Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 239 (e)- Joint trial of receiver of Property looted in dacoity along with persons involved in dacoity who were charged with dacoity with murder under S. 396 P. -P. C.-Held, in order. S. D. was charged and convicted under sections 412/414 P. P. C. at a joint trial with the' remaining accused who were charged and convicted under sections 395 and 396 P. P. C. On objection being taken that the joint trial was illegal inasmuch as the offence alleged against the other appellants was not of dacoity alone but also one of murder committed during the commission of that dacoity made punishable by section 396 of the P. P. C. Held, the mere fact that the appellants other than S. D. were, in addition to being persons accused of an offence of dacoity (which offence includes theft), persons accused also of another offence, would not make the joint trial of Shukar Din with them illegal, if, as in the present case, those appellants' case be jointly tried for the two offences. (b) Evidence Act (I of 1872), S. 133-Corroboration of statement of accomplice necessary-Greater caution in case of approver's statement-Mere absconding of accused no corroboration-Guilty conscience must be established-Recovery of stolen Property-Corroboration. It is well settled that no conviction should be based on the statement of an accomplice, unless it is corroborated in material particulars. The corroboration required must be not only general corroboration of the statement of the accomplice but also against each of the accused persons before that person can be convicted of an offence. That when dealing with the evidence of an approver greater care is called for. Before absconding can be used against an accused person it must be established that be absconded not because, though innocent, he was afraid of being arrested but because he had a guilty conscience and cases are not uncommon in which innocent persons when convinced that they were going to be arrested have absconded. It is not necessary that corroborative evidence by itself should establish the offence deposed to by the approver. Recovery of looted property from possession of accused coupled with the statement of approver that those accused were his companions in the dacoity is enough to prove that they bad taken part in the dacoity (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 396-Doroity with murder-Whether and when accused should be charged under Ss. 302/149 P. P. C. rather than under S. 396.

Summary: Acquittal granted---(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 120-B, 420, 382 & 414---Criminal conspiracy, cheating, theft, and receiving stolen property---Conviction and sentence---Appellant, along with co-accused, was charged with criminal conspiracy, cheating, and theft of a vehicle---Prosecution relied on the ocular account of the complainant (P.W.1) and his cleaner (P.W.2), along with circumstantial evidence and the appellant’s confessional statement recorded under S. 164, Cr.P.C.---Trial Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine under Ss. 120-B, 420, and 382, P.P.C., along with additional imprisonment under S. 414, P.P.C. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 164---Confession of accused---Admissibility---Retracted confession---Appellant retracted his confession, alleging that it was obtained under coercion and duress---Trial Court relied on the confession for conviction---Held, that the confession was not voluntary, as the appellant alleged mistreatment and coercion by the police and jail authorities---No corroborative evidence was provided to establish that the confession was made freely and voluntarily---In the absence of independent corroboration, a retracted and exculpatory confession was not a sufficient basis for conviction. (c) Criminal trial---- ----Role of accused in the occurrence---Presumption of innocence---Appellant was a young boy aged 16/17 years and was picked up alone at a later stage while the other co-accused were already present in the vehicle---No evidence suggested prior conspiracy or shared intent with the main accused---Held, that the prosecution failed to establish that the appellant actively participated in the crime or shared a common intention with the other accused. (d) Duty of trial court---- ----Obligation to ensure fair trial and inquire into material allegations---Appellant made serious allegations of mistreatment, including coercion and sexual abuse by a police officer and another individual during detention---Trial Court failed to investigate these claims despite their relevance to the voluntariness of the confession---Held, that the trial court, as a fact-finding body, should have inquired into the allegations to ensure a fair trial and avoid wrongful conviction. (e) Criminal liability---- ----Common intention under S. 34, P.P.C.---Failure to frame charge properly---Trial Court did not explicitly charge the appellant under S. 34, P.P.C., nor was he questioned regarding the existence of a common intention with the main accused---Absence of such a charge indicated that no case of shared criminal intent was made out against him. ----Disposition: Appeal accepted. Convictions and sentences set aside. Appellant acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith.