Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Art. 175E(5) & Federal Legislative List, Entry 49---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022, Sch. 2, Serial No. 14---Provincial sales tax on services---Construction services---Challenge to vires---Tax on services vis-à-vis tax on goods---Scope of provincial taxing power after Eighteenth Amendment--- Petitioners challenged vires of Serial No. 14 of Schedule 2 to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022 on ground that levy described as tax on “Construction Services” in substance included goods component of construction contracts, which, according to petitioners, could only be taxed by Federation under Entry 49 of Federal Legislative List---Federal Constitutional Court held that impugned provision, when read harmoniously with Entry 49, imposed tax only on services and not on goods---After Eighteenth Amendment, power to levy tax on services vested exclusively in Provinces, while Federation retained competence over taxes on sales and purchases of goods except sales tax on services---Impugned entry was confined to construction and allied services and was not inconsistent with Constitution---Even learned counsel for petitioners conceded that Serial No. 14 was confined to services and did not extend to goods---Accordingly, no ground was made out to strike down impugned law as ultra vires. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022--- ----Levy on entire contractual consideration---Inclusion of goods component---Double taxation concern---Adjustment mechanism---Need for bifurcation--- Court, however, observed that grievance of petitioners substantially related not to vires of law but to manner of its implementation, as show-cause notices had demanded tax on entire contractual consideration for period from July 2021 to April 2022, including value of goods utilized in performance of contracts---Court noted that statute itself allowed claim of adjustments, including refunds, regarding tax paid under other laws on goods or taxable services used in provision of taxable services, and Memorandum of Understanding between FBR and KPRA also envisaged cross-adjustment to avoid double taxation---Matter was thus governed by existing law and administrative arrangement and did not warrant constitutional invalidation of impugned provision---Court nevertheless emphasized that KPRA should devise clearer mechanism, rules or Standard Operating Procedures requiring bifurcation of contractual consideration into service component and goods component so that only service portion is subjected to provincial sales tax and unnecessary hardship to taxpayers is avoided. Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Art. 175E(5)---Federal Constitutional Court---Jurisdiction---Tax reference involving vires of law--- Though tax references were not expressly enumerated within ordinary appellate jurisdiction of Federal Constitutional Court, challenge in present case involved substantial question of constitutional interpretation, namely vires of provincial law---Court held that Art. 175E(5) empowered it, on its own motion or otherwise, to call for record of “any case” from “any court” where substantial question of law as to interpretation of Constitution arose---Such power was unqualified and wide enough to include tax references and other proceedings even where express jurisdiction might not otherwise be specifically mentioned---Since vires of legislation inherently raised substantial constitutional question, Federal Constitutional Court was competent to adjudicate matter and, under present constitutional scheme, is sole apex forum for determining vires of legislation. (a) Provincial sales tax on services---Construction services---Constitutional validity--- After the Eighteenth Amendment, Provinces possess exclusive competence to levy tax on services, while Federation retains competence to tax goods under Entry 49 of Federal Legislative List, except sales tax on services---Serial No. 14 of Schedule 2 to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022, being confined to “Construction Services” and allied services, was intra vires the Constitution. (b) Vires challenge---Harmonious construction of constitutional and statutory provisions--- Where constitutional entry and impugned statutory provision can be read harmoniously without contradiction, constitutional invalidation is not warranted---Impugned law did not trench upon federal taxing domain over goods merely because construction contracts may involve use of goods in course of service delivery. (c) Levy on whole contract amount---Goods and services mixed in construction contracts---Effect--- If tax is demanded on entire contractual consideration, inclusive of both service charges and cost of goods utilized in execution of contract, such grievance pertains to application and assessment mechanism rather than constitutional validity of charging provision itself---Province may tax service component only and not goods component. (d) Double taxation concern---Statutory adjustment and refund mechanism--- Where statute provides for adjustment or refund of tax paid under other laws on goods or taxable services used in provision of taxable service, and there exists inter-agency arrangement for cross-adjustment, apprehended double taxation is addressable within framework of law and does not by itself render charging provision unconstitutional. (e) Revenue administration---Need for bifurcation of contractual consideration--- Revenue authority should streamline process by first requiring taxpayer to identify and segregate portion of contractual consideration attributable to services and portion attributable to goods, so that provincial sales tax is levied strictly on services while goods component remains governed by federal sales tax regime---Formulation of rules or Standard Operating Procedures to this effect was recommended. (f) Federal Constitutional Court---Jurisdiction over tax reference involving vires of law--- Even though tax references are not expressly listed in ordinary heads of jurisdiction, Art. 175E(5) authorizes Federal Constitutional Court to call for and adjudicate “any case” from “any court” if it involves substantial question of law as to interpretation of Constitution---Challenge to vires of legislation inherently raises such question and therefore falls within jurisdiction of said Court. (g) Present constitutional scheme---Forum for striking down legislation--- Under present constitutional arrangement, authority to adjudicate upon vires of legislation and to strike down laws on constitutional grounds vests in Federal Constitutional Court, and not in Supreme Court, wherever substantial question of constitutional interpretation is involved. Leave refused; petitions dismissed; impugned judgment affirmed.

Summary: Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act (XLII of 2012)--- ----Ss. 3(3), 11, 24, 52 & 67-A---Reference---Taxable services---Territorial jurisdiction---Applicant / company was withholding agent and was aggrieved of show cause notice issued by Authorities for non-deducting of sale tax on the services---Plea raised by applicant / company was that taxable services were provided in other province and tax could not be charged only for the reason that head office was registered in the Province of Punjab---Validity---Mere residency of a company in Punjab or its classification as a prescribed withholding agent does not, by itself, create a substantive tax liability under Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012---Liability to sales tax under Ss. 11, 24 & 52 of Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012 was fastened exclusively upon a registered person providing taxable services---Punjab Revenue Authority was competent to initiate withholding tax proceedings on the basis of undisputed audited accounts showing composite amounts paid for services; final determination of withholding tax liability could not be made on aggregated figures alone---Each individual transaction was to be reconciled and examined to ascertain whether it had constituted a taxable service, the applicable rate of tax, and the obligation to deduct and deposit tax---Burden was upon the withholding agent to explain nature of transactions and justify non-deduction of tax---Once documentary evidence was produced before Appellate Tribunal, it was incumbent upon the Tribunal, as the final fact-finding authority, to scrutinize and reconcile each transaction and determine taxability accordingly---Appellate Tribunal’s failure to undertake such exercise amounted to non-application of judicial mind, warranting annulment of its order and remand of the matter for fresh decision in accordance with law---High Court declared that the show cause notice was issued without any legal foundation and Appellate Tribunal had erred in upholding initiation of proceedings under S. 52 of Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012 against applicant / company, despite absence of any statutory authority permitting such proceedings against a service recipient---Appellate Tribunal wrongly placed reliance on Withholding Rules, 2015, as subordinate legislation could not enlarge or create a substantive tax liability not contemplated by the parent statute---High Court set aside order passed by Appellate Tribunal as well as Order in-Original and show cause notice, as the Appellate Tribunal fell in error by sustaining proceedings and by affirming jurisdiction of Punjab Revenue Authority against applicant / company---Reference was allowed in circumstances. Nagina Silk Mill, Lyallpur v. The Income Tax Officer, Award Lyallpur and others PLD 1963 SC 322; Messrs Dewan Cement Ltd. v. Collector of Customs and Sales Tax and another 2009 SCMR 1126; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance, Islamabad and 4 others v. Messrs Ibrahim Textile Mills Ltd. and others 1992 SCMR 1898; Pak Gulf Constructions (Pvt.) Limited v. Government of Punjab and others 2025 PTD 255; Fauji Cement Company Limited v. Government of Punjab and others 2025 PTD 864; Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, Audit Range, Zone-I and others v. Messrs Eden Builders Limited and others 2018 PTD 1474; Collector of Customs, Sales Tax (West), Karachi v. Messrs K&A Industries, Karachi 2006 PTD 537; M/s Khawaja Tanneries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commissioner Punjab Revenue Authority and others Tax Reference (PRA) No.03 of 2025; M/s Jawa Pharmaceuticals (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commissioner Punjab Revenue Authority and others Tax Reference (PRA) No.60652 of 2021 and Rahat Café, Rawalpindi v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Finance and others 2024 PTD 898 ref. Barrister Saad M. Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court, Yawar Mukhtar, Muhammad Abdul Sajjad and Shahid Razzaq for Appellant. Muaz ul Mulk with Ms. Nadia Murad, Legal Officer, Punjab Revenue Authority. Barrister Raja Hashim Javed, Assistant Advocate General. Khudayar Khan for Respondent. Date of hearing: 28th January, 2026.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act (XLII of 2012)--- ----Ss. 24, 56, 60 & 62---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Proceedings by Punjab Revenue Authority, assailing of---Alternative remedy for service provider, availability of---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, invoking of---Scope---Petitioners (engaged in the business relating to selling of food items) filed constitutional petition being aggrieved of the proceedings conducted by the Punjab Revenue (authority/respondent) under S. 56 of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012 (‘the Act, 2012’)---Validity---Section 56 of the Act, 2012 bestows power upon the officers authorized by the authority to have access to premises, stocks, accounts and records of a registered person or a person liable for registration or whose business activities are covered under the Act, 2012 to ascertain the correct quantum of Punjab Sales Tax payable by the petitioners; Show-Cause Notices under S. 24 of the Act, 2012 were also issued to the petitioners---Section 60 of the Act, 2012 provides the power of adjudication in respect of certain cases of contravention or violation including tax fraud under the Act, 2012 or the Rules---Furthermore, S. 62 vests power of revision upon the authority---Therefore, the petitioners had alternate and efficacious remedies provided under the Act, 2012 ; in presence thereof invoking the constitutional jurisdiction would amount to stifling the normal course of law---Jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution is neither unbridled nor unrestricted, instead it is an extraordinary jurisdiction to be exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances---Wherever an efficacious and adequate remedy is available to a person invoking Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, it exercises restraint unless some compelling circumstances exist for invocation of such jurisdiction---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Syed Masood Ali v. Mst. Feroza Begum and another PLD 2025 SC 339; Muhammad Safeer and others v. Muhammad Azam and others PLD 2024 SC 838; Special Secretary-II (Law and Order), Home and Tribal Affairs Department. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others v. Fayyaz Dawar 2023 SCMR 1442 and Mian Azam Waheed and 2 others v. The Collector of Customs 2023 SCMR 1247 ref. Hafiz Muhammad Idrees and Hassan Askari Kazmi for Petitioner.

Summary: Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 11(5), first proviso & 11G(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Article 189---Law settled by judgments of superior courts---Binding on Government Departments including Federal Board of Revenue (FBR)---Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) repeatedly assailing decisions qua questions of law already settled by judgments of superior courts---Doctrine of stare decisis---In the present case, the Order-in-Original was barred by time having been issued after a period of 120 days from the date of the issuance of the Show-Cause Notice; whereas adjudication within stipulated time is/was mandatory in nature as affirmed / settled by various judgments of superior courts---Despite the law laid down by the Supreme Court which is binding on the Federal Board of Revenue ("FBR") in terms of Article 189 of the Constitution, in the present case, the petitioners / Department attempted to reinvent the wheel by agitating the ground that the time limit of 120 days prescribed in the first proviso to Section 11(5) substituted and replaced by Section 11G(2) of the 1990 Act for passing an order is directory and not mandatory---When government departments routinely file appeals/petitions (often up to the High Courts and the Supreme Court) on questions of law that have already been authoritatively settled, the practice results in serious institutional harms---The most immediate consequence is the clogging of court dockets---Courts are compelled to spend scarce judicial time revisiting issues that are no longer res integra at the cost of undecided legal and constitutional questions, criminal appeals involving personal liberty, and civil disputes pending for years; which undermines the constitutional mandate of speedy justice---Repeated appeals/petitions on settled law weaken respect for Article 189 of the Constitution, the doctrine of stare decisis, and judicial discipline within the executive branch---When the State itself disregards binding precedents, it sends the wrong signals to subordinate courts, litigants---Such appeals/petitions result in unavoidable litigation costs, consumption of public funds for counsel, court fees and administrative processing---The State is expected to act as a responsible and fair litigant, not as a compulsive appellant/petitioner---Courts already possess both constitutional authority and jurisprudential tools to address the problem of repeated appeals/petitions by government departments on settled questions of law---Not only can the courts dismiss such appeals/petitions in limine, but one of the most effective tools is the imposition of costs---In egregious cases, courts may require identification of the officer for authorizing the appeals/petitions---It is imperative for there to be internal accountability by government departments and careful legal scrutiny before filing appeals/petitions---Had such scrutiny taken place before the filing of the instant petition, it would have been realized that the primary question of law sought to be agitated by the petitioners already stood authoritatively settled---Stood order to address said problem it is imperative for the Chairman, FBR to consider constituting committees which function with the highest degree of independence and includes a retired Judge of the superior judiciary, an experienced tax practitioner, and senior serving or retired officers of the FBR with distinguished record and impeccable credentials with the mandate to timely examine each case before a decision is made to file a reference before the High Court or a petition before this/Supreme Court---The FBR may also consider undertaking review of all pending cases in order to determine whether the questions of law sought to be agitated therein already stand settled by judgments of superior courts---Leave to appeal was declined---Petition, filed by department, was dismissed. Commissioner Inland Revenue v. POF Welfare Packages, Sanjwal, Attock (STR No.12/2013); The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala v. Messrs Super Asia Muhammad Din & Sons 2017 PTD 1756; Messrs WAK Ltd. v. Collector, Central Excise and Sales Tax 2018 SCMR 1474; Abbasi Enterprises Unilever Distributors v. Collector of Sales Tax and Federal Excise 2019 SCMR 1989 = 2020 PTD 147; Messrs WAK Ltd. v. Collector, Central Excise and Sales Tax 2025 SCMR 1280; Federal Public Service Commission through Secretary, Islamabad v. Kashif Mustafa PLJ 2025 SC 386; Director General, Rawalpindi Development Authority v. Mian Muhammad Sadiq PLD 2006 SC 142; Regional Manager, NADRA RHO, Hayatabad, Peshawar v. Mst. Hajira 2024 SCMR 197; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Mst. Zubeda Bibi 2024 SCMR 426 and Amjad Ali v. Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education 2001 PLC (C.S.) 280 ref. Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners. Malik Itaat Hussain Awan, Advocate Supreme Court along with Ms. Romana Alam, Addl. Commissioner Inland Revenue (FBR) and Yousaf Khan, S.O. Legal, FBR for Respondent. Waheed Butter, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent. Date of hearing: 15th January, 2026.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 11(2)---Assessment /recovery of tax erroneously refunded etc.---Fake / flying invoices issued by the blacklisted/suspended units, allegation of---Transaction made through proper bank channel---Scope and effect---All the transactions made with the supplier by the respondent/registered Person, during the alleged period (from July 2017 to June 2022), were through proper bank channel i.e. crossed banking instrument, whereas, at the time of purchases from the alleged suppliers, both, the buyer and the supplier were duly declared in the sale tax returns as active and no coercive action at that time was taken against the alleged blacklisted/blocked suppliers---Respondent / registered persons also produced complete detail of purchase made along with proof of purchase invoices and bank statements---Before Commissioner Inland Revenue- Appeals/CIR (A), the Department not only remained unable to provide any proof of inquiry or involvement of respondent /registered person in purchases of fake and flying invoices, but also showed unawareness of the business activities of the respondent/registered persons---Thus, at the time when the supplies were made and invoices were issued, the suppliers were neither blacklisted nor the invoices issued had any direct nexus with the blacklisting order---Therefore, the proposed question was answered against the applicant/department---The CIR(A) and the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue passed well speaking orders and had rightly set aside the order-in-original---Thus, no reason / case to interfere in the concurrent findings of the forums below was made out---Sales Tax Reference Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 11(2)---Customs Act (IV of 1969), S. 187---National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), S.14---Assessment /recovery of tax erroneously refunded etc.---Rejection by department---Fake/flying invoices issued by the blacklisted/suspended units, allegation of---Burden of proof---Whether upon Department or the registered person---Concept of reverse onus---Principle of presumption of innocence---Scope---In the present case, though Show-Cause Notice was issued to the respondent /registered person, but record was silent whether before issuance of Show-Cause Notice any meaningful efforts were made by the Department (sales tax officials ) to conduct an audit or any proper inquiry was made by exercising powers conferred under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, (‘the Act 1990’), in order to verify the allegations---It was revealed from the contents of the Show-Cause Notice that the same had been based on vague allegations and an assumption, such as; the respondent /registered person had claimed input tax adjustment against sales tax invoices of suppliers who were subsequently blacklisted/suspended or made inactive by the Federal Board of Revenue---The court looks to what is clearly said and there is no room for any intendment nor is there any equity about a tax---There is no presumption as to tax and nothing is to be read in or implied and one can only look fairly at the language used---The scheme of the Act, 1990 clearly envisages that the obligation to establish that a person is liable to pay any tax or charge and the same has not been levied or paid or has been short-levied is essentially that of the sales tax authorities---The burden to prove the allegations is on the shoulders of the authorities/department ;and in order to discharge said obligation they have been vested with wide powers under the Act, 1990---Whoever asserts a fact is also burdened with the duty to establish that it is highly probable to be true---In some exceptional cases, the legislature, in its wisdom, has provided for what is known as reverse onus, by placing the burden on the person against whom an allegation has been made; such as S. 187 of the Customs Act, 1969 and S.14 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---The concept of reverse onus i.e. placing the burden on the person against whom an allegation has been made runs contrary to the established principle of presumption of innocence---It is, therefore, for said reason that Courts lean in favour of interpreting or reading down such provision in an effort to safeguard the fundamental principles of fair trial---There is no provision pari materia with S. 187 of the Customs Act, 1969, or S.14 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, in the Act, 1990---The legislature, therefore, did not intend to reverse the onus of proof in matters relating to the levy, charge and payment of the tax under the Act, 1990---The proceedings before the adjudicating authority or the statutory appellate forum under the Act, 1990 are quasi judicial in nature---When the department alleges that a registered person has committed any illegality, the former is burdened with a statutory duty to establish before the adjudicating forum, through persuasive and proper evidence, that the allegations are highly probable to be true, rather than being unreliable, false or doubtful---The duty to establish facts on the standard of balance of probabilities is on the department under the Act of 1990, thus, the question was decided against the department---Commissioner Inland Revenue (A) and the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue passed well speaking orders and had rightly set aside the order-in-original---Thus, no reason / case to interfere in the concurrent findings of the forums below was made out---Sales Tax reference Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. Darya Khan, Barrister Iftikhar Raza Khan and Munawar Khan Kasi for Appellant. Muhammad Umar Dogar and Raja Umair Ali for Respondent No.1. Date of hearing: 28th November, 2025.

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 177 & 214-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Audit after expiry of limitation---Condonation of delay---Scope---Petitioner / company was aggrieved of extension in time by authorities to initiate audit proceeds beyond period prescribed for the purpose---Validity---Federal Board of Revenue and its officers are duly authorized under S. 214-A of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to condone delay in performance of any act or thing for which a period has been prescribed under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and audit essentially is an act or thing to be done---Purpose of S. 214-A of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is to give a separate overriding power to the Board to permit any act or thing to be done under the statute within such time period as it may deem appropriate, which is independent of any other provision of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 that provides a time frame and an audit is plainly such an act---Federal Board of Revenue has the power under S.214-A of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to grant condonation---Show cause notice was to be issued within the prescribed five-year period, and such outer limit was absolute and could not be breached---Only five-year limit did not matter and delay after a timely notice had invalidated the proceedings---Additional statutory time limits, such as the time prescribed for issuing the order-in-original after a valid show cause notice were also mandatory and not merely directory but had created multi-layered, mandatory protections for taxpayers---Delays were not caused by any external or unavoidable impediment and Federal Board of Revenue could have proceeded within the statutory period---Benefit of such conduct rebounds entirely to taxpayer, not by operation of law but through the Authority’s own failure to discharge its obligations with diligence and integrity---If the Authority was genuinely committed to proper discharge of its functions, it could have attributed liability when called for---High Court declared condonation of time by authorities as void---High Court restrained the authorities from seeking further information pertaining to Tax Year 2019 in pursuance of such condonation of time limit---High Court declared audit proceedings under S. 177 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 as time barred---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others 2017 SCMR 1427, 2017 PTD 1756; WAK Limited and others v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax 2025 PTD 1179; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Messrs Allah Din Steel and Rolling Mills and others 2018 SCMR 1328; Additional Collector of Customs, Faisalabad v. Messrs Fatima Enterprises, Multan and another (2025 SCMR 1929; Federal Board of Revenue v. Abdul Ghani 2021 SCMR 1154; Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV, Lahore v. Messrs Panther Sports and Rubber Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2022 SCMR 1135; Sabre Travel Network Pakistan Limited v. Pakistan and others (2025) 131 Tax 456 and Dowell Schlumberger (Western) S.A in W.P. No. 1183 of 2018 rel. (b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)--- ----S. 24-A---Recording of reasons---Scope---Requirement to articulate reasons is neither a mere procedural formality nor an empty ritual rather it is a substantive safeguard designed to demonstrate that discretion has been exercised judiciously, objectively, and with due application of mind---Reasoned decision-making ensures that affected persons are apprised of the basis of the action taken, which facilitates meaningful judicial review, and acts as a restraint against arbitrariness or caprice. Additional Collector of Customs, Faisalabad v. Messrs Fatima Enterprises, Multan and another 2025 SCMR 1929 rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Judicial review---Institutional manipulation---Scope---High Court cannot and should not in the exercise of judicial review close its eyes if there is institutionalized manipulation apparent on the face of the record. Sardar Taimoor Aslam and Mudassar Abbas for Petitioner. Muhammad Asif Jadoon, A.A.G. for Respondent No.1. Osama Shahid for Respondent No.2. Assisted by: Muhammad Yahya Khan Niazi, Judicial Law Clerk. Date of hearing: 22nd October, 2025

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII o f 1990)--- ----Ss.38 & 40---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Inspection conducted at petitioner’s business premises, challenge to---Authorities cannot lawfully enter, inspect, or obtain records without first obtaining a magistrate’s warrant under S. 40 of the Act, 1990, plea of---Whether proceedings under S. 38 can be undertaken without first invoking S. 40 of the Act, 1990---‘Routine inspection’---‘Search and seizure’---Distinction---Briefly, the inspection at petitioner’s premises was carried out pursuant to an authorization issued by the Commissioner Inland Revenue, following information received from FBR Headquarters regarding an unusually large carry-forward of input tax declared by the petitioner in its sales tax return, necessitating verification of stock position and related records, and the inspection formed part of a structured desk audit and verification process undertaken by the tax authorities---Held: Section 38 facilitated routine, non-coercive inspections, whereas S. 40 governed intrusive searches justified by the statutory threshold of “reason to believe” and “relevant to any proceedings”---The statutory scheme therefore did not support the view that S. 38 was subordinated to S. 40; both provisions coexisted to serve distinct yet complementary purposes within the broader tax administration regime---In the present case, record did not disclose arbitrariness, mala fides, colorable exercise of authority or any overreach that might warrant interference in constitutional jurisdiction---No coercive action had been taken against the petitioner, nor had it been deprived of property or subjected to any measure beyond a routine inspection---Petitioner had declared an exceptionally high carry-forward adjustment of Rs.185,352,613/- against stock values declared at Rs.1,029,736,739/-, necessitating verification which constituted a reasonable and legally sufficient foundation for initiating inspection proceedings---Verification of such discrepancies was a routine and essential function of the tax administration to ensure accuracy of declarations---Proceedings under S. 38 were neither irregular nor excessive---The Commissioner had a proper factual and statutory basis for issuing the authorization; the officers acted strictly within the scope of S.38; no measure of coercion, seizure, or forced retrieval was adopted; and at no stage were the intrusive mechanisms prescribed under S. 40 invoked---The petitioner, therefore, failed to demonstrate any infringement of legal rights---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss.38 & 40---Access to business premises---Power to inspect stocks, accounts, and records---Permissibility of such exercise even in absence of pending adjudication---Whether proceedings under S. 38 can be undertaken without first invoking S. 40 of the Act, 1990---Routine inspection---Coercive search and seizures---Distinct statutory domains---Obtaining a prior magistrate’s warrant as condition precedent---Requirement---Proceedings under S. 38 can be undertaken without first invoking S. 40 of the Act, 1990---Scope, nature, and purpose of the two provisions are distinct---Section 38 empowers the authorized officer to access business premises, registered offices, stocks, accounts, and records of registered persons or those liable for registration---This power is exercisable even when no adjudicatory or penal proceedings are pending, and is intended to verify declarations, ascertain factual positions, examine stock levels, and review records maintained under federal, provincial, or local laws---In contrast, S.40 contemplates search and seizure, but only where the officer has reason to believe that documents or things relevant to proceedings exist at a place, and then only after obtaining a magistrate’s warrant---The two provisions thus operate independently: Section 38 allows routine inspections for verification and transparency, while S. 40 regulates coercive searches linked to pending or contemplated proceedings---Section 38 expressly authorizes Inland Revenue officers to access any business premises, manufacturing facility, registered office or any other place where stocks, business records or documents relevant under the Act, 1990 are kept---The authority extends not only to registered persons but also to persons liable for registration, and further, to any person whose business activities may be required to be examined for any inquiry or investigation in any tax fraud committed by him, his agent or any other person---This wide yet purpose-linked statutory mandate enables revenue authorities to identify tax evasion, detect fraudulent input adjustments, uncover unreported supplies, and generally ensure that the flow of tax to the exchequer is not impeded through concealment or manipulation---However, under S. 38, the officer may access the premises, inspect records, and obtain material voluntarily produced or found in plain sight, but cannot compel production of concealed documents or seize property byforce. Tanveer Ahmad for Petitioner. Mahmood Ahmad Bhatti for Respondents. Date of hearing: 8th December, 2025.