Summary: The core questions requiring determination are as under: (i) Whether the Trial Court was justified in discarding the forensic report regarding the signatures on the cheque, and in holding that the presumption of correctness under Section 118 of the Act stood rebutted? (ii) Whether the Court can inquire into the existence/probability of the underlying transaction with reference to the financial capacity of the lender of amount for which a negotiable instrument is executed? Held that the forensic report with regard to the signatures on the cheque opined only to the extent that they were "probably" of the respondent. At this juncture, it is imperative to note that whenever a forensic comparison is undertaken, whether it pertains to signatures or to thumb impressions, the evidentiary value of the expert's report essentially depends on the degree of certainty expressed therein. If the expert opines in terms of "probably," or in terms of expressions like "may be," "appears to be," the clarity of the impression is doubtful, such opinion cannot be treated as a conclusive proof. The element of probability diminishes its decisiveness, and in such cases corroboration from other independent evidence and surrounding circumstances becomes indispensable before any adverse finding can be drawn against a party. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant that financial capacity of a plaintiff in suit for recovery under Order XXXVII, CPC, is irrelevant, is also misconceived. Where the issuance of a cheque by a borrower or taking of a loan is admitted, the financial capacity of the lender may not assume much significance. However, in cases where liability is denied and the lender has also failed to furnish details of the alleged transaction, it becomes essential to scrutinize and establish the lender's financial capacity in order to assess the plausibility of the claim. The appellant/plaintiff's case had to stand on its own legs, as he cannot be allowed to unjustly enrich himself, simply on account of the presumption of correctness albeit rebuttable attached to a negotiable instrument, which otherwise stood neutralized after grant of leave to defend. The non-existence of the consideration on account of lack of financial capacity was so probable in the present case that a person of ordinary prudence cannot believe that in the year 2006, the appellant could have a hefty amount of Rs.20,000,000/- lying in cash at his home.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Section 26-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The rationale behind this legislation was to cut short the litigation. However, before invoking the penal provision, the conduct of the defendant must be carefully scrutinized. If the record reveals that the defendant had acted with bona fide intent, made efforts to comply with procedural requirements, or was prevented from timely filing the written statement due to genuine and unavoidable circumstances, then strict penal action may not be warranted. 233Crl. Appeal- Against Conviction- PPC 358-23 MUHAMMAD SULTAN VS STATE Mr. Justice Sadiq Mahmud Khurram 29- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 8239

Summary: The transfer of suit property by General Attorney in favour of his sons without the express permission of the principal was unlawful when the alleged consideration against executed General Power of Attorney was not proved. Hence, the Impugned Judgment of the Appellate Court was set aside and that of the Trial Court was upheld. 232Misc. Writ 74726/24 Sat Bharai Vs Mehar Sher Muhammad etc Mr. Justice Ahmad Nadeem Arshad 30- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5826

Summary: The following points are discussed in this revision application :- i. Whether non-appearance of the pre- emptor in the witness box was fatal to his right of pre-emption or not? ii. The pre-emptor and purchaser are real brothers, so in such situation Talb-i-Muwathibat is not proved. iii. Non-mentioning of specific portion of house in the plaint by the pre-emptor when he was received information about sale is fatal. iv. Effect of non-production of postman. v. Evidence record by local commission. 231Civil Revision- Civil Revision (against Decree)- Declaration 408-15 MST FARHAT IQBAL VS JAVED IQBAL ETC Mr. Justice Abid Hussain Chattha 30- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5913 PLJ 2025 Lahore 1048 (Bahawalpur Bench)

Summary: Registration of FIR or initiation of criminal proceedings through attorney are permissible under the law. 230Civil Revision- Civil Revision (Against Decree) u/s. 115, C.P.C. 104-15 MUHAMMAD IJAZ VS SULEMAN ASGHAR (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS Mr. Justice Mirza Viqas Rauf 30- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5954 PLJ 2025 Lahore 1053 (Rawalpindi Bench)

Summary: The core questions requiring determination are as under: (i) Whether the Trial Court was justified in discarding the forensic report regarding the signatures on the cheque, and in holding that the presumption of correctness under Section 118 of the Act stood rebutted? (ii) Whether the Court can inquire into the existence/probability of the underlying transaction with reference to the financial capacity of the lender of amount for which a negotiable instrument is executed? Held that the forensic report with regard to the signatures on the cheque opined only to the extent that they were "probably" of the respondent. At this juncture, it is imperative to note that whenever a forensic comparison is undertaken, whether it pertains to signatures or to thumb impressions, the evidentiary value of the expert's report essentially depends on the degree of certainty expressed therein. If the expert opines in terms of "probably," or in terms of expressions like "may be," "appears to be," the clarity of the impression is doubtful, such opinion cannot be treated as a conclusive proof. The element of probability diminishes its decisiveness, and in such cases corroboration from other independent evidence and surrounding circumstances becomes indispensable before any adverse finding can be drawn against a party. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant that financial capacity of a plaintiff in suit for recovery under Order XXXVII, CPC, is irrelevant, is also misconceived. Where the issuance of a cheque by a borrower or taking of a loan is admitted, the financial capacity of the lender may not assume much significance. However, in cases where liability is denied and the lender has also failed to furnish details of the alleged transaction, it becomes essential to scrutinize and establish the lender's financial capacity in order to assess the plausibility of the claim. The appellant/plaintiff's case had to stand on its own legs, as he cannot be allowed to unjustly enrich himself, simply on account of the presumption of correctness albeit rebuttable attached to a negotiable instrument, which otherwise stood neutralized after grant of leave to defend. The non-existence of the consideration on account of lack of financial capacity was so probable in the present case that a person of ordinary prudence cannot believe that in the year 2006, the appellant could have a hefty amount of Rs.20,000,000/- lying in cash at his home. 229Crl. Misc. 53550/25 Mirza Yahya Baig Vs The State etc. Mr. Justice Muhammad Amjad Rafiq 30- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5989

Summary: 228Regular First Appeal- Regular First Appeal (Final Decree)- Negotiable Instrument 8-13 LIAQAT ALI VS LIAQAT ALI SHAH Mr. Justice Anwaar Hussain 30-09- 2025 2025 LHC 6345

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 185(3), 199(1)(b)(ii) & (5), 184(3) & 187—Quo warranto against Judges of Superior Courts—Scope; interim restraint—Maintainability to the extent of seeking information/examination of personal qualification to hold office distinguished from challenge to judicial acts—Held, while a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto may lie to examine a Superior Court Judge’s qualifications, a High Court cannot—in such proceedings under Art. 199—pass an interim order restraining the Judge from performing judicial functions, in view of Art. 199(5) and the settled law in PLD 1998 SC 161—Power to so restrain, if at all, lies only with the Supreme Court in exceptional circumstances in proceedings under Art. 184(3), aided by Art. 187. (b) High Courts—Practice & Procedure ----Interim order restraining a sitting Judge from “holding Court” during pendency of quo warranto petition—Illegality—Order set aside—Respondent No.1 (writ-petitioner) himself did not defend the restraint upon appreciating PLD 1998 SC 161; Attorney-General also supported the settled position—Impugned restraining portion held unsustainable. (c) High Court Office Objections / Registry Process ----Lahore High Court Rules & Orders, Vol. V, Ch. 1-A (as adopted by IHC)—Rules 9 & 9-A—Office objections must be decided first, through a speaking administrative order; only thereafter does the matter mature onto the judicial side—Bench directed that the Division Bench of the IHC shall first decide office objections and then proceed in accordance with law. (d) Administrative law—Reasoned orders ----S. 24-A, General Clauses Act, 1897—All administrative orders must be in writing and supported by reasons—“Verbal” or unreasoned directions lack legal sanctity—Principle reaffirmed. (e) Notice to Law Officers ----Order XXVII-A, C.P.C.—Matters involving interpretation of constitutional provisions—Notice to Attorney-General/Advocate-General—Compliance emphasized. (f) Additional note (concurring) by Shahid Bilal Hassan, J. ----Registry objections: nature and consequence—Proceedings on office objections are administrative; court must record reasons when overruling/sustaining them; ministerial staff cannot determine fate of petitions—Cited case law reiterating (i) written, reasoned administrative orders (S. 24-A GCA), and (ii) that deficient filings be placed before a Judge per Rules 9 & 9-A for appropriate orders (overrule; grant time; or dismiss, as the case may be). While concurring with the result, his Lordship underscores that bypassing the objection mechanism renders such orders legally infirm and the proper course is to restore status quo ante and decide objections first. (Concurring note; not a separate disposition.) Held: (i) High Court’s interim restraint preventing a sitting Judge from performing judicial functions in a quo warranto petition is without lawful authority and is set aside in light of PLD 1998 SC 161 and Art. 199(5); (ii) Division Bench of the Islamabad High Court shall first decide office objections by a speaking order and then proceed in accordance with law. Cited Cases: • Malik Asad Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1998 SC 161 (paras 77, 84) • Zahid Hussain v. The State, 1998 SCMR 611 • CDA v. Shaheen Farooq, 2007 SCMR 1328 • Farman Ali v. Muhammad Ishaq, PLD 2013 SC 392 • Muhammad Boota v. Basharat Ali, PLD 2014 Lahore 1; 2014 CLD 64 (Lahore) • Rana Naveed Ahmad Khan v. Province of Punjab, PLD 2014 Lahore 436 • Pakistan Lawyers Forum v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2005 Lahore 107 • Tahira Naseem v. Arshad Mehmood, 2021 PCr.LJ 682 Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed to the extent indicated—Impugned IHC order set aside insofar as it restrains the petitioner-Judge from holding Court; Division Bench of IHC directed to decide office objections first by a speaking order and thereafter proceed according to law.

Summary: Summary pending