Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. I, R. 10 ---Addition or striking out of parties, doctrine of---Transposition of parties from one side (array of parties) to another side---Application of defendant for transposition from the panel of defendants to that of the plaintiffs---Scope---Attorney, appointment of---Scope ---Plaintiff/sister filed suit against her two brothers and other sister (defendants) suit was resisted by all three defendants---However, pending adjudication of the suit, other sister (one of the defendants) moved an application before the Trial Court, seeking her transposition from the panel of defendants to that of the plaintiffs---Ground taken by defendant/sister (applicant) was that due to alleged connivance of her brothers (defendants), she had put her thumb impression on a document and appointed her own son as an attorney ( son/attorney)---Trial Court allowed said application , which order was maintained by the District Court---Petitioners (defendants/brothers) filed constitutional petition against concurrent orders---Validity---Admittedly, the deceased predecessor had left behind two sons (petitioners/defendants) and two daughters i.e the plaintiff and one of the defendants/applicants---No doubt, there was a power of attorney in favour of the son of applicant/sister, who was now before the Court through her husband---As per the application as well as stance of husband (special attorney) of applicant/sister), the power of attorney in favour of son was not correct---It was indisputable that written statement on behalf of applicant/sister was filed by her son, the alleged attorney---Admittedly, the fact of appointment of son as attorney had been denied by applicant/sister through her application signed by her husband as an attorney---Irrespective of the fact that the application was categorically resisted by the petitioners/brothers and without going into the controversy and resolution of the fact as to whether son was appointed as an attorney and in that capacity, he had filed written statement , or otherwise, such fact shall be determined/ resolved by the Trial Court but after recording of pro and contra evidence---No illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional defect had been noticed in concurrent findings of both the Courts below---Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. I, R. 10---Addition or striking out of parties, doctrine of---Transposition of parties from one side (array of parties) to another side---Application of defendant for transposition from the panel of defendants to that of the plaintiffs---Scope---Application of defendant for transposition from the panel of defendants to that of the plaintiffs---Plaintiff/sister filed suit against her two brothers and other sister (defendants)---Suit was resisted by all three defendants---However, pending adjudication of the suit, other sister (one of the defendants) moved an application before the Trial Court, seeking her transposition from the panel of defendants to that of the plaintiffs---Ground taken by defendant/sister (applicant) was due to the alleged connivance of her brothers (defendants), she had put her thumb impression on a document and appointed her own son as an attorney (son/attorney)---Trial Court allowed said application, which order was maintained by the District Court---Petitioners (defendants/brothers) filed constitutional petition against concurrent orders---Contention of the petitioners/brothers was that after submission of the written statement, applicant/sister could, in no way, resile from her earlier stance---Validity---Fact of appointing son/attorney had been negated by applicant (defendant/sister) and was corroborated by her husband, who was before the Court---Transposition of a party from the array of plaintiffs or defendants and for that matter the appellants or respondents is a procedural matter, which is decided in view of the plea, or a fact alleged in the plaint or controverted through reply/written statement---No illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional defect had been noticed in concurrent findings of both the Courts below---Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances. Rukhsana Mashadi v. Qasim PLD 2002 Karachi 542 and Central Government of Pakistan v. Suleman Khan PLD 1992 SC 590 ref. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. I, R. 10 ---Addition or striking out of parties, doctrine of---Prejudice, absence of---Transposition of parties from one side (array of parties) to another side---Application of defendant for transposition from the panel of defendants to that of the plaintiffs---Scope---Application of defendant for transposition from the panel of defendants to that of the plaintiffs---Plaintiff/sister filed suit against her two brothers and other sister (defendants)---Suit was resisted by all three defendants---However, pending adjudication of the suit, other sister (one of the defendants) moved an application before the Trial Court, seeking her transposition from the panel of defendants to that of the plaintiffs---Ground taken by defendant/sister (applicant) was that due to alleged connivance of her brothers (defendants), she had put her thumb impression on a document and appointed her own son as an attorney (son/attorney)---Trial Court allowed said application, which order was maintained by the District Court---Petitioners (defendants/brothers) filed constitutional petition against concurrent orders---Validity---By transposition of applicant (sister) from the panel of defendants to the panel of the plaintiffs, no prejudice had been caused to the petitioners, who were the brothers of applicant and plaintiff, being the sons of predecessor-in-interest of parties and the fact of submission of the written statement of applicant by alleging therein that a portion of the property was transferred to her, would be determined when she would be in the witness box either in person or through attorney---No illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional defect had been noticed in concurrent findings of both the Courts below---Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances. Mian Abdul Waheed v. Mst. Amtul Hamid and others PLD 1962 (W.P) Lahore 114 ref. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. I, R. 10 --- Addition or striking out of parties, doctrine of---Transposition of parties from one side (array of parties) to another side---Application of defendant for transposition from the panel of defendants to that of the plaintiffs---Scope---Application of defendant for transposition from the panel of defendants to that of the plaintiffs---Plaintiff/sister filed suit against her two brothers and other sister (defendants)---Suit was resisted by all three defendants---However, pending adjudication of the suit, other sister (one of the defendants) moved an application before the Trial Court, seeking her transposition from the panel of defendants to that of the plaintiffs---Ground taken by defendant/sister F22(applicant) was that due to alleged connivance of her brothers (defendants), she had put her thumb impression on a document and appointed her own son as an attorney (son/attorney)---Trial Court allowed said application, which order was maintained by the District Court---Petitioners (defendants/brothers) filed constitutional petition against concurrent orders---Validity---In transposition, a person who is already on record as a plaintiff or a defendant seeks his transposition from one capacity to another capacity i.e. from plaintiff to defendant or vice versa---Since primary object of O. I, R. 10 of C.P.C., 1908, is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, there is no reason why the doctrine of addition or striking out parties does not apply to transposition of parties from one side to another---No illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional defect had been noticed in concurrent findings of both the Courts below---Constitutional petition, being merit-less, is dismissed, in circumstances. Saila Bala Dassi v. Nirmala Sundari Dassi AIR 1958 SC 394 ref. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. I, R. 10 ---"Dominus litus", principle of---Addition or striking out of parties, doctrine of---Transposition of parties from one side (array of parties) to another side---Application of defendant for transposition from the panel of defendants to that of the plaintiffs---Scope---A court can order the transposition of parties in an appropriate case---No doubt ,the plaintiff is dominus litus and master of his suit, who files his suit against the person against whom he has some sort of claim, and he cannot be urged to add a person as defendant if he does not wish to do so---The court will unceasingly consider the wishes of the plaintiff before adding a third person as a defendant in the suit---However, if the court finds that addition of the new defendant is absolutely essential and cannot be avoided to enable it to adjudicate effectively and completely the matter in controversy between the parties, it will add a person as a defendant even without the consent of the plaintiff---The principle of dominus litus cannot be overstretched in the matter of impleading or transposition of parties, because it is the duty of the court to ensure that for deciding the real matter in dispute if a person is a necessary party, the court can direct the addition, striking or even the transposition of the parties from the plaintiff to defendant or defendant or plaintiff vice versa depending upon the facts of the case---No illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional defect had been noticed in concurrent findings of both the Courts below---Constitutional petition, being merit-less, is dismissed, in circumstances. Fayaz Muhammad Qazi for Petitioners. Razi Khan for Respondents. Date of hearing: 24th June, 2024.

Summary: (a) Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)--- ----S. 7---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.265-K---Illegal dispossession---Delivery of possession of property to owner---Application under S. 265-K of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, filed by the accused was dismissed by the trial Court---Validity---Admittedly, the trial of the case would have commenced after the charge had been framed---In the present case, charge was framed on 13.05.2024 whereas order for accepting the petition filed by complainant under S.7 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, was allowed while application filed by accused under S.265-K Cr.P.C, was dismissed on 19.03.2024, prior to the commencement of the trial of the case instituted upon the private complaint---Trial Court passed the impugned order dated 19.03.2024 issuing a direction under S.7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, to the S.H.O. concerned before the commencement of the trial, therefore, the same was not tenable---Trial had not commenced, therefore, no order could have been passed by the trial Court under S.7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005---In view of the matter, petition was allowed to the extent that the order dated 19.03.2024 passed by the Trial Court, whereby a direction was issued to the S.H.O. concerned to proceed under S.7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, was set-aside, however, as charge had now been framed, therefore, the Trial Court shall be at liberty to pass a fresh order on the application filed by complainant under S.7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, which application shall be deemed pending for the purpose of making any subsequent order---Petitioners shall be at liberty to file another application under S.265-K, Cr.P.C., before the Trial Court seeking their acquittal, which application shall be decided on the basis of the evidentiary material available on the record. Khalid Saeed v. Shamim Rizwan and others 2003 SCMR 1505; Chaudhry Shujat Hussain v. The State 1995 SCMR 1249; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman and another v. Director General, Military Lands and Cantonments, Rawalpinidi and others 2005 SCMR 177 and Muhammad Akram v. Mst. Zainab Bibi 2007 SCMR 1086 rel. (b) Administration of justice--- ----If a thing is required to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. Farooq Haider Malik for Petitioners. Malik Javed Aslam Naich for Respondent No. 3. Rana Sher Zaman Akram, Assistant Advocate General for the State. Muhammad Ali, ASI. Order Sadiq Mahmud Khurram, J.--- By way of this petition filed under Article 199 of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 read with Section 561-A Cr.P.C., the petitioner has assailed the order dated 19.03.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Liaquatpur, District Rahimyar Khan, whereby the application as submitted by the petitioners under section 265-K Cr.P.C. seeking their acquittal, was dismissed and the application as submitted by the complainant of the case under section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, was allowed. 2. Brief facts of the case leading upto the filing of the instant petition are that Jam Ibrahim (respondent No.3) filed a private complaint titled "Jam Ibrahim v. Fayyaz Ahmed and 47 others" on 06.09.2018 in respect of an offence under section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 and after holding of an inquiry of the said private complaint, the learned Additional Sessions Judge summoned the petitioners as well as other accused to face trial of the said case instituted upon the private complaint as filed by Jam Ibrahim (respondent No.3) vide order dated 08.01.2019. During proceedings of summoning of the accused, as summoned by the learned Additional Sessions Judge to face trial of the case instituted upon the private complaint as filed by Jam Ibrahim (respondent No.3), the respondent No.3 namely Jam Ibrahim filed an application under section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 whereas on 02.03.2023, the petitioners filed an application under section 265-K Cr.P.C. seeking their acquittal before the learned trial court. As mentioned above, the application as filed by Jam Ibrahim (respondent No.3) was accepted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge vide his order dated 19.03.2024 whereas the application as filed by the petitioners under section 265-K Cr.P.C. was dismissed; hence the petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners, at the very outset, submits that he has been instructed not to press this petition to the extent of allowing of application under section 265K Cr.P.C. as submitted, by the petitioners seeking their acquittal and to press this petition only to the extent of order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge dated 19.03.2024 issuing a direction to the S.H.O. concerned under section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that as the trial of the case had not commenced, therefore, no order under section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 could have been passed. 4. Learned counsel for respondent No.3 (the complaint of the case instituted upon the private complaint) has submitted that the order dated 19.03.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, was passed in accordance with the law and did not merit any interference by this Court. Learned counsel for respondent No.3 further submits that petitioner No.1 namely Haji Ghulam Muhammad has been declared a proclaimed offender by the learned trial court, which order was passed on 29.03.2024. Certified copy of which has been appended with this petition itself. 5. Learned Assistant Advocate General has submitted that learned counsel for the petitioners is correct in saying that the learned Additional Sessions Judge could not have passed any order under section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 before the commencement of the trial, however, has also submitted that the case instituted upon the private complaint of Jam Ibrahim (respondent No.3) had been pending since 06.09.2018, therefore, undue delay had been caused in the conclusion of the same. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, learned counsel for respondent No.3, learned Assistant Advocate General and perused the record with their able assistance. 7. Perusal of the record reveals that Jam Ibrahim (respondent No.3) filed a private complaint titled "Jam Ibrahim v. Fayvaz Ahmed and 47 others" on 06.09.2018 in respect of an offence under section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 and after holding of an inquiry of the said private complaint, the learned Additional Sessions Judge summoned the petitioners as well as other accused to face trial of the said case instituted upon the private complaint as filed by Jam Ibrahim (respondent No.3) vide order dated 08.01.2019. During proceedings of summoning of the accused, as summoned by the learned Additional Sessions Judge to face trial of the case instituted upon the private complaint as filed by Jam Ibrahim (respondent No.3), the respondent No.3 namely Jam Ibrahim filed an application under section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 whereas on 02.03.2023, the petitioners filed an application under section 265-K Cr.P.C seeking their acquittal before the learned trial court. As mentioned above, the application as filed by Jam Ibrahim (respondent No.3) was accepted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge vide his order dated 19.03.2024 whereas the application as filed by the petitioners under section 265-K Cr.P.C. was dismissed. As mentioned above, as the learned counsel for the petitioners has already submitted that he has been instructed not to press this petition to the extent of rejection of the petition filed under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. by the learned Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 19.03.2024, therefore, nothing more is being discussed in this order with regard to that part of the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. With regard to the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge passed by him under section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 directing the S.H.O. concerned to proceed under section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, it has been observed that reading of the language of Section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 makes it mandatory that if any order is to be passed under the said section, it can only validly be passed if trial of the case has commenced. Admittedly, the trial of the case concerned would have commenced after the charge had been framed. In the present case, charge was framed on 13.05.2024 whereas order was passed on 19.03.2024, prior to the commencement of the trial of the case instituted upon the private complaint as filed by Jam Ibrahim (respondent No.3). For reference, Section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is being re-produced below:- "7. Eviction and mode of recovery as an interim relief.___(1) If during trial the Court is satisfied that a person is found prima facie to be not in lawful possession, the Court shall, as an interim relief direct him to put the owner or occupier, as the case may be, in possession. (2) Where the person against whom any such order is passed under subsection (1) fails to comply with the same, the Court shall, notwithstanding any other law for the time being in force, take such steps and pass such order as may be necessary to put the owner or occupier in possession. (3) The Court may authorize any official or officer to take possession for securing compliance with its orders under subsection (1). The person so authorized may use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary. (4) If any person, authorized by the Court, under subsection (3), requires police assistance in the exercise of his power under this Act, he may send a requisition to the officer-in-charge of a police station who shall on such requisition render such assistance as may be required. (5) The failure of the officer-in charge of Police Station to render assistance under subsection (4) shall amount to misconduct for which the Court may direct departmental action against him." As mentioned above, for the fact that the learned Additional Sessions Judge passed the impugned order dated 19.03.2024 issuing a direction under section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 to the S.H.O. concerned before the commencement of the trial, therefore, the same is not tenable. If a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. It is well-settled principle of interpretation of statute that where any provision couched in negative language requires an act to be done in a particular manner then it should be done in the manner as required by the statute otherwise such act will be illegal.If a method is prescribed to do a thing in a particular manner, it must be followed in letter and spirit. When the law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner then it would be a nullity in the eyes of law, if not performed in that very prescribed manner. The general rule expounded by this Court is that the usage of the word 'shall generally carries the connotation that a provision is mandatory in nature. However, other factors such as the object and purpose of the statute and inclusion of penal consequences in cases of non-compliance also serve as an instructive guide in deducing the nature of the provision. If the provision is couched in prohibitive or negative language, it can rarely be directory, the use of peremptory language in a negative form is per se indicative of the interest that the provision is to be mandatory. To enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law is the inalienable right of every citizen protected under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The rule of law constitutes the bedrock of governance. When the law stipulates that something has to be done in a particular manner that is how it should be done. And any person who exercises authority must do so in accordance with the law. Reliance in this regard is placed on the cases of Khalid Saeed v. Shamim Rizwan and others (2003 SCMR 1505), Chaudhry Shujat Hussain v. The State (1995 SCMR 1249), State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman and another v. Director-General, Military Lands and Cantonments, Rawalpindi and others (2005 SCMR 177) and Muhammad Akram v. Mst. Zainab Bibi (2007 SCMR 1086). As mentioned above, the trial had not commenced, therefore, no order could have been passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge under section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. 8. In view of the matter, this petition is allowed to the extent that the order dated 19.03.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, whereby a direction was issued to the S.H.O. concerned to proceed under section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, is set-aside, however, as charge has now been framed, therefore, the learned Additional Sessions Judge shall be at liberty to pass a fresh order on the application filed by Jam Ibrahim (respondent No.3) under section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, which application shall be deemed pending for the purpose of making any subsequent order. The petitioners shall be at liberty to file another application under section 265-K Cr.P.C. before the learned trial court seeking their acquittal, which application shall be decided on the basis of the evidentiary material available on the record any evidentiary material produced by the petitioners before the learned trial court and without being prejudiced in any manner by the earlier order dated 19.03.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge or by the fact that the charge has been framed against the petitioners on 13.05.2024 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. 9. As petitioner No.1 namely Haji Ghulam Muhammad has been declared a proclaimed offender by the learned trial court and as the said order is still in field, therefore this petition to the extent of petitioner No.1 is dismissed as him having no locus standi to file this petition. JK/G-11/L Petition allowed.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 498 & 497(2)---Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order (4 of 1979), Arts.3 & 4---Prohibition on manufacturing, of intoxicants, owning or possessing intoxicants---Pre-arrest bail, grant of---Rule of consistency---Absence of incriminating material---Further inquiry---Allegation against the applicant was that he whilst sitting on rear seat of motorcycle driven by co-accused (son of applicant) was intercepted by the police, but escaped by taking benefit of darkness; however, police party though beings armed with sophisticated weapons did not follow him---Co-accused, from whom police recovered motorcycle and certain quantity of local liquor, had been bailed out---Applicant at the time of fleeing away had not left any incriminating material nor had been shown to have any article with him connecting him with the commission of offence except his mere presence, which allegation was yet to be established by the prosecution after recording evidence and then Trial Court had to determine the same---Maximum punishment for the offence alleged was 03 years---Case against applicant was one of further inquiry---Pre-arrest bail was allowed, in circumstances. Manzoor Ali alias Mumtaz v. The State 2001 PCr.LJ 344; Muhammad Ramzan v. Zafar Ullah and another 1986 SCMR 1380 and Muhammad Tanveer v. The State and another PLD 2017 SC 733 rel. Wishan Das Kollhi for Applicant. Shahzado Saleem, Additional P.G Sindh for the State. Date of hearing; 24th June, 2024. Order Muhammad Saleem Jessar, J.--- Through instant bail application, applicant Anopo alias Anopchand seeks his admission on pre arrest bail in Crime No.15 of 2024, registered with P.S Kaloi for offence under Article 3/4 PEHO, 1979. The case has been challaned which is now pending for trial before Court of Judicial Magistrate Diplo. After furnishing surety before this court, the applicant has surrendered before trial court and joined the trial proceedings which is fixed for hearing on 01.07.2024. 2. The crux of the prosecution case are that a police party headed by SIP Premon had left PS under their daily dairy entry No.21 at 0300 hours dated 22.05.2024. While snap checking they saw a red color motorbike came along with riders having a white colored katta (sack) lying over fuel tank. The police party intercepted them to stop but person seated on rear seat to whom they know as Anopo alias Anopchand (applicant) slipped away by making his escape good due to darkness. The person who was riding the motorbike was enquired of his whereabouts who disclosed his name to be Raja. Due to non-availability of private persons, the complainant by citing his subordinate(s) as mashirs took possession of the motorbike as well katta (sack) then 10 pints of white color watt one and 10 pints of red color dry gin. Such memo of arrest and recovery was prepared on spot. Later they came at the PS along with accused and case property where instant case was registered on behalf of the State. 3. Learned Counsel submits that though the applicant is nominated in the FIR; however, nothing incriminating has been shown to have been recovered from his exclusive possession and per allegation he while seeing the police party made his escape good, therefore, case against him requires further inquiry. He lastly prayed for grant of bail. 4. On the other hand, learned Assistant P.G appearing on behalf of State opposes the bail application; however, cannot controvert the fact that the offence with which the applicant stand charged carries maximum punishment for 03 years besides allegation against him is that he allegedly flee away from the scene of offence and nothing was recovered from his possession. 5. Heard learned Counsel for respective parties and have gone through record made available before me. 6. No doubt, the applicant is nominated in the FIR; however, allegation against him is that he whilst sitting on rear seat of motorcycle driven by co-accused was intercepted by the police and had made his escape good by taking benefit of darkness; however, police party though was less with sophisticated weapons did not follow him. As reported co-accused Raja who is said to be son of applicant from whom police recovered motorcycle as well as certain quantity of Pakistani Whisky, has been bailed out by the trial court. Though applicant has been shown sitting on rear seat of the motor bike, but at the time of fleeing away, had not left any incriminating nor has been shown to be having any article with him, connecting him with the commission of offence except mere his presence. Therefore, such allegation is yet to be established by the prosecution after recording its evidence and then trial court has to determine the same. Moreover, case is being tried by the Court of Judicial Magistrate where after recording its evidence, if prosecution may succeed to prove its charge against him even then punishment of more than three years cannot be visualized. Reliance is placed on the case of Manzoor Ali alias Mumtaz v. The State (2001 PCr.LJ 344) [Karachi]. In case the applicant may be taken into custody today, tomorrow again he will be released on bail on the ground of consistency. 7. In the circumstances and in view of dicta laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in case of Muhammad Ramzan v. Zafar Ullah and another (1986 SCMR 1380) and in case of Muhammad Tanveer v. The State and another (PLD 2017 SC 733), the case against applicant requires further inquiry. Consequently, instant bail application is hereby allowed; ad-interim pre-arrest bail granted earlier to applicant Anopo alias Anopchand son of Nanak is hereby confirmed on same terms and conditions. 8. The observations made in this decision are of a tentative nature and will not influence the merits of the case. SA/M-79/Sindh Bail confirmed.

Summary: Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----Ss. 34, 126 & 278---Power to stay legal proceedings, where there is an arbitration agreement---Scope---Parties to the dispute in the main petition not parties to the agreement or in the arbitration clause---Effect---Exclusive jurisdiction of High Court while functioning as a Company Bench over certain company-related matters---Scope---Third party interest---Factual controversies---Applicants sought stay in the main petition and for referring the dispute regarding rectification of register to the arbitration---Validity---Where all parties to the main petition were not parties to the arbitration clause, which constituted a separate agreement, bifurcation of judicial action could not be allowed, which would not only cause inevitable delay in the resolution of the dispute but could also lead to conflicting decisions, increased litigation costs, and harassment of the parties---Right to arbitrate could not be enforced by anyone who is not a party to the agreement containing the arbitration clause, thus, proceedings in the main petition could not be stayed under S. 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (Act)---Non-signatory could not compel arbitration except under exceptional circumstances---In the absence of any contract, an agent could not personally enforce contracts entered into by them on behalf of their principal, nor were they personally bound by them---Court may refuse to stay the proceedings if it is satisfied that there is no sufficient reason to refer the matter to arbitration and that a substantial miscarriage of justice or inconvenience to the parties would occur---Staying proceedings under S.34 of the Act is discretionary and not mandatory---There is no fixed rule for determining when a stay should be refused, however, each case has different facts, and the decision to grant or refuse a stay depends on the specific facts and circumstances of each case---Court can make an objective assessment and decide whether the stay of legal proceedings should be granted or refused---Section 34 of the Act, implies that the Court should first examine whether the arbitration clause applies to the dispute and if it does, the Court must determine whether the nature of the dispute is such that the ends of justice would be better served by a decision of the Court or by the private forum chosen and agreed upon by the parties---Matters involving third-party rights and factual controversies related to companies should be resolved by the courts established under Company Law, which have the authority to frame issues and admit both oral and documentary evidence for adjudication of the dispute---Application for staying the proceedings and for referring the matter to arbitration was dismissed, in circumstances. Case law referred. Iftikhar-ud-Din Riaz, M. Haroon Mumtaz, Ahmad Abdul Rehman, Asfand Mir for Applicant (C.M. No.3 of 2023) / Respondents Nos.1 to 3 (in main petition): Hafiz Talha for Respondent 4 (in main petition). Zaki Rehman for Respondent No.5 (in main petition). Arshad Tayebaly, Arshad Nazir Mirza, Talha Javed, Saad Amir, Amna Iqbal, Shakoh Zulqarnain and Nadia Iffat for Petitioners (in C.M. No.3 of 2023). Date of hearing: 24th June, 2024.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending