Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Background: The petitioners, a multinational company, filed a revision petition challenging the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Lahore, who had set aside the Civil Judge's order and remanded the case for a fresh decision on the merits. The respondents had initially filed a suit seeking damages of Rs. 14 million, alleging copyright infringement concerning a song they had created and composed. The Civil Judge had earlier returned the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) for lack of jurisdiction. However, the Additional District Judge had overturned this decision and remanded the case back to the trial court. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the respondents' claim of copyright infringement and passing off. ----2- Whether the matter falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Intellectual Property Tribunal as per the Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the respondents' claim involved allegations of copyright infringement, which fall under the purview of intellectual property laws. The Copyright Ordinance, 1962, provides exclusive rights related to literary, musical, and artistic works, which were allegedly violated in this case. The court ruled that the Intellectual Property Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over all intellectual property disputes, including copyright infringement, as outlined in Section 18 of the Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012. The court emphasized that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to hear cases related to intellectual property infringement, as these matters must be addressed by the specialized tribunal. The revision petition was allowed, and the judgment of the Additional District Judge was set aside. The respondents’ plaint was ordered to be returned for presentation before the Intellectual Property Tribunal. -----Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Multazam Raza v. Muhammad Ayub Khan (2022 SCMR 979) Messrs Tabaq Restaurant v. Messrs Tabaq Restaurant (1987 SCMR 1090) Messrs Shaheen Chemist through Proprietors v. Zahid Mehmood Chaudhry (2023 CLD 1) Messrs Ferozesons Pvt. Ltd. v. Dr. Col. Retd. K.U. Kureshi (2003 CLD 1052) Glaxosmithkilne Services Ltd. v. Anfords Pakistan (SBLR 2017 Sindh 1537)

Summary: Difference between jurisdictions of Civil Court under Section 9 of CPC and under Section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 ------ An Award after withdrawal of ordinary suit cannot be held illegal merely because order of reference was not obtained under Section 21 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 --- The case revolved around a dispute between two parties that had initially referred their matter to arbitration without obtaining a court order, resulting in the dismissal of the suit. Subsequently, the arbitrators issued an award, and the petitioners sought a judgment according to the award under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act of 1940.The core legal issue before the court was whether a decree should be passed under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) or if judgment should be pronounced according to the award under Section 17 of the Act of 1940. Despite the court's opinion that Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC might not be directly applicable, it acknowledged the fundamental principle that parties have the option to settle disputes outside of court.The court delved into the various types of arbitration under the Act of 1940, distinguishing between arbitration without court intervention, arbitration with court intervention when no suit is pending, and arbitration in suits. The judgment analyzed the historical background of arbitration laws in British India, leading to the promulgation of the Act of 1940.The court critiqued the lower courts' decisions that declared the arbitration agreement and award as illegal due to the absence of a court order for reference under Section 21. It emphasized that such an agreement, entered into after the withdrawal of a suit, should not be treated as unlawful. The judgment cited relevant legal provisions, including Sections 14, 17, and 47 of the Act of 1940, as well as Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC.In conclusion, the court set aside the impugned orders, allowing the petitioners' application under Sections 14 and 17 of the Act of 1940 to be deemed pending. The written compromise deed was to be returned for consideration by the lower court, with instructions to pronounce judgment under Section 17 of the Act of 1940 if all legal formalities were fulfilled. The matter was remanded to the Civil Court.

Summary: PLJ 2023 SC (AJK) 127 [Appellate Jurisdiction] Present Kh Muhammad Nasim and Raza Ali Khan JJ ALLAH DITTA - - Appellant versus Ms BOARD OF REVENUE AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR MUZAFFARABAD and 12 others - - Respondents CA No 12 of 2022 decided on 2432023 (On appeal from the judgment of the High Court dated 08022022 in Writ Petition No 742022) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution 1974 - - - - - - Arts 44 42 (10) - - Writ petition - - Dismissed - - Maintainability - - Non - joinder of necessary party - - Challenge to - - It is settled principle of law that order passed by an authority cannot be set aside without arraying authority as party in line of respondents - - In writ petition only arrayed Board of Revenue and failed to array Commissioner Mirpur Division which was necessary party - - High Court has committed no illegality while dismissing writ petition on ground of non - joinder of necessary party - - Writ petition was not maintainable without arraying necessary party and rightly dismissed by High Court there is no need to attend other points raised by counsel for appellant as same would be an exercise in futility - - Appeal dismissed [Pp 129 130 131] A B C 2003 SCR 142 2016 SCR 33 Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan Advocate for Appellant Raja Zafar Hussain Khan Advocate for Respondents No 2 - 13Judgement Result:Appeal dismissed

Summary: Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 42 & 54---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 115---Suit for declaration and injunction---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Time barred civil revision application filed during pendency of another application filed within time---Suit was filed by respondents / plaintiffs assailing mutation containing names of petitioners/defendants as owners of suit land---Trial Court dismissed the suit but Lower Appellate Court decreed the same in favour of respondents/plaintiffs---Two revision applications were filed against same judgment, one was within time while the other was barred by limitation---Held: Respondents/plaintiffs had been in possession of property since long and their possession was never disturbed in any manner---There had not been any actual denial of their rights except through mutation in question---One of the mutations was attested on 28-06-1997 while the other mutation had been attested on 25-05-1998 ---Suit instituted on 23-09-2000 was within six years of attestation of mutation when actual denial of right took place---Delay in limitation in filing of other revision application was condoned as the other application filed against same judgment was filed within time and was also sought to be disposed of through single judgment---High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court in favour of respondents / plaintiffs---Revision was dismissed in circumstances. Haji Muhammad Yunis (deceased) through legal heirs and another v. Mst. Farukh Sultan and others 2022 SCMR 1282 and Muhammad Ashraf and others v. United Bank Limited and others 2019 SCMR 1004 rel. Muhammad Shoaib Khan for Petitioner. Khalid Rehman, Ghazanfar Ali, Zia-ur-Rehman, Khan Hussain, Abid Ali and Aimal Khan Barkandi for Respondents. Date of hearing: 17th October, 2023. Wiqar Ahmad, J .--- This single judgment shall dispose of instant petition (C.R. No.1717-P/2011) and C.R. No.892-P/2012, filed by petitioners Muhammad Ikram etc and Muhammad Amin etc, against Fazlur Rehman and others, as both these petitions, have been filed against same judgment dated 29.11.2011, passed by learned Additional District Judge-III, Swabi, whereby appeal of respondents against petitioners was allowed thereby setting aside judgment and decree dated 28.05.2010, of learned Senior Civil Judge, Peshawar passed in Civil Suit No. 184/1 of 2008.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 lays down the grounds for eviction of a tenant from the rented premises. Personal bonafide need is one of the recognized grounds for eviction. Sub-section 4 (b) of section 17 of the "Act, 1963" deals with the ground of personal bonafide need in case of commercial building It is an oft repeated principle of law that whenever a landlord pleads that the "rented premises" are required to him for his personal need bonafidely, assertion on oath by the landlord that he requires the property in good faith for his personal use shall be sufficient to accept his bonafides if such assertions are consistent and in conformity with the averments of the ejectment petition. Such statement cannot be discarded in vacuum. Even otherwise, it is always the landlord, who is vested with the prerogative to exercise his choice for the "rented premises" and if he needs it bonafidely for his personal use, his claim cannot be rejected outrightly.

Summary: Summary pending