Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 11(2)---Assessment /recovery of tax erroneously refunded etc.---Fake / flying invoices issued by the blacklisted/suspended units, allegation of---Transaction made through proper bank channel---Scope and effect---All the transactions made with the supplier by the respondent/registered Person, during the alleged period (from July 2017 to June 2022), were through proper bank channel i.e. crossed banking instrument, whereas, at the time of purchases from the alleged suppliers, both, the buyer and the supplier were duly declared in the sale tax returns as active and no coercive action at that time was taken against the alleged blacklisted/blocked suppliers---Respondent / registered persons also produced complete detail of purchase made along with proof of purchase invoices and bank statements---Before Commissioner Inland Revenue- Appeals/CIR (A), the Department not only remained unable to provide any proof of inquiry or involvement of respondent /registered person in purchases of fake and flying invoices, but also showed unawareness of the business activities of the respondent/registered persons---Thus, at the time when the supplies were made and invoices were issued, the suppliers were neither blacklisted nor the invoices issued had any direct nexus with the blacklisting order---Therefore, the proposed question was answered against the applicant/department---The CIR(A) and the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue passed well speaking orders and had rightly set aside the order-in-original---Thus, no reason / case to interfere in the concurrent findings of the forums below was made out---Sales Tax Reference Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 11(2)---Customs Act (IV of 1969), S. 187---National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), S.14---Assessment /recovery of tax erroneously refunded etc.---Rejection by department---Fake/flying invoices issued by the blacklisted/suspended units, allegation of---Burden of proof---Whether upon Department or the registered person---Concept of reverse onus---Principle of presumption of innocence---Scope---In the present case, though Show-Cause Notice was issued to the respondent /registered person, but record was silent whether before issuance of Show-Cause Notice any meaningful efforts were made by the Department (sales tax officials ) to conduct an audit or any proper inquiry was made by exercising powers conferred under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, (‘the Act 1990’), in order to verify the allegations---It was revealed from the contents of the Show-Cause Notice that the same had been based on vague allegations and an assumption, such as; the respondent /registered person had claimed input tax adjustment against sales tax invoices of suppliers who were subsequently blacklisted/suspended or made inactive by the Federal Board of Revenue---The court looks to what is clearly said and there is no room for any intendment nor is there any equity about a tax---There is no presumption as to tax and nothing is to be read in or implied and one can only look fairly at the language used---The scheme of the Act, 1990 clearly envisages that the obligation to establish that a person is liable to pay any tax or charge and the same has not been levied or paid or has been short-levied is essentially that of the sales tax authorities---The burden to prove the allegations is on the shoulders of the authorities/department ;and in order to discharge said obligation they have been vested with wide powers under the Act, 1990---Whoever asserts a fact is also burdened with the duty to establish that it is highly probable to be true---In some exceptional cases, the legislature, in its wisdom, has provided for what is known as reverse onus, by placing the burden on the person against whom an allegation has been made; such as S. 187 of the Customs Act, 1969 and S.14 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---The concept of reverse onus i.e. placing the burden on the person against whom an allegation has been made runs contrary to the established principle of presumption of innocence---It is, therefore, for said reason that Courts lean in favour of interpreting or reading down such provision in an effort to safeguard the fundamental principles of fair trial---There is no provision pari materia with S. 187 of the Customs Act, 1969, or S.14 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, in the Act, 1990---The legislature, therefore, did not intend to reverse the onus of proof in matters relating to the levy, charge and payment of the tax under the Act, 1990---The proceedings before the adjudicating authority or the statutory appellate forum under the Act, 1990 are quasi judicial in nature---When the department alleges that a registered person has committed any illegality, the former is burdened with a statutory duty to establish before the adjudicating forum, through persuasive and proper evidence, that the allegations are highly probable to be true, rather than being unreliable, false or doubtful---The duty to establish facts on the standard of balance of probabilities is on the department under the Act of 1990, thus, the question was decided against the department---Commissioner Inland Revenue (A) and the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue passed well speaking orders and had rightly set aside the order-in-original---Thus, no reason / case to interfere in the concurrent findings of the forums below was made out---Sales Tax reference Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. Darya Khan, Barrister Iftikhar Raza Khan and Munawar Khan Kasi for Appellant. Muhammad Umar Dogar and Raja Umair Ali for Respondent No.1. Date of hearing: 28th November, 2025.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.12(2)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.47---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C---Petitioner claiming to be widow of the deceased---Declaration decree obtained by children of deceased after his death---Petitioner/widow not impleaded in the suit---Effect---Courts below relied on testimony rendered in earlier judicial proceedings---Permissibility---Inadmissibility of such evidence against non-party---Non-framing of issues by courts below in S.12(2), C.P.C. application where facts were disputed---Remand of case in circumstances---Facts: The petitioner (claiming to be the widow of deceased) filed an application under S.12(2) C.P.C. to set aside the judgment and decree passed in a suit for declaration filed by the deceased’s children (respondents Nos. 3 to 8) against “public at large” wherein the suit was decreed; the petitioner’s section 12(2) application was dismissed and her revision was also dismissed by the District Court; findings of both the courts below were drawn from the statements/evidence of the deceased and his witnesses recorded in the earlier jactitation-of-marriage proceedings filed by respondent No.9/mother of respondents Nos.3 to 8; petitioner filed present constitutional petition challenging both concurrent orders---Issue: “Whether the evidence recorded in the earlier suit for jactitation of marriage could legally be pressed into service against the present petitioner, who was neither a party to those proceedings nor afforded any opportunity of cross-examination?”---Held: In the present case, none of the mandatory pre-conditions for use of earlier recorded testimony in subsequent proceedings stood fulfilled---The petitioner was neither a party to the suit for jactitation of marriage nor afforded any right or opportunity to cross-examine the deceased or his witnesses---Furthermore, the issues involved in the said proceedings were materially distinct from the controversy arising in the application under S.12(2), C.P.C.---Consequently, the evidence recorded in the earlier proceedings was wholly inadmissible against the petitioner and could not legally form the basis for adjudication of her rights---The courts below, therefore, committed a manifest error of law by treating such evidence as determinative, in clear disregard of the statutory mandate contained in Art.47 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---The omission to implead the present petitioner, who claimed to be the widow of deceased at the time of his death, became significant and prima facie indicative of material concealment---Such selective impleadment, in a suit directly concerning declaration of legal heirship and inheritance rights, struck at the root of fair adjudication and attracted the mischief contemplated under S.12(2), C.P.C.---The controversy squarely involved disputed questions of fact, which could only have been resolved through proper framing of issues and recording of evidence of the contesting parties---Impugned orders were set aside and matter was remanded to Trial Court---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art.47---Testimony recorded in earlier judicial proceedings---Admissibility in subsequent proceedings---Conditions precedent---The relevancy and admissibility of evidence recorded in an earlier judicial proceeding is conditional and circumscribed, and not absolute---Such evidence can be relied upon in a subsequent proceeding for proving the truth of the facts stated therein only if the following conditions prescribed therein are satisfied, i.e. (i) that the earlier proceeding was between the same parties or their representatives-in-interest, (ii) that the adverse party had the right and opportunity of cross-examination, (iii) that the questions in issue in both proceedings were substantially identical. Muhammad Farooq Warind for Petitioner. Ch. Abdul Jabbar for Respondents Nos. 3 to 8. Date of hearing: 10th December, 2025.

Summary: Section 26 of the Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960 (West Pakistan Ordinance VI of 1960) restricts the jurisdiction of civil courts solely in matters arising under the Ordinance. It does not, however, preclude the civil courts from exercising jurisdiction in cases where deprivation of title is alleged on the ground of fraud; such disputes, by virtue of Section 9 CPC, fall within the exclusive and ultimate jurisdiction of the civil courts. 82Execution Application 1-25 BOP VS M/S AGRI INTERNATIONAL ETC Mr. Justice Abid Hussain Chattha 09- 12- 2025 2025 LHC 7720

Summary: Inter alia, following question requires determination: Whether a wife pursuing claims for dower, dowry articles and maintenance, who appears before the Court without counsel of her choice or any independent advice and withdraws her suit, can later seek to recall that statement on the ground of fraud, undue influence keeping in view the fact that sanctity is attached to the judicial proceedings? Held: Statements recorded by the litigants are generally given full weight because same are presumed to reflect the free and voluntary will of the party making them before the Courts. However, this principle is not an unbending rule of thumb. The Court must examine the attending circumstances to determine whether the act was truly voluntary and free from undue influence or fraud. Further held that in a dispute whenever a statement is to be recorded by a vulnerable litigant, like females in a family matter, the Court must take all necessary steps to ensure that the statement is fully understood by the maker; the statement should be recorded in a language which the party comprehends; particularly, if the maker is illiterate, the Presiding Officer must ensure that she is accompanied by her kin, who is literate, having no adverse interest, and understands the statement she makes and it should be read over to her by the Presiding Officer of the Court, who should specifically question such vulnerable party to ascertain that she understands the contents and implications of the statement, and that it is being made voluntarily, without any inducement, undue influence, or coercion, and that she has the independent advice from counsel of her choice. Such procedural safeguards are essential to uphold the principles of natural justice and to ensure that the sanctity of the judicial proceedings is preserved while protecting the substantive rights of vulnerable parties as required under the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. 81Civil Revision 237987/18 Muhammad Arshad Mehmood etc Vs Muhammad Bashir etc Mr. Justice Malik Waqar Haider Awan 10- 12- 2025 2025 LHC 7797

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Inter alia following question of law has been put forth for opinion of this Court: i. Whether an order passed under Section 54 of the Act, by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Punjab, or his delegate (such as respondent No.7), which has not been challenged in appeal, under the Act, operates so as to bind the Civil Courts and preclude them from examining the validity of an alleged agreement to sell? Held that this Court is of the opinion that Sections 27 and 54 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 ("the Act") operate in complementary fashion: Section 27 governs internal transfers of a co-operative society after the death of a member, and Section 54 prescribes the procedure for resolving disputes, inter alia, between the members, claimants, or the society itself. The proviso to Section 54 functions as a check on the Registrar's power (purportedly delegated to respondent No.7 in the present case): where complicated questions of law and fact are involved, the Registrar is to consider suspension and allow a Civil Court to determine those issues. The nomination under Section 27 facilitates administrative transfer or payment but does not vest ownership in the nominee to the prejudice of heirs. The statutory scheme, therefore, ensures that an officer of the Punjab Co- operatives Department?whether Registrar or his delegatee like respondent No.7 should not adjudicate contested title that requires plenary evidentiary probe by a Civil Court. Further held that an order passed under Section 54 of the Act, by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Punjab, or his delegate (such as respondent No.7), which has not been challenged in appeal, under the Act, may bind the co-operative society insofar as the said society acted under Section 27(3) in good faith; but it cannot, on the material before the Courts below as also this Court, be treated as an unimpeachable determination of the title of the petitioner. 76Crl. Misc. 68529/25 Awon Muhammad Vs The State etc. Mr. Justice Muhammad Tariq Nadeem 10- 12- 2025 2025 LHC 8016

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 175E(1) [as inserted by the Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025], 184(1) (since omitted) & 199---Dispute between Governments---Jurisdiction---Misdescription of Government---Matter pertained to a dispute between an office of Federal Government describing itself as Central Government and between Board of Revenue Punjab, over a piece of land---High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction declined to interfere in the matter on the ground that it was a dispute between two Governments---Validity---Original jurisdiction in any “dispute between any two or more Governments” was vested in Supreme Court under Article 184(1) of the Constitution but pursuant to the Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025 such jurisdiction is now vested to the Federal Constitutional Court under Article 175E(1) of the Constitution---Nature of such jurisdiction had not changed and a dispute between a Federal statutory corporation, such as the Evacuee Trust Property Board, and a Provincial department did not, merely for such reason, become a “dispute between two Governments”---Misdescription of petitioner as “Central Government through Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board, etc.” and any concession made at the bar could not divest High Court of jurisdiction that otherwise vested in it under Article 199 of the Constitution---Federal Constitutional Court set aside the order and remanded the matter to High Court for deciding the same afresh in accordance with law---Appeal was allowed. Pakistan Railways v. Karachi Development Authority 2003 SCMR 563 rel. Mian Irfan Akram, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Waseem Mumtaz Malik, Additional Advocate General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 9th December, 2025.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act (XVII of 1996)--- ----Ss.35 & 36---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, R.2(3) [since repealed]---Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2020, R.21---Disciplinary proceedings, challenge to---Constitutional petition, filing of---Maintainability---Non-statutory service rules of transferred employees---Issuance of show cause notice and charge sheet, assailing of---Briefly, matter comprised of multiple constitutional petitions filed by employees of Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL), grouped into two categories: Category “A”, consisting of petitioners who were not employees of the erstwhile Pakistan Telegraph and Telephone Department and joined PTCL after the enactment of the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Act, 1991 and the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996; and Category “B”, consisting of petitioners who were originally employees of the T&T Department and were subsequently transferred first to the Corporation and then to PTCL---The petitions arose out of disciplinary proceedings initiated by PTCL, including the issuance of show-cause notices and charge sheets against the petitioners---All petitions challenged the initiation of disciplinary actions by PTCL and involved questions relating to the nature of employment of the petitioners, the applicable service framework, and the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the petitions---Held: Petitioners of category (A) petitions were neither civil servants nor were they employed as employees of T&T department and were rather appointed by the corporation, therefore, the petitions mentioned in category (A) were not maintainable since the services of these petitioners were never regulated under any statutory rules as they started their employments being employees of corporation and were then transferred to PTCL as transferred employees---After PTCL’s privatization under the Act, 1996 and subsequent amendments thereto, the petitioners’ status in both categories (A & B) seized to be that of civil servants and they were governed by the PTCL’s internal rules and regulations or standing orders---Consequently, the E&D Rules, 1973 were no longer applicable---It was settled by Supreme Court in the case reported as 2021 SCMR 1998 that an employee, who, at no point, had served in T&T department, could not claim that his terms and conditions of service were baptized by any statutory protections---Such employees could not invoke constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution for agitating the grievance pertaining to their service matters---It was the case of the petitioners in category (B) petitions that since the proceedings sought to be initiated against the them were in violations of the E&D Rules 1973, as such proceedings had either not been initiated by mentioning the E&D Rules, 1973 or where even so mentioned, the proceedings were not initiated by the ‘competent authority’, therefore, the proceedings were without jurisdiction---This ground failed for two reasons; firstly, the E&D Rules, 1973 had been repealed by virtue of R. 21 of the Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2020 (E&D Rules, 2020) and the concept or term ‘authorized officer’, as couched in sub-rule (3) of R. 2 of E&D Rules, 1973 had been done away with by the substituted/replaced Rules i.e. E&D Rules, 2020, thus the entire premise of the case sought to be built by the petitioners was without any foundation---Without prejudice to the foregoing, even sub-rule (3) of the R. 2 of E&D Rules, 1973 provided that if no officer was so authorized, the authority could proceed to perform such functions---This was beside the point that the petitioners of category ‘B’ could not insist that they could only and exclusively be proceeded under the E&D Rules, 1973 and the prescribed rules and regulations of Corporation/PTCL, could not be invoked---Mere maintainability of a constitutional petition, owing to statutory protections in terms of Ss. 35 & 36 of the Act, 1996, did not mean that the petitioners could stifle the very essence and purpose of the incorporation of the PTCL and the Act, 1996---It was concluded that the proceedings initiated by the respondent PTCL had lawfully been commenced, therefore, filing of present petitions by way of laying challenges to the mere issuance of the show cause notices and charge sheets were not tenable---All petitions, falling under categories “A” and “B”, were dismissed---Category “A” petitions being held not-maintainable for want of jurisdiction, while category “B” petitions were dismissed on merits. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited v. Muhammad Samiullah 2021 SCMR 1998; Masood Ahmed Bhatti Review judgment 2016 SCMR 1362; Asghar Ali v. PTCL and others PLJ 2025 Lah. 516 = 2025 LHC 922; Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited v. Imran Aziz and others (Civil Appeal No.1509 of 2021); Bilal Hussain v. Present National Bank of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 313 and Lal Khan v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal 1995 SCMR 1758 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Employment---Constitutional petition filed by employee---Terms and conditions of service not being governed by statutory rules---Effect---Maintainability---The alleged violations, if any, quo the terms and conditions of service, if not backed by statutory rules, cannot be redressed while exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited through Chairman v. Iqbal Nasir and others PLD 2011 SC 132; Pakistan Defence Officer’s case 2013 SCMR 1707 and Pakistan Electric Power Company v. Syed Salahuddin and others 2022 SCMR 991 rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Employment---Constitutional petition filed by employee---Maintainability---Statutory rules and non-statutory rules---Distinction--Rules of an organization if not approved by government and having been drafted, approved or adopted for internal arrangement and functioning of such organization are non-statutory. Shafique Ahmed Khan and others v. NESCOM through Chairman, Islamabad and others PLD 2016 SC 377; Ziaullah Khan Niazi v. Chairman, Pakistan Red Crescent Society 2004 SCMR 189; University of the Punjab, Lahore and 2 others v. Ch. Sardar Ali 1992 SCMR 1093; M.H. Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan and 2 others 1994 SCMR 1024 and Muhammad Rafi and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2016 SCMR 2146 rel. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Employment---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Non-statutory rules of service---Adoption of statutory rules of another organization---Effect upon service statues of the employees---Mere adoption of statutory rules does not render the rules statutory for the purpose of organization which adopts such rules. M.H. Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan and 2 others 1994 SCMR 1024 rel. (e) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act (XVII of 1996), Ss.35 & 36---Constitutional petition filed by employees in service of T&T Department---Maintainability---Petitions filed by those employees who were part of the T&T Department would be maintainable for the reason that such employees had statutory rules relating to terms and conditions of their service which were protected by S. 35 read with S. 36 of the Act, 1996---It is not axiomatic that all employees of T&T Department would have ipso facto right to challenge any/all actions, if so initiated against them, by invoking judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited v. Muhammad Samiullah 2021 SCMR 1998 rel. (f) Jurisdiction--- ----Question of jurisdiction has to be decided ahead of all other questions---Jurisdiction lies at the foundation of all legal proceedings and if it is not present, the proceeding is void. [Grahan v. Maingay (1793) RIDG.L&S.20, 72] ref. (g) Master and servant--- ----Principle---Scope---Where conditions of service of an employee of even a statutory body are not regulated by statutory rules and are governed under the terms of a contract or the rules/instructions/regulations for internal use, the relationship of the employee with such instrumentality is governed by the principle of master and servant unless the services are protected in terms of the provisions contained in labour laws. Ishtiaq A. Chaudhary, Hassan Muhammad Rana and Ahmad Fraz Lone for Petitioner. Shahid Anwar Bajwa, Abdul Rahman Bajwa, Rana Nafees, A.D. Shaid, Saad Saleem Rai Ali Shah Marth for PTCL (in W.Ps. Nos.38709, 49394, 53395, 13062, 24612, 12102, 12694 and 64364 of 2024). Barrister Umer Abdullah, Mohammad Ahmad Mughal, Zarak Zaman Khan, Sheikh Waseem Ahmad, Hussain Tahir Zaidi and Miss Zunaira Patrick for Respondents (in W.Ps. Nos.43927 and 28677 of 2023 and 30309 of 2025). Abu Zar Salman Khan Niazi, Zain Sheikh, Umar Bin Khalid Cheema and Wajid Maqsood for Respondents (in W.P. No.6522 of 2025). Syed Faisal Khurshid SM Legal for PTCL and Waqas Mehmood (Manager PTCL). Fawad Haider AM Legal PTCL. Mirza Amir Baig, Abdul Aleem Khan and Saqib Murad for Respondents. Dates of hearing: 24th November, 1st, 3rd, 5th and 9th December, 2025. KHALID ISHAQ, J.--- This judgment will decide the following Constitutional Petitions filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (the "Constitution"), as all these petitions involve common questions of law that require determination by this Court. However, the Constitutional Petitions are divided into two categories, "A" and "B", due to the distinct nature and legal status of the petitioners involved.

Summary: C.P.L.As. Nos. 2199-L and 2211-L of 2024 and 1567 to 1569 of 2025 (Against the judgments dated 29.08.2024 and 05.03.2025, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in W.Ps. Nos. 14891 of 23, 41703 of 2024, 5687 of 2025, 1133 and 5691 of 2025 respectively). and C.M.A. No. 2390 of 2025 in C.P.L.A. No. 1567 of 2025 (Stay application). (a) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)--- ----Ss. 22 (1)(b) & 22A---Old-age benefit regimes---Scope---Two distinct benefit regimes have been provided under Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Monthly old-age pension under S.22(1) of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 payable at the rate specified in the Schedule thereto--- Old-age grant is payable in lump sum at the rate prescribed under S.22A of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Insured person, under the two provisions of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 who has attained the age of sixty years, or fifty-five years in the case of a woman, is entitled to a monthly old-age pension if contributions in respect of him or her have been paid for a period of not less than fifteen (15) years; otherwise, such person is entitled only to an old-age grant. (b) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)--- ----Preamble---Provisions of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 have been enacted to provide economic security, social protection and dignity to employees in their old age, and not to deprive them of pensionary benefits on account of marginal, technical, or inadvertent deficiencies---Where an insured person has substantially fulfilled statutory requirements and has paid contributions for almost the entire qualifying period, denial of a monthly old-age pension for a negligible shortfall would result in grave hardship, arbitrariness, and manifest injustice, thereby undermining the benevolent spirit of the legislation. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Beneficial legislation---Scope---Social welfare and beneficial statutes must be construed liberally so as to advance remedy and suppress mischief sought to be remedied---Courts are, therefore, under a Constitutional and legal duty to adopt a purposive, pragmatic, and equitable interpretation which safeguards rights and legitimate expectations of individuals for whose benefit the statute has been enacted---In appropriate cases, interpretative role of Court becomes essential to prevent irreparable loss, undue hardship, and injustice that may otherwise ensue from a rigid, literal, or technical application of the law. (d) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)--- ----Ss. 22(1)(b), 22A & Schedule, Clause 1---Employees’ Old-age benefits---Duration of service---Rounding off principle---Applicability--- Petitioner of Employees’ old-age benefit institution was aggrieved of judgment passed by High Court allowing claims of respondents of retired employees whose length of service was short of a few months from the duration of 15 years---Validity---Provision of Clause 1 of Schedule to Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 does not merely prescribe a formula for calculation of monthly pension; rather, it also provides pragmatic mechanism for accounting fractional periods of insurable employment---This reflects legislative intent to avoid technical disqualifications on account of insignificant shortfalls and to ensure that substantive rights are not defeated by minor procedural deficiencies---‘Rounding off’ provision contained in Schedule to Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 must be read harmoniously with S.22 of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Any interpretation that excludes its application at the stage of determining eligibility would not only defeat the express legislative scheme but would also result in manifest injustice, thereby frustrating the social-welfare objectives underlying the statute---Acceptance of such interpretation does not create an inconsistency between Ss. 22 & 22A of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Provision of S.22A of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 operates in a distinct and separate field and is intended to cover cases where the insured person falls substantially short of the qualifying period for a pension---Respondents of retired employees did not, in arithmetical terms, complete fifteen full calendar years of employment, as defined under S.2(q) of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Upon application of the principle of ‘rounding off’ expressly provided in Schedule to Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, their period of insurable employment was deemed to have been completed up to fifteen years, as required under proviso to S.22(1)(b) of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Such deeming fiction was not judicially invented but was expressly provided by the Legislature itself through Schedule to Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Once the Schedule to Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 was applied in its proper perspective, respondents of retired employees could not be said to have fallen short of the mandatory requirement---On the contrary respondents of retired employees were to be treated as having satisfied all the conditions prescribed under S.22(1) of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Respondents of retired employees had fulfilled mandatory requirements of Section 22(1) of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 through the statutorily recognized mechanism of ‘rounding off’ and were rightly found entitled to the grant of a monthly old-age pension by High Court---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court which had correctly understood the controversy at hand and made a well-founded decision based on the relevant law on the issue---High Court arrived at a sound and reasoned conclusion that was both legally correct and just and there was no illegality, perversity or misreading or non-reading of evidence in the judgment passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. 2025 PLC 38; Colony Sarhad Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi v. Government of Pakistan and others PLD 1976 SC 227; Abdus Salam Khan v. Salim-Ud-Din Ahmad Siddiqui and 2 others PLD 1979 Lah. 85; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division and another v. Abdul Rasheed Memon 2025 SCMR 532; State of U.P. and others v. Pawan Kumar Tiwari and others AIR 2005 SC 658 and Pakistan, through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Himayatullah Farukhi PLD 1969 SC 407 rel. (e) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)--- ----Ss. 22(1)(b), 22A & Sched., Clause 1---Employees’ old-age benefits---Rounding off, principle of---Fractional periods---Calculation---Where statute itself prescribes a method for dealing with fractional periods of service, such a method necessarily informs and influences determination of eligibility---Any contrary interpretation would render such rounding-off provision redundant and ineffective, which is impermissible. (f) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Schedule to an Act---Object, purpose and scope---Schedule forms an integral part of the Act and falls squarely within the ambit of its provisions---Schedule operates as an extension of the section that introduces or attracts it--- Ordinarily, material is placed in a Schedule because it is too detailed, elaborate, or lengthy, which cannot be conveniently incorporated within the body of a section---Such placement does not diminish its legal force or binding effect, which remains coextensive with the substantive provisions of the Act. Messrs MCB Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue 2014 PTD 1874 and Mars, Incorporated through Authorized Signatory and others v. the Registrar of Trade Marks and others 2019 CLD 27 rel. (g) Maxim--- ----Ut res magis valeat quam pereat---Applicability---Maxim ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’ mandates that a construction be adopted that gives efficacy to the statute rather than having it fail. (h) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art.114---Estoppel---Principle of promissory estoppel---Scope---Principle of promissory estoppel restrains a public authority from resiling from a position that has been consciously adopted and acted upon by affected persons, unless an overriding public interest so demands and such departure is sanctioned by law. Hafeez Saeed Akhtar, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Umar Riaz, Advocate Supreme Court, Abdul Ahad Memon, Director (Law) and Sukhan Ilyas, Deputy Director (Law) for Petitioners. Hassan Lateef Chaudhry, Advocate High Court (with special permission of the Court) along with Shahbaz Hussain, Respondent No. 3 for Respondents. Date of hearing: 9th December, 2025.

Summary: (a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Ss.15, 19 & 25---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Rules, 2018, Rr.3 & 4---Eexecution of a banking case---Decree holder bank seeking to sell mortgaged properties itself without intervention of Banking Court---Permissibility---Legality---Brief facts of the matter were that the execution proceedings were pending before the Banking Court, whereby, notices were issued and court auctioneers were appointed to proceed with the court auction, however, before any meaningful auction steps were taken, the decree holder bank filed an application under S.19(3) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 read with Rr. 3 & 4 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Rules, 2018, seeking leave to sell the mortgaged/charged properties itself through public auction without court intervention, while the judgment-debtors objected that once C.P.C. mode was adopted the bank could not switch---Therefore, the issue requiring determination before the Court was “whether the Banking Court was precluded to grant permission to the decree holder to sell the charged property by itself through public auction or sealed tenders after it had commenced execution proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the C.P.C. under S. 19 of the Ordinance?”---Held: The Ordinance, 2001 has endeavored to provide for multiple options regarding execution of a banking Decree so that the same is satisfied within a reasonable time---Section 19 of the Ordinance was a complete code for execution of a banking decree and granted certain definite and substantive rights to a financial institution, subject to the conditions prescribed under S. 19 read with relevant and applicable provisions of S. 15 of the Ordinance, 2001---Financial institution could sell or cause to be sold, the charged properties of the judgment debtor subject of decree either with or without the intervention of the Banking Court either by public auction or by inviting sealed tenders and appropriate the proceeds towards total or partial satisfaction of the decree---The decree constituted and conferred sufficient power and authority to a financial institution qua sale of charged assets and a financial institution could transfer marketable title subject to the remedies extended in terms of relevant and applicable provisions of Ss.15 & 19 of the Ordinance, 2001---In the present case, the sale of charged properties by the decree holder bank through public auction without intervention of the Court was likely to complete at a faster time track and could save precious time of the Court---Mortgaged properties were allowed to be sold through public auction by the decree holder bank without intervention of the Court in accordance with prescribed procedure---Application filed by the decree holder bank was allowed, in circumstances. Shahida Bibi and others v. Habib Bank Limited and others PLD 2016 SC 995 rel. (b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Ss.15 & 19---Decree holder bank seeking to sell the mortgaged properties itself through public auction without intervention of the Banking Court---Validity---Banking Court is empowered to grant permission to the decree holder at any stage of execution proceedings to exercise the option to sell charged property by way of mortgage, pledge or hypothecation without intervention of the Court either by sealed tenders or public auction subject to conditions and a conscious order passed in this respect under S. 19(1) read with S. 19(3) of the Ordinance, 2001. (c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S.19(2)---Execution of a banking decree---Modes of execution available to Banking Court stated---Section 19(2) of the Ordinance, 2001 provides three explicit modes to the Banking Court to execute a banking decree, (a) in accordance with the provisions of the C.P.C; or (b) in accordance with any other law for the time being in force; or (c) in such manner as the Banking Court may at the request of the decree holder consider appropriate, including recovery as arrears of land revenue. (d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S.19(1)---Automatic conversion of suit into execution---Requirement of instituting separate execution application and issuing notices to judgment debtor, exception to---Section 19(1) of the Ordinance, 2001 provides for automatic conversion of suit into execution proceedings without the need to file a separate application and issue fresh notice to the judgment debtors. Syed Muhammad Kaswar Gardezi for Applicant. Mughees Aslam Malik for Judgment Debtors Nos.1 to 5 (a & b).