Summary: Dissenting Note by Justice Athar Minallah ---- Issues: 1. Whether the discontinuation of live streaming could occur without violating the principles established by a larger bench of the Supreme Court. 2. Whether halting live streaming deprived the public of their right to information under Article 19-A of the Constitution. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Justice Athar Minallah referenced the Justice Qazi Faez Isa’s case, affirming the public's right under Article 19-A of the Constitution to access information on matters of public importance, which includes live streaming of court proceedings. The justice noted that stopping live streaming without a judicial order contradicted established principles of transparency and public access to judicial processes. It was held that proceedings should be continuously available to the public unless justified by exceptional circumstances. The application to resume live streaming was allowed, directing that proceedings be made accessible to the public via live streaming to uphold transparency and the public's right to information. ----Citations/Precedents: Justice Qazi Faez Isa and others v. President of Pakistan and others (PLD 2023 SC 661): Established the right of the public to access court proceedings through live streaming under Article 19-A of the Constitution. Manzoor Elahi v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1975 SC 66) Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416): Defined 'matters of public importance' which influence the right under Article 19-A. Justice Athar Minallah's decision emphasized that all judicial proceedings under Article 184(3) of the Constitution are of public importance and must be accessible to the public. This ruling establishes a precedent for necessary transparency and accountability in judicial processes involving significant constitutional and political questions.

Summary: ----Issues: 1. Whether the proceedings of the case should be live-streamed as requested by the Advocate-General of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 2. Whether the High Court and the Supreme Court have the jurisdiction to entertain interim orders during the pendency of a suit. 3. Whether the involvement of the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the case is justified. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the application for live-streaming the court proceedings, providing several key points in its reasoning: ---Live-Streaming Request: The Court found the reason provided for live-streaming ("non-live showing of only the above-mentioned case amongst others is discrimination") factually incorrect, as very few cases have been live-streamed, and those that were live-streamed were decided by a Full-Court meeting. ----Article 25 of the Constitution: The application did not demonstrate how the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was being denied equality or equal protection under Article 25. Public Interest and Potential Misuse: The Court highlighted that while live-streaming can enhance transparency and public access, it also poses risks of misuse for political purposes and grandstanding. ----Procedural History and Participation: Mr. Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi did not attend any of the 53 hearings of CP No. 21/2022 personally and did not request live-streaming during those hearings. The Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was not a party to the original petition and did not participate in any hearings. ---Involvement of Political Figures: The Court expressed concerns about potential political exploitation of live-streamed proceedings, as Mr. Niazi, during his address, mentioned unrelated political matters. ----Judicial Efficiency: The Court stressed the importance of not allowing the proceedings to be used for purposes unrelated to the case at hand, as this would thwart the administration of justice. ----Citations/Precedents: --Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan: Ensures equality of all citizens before the law. --Article 19-A of the Constitution of Pakistan: Right to access information in matters of public importance. --Order dated 13 April 2021 (CMA No. 1243/2021 in CRP No. 296/2020): Recognized the right of people to have access to information in matters of public importance. --Full-Court Meeting Decision dated 18 September 2023: Initiated a pilot project for live-streaming cases of public interest. --Office Order No. F.1/17/2009(201)-SCA dated 18 October 2023: Addressed the technical aspects and modalities of live-streaming court proceedings. ----Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the application for live-streaming the proceedings, upholding the principles of judicial discretion and the proper administration of justice. The Court emphasized the risks of political exploitation and the need to maintain focus on the legal issues at hand. The decision reinforced the exclusive domain of the Court to decide on live-streaming requests and the importance of ensuring that such requests do not undermine the judicial process.

Summary: Admittedly, the cheque on the basis of which the suit was instituted by the respondent was torn down/mutilated but the suit was decreed as issuance of the cheque was admitted albeit as a guarantee and given to the arbitrators named in petition for leave to defend but none of them appeared as witness. The core legal issue before this Court is whether presumption of correctness attached to a negotiable instrument, in terms of Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is lost or rebutted if the said instrument-the cheque in present case, is in a mutilated/torn-down condition. Held: The mutilated condition of a negotiable instrument is not sufficient to hold that presumption of correctness is no more attached with it if the key information of an instrument such as the name of payee, date, amount, signatures etc., have not been damaged. In such circumstances, the presumption attached thereto is not lost.

Summary: Sentences of the appellant in different cases shall run concurrently.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Admittedly, the cheque on the basis of which the suit was instituted by the respondent was torn down/mutilated but the suit was decreed as issuance of the cheque was admitted albeit as a guarantee and given to the arbitrators named in petition for leave to defend but none of them appeared as witness. The core legal issue before this Court is whether presumption of correctness attached to a negotiable instrument, in terms of Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is lost or rebutted if the said instrument-the cheque in present case, is in a mutilated/torn-down condition. Held: The mutilated condition of a negotiable instrument is not sufficient to hold that presumption of correctness is no more attached with it if the key information of an instrument such as the name of payee, date, amount, signatures etc., have not been damaged. In such circumstances, the presumption attached thereto is not lost. 1051Election 28985/24 Salman Akram Raja Vs Election Commission of Pakistan etc Mr. Justice Shahid Karim 27- 05- 2024 2024 LHC 2466 2025 CLC 56 (Lahore)

Summary: Sentences of the appellant in different cases shall run concurrently. 1050Regular First Appeal- Regular First Appeal (Final Decree)- Order XXXVII CPC 338-21 LIAQAT ALI VS NOOR AHMAD Mr. Justice Anwaar Hussain 29- 05- 2024 2024 LHC 3063 PLJ 2024 Lahore 749 (Multan Bench, Multan)

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Delay of six hours and forty minutes in lodging the FIR not explained---Accused was charged for committing murder of the sister of complainant by cutting her throat with a sharp edged sickle---Record showed that no specific time of the occurrence had been mentioned in the contents of the FIR and it was simply mentioned there that the occurrence took place in the early hours of the day on 28.12.2019---Eye-witness of the occurrence stated during his cross-examination that he did not know the time of reaching at the place of occurrence, however, it could be between 06:00 or 07:00 a.m.---If it was presumed that the occurrence took place on 28.12.2019 at 07:00 a.m. even then the FIR was lodged on the said day at 01:40 p.m. and as such there was delay of six hours and forty minutes in lodging the FIR---Distance between the police station and place of occurrence was only 4.5 kilometers and the said witness further stated during his cross-examination that the police reached the place of occurrence 10 to 15 minutes after the occurrence but even then no plausible explanation had been given for the gross delay of six hours and forty minutes in lodging the FIR---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly. Mehmood Ahmad and 3 others v. The State and another 1995 SCMR 127 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Delay of about twelve hours in conducting the post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased---Consequential---Accused was charged for committing murder of the sister of complainant by cutting her throat with a sharp edged sickle---Record showed that post-mortem examination on the dead body of deceased was conducted on 28.12.2019 at 06:45 p.m. and as such there was delay of about twelve hours in conducting the post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased---Such delay in conducting the postmortem examination on the dead body of the deceased was suggestive of the fact that the occurrence was unseen and the said delay was consumed in procuring the attendance of fake eye witnesses---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly. Muhammad Ilyas v. Muhammad Abid alias Billa and others 2017 SCMR 54; Khalid alias Khalidi and 2 others v. The State 2012 SCMR 327; Sufyan Nawaz and another v. The State and others 2020 SCMR 192; Zafar v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 326 and Muhammad Ashraf v. The State 2012 SCMR 419 rel. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence--- Chance witnesses---Non-availability of justification for the presence of witnesses at the time and place of occurrence---Accused was charged for committing murder of the sister of complainant by cutting her throat with a sharp edged sickle---Ocular account of the prosecution was furnished by complainant and his paternal uncle---Both the said witnesses were residents of Noshera Road, "G" (Gujranwala), whereas the occurrence took place in the locality of Rasool Pura Jhangi of District "G" (Gujranwala)---Eyewitness stated during his cross-examination that the distance between his residence and place of occurrence was ten kilometers---Said witness did not mention any special reason for visiting the house of the appellant, during early morning on the day of occurrence---Complainant, who was brother of the deceased had stated that deceased was expelled by the appellant, however, the appellant took her back one month prior to the date of occurrence and as such there was no special reason for the said witnesses to visit the house of the deceased on the day and time of occurrence---Said witnesses were not residents of the locality where the occurrence took place and as such they were chance witnesses and their evidence was not free from doubt---As the prosecution eye-witnesses were chance witnesses and they could not prove any valid reason of their presence at the spot and at the time of occurrence , therefore, their very presence at the spot at the relevant time became doubtful---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt--- Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly. Mst. Sughra Begum and another v. Qaiser Pervez and others 2015 SCMR 1142 and Muhammad Irshad v. Allah Ditta and others 2017 SCMR 142 rel. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Unnatural conduct of eyewitnesses in not saving the deceased---Accused was charged for committing murder of the sister of complainant by cutting her throat with a sharp edged sickle---Complainant was real brother whereas eyewitness was paternal uncle of the deceased---Complainant party compromised of two adult male members whereas the appellant was alone at the time of occurrence---As per scaled site plan the distance between the eye witnesses and the appellant was only ten feet at the time of occurrence---According to post mortem report of the deceased there were four injuries on the body of deceased---Appellant was not armed with any formidable weapon like firearm at the time of occurrence and he was only carrying a sickle at the relevant time---Said witnesses, who were closely related to the deceased, did not try to intervene and save the deceased at the time of occurrence and even after the occurrence they did not try to apprehend the appellant at the spot---Said witnesses kept on standing like silent spectators and they allowed the appellant to inflict repeated injuries on the body of deceased---Such fact showed that the said witnesses were not present at the spot at the relevant time and their conduct was highly unnatural---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly. Pathan v. The State 2015 SCMR 315; Zafar v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 326 and Liaquat Ali v. The State 2008 SCMR 95 rel. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Ocular account and medical evidence---Confliction---Accused was charged for committing murder of the sister of complainant by cutting her throat with a sharp edged sickle---According to the ocular account the eye witnesses stated regarding infliction of only one injury on the neck of the deceased by the appellant with the help of sickle whereas according to the post mortem report of the deceased there were three incised wounds on the neck, right hand and left cheek and one contusion around right eye extending to right forehead and right cheek of deceased---Remaining three injuries except injury No.1, which was on the neck of the deceased, were not explained by the eye witnesses---Had the eye-witnesses seen the occurrence then they must have explained all the injuries sustained by deceased---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly. Usman alias Kaloo v. The State 2017 SCMR 622; Muhammad Ali v. The State 2015 SCMR 137 and Irfan Ali v. The State 2015 SCMR 840 rel. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Contradictions in the statements of eyewitnesses---Consequential---Accused was charged for committing murder of the sister of complainant by cutting her throat with sharp edged sickle---Record showed that there were material contradictions in the statements of eye-witnesses---Complainant stated that the deceased had six children and he saw two or three sons of the deceased in the house of occurrence whereas remaining two children of the deceased were playing in the street at the relevant time and they remained in the street---On the other hand, eyewitness had stated that only younger son of the deceased aged about three years was sitting inside the house whereas the remaining five children of the deceased were not in the house at the time of occurrence---Likewise, complainant stated that the appellant was arrested on the next day of occurrence whereas eyewitness stated that the appellant was arrested on the day of occurrence within two or three hours of the occurrence---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---DNA profile of accused not matching with sample taken from crime weapon and deceased---Accused was charged for committing murder of the sister of complainant by cutting her throat with a sharp edged sickle---It was noteworthy that two buccal swabs of deceased, hair recovered from right and left hands of the deceased, swabs taken from the blade and handle of sickle, as well as buccal swab of appellant and his shalwar and qameez were sent to the office of Forensic Science Agency but according to DNA test report none from the said articles matched with the DNA profile of the appellant---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly. (h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Recovery of weapon of offence---Inconsequential---Accused was charged for committing murder of the sister of complainant by cutting her throat with a sharp edged sickle---Record showed that weapon of offence i.e. sickle was recovered---However, said recovery was not effected on the pointing out of the appellant---Swabs taken from the handle and blade of sickle did not match with the DNA profile of the appellant---Said sickle was recovered on the day of occurrence by Forensic Science Agency team from a drum lying at the spot but none of the prosecution eye witnesses stated that while leaving the place of occurrence the appellant threw his sickle in the said drum---Under the circumstances, the recovery of sickle was of no avail to the prosecuti on---Circumstances establishe d that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly. (i) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Withholding material witnesses---Effect---Accused was charged for committing murder of the sister of complainant by cutting her throat with a sharp edged sickle---Complainant admitted during cross-examination that in the house of occurrence he saw two or three sons of the deceased and out of them two were above the age of 12 years and were in a position to make statement---Said sons of deceased being residents of the house, where the occurrence took place were the most natural witnesses of the occurrence but prosecution conceded that neither their statements under S.161, Cr.P.C., were recorded during the investigation of the case nor they ever appeared before the Trial Court, therefore, the prosecution had withheld the best piece of evidence, hence an adverse inference within the meaning of Art.129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, could validly be drawn against the prosecution that had the said witnesses been produced in the witness box their evidence would have been unfavourable to the prosecution---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly. Lal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1846; Muhammad Rafique and others v. The State and others 2010 SCMR 385; Pathan v. The State 2015 SCMR 315 and Riaz Ahmed v. The State 2010 SCMR 846 rel. (j) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Motive not proved---Accused was charged for committing murder of the sister of complainant by cutting her throat with a sharp edged sickle---It was noteworthy that although it had been alleged by the prosecution witnesses that appellant used to quarrel with deceased but admittedly the deceased was living with the appellant in his house for last 20-years---Deceased lived with the appellant till the day of occurrence---Prosecution had not produced copy of any suit whereby the deceased sought decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula or she had ever filed any application before the concerned SHO against the appellant for quarreling with her---No specific reason of quarrel between the appellant and the deceased had been mentioned by any prosecution witness---Thus, the motive alleged by the prosecution had not been proved in this case---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly. (k) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---If there is a single circumstance which creates doubt regarding the truthfulness of the prosecution case, the same will be sufficient to give benefit of doubt to the accused. Ms. Najma Parveen for Appellant. Ch. Uzair Ashraf defence counsel. Rai Akhtar Hussain, Addl. Prosecutor General with Sajid Sub-Inspector for the State. Complainant in person. Date of hearing: 29th May, 2024. Judgment Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, C.J .--- By this single judgment we shall decide Criminal Appeal No.69111 of 2020 titled as 'Muhammad Afzal Vs The State etc', filed by Muhammad Afzal (appellant), as well as, Murder Reference No.155 of 2020, sent by the learned trial Court for confirmation or otherwise of the sentence of death awarded to Muhammad Afzal (appellant). We propose to decide both these matters by this single judgment as these have arisen out of the same judgment dated 09.12.2020 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Gujranwala. 2. Muhammad Afzal (appellant) was tried in case FIR No.504 dated 28.12.2019 registered at Police Station Ferozwala, District Gujranwala in respect of offence under Section 302 of P.P.C. After conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court vide its judgment dated 09.12.2020 has convicted and sentenced Muhammad Afzal appellant as under:- Under Section 302(b) P.P.C sentenced to death as tazir for committing Qatl-i-Amd of Mst. Zareena Bibi (deceased). He was also ordered to pay Rs.500,000/-(Rupees five hundred thousand only) to the legal heirs of the deceased as compensation under Section 544-A of Cr.P.C., recoverable as arrears of land revenue and in default thereof, to suffer imprisonment for six months S.I." 3. Brief facts of the case as given by Muhammad Imran, complainant (PW-4) in his complaint (Exh.PC), on the basis of which FIR (Exh.PB) was lodged, are that he (complainant) was a labourer by profession. Twenty years earlier the complainant's younger sister Mst. Zareena Bibi (deceased) was married to Muhammad Afzal (appellant). She had six sons and all were alive. The complainant's brother in law, namely Muhammad Afzal (appellant) very often used to beat his sister due to which his sister many a times returned to the house of her parents. A month prior to the occurrence Muhammad Afzal, appellant effected compromise with the sister of the complainant and took her to his house. On 28.12.2019, early in the morning, the complainant (PW-4) along with his paternal uncle, namely Muhammad Arshad son of Muhammad Deen caste Jatt Gill resident of Lohay Wali Pulli, Noshera Road came to the house of his sister situated at Rasool Pura Jhangi to see her. They saw that Muhammad Afzal, appellant was quarreling with the sister of the complainant (PW-4). On seeing the complainant party Muhammad Afzal, appellant cut the throat of sister of the complainant with a sharp edged sickle, who became seriously injured. Due to loss of blood she succumbed to the injury. Muhammad Afzal, appellant decamped from the place of occurrence. 4. The appellant was arrested in this case on 28.12.2019 by Muhammad Atif, Sub-Inspector (PW-11). After completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and submitted before the learned trial Court. The learned trial Court, after observing legal formalities, as provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 framed charge against the appellant on 14.03.2020, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 5. In order to prove its case, the prosecution produced eleven (11) witnesses during the trial. The prosecution also produced documentary evidence in the shape of Exh.PA to Exh.PQ. 6. The statements of Muhammad Afzal (appellant) under Section 342 of Cr.P.C. was recorded. The appellant refuted the allegations levelled against him and professed his innocence. Neither the appellant opted to appear as his own witness on oath as provided under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 in disproof of the allegations levelled against him nor he produced defence evidence. 7. Muhammad Imran, complainant is present before the Court today. He is duly identified by Sajid, Sub-Inspector. He (complainant) submits that he does not want to hire the services of a private counsel in this case and will be satisfied with the arguments of learned Addl. Prosecutor-General. Even otherwise, it is a State case and the learned Addl. Prosecutor General is ready to argue the same, therefore, we proceed to decide both these matters after hearing arguments of learned counsel for the appellant, learned defence counsel, learned Addl. Prosecutor-General for the State and perusing the record. 8. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellant and learned defence counsel at state expenses for the appellant that the appellant is absolutely innocent and he has falsely been implicated in this case by the complainant being in league with the local police; that there is delay of six hours and forty minutes in lodging the FIR and delay of almost twelve hours in conducting postmortem examination on the dead-body of Mst. Zareena Bibi deceased which shows that the occurrence was unseen; that the prosecution eye-witnesses are chance witnesses as they have not given any plausible reason for their presence at the spot at the relevant time; that there is conflict between the ocular account and the medical evidence of the prosecution; that nothing incriminating was recovered on the pointing out of the appellant; that report of PFSA (Ex.PQ) was in the negative; that the prosecution has failed to prove the alleged motive against the appellant; that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt therefore, the appeal filed by the appellant may be accepted and he may be acquitted from the charge. 9. On the other hand, learned Addl. Prosecutor-General contends that the prosecution has fully proved its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of any doubt, therefore, he has rightly been convicted and sentenced by the learned trial Court; that the prosecution witnesses stood the test of lengthy cross-examination but their evidence could not be shaken; that the prosecution case against the appellant is substantially supported by the medical evidence furnished by the prosecution through Dr. Huma Siddiqa (PW-9); that the prosecution case against the appellant is further corroborated by the recovery of sickle (P.10) from the place of occurrence; that there is no substance in the appeal filed by the appellant, therefore, the same may be dismissed. 10. Arguments heard and record perused. 11. We have noted that no specific time of the occurrence has been mentioned in the contents of the FIR (Ex.PB) and it was simply mentioned there that the occurrence took place in the early hours of the day on 28.12.2019, however the eye-witness of the occurrence, namely Muhammad Arshad (PW-5) stated during his cross-examination that he did not know the time of reaching at the place of occurrence after Fajar prayer, however, it could be between 06:00 or 07:00 a.m. If for the sake of arguments it is presumed that the occurrence took place on 28.12.2019 at 07:00 a.m. even then the FIR (Ex.PB) was lodged on the said day at 01:40 p.m. and as such there is delay of six hours and forty minutes in lodging the FIR. The distance between the police station and place of occurrence was only 4.5 kilometers and the said witness further stated during his cross-examination that the police reached at the place of occurrence after 10 to 15 minutes of the occurrence but even then no plausible explanation has been given for the abovementioned gross delay of six hours and forty minutes in lodging the FIR (Ex.PB). The relevant parts of the statement of Muhammad Arshad (PW-5), who was paternal uncle of the complainant (PW-4) are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- "............I did not say "Fajar" prayer. I do not know the time of reaching at the place of occurrence after "Fajar" prayer. Voluntarily, stated it could be between 06:00 or 07:00 a.m..........." "............. Police came at the place of occurrence after 10 to 15 minutes of the occurrence....." Under the circumstances, the presence of Muhammad Imran, complainant (PW-4) and Muhammad Arshad (PW-5) at the spot at the relevant time becomes highly doubtful. We may refer here the case of "Mehmood Ahmad and 3 others v. The State and another" (1995 SCMR 127), wherein at Para No.5, of the judgment, the august Supreme Court of Pakistan was pleased to observe as under:- "5................. Although in some circumstances a delay of two hours may not be of much importance yet in the facts and circumstances of this particular case as they have happened, the delay has great significance. It can be attributed to consultation, taking instructions and calculatedly preparing report keeping the names of accused open for roping in such persons whom ultimately prosecution may wish to implicate..............." We have further noted that post-mortem examination on the dead body of Mst. Zareena Bibi (deceased) was conducted on 28.12.2019 at 06:45 p.m. and as such there is delay of about twelve hours in conducting the post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased. The abovementioned delay in conducting the postmortem examination on the dead body of the deceased is suggestive of the fact that the occurrence was unseen and the said delay was consumed in procuring the attendance of fake eye-witnesses. In the case of 'Muhammad Ilyas v. Muhammad Abid alias Billa and others' (2017 SCMR 54), the Apex Court of the country was pleased to observe that delay of 09 hours in conducting the postmortem examination on the dead-body of the deceased suggests that the prosecution eye-witnesses were not present at the spot at the time of occurrence therefore, the said delay was used in procuring the attendance of fake eye-witnesses. Relevant part of the said judgment at page No. 55 reads as under:- "2. ....................... Post-mortem examination of the dead body of Muhammad Shahbaz deceased had been conducted after nine hours of the incident which again was a factor pointing towards a possibility that time had been consumed by the local police and the complainant party in procuring and planting eye-witnesses and cooking up a story for the prosecution...." Similarly, in the case of "Khalid alias Khalidi and 2 others v. The State" (2012 SCM 327), the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan considered the delay of 10/11 hours from the occurrence in conducting the post mortem examination on the dead body of deceased, to be an adverse fact against the prosecution case and it was held that it shows that the FIR was not lodged at the given time. Similar view was taken by the Apex Court of the country in the cases reported as "Sufyan Nawaz and another v. The State and others" (2020 SCMR 192), "Zafar v. The State and others" (2018 SCMR 326) and "Muhammad Ashraf v. The State" (2012 SCMR 419). 12. The ocular account of the prosecution was furnished by Muhammad Imran, complainant (PW-4) and Muhammad Arshad (PW-5). They both are residents of Noshera Road, Street Lohay Wali Pulli Gujranwala, whereas the occurrence took place in the locality of Rasool Pura Jhangi of District Gujranwala. Muhammad Arshad (PW-5) stated during his cross-examination that the distance between his residence and place of occurrence was ten kilometers. Relevant part of his statement reads as under:- ".............. Distance between my residence and place of occurrence was 10-kilometers........" No special reason for visit of the house of the appellant, of the abovementioned witnesses in the early morning on the day of occurrence has been mentioned by the said witnesses. Muhammad Imran, complainant (PW-4), who was brother of the deceased has stated that Mst. Zareena Bibi (deceased) was expelled by the appellant, however, the appellant took her back one month prior to the date of occurrence and as such there was no special reason for the abovementioned witnesses to visit the house of the deceased on the day and time of occurrence. They were not residents of the locality where the occurrence took place and as such they are chance witnesses and their evidence is not free from doubt. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of "Mst. Sughra Begum and another v. Qaiser Pervez and others" (2015 SCMR 1142) at Para No.14, observed regarding the chance witnesses as under:- "14. A chance witness, in legal parlance is the one who claims that he was present on the crime spot at the fateful time, albeit, his presence there was a sheer chance as in the ordinary course of business, place of residence and normal course of events, he was not supposed to be present on the spot but at a place where he resides, carries on business or runs day to day life affairs. It is in this context that the testimony of chance witness, ordinarily, is not accepted unless justifiable reasons are shown to establish his presence at the crime scene at the relevant time. In normal course, the presumption under the law would operate about his absence from the crime spot. True that in rare cases, the testimony of chance witness may be relied upon, provided some convincing explanations appealing to prudent mind for his presence on the crime spot are put forth, when the occurrence took place otherwise, his testimony would fall within the category of suspect evidence and cannot be accepted without a pinch of salt." Similar view was taken in the case of "Muhammad Irshad v. Allah Ditta and others" (2017 SCMR 142). Relevant part of the said judgment at Para No.2 reads as under:- "............Muhammad Irshad complainant (PW8) and Rab Nawaz (PW9) were chance witnesses and the stated reason for their presence with the deceased at the relevant time had never been established before the trial court through any independent evidence......" As the above-mentioned prosecution eye-witnesses are chance witnesses and they could not prove any valid reason of their presence at the spot at the time of occurrence, therefore, their very presence at the spot at the relevant time becomes doubtful. 13. We have also noted that the conduct of the abovementioned eye-witnesses was highly unnatural. Muhammad Imran, complainant (PW-4) is real brother whereas Muhammad Arshad (PW-5) is paternal uncle of the deceased. The complainant party was compromising of two adult male members whereas the appellant was alone at the time of occurrence. As per scaled site plan (Ex.PA) the distance between the abovementioned eye-witnesses and the appellant was only ten feet at the time of occurrence. According to post mortem report (Ex.PK) of the deceased there were four injuries on her body. The appellant was not armed with any formidable weapon like firearm at the time of occurrence and he was only carrying a sickle at the relevant time. The abovementioned witnesses, who were closely related to the deceased did not try to intervene and save the deceased at the time of occurrence or even after the occurrence they did not try to apprehend the appellant at the spot. The abovementioned witnesses kept on standing like silent spectators and they allowed the appellant to inflict repeated injuries on the body of Mst. Zareena Bibi (deceased). The abovementioned fact shows that the above-referred witnesses were not present at the spot at the relevant time. We may refer here the case of "Pathan v. The State" (2015 SCMR 315), wherein at Para No.5, of the judgment, the august Supreme Court of Pakistan was pleased to observe as under:- "The presence of witnesses on the crime spot due to their unnatural conduct has become highly doubtful, therefore, no explicit reliance can be placed on their testimony. They had only given photogenic/photographic narration of the occurrence but did nothing nor took a single step to rescue the deceased. The causing of that much of stab wounds on the deceased loudly speaks that if these three witnesses were present on the spot, being close blood relatives including the son, they would have definitely intervened, preventing the accused from causing further damage to the deceased rather strong presumption operates that the deceased was done to death in a merciless manner by the culprit when he was at the mercy of the latter and no one was there for his rescue...." Similar view was taken by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the cases of "Zafar v. The State and others" (2018 SCMR 326) and "Liaquat Ali v. The State" (2008 SCMR 95). Under the circumstances, it cannot be safely held that the abovementioned eye-witnesses were present at the spot at the relevant time and they had witnessed the occurrence because their conduct is highly unnatural. 14. It is further noteworthy that the ocular account of the prosecution is in conflict with the medical evidence because according to the ocular account the abovementioned eye-witnesses stated regarding infliction of only one injury on the neck of the deceased by the appellant with the help of sickle whereas according to the post mortem report (Ex.PK) of the deceased there were three incised wound on the neck, right hand and left cheek and one contusion around right eye extending to right forehead and right cheek of Mst. Zareena Bibi (deceased). The remaining three injuries except Injury No.1 which was on the neck of the deceased were not explained by the abovementioned eye-witnesses. Had the abovementioned eye-witnesses seen the occurrence then they must have explained all the injuries sustained by Mst. Zareena Bibi (deceased). The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of "Usman alias Kaloo v. The State" (2017 SCMR 622) at Para No.3, observed regarding the chance witnesses as under:- "3. .............Some of the above mentioned eye-witnesses had maintained that the deceased had received only one injury at the hands of the appellant but the Postmortem Examination Report shows that the deceased had received as many as 8 injuries on different parts of his body. A peculiar feature of this case is that the inmates of the house of occurrence, i.e. the mother, wife and children of Noor Muhammad deceased had never been associated with the investigation of this case and no statement of the said natural witnesses had been recorded by the investigating officer nor were they produced before the trial court............" Similarly, in the case of "Muhammad Ali v. The State" (2015 SCMR 137) at Para No.5 the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan observed regarding ocular account and number of injuries as under:- "5............... The medical evidence also does not support the ocular account qua the number of injuries as according to the Doctor P.W.6 the deceased had received as many as 8 injuries. Injuries Nos.6 and 8 were incised wounds, injuries Nos.1, 2 and 7 were caused by blunt weapon while injuries Nos.3, 4 and 5 were caused by firearms. Only one injury on thigh has been attributed to the appellant.... ......In such circumstances, the presence of the eye-witnesses at the spot is doubtful. Had they been present at the spot and had witnessed the occurrence, they could have ascribed the correct role to the accused and explain all the injuries on the person of the deceased......" Similar view was taken by the Apex Court of the country in the case of "Irfan Ali v. The State" (2015 SCMR 840). 15. We have also noted that there are material contradictions in the statements of above

Summary: Sindh Local Government Ordinance (XLII of 2013)--- ----Ss. 100, 103 & 141---Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (Collection of Municipal Utility Charges and Tax) Rules, 2002---Municipal and utility charges tax, collection of---Petitioners assailed charging of municipal and utility charges in electricity bills---Contention of respondent / Mayor Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) was that they intended to establish a committee, inclusive of representatives from all political parties, which was tasked with deliberating resolution/dispute, which would be presented to the Council---Following observance of due legislative process, the Council would then proceed accordingly---Respondent / Mayor contended that they after examining number of units in electricity bills and, up to 300 units would extend relief to common man living below the standard life, who could not afford more financial burden---Respondent / Mayor contended that such exercise would be completed within three months---High Court declined to interfere in the matter in view of the contentions of respondent / Mayor---High Court directed KMC to proceed with its actions in compliance with applicable law and any Resolutions or Notifications issued by KMC would be considered provisional and subject to final determination---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly. Muhammad Tariq Mansoor for the Petitioners (in C.P. No. D-2724 of 2022 and 233 of 2024). Arif Shaikh and Zeeshan Rafiq for the Petitioner No. 1 (in C.P. No. D-2724 of 2022). Usman Farooq for the Petitioner (in C.P. No. D-5654 of 2022). Syed Hassan Mujtaba Abidi, Mohsin Khan and Naveed Anjum for Respondent/KMC. Zeeshan Adhi and Suresh Kumar, Addl. A.G. Sindh. Murtaza Wahab, Mayor Karachi. Ayan M. Memon, Hassan Qamar along with Syed Irfan Ali Shah, Director Legal, K-Electric for Respondent No. 6. Order Salahuddin Panhwar, J .--- Heard parties at length. Three petitions bearing C.P. Nos. D-2724, 5654 and 6798 2022 are challenging the resolution of Administrator and Notifications dated 21.01.2022, 11.04.2022 and 12.04.2022, whereas, C.P. No.D-233/2024 is filed after two years wherein declaration is sought by challenging provisions of KMC, MUCT Rules, 2022 to the extent of Rules 2(b), 3, 4(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), 5(a), (b) for entering into contract with public/private utility service providers for collection of MUCT Tax are inconsistent, ultra vires and in contravention with the parent Act. Further that petition seeks enforcement of power of collection regarding MUCT Tax under Sections 100(2), 103(3), 141(1) of SLGA, 2013 as well as challenged Council Resolution No.22 dated 11.12.2023. 2. In C.P. No.D-2724 of 2022, the Petitioners have prayed for the following reliefs:- a) To declare the impugned act/decision to charge from the citizens of Karachi the two KMC taxes, i.e. Fire and Conservancy and/or any other tax/duty through the K- Electric bills is illegal, unlawful and discriminatory, as such not tenable and set-aside the said impugned decision. b) To hold that the mechanism already in vogue for collection of Municipal taxes by the department be made effective and efficient to get collection of the Municipal taxes rather hiring the service of K-Electric, further burdening the KMC, instead to utilizing the services of the own employees who are heavily paid by the department. c) To suspend the operation of the impugned decision for collection of Fire and Conservancy taxes through K-Electric bills, notified vide Notification dated 21.01.2022, issued by the Respondents, Government of Sindh. d) Any other relief(s) as this Honorable court deems fit and appropriate under the circumstances of the case may be granted to the petitioner. 3. In C.P. No.D-5654 of 2022, the Petitioners have prayed for the following reliefs:- (i) Declare that Municipal Utility Charges and Taxes imposed under the Resolution of Respondent No. 4 are illegal and without following the provisions of law. (ii) Declare that connecting and linking the Municipal Utility Charges and Taxes with the consumption of electricity units is illegal and liable to be set aside. (iii) Declare Notifications dated 21-01-2022, 11-04-2022, 12.04.2022 and summary put up by the Metropolitan Commissioner and Resolution signed by the Respondent No. 4, as illegal, void and ab-initio. (iv) Stop the Respondents No. 6 from collection of Municipal Utility Charges and Taxes, in Electricity Bills. (v) Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances. 4. In C.P. No.D-6798 of 2022, the Petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:- I. Declare that Municipal Utility Charges and Taxes (MUCT) imposed by Respondent No. 4 on the consumption of electricity units are illegal and contrary to law. II. Declare that collection of MUCI through monthly electricity bills is unlawful and ultra vires the Act, 2013. III. Declare that the Impugned notifications are all illegal, unlawful and void ab initio. IV. Permanently and pending disposal of this case, restrain the Respondent No. 4 from imposing and collecting MUCT through electricity bills. V. Grant such other relief as may be deemed necessary in the circumstances of the case. VI. Grant costs. 5. The Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (Collection of Municipal Utility Charges and Tax) Rules, 2002, are legislative instruments governing the levy and collection of municipal utility charges and taxes within Karachi. These regulations delineate the procedural framework and methodologies for the accrual of fees associated with municipal amenities. In particular, they stipulate the assimilation of such charges within the power invoices furnished by K-Electric. Moreover, these rules explicate the duties and obligations incumbent upon the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) and K-Electric in the execution of this mandate. The efficacy of these collection modalities has been a contentious issue. Proponents within the KMC assert that robust collection systems are imperative for the financial fortification of the Corporation. Conversely, the legitimacy of the KMC's provisional administration to enforce these levies has been called into question. To encapsulate, the aforementioned Rules are designed to facilitate the efficient appropriation of municipal utility charges and taxes in Karachi, with an emphasis on the utilization of electricity billing as the primary collection conduit. Nonetheless, the juridical scrutiny and contractual dynamics between KMC and K-Electric are under judicial review by this Court in Constitution Petition No. D-233 of 2024, wherein the constitutional validity of the said Rules is being contested. In Constitution Petition No.D-233/2024, the Petitioner challenges the validity (vires) of the Rules promulgated by the Local Government. This Court heard arguments of the learned counsel for the Petitioner, who cited various legal precedents (case laws). However, due to paucity of time, the hearing of Constitution Petition No. D-233/2024 is adjourned being part-heard. The matter will be fixed in the second week of August, 2024. Office is directed to de-tag C.P.No.D-233/2024, however, the injunction application in this petition will be decided with main petition. With regard to ad-interim injunction in peculiar circumstances we are of the view that same cannot be extended in this petition at this stage. 6. With regard to the remaining Petitions, Mayor of Karachi appeared before the Court, the Court raised the question of the resolution's validity. Specifically, it is noted that the resolution was allegedly enacted by the Administrator, not the Council. Under applicable law, the Council holds the authority to enact resolutions, not the Administrator. The Mayor, in response to the Court's query, submitted a statement concerning the approval of the resolution as per law after due deliberation and its circulation among the public. This statement has been duly taken on record. Given its pertinence, the statement is reproduced as under: "It is most respectfully submitted on behalf of the Mayor of Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) that the KMC will review the Agreement with K-Electric, to ensure that service charges are directly deductible by K-Electric and no other deduction shall be made directly. Moreover, the Mayor will constitute a special committee of Council Members to deliberate on the issue and the same will be presented to the Council for approval. Further, deliberations will also be made to maximize the tax collection for Karachi, however, some relief/exemption will be given to citizens receiving K-Electric bill of PKR 10,000/- or less per month". 7. Learned counsel for the Petitioner(s) asserts that the Petitioners does not contest the taxation imposed by the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) and aims to reinforce the municipal council's efficacy. Nonetheless, the Petitioner harbors concerns regarding the non-passage of the pertinent resolution by the council, coupled with apprehensions that the council members may not be granted the opportunity for deliberation. Addressing this matter, the Mayor's submitted statement indicates an intention to establish a committee, inclusive of representatives from all political parties. The committee is tasked with deliberating the resolution/dispute, which will subsequently be presented to the council. Following the observance of due legislative process, the council will then proceed accordingly. Besides, Mayor KMC has categorically contended that they will examine the number of units in the electricity bills and, up to 300 units they will extend relief to the common man living below the standard life and who cannot afford more financial burden. This exercise shall be completed within three months. 8. Accordingly, petition Nos. C.P No.D-2724 of 2022 and C.P No.D-5654 and 6798 of 2022 are hereby disposed of in terms of above. However the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) is directed to proceed with its actions in compliance with applicable law. Needless to mention that any Resolutions or Notifications issued by the KMC shall be considered provisional and subject to the final determination of C.P. No.D-233/2024. MH/N-24/Sindh Order accordingly.