Summary: (a) Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967----S. 166---Correction of revenue record---Scope of power---Clerical or arithmetical mistakes---Settlement entry undisturbed for about forty-four years---Land recorded as Ghair Mumkin Garha Khad in 1954-55 and 1958-59 records but, during settlement operations of 1971-72 (when old Khasra No.342 was renumbered 369), recorded as Ghair Mumkin Kulli and so carried forward---District Collector, on application of private respondent, replaced the description by summary order dated 11.08.2015---Held, that S. 166 confers a narrowly circumscribed power to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes in a decree or order, or errors arising therein from accidental slip or omission; the provision is corrective, not adjudicatory, and does not authorise reopening of concluded settlement proceedings or determination of disputed proprietary or possessory rights under guise of correcting the record---Distinction between clerical correction and substantive adjudication depends not on the label but on the nature of the alleged error, the effect of its correction and the inquiry required to establish it; an alteration does not become clerical merely because described as a "correction"---Mere fact that an earlier record carried a different description did not establish that the subsequent settlement entry resulted from clerical mistake or accidental slip; determining how the alteration occurred, whether it was a conscious settlement exercise, and the effect of reversal on rights and possession required an inquiry beyond S. 166---District Collector exceeded his limited power. Cited Cases: • Faiz Ullah Khan v. Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore PLD 2026 FCC 97 (b) Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967----S. 172(2)(vi)---Revenue entries---Presumption of correctness---Competing proprietary or possessory claims---Jurisdiction of Civil Court---Held, that revenue entries do not by themselves confer title but carry a rebuttable presumption of correctness; long-standing entries forming part of the record-of-rights cannot be displaced on oral assertions, and the presumption must be rebutted by sufficient and convincing evidence---Where challenge to an entry involves competing proprietary or possessory claims, such claims require adjudication by a competent Civil Court---Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court in S. 172(2)(vi) must be understood in light of the distinction between correction of revenue record and adjudication of substantive rights; it applies to corrections within exclusive competence of revenue authorities and cannot be extended to adjudication of disputed rights merely because it may entail a consequential alteration in the revenue record; exclusive authority of revenue authorities extends only to entries which are not controversial. Cited Cases: • Inayat Khan v. Allah Ditta 2007 SCMR 655 • Mazloom Hussain v. Abid Hussain PLD 2008 SC 571 • Mehr Khan v. Mst. Basaee PLD 2008 SC 612 • Dildar Ahmad v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore 2013 SCMR 906 (c) Natural justice---Denial of hearing---Persons in recorded possession neither impleaded nor heard---Appellate affirmance does not cure defect---Petitioners, whose predecessors were shown in the cultivation column and who were in possession with constructions, were neither impleaded nor heard before District Collector's order---Held, that denial of opportunity of hearing was an independent infirmity; an entry carrying such consequences could not lawfully be altered behind their backs, and the order amounted in substance to determination of contested rights without lawful authority or due process---Subsequent appeal did not cure the defect since the Additional Commissioner undertook no fresh factual inquiry nor afforded effective opportunity to contest the reports or adduce evidence, and merely endorsed the Collector's conclusion; an appellate affirmance that leaves the underlying denial of fair hearing unaddressed cannot cure the original procedural defect. (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 199---Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967, S. 164---Shamlat Deh---Revisional jurisdiction of Board of Revenue---Scope of constitutional review---High Court acting as appellate court---High Court restored Collector's and Commissioner's orders reasoning that land described as Shamlat Deh and earlier recorded as Ghair Mumkin Garha Khad was public property which revenue authorities were bound to rectify---Held, that this reasoning proceeded on an assumption that itself required determination; description of the proprietary body as Shamlat Deh Hasb-e-Hisas Paimana Malkiat did not by itself establish that land vested absolutely in the State or that every person in possession was an encroacher, rights in Shamlat Deh being determinable with reference to the Wajib-ul-Arz, revenue record, nature and purpose of reservation, shares of village proprietors and applicable law; character of land as Shamlat Deh and legality of settlement entry are distinct questions---Obligation of State to protect communal property from unlawful occupation is unquestionable but cannot dispense with lawful authority, relevant evidence and due process to first determine whether occupation is unlawful---Earlier civil proceedings, being withdrawn or inconclusive, neither established the private respondent's claim nor vested the Collector with jurisdiction, and further showed that competing claims required adjudication---Member, Board of Revenue, exercising revisional jurisdiction under S. 164, was competent to examine legality and propriety of subordinate orders and rightly set them aside; his order disclosed neither jurisdictional defect nor perversity warranting interference under Art. 199---High Court reassessed merits as if exercising appellate jurisdiction, substituted its own conclusions on character of land and legality of possession and identified no sustainable ground for disturbing the revisional order---Clarified that neither the revisional order nor the judgment confers title on petitioners, legitimises encroachment or bars a competent authority or aggrieved person from pursuing appropriate remedy in accordance with law; questions of title, possession, shares in Shamlat Deh and permissibility of constructions, if raised before a competent forum, to be determined independently on pleadings and evidence after hearing all affected parties; decision confined to legality of the summary correction. Disposition: Petition for leave to appeal converted into appeal and allowed; judgment dated 13.10.2025 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore in W.P. No.215416/2018 set aside and order dated 15.03.2018 of the Member (Judicial-VII), Board of Revenue, Punjab restored; parties to bear their own costs. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Supreme Court Rules, 1980----O. XXIII, R. 8, first proviso---Supreme Court Rules, 2025---Petition for leave to appeal in a criminal matter---Mandatory surrender to order of imprisonment---Condition precedent to entertainment of petition---Criminal miscellaneous appeal against office objection---Office of the Supreme Court raised an objection to entertainability of the petition for want of surrender to the sentence---It was stated before the Court that the appellant had been dealt with by the Judicial Magistrate, Section-30, Lahore, in a complaint under Ss. 22-A and 24-A of the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011 (Amended Act, 2015), that the sentence awarded was less than one year, that execution had been postponed and bail extended to enable filing of an appeal subject to surety bonds of Rs.200,000, and that the High Court by order dated 01.08.2025 had dismissed the matter as time-barred---Counsel submitted that the appellant was ready to surrender and to furnish surety, and that the office objection was misplaced---Held, that the first proviso to O. XXIII, R. 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 stipulated that unless surrender was first made to an order of imprisonment, the petition shall not be entertained---There was no change in that requirement between the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 and the Supreme Court Rules, 2025---Decision in the Muhammad Adnan case was squarely applicable---Objection raised by the office was in accordance with law and correct. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Adnan case (as applied in the order) Disposition: Office objection upheld; Criminal Miscellaneous Appeal dismissed. (Crl. M. Appeal No. 37 of 2025 in C.P.L.A. Nil of 2025, Supreme Court of Pakistan, Islamabad, 16.07.2026)

Summary: (a) West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967----S. 52---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Mutation of gift---Presumption of truth attached to revenue record---Concurrent findings---Respondent No.1 instituted a suit for declaration and permanent injunction claiming ownership and peaceful possession of a 1/16 share measuring 2 rode, 9 pole in Khewat Khatooni No.133/135, Khasra No.264, Mahal and Mauza Ismailzai, Tappa Manzaki, Tehsil and District Pishin, on the basis of Mutation No.448 dated 30.10.1998, reference Mutation No.374, recording a gift (hiba) from his father-in-law, Akhtar Muhammad---Petitioners, for the first time in the written statement, alleged that the mutation was fake and that there was no valid gift---Neither the petitioners nor the legal heirs of Akhtar Muhammad (two sons and three daughters) challenged the gift or Mutation No.448 before the revenue authorities or any court of law---Held, that official revenue entries and mutations recorded by public officers in the discharge of official duties in periodic record of rights such as jamabandis and Khasra Girdwari carried a statutory presumption of truth unless disproved by cogent and convincing evidence under S. 52 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967---Mutations Nos.374 and 448, duly incorporated in the revenue record on 30.10.1998 and never disputed or challenged, constituted valid official record---Petitioners having failed to produce any material to rebut those longstanding entries could not displace the statutory presumption---Mere allegation against a gift or revenue entry, without approaching the revenue authorities or a court of competent jurisdiction seeking cancellation, and without specifically alleging fraud or forgery in execution or registration of the gift, could not be given heed in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against alleged encroachment---Respondent No.1, through his own statement, two witnesses and the Halqa Patwari who produced Mutations Nos.374 and 448, established continued uninterrupted possession of the claimed share; testimony of the three witnesses could not be shaken---Petitioners could not establish through evidence any right, title or even possession over the property---No factual error or legal infirmity was found in the concurrent findings of the Trial Court, Appellate Court and High Court in revisional jurisdiction---Interference declined and leave refused. Cited Cases: • Mst. Jehan Bano and others v. Mehraban Shah and others 2024 SCMR 1096 • Mazloom Hussain v. Abid Hussain and others PLD 2008 SC 571 • Abdul Ahad v. Roshan Din PLD 1979 SC 890 • Hakim Khan v. Aurangzeb 1979 SCMR 625 • Aurangzeb v. Muhammad Jaffar 2007 SCMR 236 • Muhammad Amir v. Mst. Beevi 2007 SCMR 614 Disposition: Petition dismissed and leave refused. (Civil Petition No.155-Q of 2022, against judgment dated 21.09.2022 of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in Civil Revision No.313 of 2021; Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 15.07.2026, by Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, J.; Approved for Reporting)

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969----Ss. 25, 25(1), 25(9) & 25A---Customs Rules, 2001---Determination of customs value---Sequential methods of valuation---Fall-back method---Scope---Importers of tyres and tubes produced commercial invoices, letters of credit and C&F price lists of foreign exporters to establish transactional value---Customs authorities, without declaring such documents forged or fake and without confronting the importers with adverse material, discarded declared transactional values and, while issuing Valuation Rulings Nos.1543/2021, 1544/2021 and 1545/2021 dated 03.08.2021, resorted directly to the fall-back method under S. 25(9)---Held, that S. 25 of the Customs Act, 1969 prescribed a sequential order for determination of true transactional customs value---Direct resort to the fall-back method under S. 25(9), bypassing the methods in sub-sections (1), (5), (6), (7) and (8), was not supported by the statute---Fall-back method applied only if those earlier methods could not be applied; its application was subject to the Customs Rules, 2001; and value had still to be derived from among the methods specified in those sub-sections, applied in a flexible manner---Those sub-sections could not be pushed aside or ignored---Where importer produced material supporting transactional value and authorities possessed no concrete contrary evidence, after due confrontation as required by S. 25, sequential methods had to be followed---Issue as to sequential method of valuation had attained finality. Cited Cases: • Sadia Jabbar and 3 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad and others 2012 SCMR 617 • Federation of Pakistan vs. Sadia Jabbar C.A.895/2011 alongwith C.As.863 to 903/2011, dismissed vide order dated 09.01.2024 • Goodwill Traders, Karachi v Federation of Pakistan 2014 PTD 176 (b) Customs Act, 1969----S. 25A---Valuation Ruling---Determination of higher values of tyres and tubes---Director General (Customs Valuation) did not collect credible data to justify higher determination of value of the subject goods, nor provided credible evidence of increase in prices of input raw materials such as natural rubber, synthetic rubber, steel cord or carbon black during the period in question, which could justify determination of higher value under S. 25A---Customs Appellate Tribunal's finding that uncontroverted import documents were sufficient to establish applicability of the primary valuation method under S. 25(1), particularly in the absence of adverse material to discard such valuation, and that the Director, while determining value under S. 25A, did not specify any reason for discarding methods preceding the fall-back method under S. 25(9), was neither perverse nor contrary to the record. (c) Customs Act, 1969----S. 196---Reference jurisdiction of High Court---Findings of fact of Customs Appellate Tribunal---Scope---Customs Appellate Tribunal is the final forum for determination of facts in tax and customs matters, and its findings of fact cannot be disturbed by the High Court under reference jurisdiction unless shown to be perverse, based on surmises and conjectures, or entirely unsupported by evidence on record---Domain of High Court while exercising reference jurisdiction under the Customs Act, 1969 is strictly limited to deciding questions of law; it cannot go behind or substitute findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal unless a proper question of law challenging the same as perverse or contrary to the record is competently raised---In the present cases no specific question relating to finding of fact as perverse or contrary to the record was raised by the department; questions proposed related to powers of Director and Director General of Customs Valuation under Ss. 25A and 25D---High Court, while exercising reference jurisdiction, could not dispute such findings of fact in a summary manner, particularly when no such specific question was formulated. Cited Cases: • Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Messrs Sargodha Spinning Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. 2022 SCMR 1082 • Messrs Middle East Construction Company v. The Collector of Customs 2023 SCMR 838 • National Logistics Cell, Government of Pakistan v. The Collector of Customs 2023 SCMR 1325 --------- Disposition: Civil petitions converted into appeals and allowed; impugned order dated 29.02.2024 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Special Customs Reference Application Nos.650 to 661 and 669 to 680 of 2022 set aside; judgment dated 26.07.2022 of the Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi restored in respect of all appellants. (Civil Petition Nos.306-K to 329-K of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 15.07.2026; Yahya Afridi, CJ, Irfan Saadat Khan and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ. Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991----S.13---Right of pre-emption---Nature of right---Mandatory Talbs---Agricultural land measuring 66 Kanals and 01 Marla in Mauza Langar Pakhral, Tehsil Sohawa, District Jhelum, was transferred in favour of appellant through Mutation No.408 dated 15.07.2002---Predecessor-in-interest of respondents instituted suit for possession through pre-emption on 11.11.2002, asserting that sale had been effected for Rs.198,000/-, that he received information of sale on 07.10.2002 at about 9:00 a.m. from one Javed Hussain in presence of Karam Hussain, immediately performed Talb-i-Muwathibat, and dispatched notice of Talb-i-Ishhad on 08.10.2002---Trial Court, vide judgment and decree dated 01.12.2006, held that Talbs had been established but dismissed suit on ground that pre-emptor had failed to establish superior right vis-a-vis appellant---First appellate Court, vide judgment and decree dated 13.03.2010, partly decreed suit to extent of fifty percent of suit property, holding both parties to be co-sharers in the Khata---High Court, vide judgment dated 13.06.2019, dismissed appellant's revision, allowed respondents' revision, treated findings on Talbs as having attained finality, and decreed suit in its entirety---Held, that right of pre-emption is not a right to acquire property in the ordinary sense but a right of substitution, whereby pre-emptor seeks to displace a completed sale and step into shoes of vendee---Owing to its very nature, the right has consistently been described as a weak, feeble and fragile right, capable of defeating a lawful transfer of property only when every statutory requirement prescribed for its exercise is strictly complied with---A claimant seeking enforcement of such right must plead and prove the same as required by law, and any deficiency in respect thereof is fatal to his claim---Statutory scheme embodied in S.13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, recognizes three demands, namely Talb-i-Muwathibat, Talb-i-Ishhad and Talb-i-Khusumat---Of these, Talb-i-Muwathibat occupies a position of paramount importance, for it constitutes the very foundation upon which subsequent demands are built---Failure of the foundational demand necessarily renders all subsequent acts legally inconsequential. Mian Pir Muhammad v. Faqir Muhammad PLD 2007 SC 302; Haji Muhammad Salem v. Khuda Bakhsh PLD 2003 SC 315; Fazal Suhhan v. Mst. Sahib Jamala PLD 2005 SC 977; Khyber Khan v. Haji Malik Amanullah Khan 2007 SCMR 1036; Dr. Pir Muhammad Khan v. Khuda Bakhsh 2015 SCMR 1243; Farid Ullah Khan v. Irfan Ullah Khan 2022 SCMR 1231; Sardar Muhammad v. Taj Muhammad 2023 SCMR 1113; Kashmali Khan v. Mst. Malala 2023 SCMR 1176 and Ghulam Abbas v. Abdul Sattar 2026 SCP 172 ref. (b) Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991----S.13---Talb-i-Muwathibat---Pleading of date, time and place---Proof of first knowledge---Complete chain of information---Material contradictions---Talb-i-Muwathibat is commonly understood as a "jumping demand", that is, an immediate and spontaneous assertion of the right of pre-emption the moment knowledge of the sale is acquired---Law insists upon strict pleading of date, time and place of such demand because only then can the Court determine whether the demand was made instantly and without avoidable delay---Said particulars are not matters of form but of substance going to the root of the claim---Where plaint itself does not disclose mandatory particulars of the demand, the claim becomes legally deficient at its inception and no amount of evidence subsequently led can cure the defect---Omission to mention even one of the three essential particulars---date, time or place---of Talb-i-Muwathibat is sufficient to defeat the claim---Validity of Talb-i-Muwathibat is inextricably linked with proof of first knowledge---Unless the source from which information regarding the sale reached the pre-emptor is satisfactorily proved through confidence-inspiring evidence, it becomes impossible for the Court to determine whether the demand was made immediately upon receipt of information or after unexplained delay---Only a complete chain regarding transmission of information concerning the sale can establish the essential ingredients of Talb-i-Muwathibat, namely (i) the exact time, date and place at which the pre-emptor first acquired knowledge of the sale, and (ii) the immediate declaration of intention by the pre-emptor to exercise the right of pre-emption---Where the source from whom the informer acquired the information remains unproved, the entire foundation of Talb-i-Muwathibat becomes doubtful---Statement of original plaintiff as P.W.4, viewed in light of meaning of "immediate" as occurring without delay or instant, was found wanting---Pleadings were silent as to how the informer received information about the disputed transaction---Respondents failed to establish the complete chain through which information regarding the sale allegedly reached the pre-emptor---Evidence was marred by material contradictions regarding the alleged Majlis, identity of persons present, circumstances in which information was conveyed, and performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat, which were not minor discrepancies attributable to lapse of memory but related to foundational facts---Where the right asserted is a weak and feeble right requiring strict compliance with statutory conditions, contradictions touching upon source of information, constitution of Majlis, identity of witnesses to the demand and circumstances surrounding performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat cannot be brushed aside as inconsequential---Finding of Courts below regarding valid performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat could not be sustained---Where first Talb is not proved in accordance with law, the entire superstructure of the claim for pre-emption collapses. Muhammad Riaz v. Muhammad Akram 2024 SCMR 692; Farid Ullah Khan v. Irfan Ullah Khan 2022 SCMR 1231; Ghulam Abbas v. Abdul Sattar 2026 SCP 172; Mian Pir Muhammad v. Faqir Muhammad PLD 2007 SC 302; Khyber Khan v. Haji Malik Amanullah Khan 2007 SCMR 1036 and Kashmali Khan v. Mst. Malala 2023 SCMR 1176 ref. (c) Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991----S.13(3)---Talb-i-Ishhad---Affirmation of intention---Service of notice---Burden of proof---Under S.13(3) of the Act, the pre-emptor is obliged, after making Talb-i-Muwathibat, to affirm and confirm his intention to exercise the right of pre-emption by making Talb-i-Ishhad in presence of two truthful witnesses and by serving notice upon the vendee in the manner recognized by law---Service of notice relating to Talb-i-Ishhad upon the vendee is a mandatory requirement and failure to prove performance of even one Talb is sufficient to defeat the entire claim---Where service of notice is denied, the burden squarely lies upon the pre-emptor to prove such service through legally admissible evidence---Mere dispatch of a notice does not constitute proof of service---Proof of dispatch alone is not enough; what must be established is service in the manner contemplated by law---Notice relied upon by respondents did not clearly disclose affirmation and confirmation of intention to exercise the right of pre-emption in the manner contemplated by S.13(3) of the Act---Once making of Talb-i-Muwathibat became doubtful, subsequent Talb-i-Ishhad necessarily lost its legal foundation---Even independently viewed, evidence led by respondents fell short of the strict standard required for proving Talb-i-Ishhad. Sardar Muhammad v. Taj Muhammad 2023 SCMR 1113; Mir Muhammad Khan v. Haider PLD 2020 SC 233; Bashir Ahmed v. Ghulam Rasool 2011 SCMR 762; Munawar Hussain v. Afaq Ahmed 2013 SCMR 721; Sherzali v. Saad Ullah Khan Civil Appeal No.888 of 2020 and Farid Ullah Khan v. Irfan Ullah Khan 2022 SCMR 1231 ref. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.115---Revisional jurisdiction of High Court---Pre-emption---Findings of Courts below at variance or vitiated by misreading or non-reading of evidence---Duty of High Court to re-examine evidence---Selective scrutiny of issues---High Court independently appraised evidence on question of appellant's alleged co-sharership but declined to subject evidence relating to Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad to the same degree of scrutiny, principally on the premise that findings of trial Court on those issues had attained finality---Held, that where judgments of Courts below are at variance, or where findings recorded by them suffer from misreading or non-reading of material evidence resulting in miscarriage of justice, High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under S.115, C.P.C., is not merely empowered but is under a duty to re-examine the evidence and determine which of the conflicting views is in accordance with the record and the law---Interference in revision is warranted where findings of Courts below are vitiated by material irregularity or misreading of evidence resulting in failure of justice---Where conflicting findings are before High Court, or where findings suffer from material irregularity occasioned by misreading or non-reading of evidence, High Court is duty-bound to undertake an independent appraisal of the record---Selective exercise of revisional jurisdiction, by treating findings on Talbs as having attained finality while independently examining co-sharership, was contrary to settled principles. G.M. Sikdar v. The Controller of Import And Export PLD 1970 SC 158; Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan PLD 1970 SC 173; Shaukat Nawaz v. Muhammad Siddique 1988 SCMR 851; Abdul Rashid v. Muhammad Yaseen 2010 SCMR 1871; Amir Haider v. Shabir Ahmad 2000 SCMR 859; Qutab Din v. Muhammad Ashraf 2005 SCMR 1103 and Karim Bakhsh v. Jindwadda Shah 2005 SCMR 1518 ref. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. XLI, R.33---Cross-objections---Distinction between challenging a decree and supporting a decree---High Court declined to examine legality of Talbs on ground that no cross-objections had been filed against findings of trial Court regarding performance of Talbs---Held, that a respondent, without filing cross-objections, is fully entitled to support a decree on any ground available on the record, including a ground decided against him by the Court below---Requirement of cross-objections arises only where a party seeks to attack or vary the decree itself---Powers conferred upon an appellate Court under O. XLI, R.33, C.P.C. are sufficiently wide to enable it to pass such decree or order as ought to have been passed, notwithstanding absence of any appeal or cross-objections---An appeal is a continuation of original proceedings and appellate Court is under an obligation to reconsider the controversy afresh, both on facts and law---Failure to file cross-objections does not preclude a party from canvassing a question of law before the appellate forum, nor does it divest the appellate Court of jurisdiction to examine and determine such question---Appellant had consistently questioned legality of respondents' claim and specifically assailed findings relating to performance of Talbs, and the issue was alive before High Court---Questions relating to Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad constituted the very foundation of respondents' entitlement to a decree---Once the decree of first appellate Court was under challenge, High Court was under a duty to examine whether mandatory statutory requirements governing exercise of the right of pre-emption had in fact been satisfied---High Court overlooked the settled distinction between assailing a decree and supporting a decree on alternative grounds---Supreme Court independently examined pleadings and evidence relating to Talbs and found that respondents failed to establish the mandatory requirements prescribed by law---Respondents were not entitled to a decree for possession through pre-emption. Shahro v. Mst. Fatima PLD 1998 SC 1512 and Mushtaq-ul-Aarifeen v. Mumtaz Muhammad 2022 SCMR 55 ref. Cited Cases: • Mian Pir Muhammad and another v. Faqir Muhammad through L.Rs. and others PLD 2007 SC 302 • Haji Muhammad Salem v. Khuda Bakhsh PLD 2003 SC 315 • Fazal Suhhan and others v. Mst. Sahib Jamala and others PLD 2005 SC 977 • Khyber Khan and others v. Haji Malik Amanullah Khan 2007 SCMR 1036 • Dr. Pir Muhammad Khan v. Khuda Bakhsh 2015 SCMR 1243 • Farid Ullah Khan v. Irfan Ullah Khan 2022 SCMR 1231 • Sardar Muhammad (deceased) through LRs v. Taj Muhammad (deceased) through LRs and others 2023 SCMR 1113 • Kashmali Khan and others v. Mst. Malala 2023 SCMR 1176 • Ghulam Abbas v. Abdul Sattar and another 2026 SCP 172 • Muhammad Riaz v. Muhammad Akram and others 2024 SCMR 692 • Mir Muhammad Khan and others v. Haider and others PLD 2020 SC 233 • Bashir Ahmed v. Ghulam Rasool 2011 SCMR 762 • Munawar Hussain v. Afaq Ahmed 2013 SCMR 721 • Sherzali and others v. Saad Ullah Khan Civil Appeal No.888 of 2020 • G.M. Sikdar v. The Controller of Import And Export and 2 Others PLD 1970 SC 158 • Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan PLD 1970 SC 173 • Shaukat Nawaz v. Muhammad Siddique 1988 SCMR 851 • Abdul Rashid v. Muhammad Yaseen and another 2010 SCMR 1871 • Amir Haider v. Shabir Ahmad through Legal Heirs and others 2000 SCMR 859 • Qutab Din and another v. Muhammad Ashraf and others 2005 SCMR 1103 • Karim Bakhsh through L.Rs. and others v. Jindwadda Shah and others 2005 SCMR 1518 • Shahro and others v. Mst. Fatima and others PLD 1998 SC 1512 • Mushtaq-ul-Aarifeen and others v. Mumtaz Muhammad and others 2022 SCMR 55 Disposition: Civil Appeal allowed; judgment dated 13.06.2019 of Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, in Civil Revisions Nos.315-D and 360-D of 2010, and judgment and decree dated 13.03.2010 of first appellate Court, set aside; judgment and decree dated 01.12.2006 of trial Court dismissing the suit restored, albeit for reasons different from those recorded by trial Court; no order as to costs; C.P.L.A. No.3740/2019 disposed of in the same terms. (C.A. No.1543/2019 a/w C.P.L.A. No.3740/2019, announced in open Court on 13.07.2026, by Shahid Bilal Hassan, J. (Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Musarrat Hilali, JJ. on the Bench); Approved For Reporting)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 10-A & 189---Review jurisdiction---Review of Supreme Court judgment dated 21.08.2024 in C.P.L.A. No. 304/2022 by Federal Constitutional Court---Inherent power to correct error---Miscarriage of justice---Persons not heard---Supreme Court upheld High Court judgment and made general declarations that any lease, licence, allotment or permission granted for operation of restaurants within Margalla Hills National Park (MHNP) was contrary to Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979 and of no legal effect, and review petitions filed by other aggrieved parties were dismissed on 03.09.2024 without effective opportunity to present case to present petitioners, who were arrayed as respondents---Held, that case represented an exceptional instance where limits of judicial power were transgressed, resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, findings of final and conclusive nature having been recorded on questions that fell within exclusive domain of Civil Court, affecting rights and liabilities of persons who were neither parties nor afforded opportunity of being heard as per mandate of Art. 10-A---Judgment affecting rights of persons who have not been heard cannot ordinarily be permitted to attain finality merely because pronounced by highest Court---Duty to correct an error is an obligation cast upon every Judge by oath of office, power to rectify a manifest wrong does not depend on existence of enabling procedural rule but inheres in function of Court, and where an error has occasioned injustice it is Court's bounden duty to correct it---Where a Court by adopting particular procedure does something it never intended resulting in miscarriage of justice, it possesses inherent jurisdiction to rectify the error---Rules of procedure and technicalities cannot obstruct administration of justice, and law must bend in aid of justice---Where error identified in review petition arose from mistaken assumption of fact or law, and earlier judgment would not have been rendered but for such erroneous assumption, nothing precludes Court from recalling or rectifying error in review jurisdiction---Errors were glaring, self-evident, found floating on surface of record and had material bearing on final result. Cited Cases: • Chairman, Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education, Lahore v. Ali Mir 1984 SCMR 433 • Suba through Legal Heirs v. Fatima Bibi through Legal Heirs 1996 SCMR 158 (b) Civil Procedure Code, 1908----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Interlocutory proceedings---Civil revision and first appeal against order (F.A.O.) arising from refusal of temporary injunction---Pending civil suits---Scope of High Court's jurisdiction---Monal Group of Companies instituted suit on 27.02.2021 against CDA and others seeking declaration that it was lawful lessee of Remount, Veterinary and Farms Directorate (RV&FD) under agreement dated 30.09.2019, and Metropolitan Corporation instituted separate suit on 31.07.2021 seeking eviction; High Court clubbed Civil Revision and F.A.O. with public interest writ petitions regarding MHNP, declared 2019 Agreement void and directed CDA to conduct inquiry---Held, that Civil Revision and F.A.O. arose from interlocutory proceedings only while substantive disputes remained sub judice before Civil Court and were yet to be adjudicated after parties had full opportunity to lead evidence---High Court was required to decide those proceedings independently, making only tentative observations so that merits of pending main cases remained uninfluenced---High Court, transgressing limits of its jurisdiction, adjudicated entire controversy pending before Civil Court, held that RV&FD lacked jurisdiction and authority to execute 2019 Agreement and declared it void, made observations regarding other restaurants not before it and directed CDA to conduct inquiry to identify officials responsible---Supreme Court failed to discharge its judicial duty in affirming that judgment and again failed to correct the illegality in review. (c) Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979 (repealed)---Islamabad Nature Conservation and Wildlife Management Act, 2024, Ss. 3 & 12(3), (4)---Margalla Hills National Park---Restaurant site---Ownership, lease and rent---Jurisdiction of Capital Development Authority---Held, that questions relating to entitlement to or ownership of restaurant site, its handing over to respondent by lease and recovery of rent therefrom involve disputed questions of fact requiring adjudication by competent Civil Court after parties lead evidence, and conclusion in impugned judgment that any lease, licence, allotment or permission for operation of restaurants within MHNP was contrary to Ordinance of 1979 and of no legal effect was contrary to law and facts and was set aside to that extent---MHNP forms an integral part of Islamabad Capital Territory and is subject to laws, rules and regulations applicable to Federal Capital, hence approval of any construction plan or building activity for public purpose within MHNP falls within statutory jurisdiction of CDA---Findings that Islamabad Wildlife Management Board is entitled to withdraw amount of rent deposited by respondent in Court for preservation, conservation and management of MHNP, and that the Board may regulate certain activities within MHNP by issuing licences, were contrary to law and set aside; all matters regarding administration of MHNP to be regulated by CDA strictly in accordance with applicable law, rules and regulations---Ordinance of 1979 having been repealed, the Nature Conservation and Wildlife Management Board constituted under S. 3 of the Act of 2024 is responsible for implementing the Act, including ensuring that construction of rest houses, hotels and other buildings for the public within MHNP complies with S. 12(3) and (4) thereof---High Court lost sight of this legal position and rendered judgment causing grave miscarriage of justice. (d) Review---Consequential or derivative judgments---Held, that once the impugned judgment of Supreme Court was reviewed to the aforesaid extent, every consequential or derivative judgment founded thereon, including the review judgment dated 03.09.2024, cannot survive independently and must also fall. Disposition: Review petitions (C.R.P. No. 825/2024 and F.C.R.P. No. 44/2025) allowed, for detailed reasons to be recorded later; judgment dated 21.08.2024 of the Supreme Court in C.P.L.A. No. 304/2022 reviewed and set aside to the extent indicated in clauses I to V of the order, and consequential judgments including the review judgment fall; concerned Civil Court to take up the suits together by consolidating them and proceed from the stage at which they stood before the impugned judgments, parties being at liberty to file fresh application for interim relief, to be decided in accordance with law without being influenced by earlier judgments/orders, and thereafter to decide the consolidated suits expeditiously on merits after equal, fair and adequate opportunity to produce evidence; Miscellaneous Application No. 3108 of 2026 and other pending miscellaneous applications disposed of; no order as to costs. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 175F(1) & (2), 188---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O. XXVI, Rr. 1-4 & 9---Supreme Court Rules, 2025, R. 1(3)---Review jurisdiction---Transfer of pending review petitions to Federal Constitutional Court---Procedure---Held, review petitions covered by Art. 175F(1) pending before the Supreme Court immediately prior to the Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025 stood transferred to the Federal Constitutional Court by operation of Art. 175F(2)---Rules of 1980 were revoked by Supreme Court Rules, 2025 (notified on 06.08.2025 and subsequently adopted by the Court), but R. 1(3) of the Rules of 2025 provides that proceedings pending under the Rules of 1980 shall continue as if Rules of 2025 had not been made; review petitions filed prior to Rules of 2025 are thus governed by the Rules of 1980, the two sets containing substantially identical provisions on review (O. XXVI and O. XXVIII respectively). (b) Supreme Court Rules, 1980----O. XXVI, Rr. 3 & 4---Review petition---Reasoned opinion of Advocate---Nature of review---Held, statutory scheme contemplates filing of a reasoned and substantive review petition and not a mere formal or skeletal application; R. 3 requires certified copy of judgment so that petitioner and Advocate may scrutinize reasoning and identify specific error, and R. 4 obliges Advocate to specify points on which review is based and to add a certificate, in the form of a reasoned opinion, that review is justifiable---Reasoned opinion necessarily presupposes availability of reasons recorded in the judgment sought to be reviewed and cannot be discharged by a bald or mechanical certification---Review is not an appeal in disguise, nor does it permit rehearing of entire controversy; it lies only on limited and recognised grounds such as error apparent on the face of the record---It would be practically impossible for an Advocate to comply with Rr. 3 and 4 unless detailed reasons recorded by the Court are first made available; Rr. 3 and 4 are substantive safeguards and serve to discourage speculative, premature or frivolous review petitions, particularly in view of R. 9 which permits only one opportunity to seek review---Any interpretation requiring an aggrieved party to institute review before detailed reasons are made available would dilute mandatory requirements of Rr. 3 and 4 and render furnishing of reasoned opinion largely illusory. Cited Cases: • Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan through its President v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and others PLD 2024 SC 1228 (delay in filing review condoned in view of practical impossibility of filing meaningful review without reasoned judgment) (c) Supreme Court Rules, 1980----O. XXVI, R. 2---Limitation for review---Short order and detailed reasons---Computation of limitation---Held, line of authorities holding that a short order signed by the Judges is final, operative and fully effective even in absence of detailed reasons was evolved to preserve efficacy and enforceability of orders in exceptional situations where reasons could not be authored due to circumstances beyond the Court's control, on maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, and detailed reasons later recorded are merely explanatory and cannot alter, vary or travel beyond operative part of the short order---Observation in Petrosin Corporation's case that a party intending to file appeal or review must avail remedy within limitation reckoned from date of short order offered no independent reasoning, did not examine scheme of procedural rules governing review, and of authorities relied upon only Abdul Hameed Dogar contained observation on limitation, which carried little precedential value as made by a learned Single Judge in a Chamber Appeal on administrative side without recording cogent reasons; remaining authorities did not address the question---Court expressed respectful reservation regarding view in Petrosin Corporation, which cannot be regarded as one of universal application---Where review ordinarily remains pending until detailed reasons are authored and released, as under R. 7 review is to be heard by same bench as far as practicable, it would be manifestly unjust to hold aggrieved party bound by limitation commencing from short order when the Court itself has deferred adjudication until reasons are rendered; litigant cannot suffer on account of delay attributable to the Court---In Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited every judgment must expressly bear the date on which it is written, signed and pronounced, the purpose of separate dates being to preserve rights of litigants in matters of limitation---O. XXVI, R. 2 must receive a purposive, contextual and justice-oriented interpretation, preserving right to institute review within limitation computed either from date of short order or from date detailed reasons are pronounced, depending on whether challenge is directed to operative part embodied in short order or to reasoning articulated in detailed judgment. Cited Cases: • D.G. A.N.F. Rawalpindi and others v. Munawar Hussain Manj and others 2014 SCMR 1334 • In the matter of Reviews on behalf of Justice (Retd.) Abdul Ghani Sheikh and others PLD 2013 SC 1024 • Justice Hasnat Ahmed Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2011 SC 680 • Wisram Das v. SGS Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2010 SCMR 1234 • Wafi Associates (Pvt.) Limited v. Farooq Hamid and others 2010 SCMR 1125 • Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry v. President of Pakistan through Secretary and others PLD 2010 SC 61 • The State v. Asif Adil and others 1997 SCMR 209 • Petrosin Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. OGDC through Managing Director PLD 2011 SC 235 (reservation expressed) • Abdul Hameed Dogar v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2010 SCMR 312 • Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited, Lahore PLD 2023 SC 241 (d) Supreme Court Rules, 1980----O. XXVI, Rr. 2 & 9---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 10-A & 188---Maintainability of review petition---Subsequent application for review---Party impleaded but not served in earlier review petitions---Civil Review Petition No. 825 of 2024 (Metropolitan Corporation, Islamabad) was filed on 26.09.2024 after certified copy applied for on 21.08.2024 (date of detailed reasons) and obtained on 29.08.2024, and was found by the Office within limitation by Office Memorandum dated 18.12.2024; earlier review petitions of other aggrieved parties had been dismissed by review judgment dated 10.09.2024 without service of notice on the petitioner, although impleaded as respondent, and before expiry of its own limitation---Held, petitioner was deprived of fair hearing under Art. 10-A and its right to seek review within the limitation could not be rendered infructuous by premature disposal of other review petitions, a litigant not being deprived of a constitutional remedy merely because the Court, for reasons attributable to its own process, adjudicated other review petitions before expiry of limitation available to him---R. 9 bars only a "subsequent application for review", necessarily contemplating a second or successive review by the same party who has already invoked review jurisdiction and whose earlier review has been finally adjudicated; the embargo is personal to such party and cannot extend to another aggrieved person who has neither previously invoked review nor been afforded an effective opportunity to do so; mere fact of being impleaded as respondent in an earlier review is of no consequence where notice was not duly served (acknowledged by the Addl. Attorney General)---Present petition being first and only invocation of review jurisdiction under Art. 188, held, maintainable and within limitation, bar of R. 9 having no application---Finality is a good thing but justice is a better (Ras Behari Lal v. Emperor). Cited Cases: • Ras Behari Lal and others v. Emperor AIR 1933 PC 208 (e) Limitation---Civil Review Petition No. 44 of 2025 (Capital Development Authority)---Delayed petition heard along with connected timely petition---Held, a petition filed beyond limitation may, in appropriate circumstances, be heard and decided on merits along with a connected petition filed within time; petition was against same impugned judgment and raised substantial questions of law arising in C.R.P. No. 825 of 2024, and it would not serve ends of justice or judicial economy to decide one while leaving the other undecided---Both petitions decided together on merits. Cited Cases: • Mehreen Zaibun Nisa v. Land Commissioner, Multan and Others PLD 1975 SC 397 • Noon Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Market Committee and others PLD 1989 SC 449 • Syed Imran Raza Zaidi v. Government of the Punjab 1996 SCMR 645 • Chairman Federal Board of Revenue v. Iqbal Hussain Shaikh and others 2016 SCMR 773 • Messrs Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2020 SC 641 (f) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 10-A & 199---Court-appointed Commission---Reliance on Commission's report for coercive directions including demolition---Margalla Hills National Park (MHNP)---Public interest writ petitions in High Court, in which Commission was constituted under order dated 20.02.2015 in W.P. No.1276 of 2011, were decided alongside Civil Revision No.13 of 2021 and F.A.O. No.111 of 2021 of Monal Group of Companies---Held, gravity of allegations cannot dispense with the fundamental requirement of due process---Commission constituted by Court serves a valuable fact-finding and advisory function but, unless relevant law expressly provides otherwise, its report cannot be treated as conclusive proof of facts stated therein; its findings are at best recommendatory, and where report contains disputed questions of fact or attributes illegality, misconduct or liability to particular persons or institutions, such findings must be tested through judicial process in accordance with natural justice---High Court's unquestioning reliance on the Commission's report was misplaced and resulting judgment could not be sustained in law. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Interlocutory proceedings---Civil Revision and F.A.O. arising from interlocutory orders---Jurisdictional overreach by High Court and Supreme Court---Held, Civil Revision and F.A.O. before High Court arose from interlocutory proceedings only, whereas substantive disputes (suits by Monal Group of Companies against CDA, Metropolitan Corporation and RV&FD, and suit of Metropolitan Corporation for eviction) remained sub judice before the Civil Court, to be adjudicated after parties lead evidence---High Court was required to decide those proceedings making only tentative observations so that merits remained uninfluenced; instead, transgressing limits of its jurisdiction, it adjudicated the entire controversy, held that RV&FD lacked authority to execute the 2019 Agreement and declared it void, made observations regarding other restaurants not before it and directed CDA to conduct an inquiry---Supreme Court failed to discharge its judicial duty in affirming and failed to correct the illegality in earlier review petitions---Where a Court by adopting a particular procedure does something it never intended, resulting in miscarriage of justice, it possesses inherent jurisdiction to rectify the error. (h) Judicial propriety---Observations founded on personal knowledge of Bench---Fair trial---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A---Review---Error apparent on face of record---Observations in judgment under review (paras 12 and 28) regarding alleged personal relationships, connections with the powerful, and political associations of the parties were not supported by admissible evidence in the record---Held, judicial findings and observations must emanate from the record and not from personal knowledge or information of the bench; where a bench possesses personal knowledge of disputed facts relating to a party, or such knowledge may give rise to reasonable apprehension of unfairness, judicial propriety demands that the Judge decline to hear the matter, and Judges of superior judiciary possess discretion to recuse themselves in appropriate cases---Constitutional guarantee of fair trial under Art. 10-A includes the right to a proper hearing before a competent, independent and unbiased forum---Proceedings could not be regarded as fully satisfying requirements of fair trial; observations dehors the record constituted an error apparent on face of record warranting correction in review jurisdiction and were expunged as wholly unnecessary to adjudication---Observation that operation of restaurants had caused recurrent fires in MHNP was founded on conjecture and speculation, no scientific study, expert opinion or admissible evidence having established causal connection; judicial findings affecting rights of parties cannot be founded on assumptions or possibilities unsupported by evidence; forest fires may result from natural and anthropogenic causes; observation set aside. Cited Cases: • Asif Ali Zardari and another v. The State PLD 2001 SC 568 • Suo Motu Case No.4 of 2010 PLD 2012 SC 553 • Muhammad Naeem and another v. The State and others PLD 2019 SC 669 (i) Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979----S. 21(2) & (3)---Islamabad Nature Conservation and Wildlife Management Act, 2024, S. 12---Islamabad Capital Territory (Zoning) Regulations, 1992, Reg. 4(3)(b)---Margalla Hills National Park---"Recreation"---Restaurants within National Park---Statutory interpretation---Held, State owes constitutional and statutory obligation to preserve wildlife and ecological integrity of MHNP, but simultaneously owes obligation to facilitate public lawfully entitled to access and enjoy National Park for recreation under S. 21(2)---Term "recreation" necessarily carries incidental human requirements including reasonable access to drinking water, sanitation, places of rest, refreshment and security, the provision of which in a regulated and environmentally sustainable manner cannot by itself be regarded as inconsistent with recreation---S. 21(3) expressly authorises construction of access roads, rest houses, hotels and other buildings with public amenities within National Park, subject to condition that development shall neither impair object for which area was declared a National Park nor compromise its ecological character; inclusion of "hotels and other buildings" shows legislature never intended an absolute prohibition on all construction or commercial activity---Regulation 4(3)(b) permits change in land use for projects related to conservation, preservation, afforestation and recreation---"Recreation" cannot be given an unduly narrow meaning but must receive a purposive and liberal interpretation, a provision not to be construed so as to render another redundant (Employees Old-Age Benefits Institution v. Muhammad Rafique)---Conclusion in para 15 of judgment under review that construction and running of restaurants impaired the object of the National Park and had no nexus with public education or research, thereby foreclosing operation of any restaurant within MHNP for all time, overlooked expression "for recreation", rendered S. 21(3) nugatory and was inconsistent with S. 21 read with Reg. 4(3)(b) and with analogous S. 12 of the Act of 2024---Correct inquiry was not whether restaurants could exist within the National Park per se, but whether particular structures or activities, on facts and evidence, impaired the object for which the National Park was established, a matter requiring determination on evidence---Conclusion set aside. Cited Cases: • Employees Old-Age Benefits Institution, Lahore and others v. Muhammad Rafique and others 2026 PLC (Labour) 107 FCCP (j) Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960----Ss. 11 & 51---Islamabad Wildlife Ordinance, 1979----Ss. 21 & 24---Respective jurisdictions of CDA and Wildlife Management Board (WMB) over Margalla Hills National Park---Held, special provisions of Ordinance of 1979 relating to protected areas apply only to areas validly notified as sanctuaries, National Parks or Game Reserves, boundaries being determined by notification under Ss. 21 and 24---Dominant statutory purpose of a National Park is preservation of natural scenery, flora and fauna; public recreation and amenities are permissible only subject to lawful restrictions and to the extent they do not impair that object---CDA continues to exercise jurisdiction over master planning, zoning, land use, building control, infrastructure and unauthorised occupation and construction under Ordinance of 1960; permission of CDA cannot by itself legalise any activity prohibited under Ordinance of 1979, nor does permission under Ordinance of 1979 dispense with requirement of planning or building approvals from CDA---In relation to MHNP, the two statutory regimes operate cumulatively rather than exclusively---Direction in para 35 of judgment under review that WMB determine how mountain ridge on which restaurants stood be utilised undermined statutory jurisdiction of CDA over land use, planning, zoning and development and was set aside---Any rent withdrawn or recovered by WMB pursuant to impugned judgment to be forthwith deposited into public exchequer, subject to lawful appropriation. (k) Review---Duty to correct manifest error---Recall of judgment affecting persons not heard---Short order dated 13.07.2026 (operative part, paras 6 and 7)---Held, exceptional case in which limits of judicial power were transgressed and a grave miscarriage of justice resulted: findings of final and conclusive nature were recorded in interlocutory proceedings on questions within exclusive domain of Civil Court, prejudging pending disputes and adversely affecting rights of several persons neither parties nor afforded opportunity of hearing under Art. 10-A, prejudice being compounded in review jurisdiction where present petitioners were not afforded effective opportunity---Judgment affecting rights of persons who have not been heard cannot ordinarily be permitted to attain finality merely because pronounced by the highest Court---Duty to correct an error is cast upon every Judge by oath of office; power to rectify a manifest wrong does not depend upon existence of an enabling procedural rule but inheres in the very function of the Court; rules of procedure cannot obstruct administration of justice and law must bend in aid of justice---Where error identified in review arose from mistaken assumption of fact or law and earlier judgment would not have been rendered but for it, nothing precludes the Court from recalling or rectifying it in review jurisdiction---Errors were glaring, self-evident, floating on surface of record and with material bearing on result---Short order read as integral part of judgment. Cited Cases: • Chairman, Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education, Lahore and another v. Ali Mir 1984 SCMR 433 • Suba through Legal Heirs v. Fatima Bibi through Legal Heirs and others 1996 SCMR 158 Disposition: Review petitions (C.R.P. No.825 of 2024 and F.C.R.P. No.44 of 2025 in C.P.L.A. No.304/2022) allowed and judgment dated 21.08.2024 of the Supreme Court (PLD 2024 SC 925) set aside in the above terms. Specifically: (i) conclusion that any lease, licence, allotment or permission granted by CDA, RV&FD or any other authority for operation of restaurants within MHNP was contrary to Ordinance of 1979 and of no legal effect set aside, questions of entitlement to, ownership of and lease of restaurant site and recovery of rent being disputed questions of fact for the competent Civil Court; (ii) MHNP being part of Islamabad Capital Territory, approval of construction plans for public purpose falls within jurisdiction of CDA, findings that WMB is entitled to withdraw rent deposited by respondent and may regulate activities by licences set aside, administration of MHNP to be regulated by CDA in accordance with law, and, Ordinance of 1979 having been repealed, the Nature Conservation and Wildlife Management Board under S. 3 of the Act of 2024 is responsible for ensuring that construction of rest houses, hotels and other buildings complies with S. 12(3) and (4); (iii) review judgment dated 10.09.2024 and every consequential or derivative judgment cannot survive and falls; earlier review petitions and miscellaneous applications (including C.M.A. No.3108 of 2026) disposed of accordingly; (iv) I.C.As. against the High Court judgment pending before this Court to be decided independently, strictly in accordance with law and on merits, keeping in view the observations made; (v) High Court judgment, to the extent it dismissed the Civil Revision and F.A.O. arising from interlocutory orders, not interfered with, plaintiffs being at liberty to file fresh applications before the Civil Court; (vi) Civil Court to consolidate pending suits, implead the Federal Government, and decide them expeditiously on merits after allowing parties to lead evidence, without being influenced by findings or observations of this Court, the Supreme Court, the High Court or the District Judge, Islamabad (West). No order as to costs. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code----Ss. 302(b), 148 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997----Ss. 7(a) & 7(g)---Murder of two members of the Christian community by a mob at a brick-kiln---Heinousness of offence---Duty of Court not to be swayed by emotions---Petitioners Muhammad Irfan son of Shakoor, Muhammad Riaz and Mehdi Khan were convicted by the Anti-Terrorism Court No. II, Lahore, in FIR No.475/2014 dated 04.11.2014 registered at Police Station Kot Radha Kishan, Kasur, inter alia under Ss. 302, 364, 353, 337-F(i), 337-F(v), 337-L(ii), 148 and 149, PPC, read with Ss. 7(a), 7(g), 21-L, 7(h) and 21-I of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and were sentenced, among other terms, to death on two counts under S. 302(b), PPC, and under S. 7(a) of the Act, which convictions the High Court maintained while acquitting ten co-accused---Supreme Court observed that the occurrence was most shocking and brutal, two innocent persons of the Christian community having been thrown into the fire of a brick-kiln by members of a mob of 500/600 persons merely on suspicion of defiling and burning of the Holy Quran---Trial Court had already disbelieved the alleged motive, no convincing evidence being available that the deceased had committed that act---Even if such an act were presumed, any private individual could not be permitted to take the law into his own hands instead of reporting the matter to the police---Christian community was a valuable part of the nation, and Islam did not permit such brutal treatment of any member of a minority merely on suspicion and without due course of law---Held, that although the occurrence was shocking and brutal, it was the duty of the Court to do justice and to see whether the prosecution had proved its case beyond the shadow of any doubt, so that a person who may be innocent may not be hanged in the absence of reliable evidence, and a culprit against whom the case was proved may not go unpunished---Case was to be decided as per law on the evidence brought on the record, without being swayed by emotions or by the heinousness of the offence. (b) Criminal trial---Contradictory ocular account---FIR disowned by private witnesses related to the deceased---Conflict between police eyewitnesses and private eyewitnesses---Roles assigned to accused---Capital charge---Prosecution case was self-contradictory: the story narrated by Muhammad Ali SI/complainant (PW-16) in the FIR was disowned and contradicted by private eyewitnesses related to the deceased (PW-17 to PW-22), and the account of police employees including injured witnesses (PW-13 to PW-16) differed both from the FIR and from the private witnesses---Glaring contradictions existed as to material aspects and the roles assigned to different accused---Of seven accused named in the FIR with the specific role of dragging the deceased out of the office of the brick-kiln and throwing them into the furnace, six except Mehdi Khan (petitioner) had been acquitted by the Trial Court, and the private witnesses had exonerated those six, thereby disowning the story in the FIR and causing a serious dent to the foundation of the case---Muhammad Irfan (petitioner) was not named in the FIR in any capacity though fifty-nine accused were named therein, and the complainant made no supplementary statement nominating him---Muhammad Riaz Kamboh (petitioner) was named in the FIR but was not assigned therein the specific role of dragging and throwing---Private witnesses related to the deceased attributed the act of throwing into the fire only to Muhammad Irfan, whereas police eyewitnesses attributed dragging and throwing to twelve named accused---Held, that there were material and glaring contradictions in the statements of the prosecution eyewitnesses regarding material aspects of the case, and their evidence was not worthy of reliance to maintain convictions and sentences on a capital charge. Cited Cases: • Qurban Ali v. The State 2025 SCMR 1344 • Ghulam Mustafa alias Raja Buledi v. The State 2025 SCMR 1633 • Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 Supreme Court 64 • Attique Ullah v. The State 2026 SCMR 937 (c) Criminal trial---Injured eyewitness---Injuries establish presence but not credibility or truth---Although the prosecution produced injured eyewitnesses (PW-13, PW-15 and PW-16), the injuries on their bodies merely established their presence at the spot on the day of occurrence and did not mean that the Court should blindly believe their evidence, particularly when that evidence had already been disbelieved by the Courts below qua acquitted co-accused of similar roles and was in conflict with the evidence of eyewitnesses related to the deceased---Held, that it was well settled that injuries on the body of an injured eyewitness were not a proof of his credibility and truth. Cited Cases: • Amin Ali and another v. The State 2011 SCMR 323 • Nazir Ahmad v. Muhammad Iqbal 2011 SCMR 527 • Muhammad Pervez and others v. The State 2007 SCMR 670 • Rooh Ullah and others v. The State 2022 SCMR 888 (d) Criminal trial---Same evidence disbelieved against acquitted co-accused---Need of independent corroboration---Rule of consistency---Case of petitioners not distinguishable from that of acquitted co-accused---Of seven FIR-nominated accused assigned the specific role of dragging and throwing, six stood acquitted; of twelve accused so assigned by police eyewitnesses, nine co-accused stood acquitted; of eleven accused assigned by private witnesses the role of dragging the deceased to the furnace, eight co-accused stood acquitted---Petition filed by the State against acquittal of 102 co-accused (Crl. Petition No.1109-L of 2019) was dismissed by a separate order of even date, and no petition against those acquittals had been filed by any legal heir or relative of the deceased, so that their acquittal had attained finality---Trial Court had already disbelieved recoveries of dandas and the motive of burning/defiling of the Holy Quran---Held, that the case of the present petitioners was not distinguishable from the case of the acquitted co-accused---Same prosecution evidence, which had already been disbelieved against ten co-accused assigned specific roles, could not be believed against the petitioners without independent corroboration, which was lacking. Cited Cases: • Akhtar Ali and others v. The State 2008 SCMR 6 • Muhammad Pervaiz v. The State PLD 2019 Supreme Court 592 • Liaqat Ali and others v. The State 2021 SCMR 455 • Shaukat Hussain v. The State 2024 SCMR 929 (e) Criminal trial---Surrounding circumstances creating doubt---Absence of burn injuries and of wooden shoes or wet clothes---Presence of private witnesses improbable---Improvement upon statements under S. 161, Cr.P.C.---Benefit of doubt---It was brought out in cross-examination that persons igniting the furnace wore wooden shoes and wet clothes to avoid burn injuries, yet there was nothing to show that the petitioners wore such articles or received any burn injury---When a highly charged mob of 500/600 persons was present, it was doubtful that eyewitnesses related to the deceased, themselves members of the Christian community, would remain at the spot at serious danger to their own lives, or that injured police employees would be allowed by the mob to remain present to witness the occurrence---None of those relatives became the complainant, and they had not signed any memo of the case as a witness---In statements recorded by the police under S. 161, Cr.P.C., the relatives had levelled a joint allegation of throwing both deceased into the furnace against the petitioners and several co-accused, but at trial they levelled that allegation only against Muhammad Irfan---Held, that the prosecution evidence was replete with circumstances creating serious doubts---If there was a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind about the guilt of the accused, the accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt not as a matter of grace and concession but as a matter of right---Prosecution failed to prove its case against the petitioners beyond the shadow of doubt. Cited Cases: • Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 • Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 (f) Acquittal petition by the State---Double presumption of innocence---Very strong and exceptional grounds required---Crl. Petition No.1109-L of 2019 was filed by the State against the acquittal of 102 accused/respondents; no appeal by any legal heir or relative of the deceased had been filed---High Court and Trial Court had acquitted those respondents on valid reasons---Held, that if an accused was acquitted by a court of competent jurisdiction, he enjoyed double presumption of innocence---Very strong and exceptional grounds were required to set aside a judgment of acquittal---No material illegality, irregularity, misreading or non-reading of evidence qua the acquittal had been pointed out---Petition dismissed and leave refused. Disposition: Jail Petition No.321 of 2019 converted into an appeal and allowed; impugned judgment dated 16.05.2019 of the Lahore High Court and judgment dated 23.11.2016 of the Trial Court set aside; petitioners Muhammad Irfan, Muhammad Riaz and Mehdi Khan acquitted of all charges while giving them the benefit of doubt, to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. Criminal Petition No.1109-L of 2019 filed by the State against acquittal of 102 co-accused dismissed and leave refused. Judgment by Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, J. (Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ. agreeing). Islamabad, 9th of July, 2026.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908----O. XXXII, R. 3---Minor defendant---Guardian ad litem---Appointment mandatory---Compromise decree recorded without appointment of guardian for the suit---Suit concerned landed property in which certain defendants, admittedly minors, had interest, plaint itself disclosed their minority, and nothing indicated that any application under O. XXXII, R. 3, C.P.C. was filed or guardian ad litem appointed before compromise was recorded---Held, that Court acts as parens patriae in relation to minors and is under a solemn and mandatory obligation to safeguard their rights at every stage, and procedural safeguards are matter of substance and not form---Once Court is satisfied that defendant is minor, appointment of guardian ad litem is not discretionary but mandatory, must be preceded by application supported by affidavit and notice as required by sub-rule (4), and minor defendant does not become party in eyes of law unless represented through duly appointed guardian---Decree against minor without compliance is liable to be declared void and of no legal effect where non-compliance has occasioned prejudice to the minor---Trial Court's failure at threshold to appoint guardian ad litem vitiated subsequent proceedings insofar as they affected minors---Omission to appoint guardian may be treated as procedural irregularity in certain circumstances, but where it has prejudicially affected the minor, Court is under paramount obligation to protect the minor and cannot permit decree to stand on technical considerations. Cited Cases: • Tanveer Mahboob v. Haroon 2003 SCMR 480 (b) Civil Procedure Code, 1908----O. XXXII, R. 7 & O. XXIII, R. 3---Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, S. 29---Compromise affecting immovable property of minors---Leave of Court and permission of Guardian Court---Mandatory requirements---Held, that O. XXXII, R. 7 prohibits next friend or guardian for the suit from entering into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor without leave of Court expressly recorded in proceedings; requirement is mandatory, and Court must satisfy itself on cogent material that compromise is demonstrably beneficial to minor, and approval cannot be mechanical---Record disclosed no application for leave under R. 7, nor leave granted or recorded before Trial Court accepted compromise; omission was not mere irregularity but violation of mandatory safeguard, and where law prescribes that an act be done in a particular manner it must be done in that manner alone or not at all---Even assuming mother represented minors, she could not compromise or deal with minors' immovable property without prior permission of competent Guardian Court, as natural guardian including the mother has no unfettered authority to compromise or dispose of minor's immovable property---Rationale of S. 29 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 applies equally to compromise whereby valuable proprietary rights of minors are surrendered---No such permission was shown to have been sought or granted, and compromise, to the extent it affected rights of minors, was devoid of legal sanctity---Even after appointment of guardian ad litem, no compromise affecting rights or property of minor can be entered into without express leave of Court, which must continue to supervise guardian's conduct. (c) Constitution of Pakistan----Preamble, Arts. 4, 9, 23, 25(3) & 35---Parens patriae---Protection of property and inheritance rights of minors and women---Held, that State, acting through its Courts, is constitutional guardian (parens patriae) of minors and other vulnerable segments of society, which obligation finds expression in the Preamble, Art. 25(3) permitting special provision for protection of women and children, and Art. 35 enjoining State to protect child and family, and Arts. 4, 23 and 25 require Courts to subject transactions affecting property rights of vulnerable persons to closest scrutiny---Provisions of O. XXXII, C.P.C. are not merely procedural but substantive safeguards and must receive purposive and progressive interpretation, as must the protective provisions of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, which are statutory manifestations of constitutional mandate---Court, in matters involving minors, cannot remain passive spectator and is under positive and continuing obligation to protect their interests---Principle also finds recognition in Arts. 17 and 25(2) of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 and in Qur'anic injunctions (4:2, 4:6, 4:10) protecting property of orphans, guardian being merely trustee of minor's property. Cited Cases: • Amar Chand v. Nem Chand AIR 1942 All. 150 (d) Parda nasheen woman---Compromise---Burden of proof---Petitioner pleaded she was illiterate parda nasheen lady and that compromise was procured without her being apprised of its nature and consequences---Trial Court failed to inquire---Held, that once validity of compromise is challenged on ground that consent of illiterate parda nasheen woman was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation or without informed understanding, Court is under legal obligation to examine the matter with utmost care and plea could not be brushed aside without meaningful judicial inquiry---Where transaction is entered into by parda nasheen, illiterate, rustic or otherwise vulnerable woman, burden rests heavily on beneficiary to establish by cogent, convincing and unimpeachable evidence that it was her free, conscious and informed act, executed voluntarily after competent, independent and disinterested advice---Doctrine is not a mere rule of evidence but a substantive principle of law---Where transaction simultaneously affects rights of minor children, burden on beneficiary is exceptionally heavy and he must dispel every suspicious circumstance by evidence of highest probative value. Cited Cases: • Phul Peer Shah v. Hafeez Fatima 2016 SCMR 1225 • Ghulam Muhammad v. Zohran Bibi 2021 SCMR 19 (e) Civil Procedure Code, 1908----S. 12(2) & O. XXIII, R. 3---Compromise decree---Challenge on ground of fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction---Application under S. 12(2) dismissed by Trial Court, allowed by Revisional Court and compromise decree set aside, then Revisional order set aside by High Court---Held, that fraud is rarely susceptible of direct proof and may be established through surrounding circumstances, conduct of parties and cumulative effect of proved facts---Compromise decree does not derive validity merely from embodiment in judicial order but from existence of lawful, voluntary and enforceable compromise, and Court does not act as mere recording agency---Where compromise is tainted by fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, uncertainty or is contrary to mandatory requirements of law, decree founded thereon cannot acquire higher legal sanctity and is amenable to challenge under S. 12(2)---Failure to appoint guardian ad litem as per proper procedure, absence of prior leave under O. XXXII, R. 7, want of permission of Guardian Court and plea of fraud by illiterate parda nasheen woman, considered collectively, gave rise to strong inference that compromise decree was not product of lawful, informed and voluntary settlement---Revisional Court rightly exercised jurisdiction in setting aside compromise decree---Statement recorded before the Court does not foreclose inquiry where fraud, misrepresentation or non-compliance with mandatory safeguards is specifically pleaded and prima facie supported by record. (f) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Interference with order of Revisional Court---Held, that primary question in constitutional jurisdiction is whether subordinate forum acted without lawful jurisdiction, failed to exercise jurisdiction, or acted illegally or with material procedural irregularity; it is not meant to substitute High Court's opinion merely because another view is possible, and interference is not warranted unless there is jurisdictional defect, patent illegality, perversity or material irregularity---High Court, without examining whether Revisional Court exceeded jurisdiction or committed jurisdictional error, substituted its own assessment, proceeding on premise that compromise was admitted and mother's statement before Trial Court rendered it beyond reproach, and overlooked core issue of petitioner's plea and rights of minors---Interference by High Court was wholly unwarranted and could not be sustained---Expedition in disposal can never be achieved at cost of mandatory statutory safeguards or constitutional guarantees. (g) Minors---Guidelines for Civil and Revenue Courts in proceedings affecting person, property or inheritance rights of minors---Court laid down that: Court shall at earliest stage ascertain whether any party is minor and ensure compliance with O. XXXII, C.P.C.; guardian ad litem to be appointed strictly under O. XXXII, R. 3 after satisfying Court that guardian has no adverse interest; no compromise, admission, concession, relinquishment or consent affecting rights or property of minor to be accepted unless Court is satisfied, for reasons recorded, that it is lawful and demonstrably in minor's best interests and O. XXXII, R. 7 fully complied with; where compromise involves transfer or alienation of minor's property or inheritance rights, compliance with Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and prior permission of Guardian Court wherever required; heightened scrutiny where compromise is entered by illiterate, parda nasheen or vulnerable person representing minor; vigilance against conflict of interest between guardian and minor; no undue haste in disposal, orders to reflect independent application of mind; safeguards are substantive and to be observed keeping in view Arts. 4, 9, 23, 24, 25(3) and 35 of the Constitution, doctrine of parens patriae and Injunctions of Islam. Disposition: Leave granted; petition converted into appeal and allowed; judgment dated 11.12.2024 of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench in W.P. No.9147/2017 set aside and judgment of Revisional Court (order dated 02.10.2017) restored; compromise judgment and decree to remain set aside, original suit restored to file of Trial Court to be decided afresh on merits after opportunity to adduce evidence, with scrupulous compliance with O. XXXII, C.P.C. and Guardians and Wards Act, 1890; no expression on merits of rival claims. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 185(3), 175F(1)(c), 175F(2) & 199---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Text Book Board Employees Regulations, 1972, Regs. 3 & 12---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Text Book Board Ordinance, 1971, S. 24---Fundamental Rules, R. 9(4)---Service matter---Upgradation of post versus induction into cadre---Separate cadres of Assistant and Storekeeper---Seniority---Respondent, appointed in 2006 as "Assistant/Storekeeper" (BS-11) against an advertised post and regularised in 2009, obtained judgment dated 19.02.2014 of High Court granting him benefit of notification dated 28.07.2007 upgrading post of Assistant from BS-11 to BS-14, while leaving his exact seniority to be determined by the respondents in accordance with law---Board, on recommendation of departmental committee, maintained separate seniority lists of Assistants and Storekeepers (orders dated 19.05.2015 and 09.06.2015), which were set aside by High Court by impugned judgment dated 04.12.2020 in Writ Petition No. 7461-P/2019---Held, earlier judgment granted respondent only limited benefit of upgradation; it neither declared that he had been appointed as Assistant, nor determined his cadre status, nor absorbed him into cadre of Assistants, nor conferred right to seniority therein---Respondent had not sought any relief regarding seniority in his earlier petition and High Court consciously left seniority to competent authorities---High Court fell into error in reading into its earlier judgment a declaration regarding change of cadre which it neither contained nor necessarily implied---Distinction between upgradation of a post and inclusion of employee into a particular cadre against which he was not initially recruited is material---Expression "cadre", though not defined in Regulations of 1972, may be understood by guidance from R. 9(4) of Fundamental Rules (by virtue of Reg. 12) as "the strength of a service or a part of a service sanctioned as a separate unit", and relates to sanctioned structure of service and cannot be determined merely by reference to pay scale---To become member of a cadre, employee must hold a post in that cadre---Post of Assistant was expressly provided as a separate cadre in Appendix to Regulations, whereas post of Storekeeper was subsequently created and separately sanctioned by competent authority; mere fact that both posts initially carried same pay scale did not make them part of the same cadre---As a general rule, employee appointed to a cadre cannot claim, as matter of right, induction into or transfer to another cadre, and any such change must have lawful basis in governing service rules, particularly where seniority or promotional rights of employees in the other cadre are likely to be affected---Regulations of 1972 provided no mechanism for transfer or induction from one cadre to another, hence there was no statutory basis for treating upgradation as altering cadre. Cited Cases: • Naimat Ullah Butt v. Government of the Punjab through Secretary Education, Lahore 1988 SCMR 1453 • Muhammad Karim v. Director Health Services 1987 SCMR 295 • Bashir Ahmed Solangi v. Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, Karachi 2007 PLC (C.S.) 824 • Chief Secretary, Government of Balochistan, Quetta v. Hidayat Ullah Khan 2022 SCMR 39 (b) Service matter---Composite designation "Assistant/Storekeeper" in appointment order---Effect---Provisional inclusion in seniority list---Held, Board could not avoid effect of its own appointment order merely by characterising word "Assistant" as inadvertent, but composite designation cannot in isolation be treated as conclusive of nature of appointment or cadre, which must be determined in light of recruitment record and governing service structure---Post of Storekeeper was created with approval of Controlling Authority (letter dated 02.09.2005) and its absence from original Appendix did not make it part of cadre of Assistants, as Reg. 3 contemplated subsequent creation of additional posts---Amendment dated 25.05.2026 incorporating post of Storekeeper (BS-14) as promotional post for Assistant Storekeepers (BS-11) could not retrospectively determine cadre status at time of appointment, but was consistent with distinct line of service---High Court erred in inferring from absence of post of Storekeeper from original Appendix that respondent had probably been appointed as Assistant and merely posted as Storekeeper---Provisional inclusion of respondent in seniority list of Assistants (order dated 29.09.2014) could neither alter character of his substantive appointment nor confer right to seniority in a cadre to which he had not been appointed, nor enlarge scope of earlier judgment or create substantive service right contrary to service structure---Departmental determination maintaining separate seniority lists was not inconsistent with earlier judgment but constituted determination of seniority within authority expressly left to the department. (c) Judgment---Scope of earlier judgment---Finality---Constructive res judicata---Order in contempt proceedings---High Court, in contempt petition (dismissed on 15.05.2019), had accepted that separate seniority lists of Assistants and Storekeepers amounted to implementation of earlier judgment in letter and spirit---Held, order in contempt proceedings does not constitute final adjudication of substantive service rights but was relevant for ascertaining scope of earlier judgment and manner of its implementation, and High Court could not construe earlier judgment as conclusively placing respondent in cadre of Assistants without considering its own subsequent order---Judgment must be understood in context of issue actually determined and relief actually granted; incidental or consequential administrative act taken in implementation cannot enlarge its operative command---Board's subsequent determination could not lawfully be set aside merely on ground that earlier judgment had attained finality; finality protected respondent's entitlement to upgradation but did not foreclose question expressly left open for competent authorities---Finality operated both ways and precluded respondent from subsequently seeking relief arising from the same cause which could and ought to have been claimed in earlier proceedings, such claim attracting principle of constructive res judicata---High Court conflated upgradation with cadre status and seniority, misconstrued scope of earlier judgment and treated provisional administrative act as creating vested right. Cited Cases: • SME Bank Limited through President Islamabad v. Izhar Ul Haq 2019 SCMR 939 (d) Laches---Writ petition filed in 2019 against administrative orders of May and June 2015---Held, service arrangements involving inter se seniority should not be unsettled without examining explanation for delay and its effect upon others, but intervening proceedings and explanation offered would have to be considered before delay alone could be made decisive---Court did not rest decision exclusively upon laches. (e) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 199---Writ petition affecting seniority---Non-impleadment of affected employees---Necessary parties---Audi alteram partem---Respondent's claim was not confined to higher pay scale but extended to inclusion in cadre of Assistants with seniority and consequential benefits, directly affecting relative seniority and promotion prospects of existing Assistants---Held, such employees were necessary parties and ought to have been impleaded and heard before relief affecting their service rights could be granted; participation of the Board could not substitute for representation of their individual and potentially competing interests---Although defect of non-joinder could have been cured by impleading them, High Court proceeded without affording opportunity, thereby offending principle of audi alteram partem---Order adversely affecting rights or interests of employee, passed without notice or opportunity of hearing, cannot be sustained in law---Impugned judgment determining cadre and seniority rights of respondent to prejudice of affected employees without hearing them was vitiated on this ground as well. Cited Cases: • Arshad Jamal v. N.-W.F.P. Forest Development Corporation 2004 SCMR 468 • Pakistan International Airlines Corporation through MD, Karachi v. Nadeem Murtaza Khan 2007 PLC (C.S.) 334 Disposition: Civil Appeal No. 537 of 2021 (transferred to this Court under Art. 175F(2) of the Constitution) allowed and impugned judgment dated 04.12.2020 of Peshawar High Court in Writ Petition No. 7461-P/2019 set aside; Civil Appeal No. 538 of 2021 and C.P.L.A. No. 6615 of 2021 disposed of as infructuous. Approved for Reporting.