Summary: Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss.122(9), 177(1), 214-C & Second Schedule, Part IV, Clause 72B---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Petitioner / taxpayer assailed notice selecting its case for audit---Validity---Notice under S. 177(6) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was issued on 20-05-2017, as the audit was to be conducted within the financial year---Completion of audit lingered due to failing of petitioner/taxpayer to convey concerns, as required under S. 177(6) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---No concerns were raised to the audit except a plea that it should be completed by 30-06-2017---No such construction could be attributed to S.177(6) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 which manifested and envisaged that concerns were invited on audit report---Taxpayer had no objections regarding conduct of audit and preparation of report thereby---Proceedings for audit concluded for all intent and purposes, and stage to amend assessment of the latest tax year had triggered and authorities issued notice under Ss. 122(9) & 111(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---No objection was raised by petitioner / taxpayer that the notice was beyond limitation provided in S.122 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Petitioner / taxpayer failed to explain as to why response to notice dated 17-09-2021 was not filed and instead Constitutional petition was instituted---High Court in exercise of Constitution jurisdiction declined to interfere in the matter as there was no jurisdictional defect in issuance of notice dated 17-09-2021 and petitioner/taxpayer lacked cooperation / facilitation, to raise concerns to the audit report---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Sialkot and others v. Messrs Allah Din Steel and Rolling Mills and others 2018 SCMR 1328; Messrs SKF Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary (Law and Justice Division) and others 2024 PTD 716; The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Messrs Super Asia Mohammad Din and Sons and others 2017 SCMR 1427; Abdul Ghani v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2019 PTD 764 and Nagina Silk Milk, Lyallpur v. The Income Tax Officer, A-ward Lyallpur and others PLD 1963 SC 322 distinguished. Zahid Imran Gondal and Muhammad Junaid for Petitioner. Rana Ghulam Hussain, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan. Malik Muhammad Shahzad Awan for Respondents.

Summary: Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 119 & 126---Members Register---Rectification---Applicant / shareholder contented that upon death of his father, shares inherited by him were not transmitted by respondent / Company---Applicant sought rectification of Members Register regarding number of shares held by his deceased father---Validity---On the date when father of applicant passed away, his shares devolved on his legal heirs as per Islamic law---Even if respondent / company or its CEO disputed shareholding of late father of applicant, they could not have cancelled that shareholding without any order of Court under S. 152 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (now S. 126 of the Companies Act, 2017)---Changes made by respondent / company to the Members Register were fraudulent---High Court directed respondent / company to reverse / rectify changes in Members Register and share certificates while shares transferred to CEO were not in issue---High Court further directed respondent / company to transmit shares to legal heirs of deceased after rectification of Members Register---High Court in exercise of S. 126(2) of Companies Act, 2017 awarded cost of Rs. 500,000 (Rupees Five Hundred Thousand only) to the applicant, payable by respondent / company and CEO personally at the rate of Rs. 250,000 each---High Court issued caution to CEO of the Company and Company Secretary but refrained from making reference against them for adjudication of an offence under S. 127 of Companies Act, 2017---Application was allowed in circumstances. Bentonite Pakistan Ltd. v. Bankers Equity Ltd. 2023 SCMR 1353; Naila Naeem Younus v. Indus Services Ltd. 2022 SCMR 1171; Muhammad Ziaullah Khan Chishti v. TRG Pakistan Limited (JCM No. 12/2025) and B and T Ag v. Ministry of Defence 2023 SCC OnLine SC 657 ref. Ms. Fareeda Mangrio for Petitioner. Shahenshah Hussain, Muhammad Hanif Faisal Alam and Syed Arshad Ali for Respondents Nos.1 and 2. Nemo for Respondents Nos.3, 5 to 8. Respondent No.4 in person. Saiyed Younus Saeed for Respondent No.9. Dates of hearing: 13th March, 6th, 15th and 29th May, 2025.

Summary: Though examination of accused under Section: 342 Cr.P.C. is the process between Court and the accused yet it is trite law that act of the Court should prejudice no one; therefore, if during this process, prosecution draws attention of the Court towards some incriminating material which has not been put to the accused, Court will examine the same and if considers it necessary, put to the accused through question.

Summary: Conduct of audit and assessment of tax return, on the basis of audit report, are two different streams of proceedings and mere plea of delay in conclusion of audit proceedings, on account of failure to raise objections to notice under Section 177(6) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, cannot defeat the assessment proceeding under Section 122 of the Ordinance, 2001.

Summary: Railway Police established and governed by the Pakistan Railways Police Act 1977 fall within the purview of Police Authorities in terms of Section 22-A(6) of the Code and Ex-Officio Justice of Peace can issue direction against delinquent Railway Police Official/Member for offence under Articles 155(1)(c) and 156(d) of the Police Order 2002 as well as offence(s) under Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention and Punishment) Act 2022; Settled principle of interpretation of statute that where the intention of the legislature and the object for which the law has been enacted are clear, Courts are not allowed to interpret the law in a manner which could impede or defeat the object for which such law has been enacted. Equally trite that the internal aid interpreting any statute or its provision can be derived primarily from the statute itself including its preamble, illustrations, headings, marginal notes, punctuation, transitory provisions, etc.

Summary: Writ Petition. Held: Constitutional Law Petition --- Prime Minister’s Assistance Package --- Cancellation of appointment --- Prospective overruling--- Vested Rights --- Article 199 of the constitution --- Petitioner appointed as Postal Clerk (BPS:09) on 02.11.2023 under the Prime Minister’s Assistance Package following retirement of his father on medical grounds. --- Later, appointment was cancelled on 18.02.2025 on the ground that Islamabad High Court order dated 08.12.2022 had declared such appointments unlawful --- Held, the order dated 08.12.2022 shows that it was interim in nature which did not final adjudicate upon the Constitutional Lawity of the Prime Minister’s Assistance Package --- The Islamabad High Court only expressed prima facie concerns regarding the manner in which appointments were being made under various office memoranda and policies, and accordingly issued a notice to the Attorney General for Pakistan under OXXVII-A CPC to assist the court on Constitutional Law aspect of the scheme. --- Vide judgment dated 26.09.2024, the Supreme Court in General Post Office Vs. Muhammad Jalal (CP No. 3390 of 2021) declared such appointments unConstitutional Law but expressly held that the judgment would not affect the appointments already made. --- Petitioner’s appointment having been made prior to 26.09.2024 stood protected under the doctrine of prospective overruling and the principle of finality of administrative action. --- Respondents’ reliance on an interim order to retrospectively invalidate an already crystallized appointment was legally misconceived --- once the appointment had been validly made and acted upon, a vested right had accrued which could not be divested in the absence of an express retrospective mandate.--- Impugned cancellation order issued without lawful authority, contrary to binding pronouncements of the Supreme Court, and void ab initio --- Petitioner reinstated in Service Law with consequential benefits including arrears of salary. --- Petition allowed.

Summary: Writ Petition. Held: Constitutional Law Petition --- Recruitment to police Service Law --- Physical standards --- Minor deficiency in chest measurement --- condonation --- Scope of Judicial interference --- Article 199 of the constitution --- Petitioner applied for recruitment as police constable and qualified written and physical test but was ultimately declared ineligible for having half-inch deficiency in prescribed chest measurement. --- contention that shortfall was marginal and should have been condoned --- Held, eligibility criteria for recruitment of constables are governed by Rule 12.15 of Police Rules, 1934, Standing order No. 26/2014 and Police Policy Board Order No. 74/2017, which expressly prohibits relaxation of height and chest measurement even for minor variations - -- where policy mandates strict adherence to physical standards, court cannot substitute or relax such standards under Article 199 --- Recruitment to disciplined forces such as police demands uniformity and compliance with prescribed benchmarks, which are essential to meet operational and institutional objectives; judicial interference in such matters would amount to overreach and compromise institutional discipline --- Petition dismissed.

Summary: i. It is true only one person has been charged. However, this does not relive the prosecution of its duty to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, nor does it excuse the Trial Court from applying its judicial mind to the evidence. ii. The statement of the complainant, rather than dispelling doubts, has heightened the apprehensions of the court regarding the circumstances in which the occurrence occurred and the manner in which the deceased was fired upon. It is, therefore, necessary to examine not only the conduct of the complainant, but also his relationship with the deceased. iii. In the presence of such rivalry, the conduct the complainant assumes critical significance. Under these circumstance, this Court is inclined to hold that the complainant was an interested, and possibly inimical, witness, and the possibility of his implicating the accused out of the personal motive cannot be ignored. iv. In view of these circumstances, this Court entertains serious reservation regarding the credibility of the narrative of the prosecution, the assertions of the presence of the complainant at the scene, and the trustworthiness of the account of the SHO.

Summary: i. The Court is mindful of the principle that what is unConstitutional Law is void ab initio. However, the determination of unConstitutional Lawity of a judicial pronouncement is exclusively within the sphere of the appellate forum, not the Court that rendered the judgment. Allowing a High Court to sit in appeal upon its own earlier judgment, even partially, would obliterate the principle of finality, destabilize judicial hierarchy, and create a jurisdiction unknown to law. ii. A party that consciously elects to abandon a statutory remedy cannot thereafter invoke the Constitutional Law jurisdiction as a means to circumvent the consequences of that election. To permit such a course would enable litigants to manufacture jurisdiction by their own omission or deliberate withdrawal, thereby unsettling the discipline of appellate hierarchy and undermining the finality attaching to judicial determinations. Jurisdiction is conferred by law, not created by parties. iii. A concluded judgment cannot be reopened merely because a litigant has, by choice, foreclosed the appellate avenue available to him. Such a proposition would strike at the very foundation of judicial certainty and would erode the structural coherence of the justice system. Hence, the contention premised on the withdrawal of the appeal does not advance the Petitioner’s case; rather, it reinforces the impermissibility of entertaining the present petition. iv. The petitioner did invoke that very jurisdiction but chose to withdraw the appeal. Judicial discipline does not allow this Court to re-assume the role of an appellate court over issues that were properly placed before, but not pursued before, the apex Court. The withdrawal of the appeal, whether strategic or otherwise, cannot be permitted to generate a fresh cause before this Court under the guise of inherent jurisdiction.

Summary: The petitioner challenged, through Constitutional Law jurisdiction, the judgment dated 19.03.1952 passed by the Sessions Judge, Derajat, only to the extent of forfeiture of immovable property of a convict sentenced to death. The petitioner claimed rights through an alleged gift and will from the convict's sister. Held that the petitioner had earlier instituted a Civil Law suit claiming ownership of the property, which was dismissed on merits; the appeal there against was also dismissed. The subsequent Civil Law revision was not decided on merits, but was partly accepted solely on the assumption that the land had allegedly been resumed by the Government under the Land Reforms (MLR-64), resulting in lack of jurisdiction of the Civil Law court. Consequently, the judgments of the courts below were modified only to the extent that the suit was ordered to be returned, with permission to approach the competent forum strictly within the context of land resumption. Held further that the return of a plaint does not confer unrestricted liberty; such permission is conditional and circumscribed by the express terms of the order. The doctrine of "permission governs consequence"" applies