to transmute the course of action from being one in aid of justice to a process of injustice then a review decision may be instituted for redressal to demonstrate error if it is found floating conspicuously on the surface of the record---Mere desire for rehearing of the matter cannot constitute sufficient ground for the grant of review which by its very nature cannot be equated with the right or remedy of appeal---Sanctity and finality of judicial determinations must not be compromised by mere persistence of litigants or mechanical issuance of advocate certificates---Review jurisdiction is not a fall back for unsuccessful litigants to reopen a lis but a narrowly confined judicial tool intended to correct palpable and consequential mistakes. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 188---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XXVI---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 114---Review---Phrase "error apparent on the face of record"---Scope---Orders based on an erroneous assumption of material facts or those made without adverting to a provision of law or reflecting departure from undisputed construction of law and the Constitution may amount to an error apparent on the face of the record and can be rectified. Commissioner Inland Revenue Z-III, Corporate Regional Tax Office, Tax House, Karachi v. Messrs MSC Switzerland Geneva and others 2023 SCMR 1011 = 2023 SCP 150 rel. Shah Faisal Ilyas, Addl. AG, KPK for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk and Ms. Uzma Zahoor, Research Officer, Supreme Court of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 25th April, 2025.

Summary: ----S. 367---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 393 & 34---Rewriting of judgment---Scope---Accused were charged for murdering the brother of complainant while attempting to commit robbery---Perusal of the judgment impugned revealed that at the first instance, the Trial Court, observed that the accused persons with their common intention, had committed the murder of the deceased, while in the subsequent para, the Court deviated from its own views and mentioned that sole fire was made at deceased due to panic and fear, meaning thereby, that they had no prior intention to kill the deceased---Thus, the Trial Court had taken erroneous views in the judgment impugned and violated the provisions of S. 367, Cr.P.C., therefore, the judgment impugned was not a proper judgment at all, as legally a judgment should invariably discuss the merits/demerits of the statements of the witnesses, with reference to the charge and a proper judgment must specify the points for determination and the reasoning of the Court for such determinations---Though normally minor omissions and commissions were curable and could be ignored by the Appellate Courts, but failure to specify the points of determination, absence of reasons for decision about the contentions raised in the matter or a total lack of reasoning, constituted a material defect in the judgment which could not be conveniently overlooked---In other words, a judgment which was not lucid, complete, self contained and unambiguous does not fulfill the requirements of S. 367, Cr.P.C-- -Accordingly, the conviction recorded on the basis of such judgment could not be sustained/upheld-- -Case was remanded to the Trial Court for the limited purpose to re-write the judgment on the basis of existing judicial record within two months strictly in accordance with law. Muhammad Nawaz and others v. The State through P.G. and others PLD 2022 SC 523 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 393 & 34---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.367---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit robbery, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Contents of judgment---Scope---Accused were charged for murdering the brother of complainant while attempting to commit robbery---Although, it was an admitted fact that the Trial Court while framing charge against the accused persons had charged them for the offence of common intention falling under S. 34, P.P.C., but while deciding the lis, each accused was dealt on the basis of 'individual liability'---Conviction was recorded against accused "B" for the murder of the deceased, however, the applicability of S. 34, P.P.C., with reference to other accused was totally ignored and they were convicted on the basis of individual liability without assigning a 'definite finding' regarding their participation in commission of offence in furtherance of their common intention falling under S. 34, P.P.C---When all the accused persons were specifically charged for having committed the crime in furtherance of their common intention, the trial Court ought to have given a 'definite finding' regarding the applicability of Ss. 302 & 34, P.P.C., to all the accused persons qua the charge of murder---Trial Court ignored the fact that all the accused persons committed their respective overt acts in furtherance of their common object, and as such, they were part of the unlawful assembly, hence, the conviction and sentence recorded against the accused on the basis of individual liability in the absence of any 'definite finding' to negate that the act of each individual was without premeditation, was beyond the scope of law---Act of each individual, if committed in furtherance of the common intention, the facts were to be dealt conjointly to arrive at a conclusion in the spirit of law---Case was remanded to the Trial Court for the limited purpose to re-write the judgment on the basis of existing judicial record within two months strictly in accordance with law. Rehmatullah Bareech and Ehsanullah Kakar for Appellants (in Criminal Appeal No.514 of 2023). Younus Mengal, A.P.G. for the State (in Criminal Appeal No.514 of 2023). Muhammad Bilal Khan for Appellant (in Criminal Appeal No.532 of 2023). Younus Mengal, A.P.G. for the State (in Criminal Appeal No.532 of 2023). Date of hearing: 27th May, 2024.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.IX, Rr.8 & 9---Dismissal of a suit for non-prosecution when the case was fixed for recording of evidence---Discretion of court to dismiss suit once ripe for hearing---Settlement of issues, effect of---The moment issues are framed in a suit, it becomes ripe for hearing---Distinction between pre-issues and post-issues proceedings stated---The petitioner filed civil suit wherein issues were framed and when the case was fixed for recording evidence, it was adjourned due to the absence of the defendants---However, on next date, though respondents/ defendants Nos. 1 to 7 were present, the petitioner failed to appear, resulting in dismissal of the suit for non-prosecution---Subsequently, the petitioner filed an application for restoration, citing his father's illness as the reason for absence---The application was dismissed for failure to justify the delay or providing sufficient cause---An appeal against this decision was also dismissed by the district court, subsequently, the petitioner then approached the Supreme Court---Held: In the suit the issues were framed and the moment issues were framed, the suit became ripe for hearing---Notwithstanding the listed applications on the fateful day, the suit was also listed for hearing as the issues had been framed and case was adjourned for evidence of petitioner/plaintiff---The argument that suit was not ripe for hearing or that it should not have been dismissed for non- prosecution and/or at the most the application fixed could have been dismissed, was not convincing---It was well within the discretion of court to dismiss the suit if it was ripe for hearing i.e. after settlement of issues---There was, however, a distinction between date of hearing of suit and date of appearance of parties before settlement of issuesand the later could not be at par with date of hearing which was not the case in the present matter---Leave to appeal was declined and the petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Asghar Ali, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Respondents not represented. Date of hearing: 8th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.188---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3(2)---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O. XXVIII, R.3---Review petition before the Supreme Court---Filing of frivolous petitions by public functionaries in order to insulate themselves, practice of---Supreme Court deprecated such practice by imposing costs---Review petition before the Supreme Court was barred by 204 days and sufficient cause was disclosed for condonation of delay---Nevertheless, the judgment of the High Court challenged in earlier round before the Supreme Court merely held that Intra-Court Appeal filed by the petitioner-institution before the High Court was not maintainable in terms of section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 as an appeal was provided under the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977 against the original order---This conclusion was upheld by Supreme Court through the impugned order under review---Supreme Court noted with grave concern that present petition, filed by a statutory institution, was not only legally untenable and devoid of merit, but also reflective of a deeper, disturbing culture of risk-averse governance---The conduct of public officers of resorting to filing petitions before the highest court of the land merely in order to insulate themselves from accountability was deprecated in the strongest terms---Courts are not to be approached mechanically or defensively, especially by those entrusted with public functions and legal stewardship---To mark Supreme Court's disapproval and to deter the continuation of irresponsible and obstructive practices by public bodies, exemplary cost of Rs.100,000/-was imposed on the petitioner-institution under Order XXVIII, Rule 3 of Supreme Court Rules, 1980 as the review petition was not only vexatious, frivolous and squandered valuable time of the court but was also reflective of institutional abdication and poor governance---Petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972)--- ----S. 3(2)---Intra Court Appeal---Maintainability---If a law dealing with original proceedings offers a remedy of appeal, revision, or review, then the right to file Intra Court Appeal (ICA) before the High Court is barred---It is immaterial whether the aggrieved person actually availed the remedy or not, what matters is the legal availability of such remedy under the law. Syed Asif Raza v. Pakistan International Airlines PLD 2001 SC 182 rel. (c) Public functionaries--- ----Filing of frivolous petitions by public functionaries in order to insulate themselves---Supreme Court deprecated such practice---While the right to access to courts is a cornerstone of the Constitutional framework, it is not an unqualified or limitless right---Such access must be exercised with responsibility and in a manner that upholds the dignity and finality of judicial proceedings---When public institutions initiate repetitive and meritless petitions they erode the integrity of the judicial process---Frivolous litigation not only clogs judicial dockets but also drains public resources and delays justice for genuine litigants---This become more concerning when such frivolous claims are filed by government or public statutory functionaries, who are expected to act with higher responsibility and to protect, rather than squander, public resources and judicial time---When public bodies initiate litigation, they do so not as private litigants pursuing personal interests, but as custodians of the law and fiduciaries of the public interest and they are under an onerous obligation to act fairly, responsibly, and in accordance with the Constitution--- Public statutory functionaries should exercise greater legal discipline and internal scrutiny before invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. District Education Officer (Female) Charsadda v. Miss Sonia Begum 2025 SCP 160 (SCP citation); Javed Hameed v. Aman Ullah 2024 SCMR 89; Lutfullah Virk v. Muhammad Aslam Sheikh PLD 2024 SC 887 and Zakir Mehmood v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence 2023 SCMR 960 rel. Rana Asadullah Khan, Addl. AGP for Petitioner. Shehryar Kasuri for Respondents. Assisted by: Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 8th May, 2025.

Summary: ----Ss.376 & 383---Police official---Succession certificate---Death on duty---Compensation amount---Tarka---Scope---Petitioner/widow of Shaheed police official was aggrieved of inclusion of name of mother of deceased in succession certificate pertaining to compensation amount awarded on death in line of duty---Validity---Compensation granted to a person after his death does not fall within the definition of Tarka---Mother of deceased could not claim any share in compensation amount---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside order passed by Lower Appellate Court and restored that of Trial Court, excluding name of mother of deceased from succession certificate for amount in question---Revision was allowed accordingly. Jamil Shah for Petitioner. Munir Ahmed Kakar for Respondent No. 1. Allauddin Kakar, Assistant Advocate General for Respondents Nos. 2 to 4. Date of hearing: 22nd December, 2023.

Summary: ----S.9 [as amended by Code of Civil Procedure (Punjab Amendment) Act, 2018]---Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act (XIII of 1976), S.29---Suits for declaration and injunction instituted by students seeking correction of date of birth and change of name---Jurisdiction of Civil Courts---Ouster of jurisdiction of Civil Court by special law---Extending the ouster clause to all cases covered by a general or special law---Special law in place directly dealing with the correction of date of birth and change of name---Jurisdiction of civil court ousted in such matters---Core issue before the civil court was with regards to its lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate such suits as specific provisions for seeking change in date of birth and change in name were provided under the calendar of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education Rawalpindi Volume-I which dealt with Act and Regulations whereas Volume II of the calendar prescribed the Rules---Chapter-III of Volume I provided the general regulations and Regulation 5 dealt with the matter relating to correction in date of birth of a candidate---Chapter-17 of Volume II of the calendar, on the other hand, provided the mode and manner of change in the name or surnames---Held: The amended version of S. 9, C.P.C. was in field but it was not taken into consideration at all---It was an admitted fact that all suits were instituted by the students after the amendment in S. 9, C.P.C.---From bare perusal of S. 9, C.P.C., it was clear that by virtue of amendment introduced through Act No. XIV of 2018 dated 20th March, 2018 to the extent of Province of Punjab, a radical and notable change was introduced by the legislature in the existing S. 9, C.P.C. and ouster clause was extended to the case for which a general or a special law was in force---This material change was undoubtedly not under consideration before the courts at the time of rendering the judgments---High Court allowed the civil revision and remanded the matters to civil court for deciding the question of jurisdiction afresh after keeping in consideration the amendment in S.9 C.P.C. introduced through Punjab Amendment Act No.XIV of 2018. Nestle Pak Limited, Lahore through Authorized Signatory and another v. Shehryar Kureshi and 3 others 2024 CLD 502 ref. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 9 [as amended by Code of Civil Procedure (Punjab Amendment) Act, 2018]---Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act (XIII of 1976), S. 29---General jurisdiction of civil court---Ouster of civil court jurisdiction---Scope---Code of Civil Procedure (Punjab Amendment) Act (XIV of 2018), 'effect of'---In case of special law directly dealing with the subject-matter the jurisdiction of civil court would be ousted---Section 9 C.P.C., bestows jurisdiction upon the civil court to try all suits of civil nature except the suits for which its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred---Civil courts are, thus, courts of ultimate jurisdiction---It is trite law that even if there is any bar in the statute ousting the jurisdiction of civil court, it cannot operate as absolute---Civil courts are courts of ultimate jurisdiction and unless jurisdiction is either expressly or impliedly barred, the final decision with regard to a civil right, duty or obligation, shall be that of the civil courts---Where allegation of mala fide action has been made in plaint, the civil court despite the bar placed on the relevant statute can examine the acts on account of being tainted with mala fide, coram non judice or void---The civil court, however, cannot jump into the matter, if its jurisdiction is either expressly or impliedly barred unless remedy provided in the relevant statute is exhausted---Due to the specific bar contained under the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976, which comprehensively provided a statutory framework for addressing matters pertaining to the correction of date of birth and change of name in educational records, the amended provision of S. 9, C.P.C., would be attracted---In light of the express exclusion provided by the special law, the jurisdiction of the civil court stood ousted, as the legislature had entrusted such matters to the exclusive domain of the authorities established under the said Act, thereby precluding adjudication by civil courts---High Court allowed the civil revision and remanded the matters to civil court for deciding the question of jurisdiction afresh after keeping in consideration the amendment in S.9 C.P.C., introduced through Code of Civil Procedure (Punjab Amendment) Act (XIV of 2018). Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Faisalabad v. Muhammad Waleed 2021 MLD 123 ref: (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----Ss. 9, 151 & O. XIV, Rr. 1, 2---Duty of courts to determine question of jurisdiction at limine stage---Proceedings without jurisdiction are void---Absence of jurisdiction vitiates entire proceedings---Non-framing of material issues---Omission to frame jurisdictional issue---Question of jurisdiction is always pivotal because if a court or tribunal having no jurisdiction proceeds with a matter and decides it, the entire proceedings would be illegal and coram non judice---It is thus obligatory for the court or tribunal to settle the question of jurisdiction at the very outset---In the present case, none of the courts had either framed proper issues to this effect or attended this pivotal question with judicious approach---Civil revision was allowed and matters were remanded to consider "whether the civil court had jurisdiction to try the suit in light of S. 9 C.P.C., as amended by Punjab Amendment Act No.XIV of 2018 in light of provisions contained in the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976 as well as the rules and regulations made thereunder". Zahid Zaman Khan and others v. Khan Afsar and others PLD 2016 SC 409 rel. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Tahir Edible Oil (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2003 CLC 416 ref. Haroon Irshad Janjua for Petitioner. Ms. Nosheen Ashraf for Respondent No.1. Malik Muhammad Khalid, Law Officer, National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) for Respondent No.2. Date of hearing: 26th February, 2025.

Summary: (Against judgment dated 04.03.2024 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in C.R. No.79723 of 2022). Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----Ss. 14, 17, 30, 33 & 39---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 74---Arbitration---Award made rule of Court---Objections against award---Trial Court inviting evidence without deciding the objections ---Dispute between the parties arose and was related to a contract executed on 01.11.2017 and was referred to arbitration by a two-member arbitral tribunal, which rendered the award on 02.07.2021---On 07.07.2021, the arbitrators filed the award before the Civil Court---On 01.09.2021, the petitioner filed objections for setting aside the said award---On 23.11.2022, Civil Court framed the issues and required the parties to submit the list of witnesses for the production of evidence---Said orders were assailed before the High Court by filing a revision petition, which was allowed by setting aside the orders dated 23.11.2022 passed by the Civil Court and case was remanded to the Civil Court for decision afresh on the basis of available record---Validity---Arbitrators were entitled to regulate their own procedure and were not governed by the strict procedure prescribed by the C.P.C. and the rules regarding evidence contained in the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Arbitrators decided the disputes based on evidence presented during arbitration proceedings---Arbitrators were under no obligation to frame issues as provided in the C.P.C.---Court recorded fresh evidence, disregarding the procedural safeguards in arbitration, such as the arbitrator's exclusive jurisdiction to assess evidence and apply the law-- -Said fact might lead to inconsistent outcomes and procedural unfairness---If the Court frames issues and records evidence after objections to an award were filed, parties might use this as an opportunity to re-litigate the entire dispute, leading to multiple proceedings on the same issues besides undermining both the legislative intent and the integrity of the arbitral process---Said multiplicity undermined the arbitrator's role in providing a one-time binding decision---Possibility of a trial after the award has been filed in Court creates uncertainty about the finality and enforceability of awards, that discourages the parties from opting for arbitration, defeating the legislative intent to promote arbitration as a preferred mode of dispute resolution---Framing of issues, recording of evidence and hearing arguments post the filing of the award in the Court is bound to increase litigation costs for parties and add to the already heavy workload of Courts---Said fact again defeats the purpose of arbitration as an economical and efficient alternative dispute resolution mechanism---Recording of evidence and conducting a trial effectively converts the Court into an appellate or fact-finding forum, which would be contrary to the statutory scheme envisaged by the Act, 1940---In the case in hand, the sole reason given by the Civil Court for framing the issues was that the contentions raised through the objections formed a factual controversy, which could not be determined without the recording of evidence---Perusal of the issues framed by the Civil Court showed that they were generalized in nature, they lacked specificity and the necessity for framing such issues could not be discovered in the impugned order---Therefore, the High Court did not commit any illegality by setting aside the order dated 23.11.2022 and remanding the matter to the Civil Court with the direction to decide the petitioner's objections to the award dated 02.07.2021 on the basis of the available record---Leave to appeal was declined and the petition was consequently dismissed. Messrs Joint Ventures Kocks K.G./RIST v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 108; Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation v. Mustafa Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2003 SC 301; Mian Corporation v. Lever Brothers of Pakistan Ltd. PLD 2006 SC 169; Federation of Pakistan v. Joint Ventures Kocks K.G./RIST PLD 2011 SC 506; Gerry's International v. Aeroflot Russian Airlines 2018 SCMR 662 and Chairman, WAPDA v. Messrs Syed Bhais Private Limited 2011 CLC 841 rel. Jawad Mahmood Pasha, Advocate Supreme Court along with Amin Gondal and Asim Tasneem, DCPs (all via video link (Lahore)) for Petitioner. Syed Tassadaq Mustafa Naqvi, Advocate High Court for Respondent. Date of hearing: 29th April, 2025.

Summary: ----O. XLI, R. 27---Appellate stage---Application for additional evidence, filing of---Whether such application should be decided first through a separate order or conjointly with the main appeal?---Held: Under the law, particularly concerning application for additional evidence, there is no specific rule that mandates such an application must be decided prior to the final judgment in the main appeal through a separate order---Appropriate course of action, whether to decide the application first or conjointly with the appeal, is entirely dependent on the specific facts and circumstances of each case and the court's assessment of what is necessary to achieve a just and holistic adjudication---Paramount consideration remains the ability of the court to pronounce a satisfactory and complete judgment, which may, in certain circumstances, be best achieved by integrating the consideration of additional evidence with the overall merits of the appeal---Additionally, an important consideration in such matters is the content and potential impact of the intended additional evidence---If the appellate court determines that the evidence sought to be produced is of such a nature that its inclusion on the record could fundamentally alter the decision of the main case, then it might indeed be prudent to decide the application separately through a distinct order---This would allow for proper consideration of its admissibility and relevance before proceeding to the merits of the appeal---However, if the appellate court, after initial assessment, forms the view that the proposed evidence, even if admitted, would likely have no material impact on the outcome of the main case, then there is no compelling need to decide the application for additional evidence separately---In such a scenario, a conjoint decision of the application and the main appeal becomes a matter of judicial economy and efficiency---Such approach significantly contributes to the sound administration of justice by streamlining proceedings, preventing unnecessary delays, and ensuring the expeditious dispensation of justice. Sultan Ali alias Sultan through L.Rs. and others v. Rasheed Ahmad and 45 others 2005 SCMR 1444 rel. Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Abdullah through legal heirs 2009 SCMR 326 distinguished. Tahir Mahmood for Petitioners. Syed Naeem-ul-Hassan Bukhari for Respondents Nos. 1 to 5. Date of hearing: 12th June, 2025.

Summary: ----Policy---Applicability---Policy, in absence of sanction of law or legislative authorization, cannot be acknowledged as a vehicle to restrict exercise and enjoyment of qualified fundamental rights---Executive authority cannot be allowed to expropriate the rights through policy-making mechanism, unless policy is hedged by law---Rules do not extend policy making authority without sanction of law/legislative authorization. Pakistan Muslim League (N) through Khawaja Muhammad Asif, M.N.A and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior and others PLD 2007 SC 642 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 18 & 199---Policy for Local NGOs/NPOs Receiving Foreign Contributions-2022---Constitutional petition---Policy---Sanction of law, absence of---Effect---Regulation of trade and profession---Petitioners assailed Policy for Local NGOs/NPOs Receiving Foreign Contributions 2022 on the ground that it failed to meet requirements of Art. 18 of the Constitution and Federal Government/Federal Cabinet lacked requisite legislative authorization for the purposes of framing the Policy--- Validity---Constitutional scheme does not envisage exercise of legislative powers by Federal Cabinet, unless such power/authority is exercised under authority of Legislature---Act of policy making, in absence of legislative authorization, manifests encroachment in legislative domain vis-a-vis the requirements prescribed under qualifying provision of Art. 18(a) of the Constitution---No prerogative/ authority can be extended to Federal Cabinet to curtail fundamental rights through executive action, upon framing of policy, unless such action is backed by law---Assumption and exercise of powers, without legislative authorization, for regulation of trade through licensing system in the garb of Art. 18(a) of the Constitution, constitutes patent abuse of executive authority and violation of constitutional scheme of trichotomy of powers---Policy under reference could not be elevated to the status of law and Federal Cabinet could not claim concurrent powers with the legislature for the purposes of Art. 18(a) of the Constitution---Policy in question failed to meet the conditions prescribed for encumbering qualified rights, extended in terms of Art. 18(a) of the Constitution---High Court declared Policy for Local NGOs/NPOs Receiving Foreign Contributions-2022 as unlawful, invalid and of no legal effect---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Marie Stopes Society v. Federation of Pakistan through Federal Secretary and 4 others 2022 CLC 880; Messrs Mustafa Impex Karachi and others v. Government of Pakistan, through Secretary Finance, Islamabad and others PLD 2016 SC 808; Province of Punjab through its Home Secretary, and 3 others v. Gulzar Hassan, Advocate and 8 others PLD 1978 Lah. 1298; Ch. Manzoor Elahi v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1975 SC 66; Pakistan Broadcasters Association and others v. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority and others PLD 2016 SC 692; Arshad Mehmood and others v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Transport Civil Secretariat, Lahore and others PLD 2005 SC 193 and Shoukat Ali v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Interior, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 2024 Isl. 135 rel. Hina Jillani, Muhammad Saqib Jillani and Rai Asad Ahmad for Petitioners. Ch. Imtiaz Ellahi, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan and Aftab Ahmad Khan, Deputy Secretary Ministry of Economic Affairs for Respondents. Date of hearing: 28th June, 2024.