Summary: Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 11 & 21(2)---Sales Tax Rules, 2006, R. 12---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 18---Sales tax registration of registered person---Suspension / blacklisting---Conditionalties, non-observance of ---Effect---Adjudication under S. 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, having culminated---Continued suspension---Scope---Freedom of trade, business, or profession---Scope---Under S. 21(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (‘the Act, 1990’), the legislature has laid down specific conditionalties before such a severe action/order of suspension can be taken---It is not the intention of the law to confer arbitrary powers upon the tax authorities---The invoking of S. 21(2) of the Act, 1990 must be supported by objective facts and proper reasoning---In the present case, the department failed to substantiate how the conditionalties mentioned in S. 21(2) were fulfilled prior to the suspension---There was no record of any speaking order or show-cause notice giving the appellant an adequate opportunity to respond or explain their position prior to passing the order of blacklisting---Such action on the part of the department was contrary to the established principles of natural justice---Furthermore, after blacklisting of the appellant, the assessing officer initiated proceedings under S.11 of the Act, 1990 which resulted into Order-in-Original (ONO )where the matter was fully adjudicated upon for the relevant tax period---Therefore, it is evident that the suspension of the appellant triggered proceedings under S.11 of the Act, 1990, were which exhausted and adjudicated---Suspension or blacklisting is not meant to be a permanent disability---It is a temporary measure subject to review and compliance with legal and procedural safeguards---The Act, 1990 does not provide for indefinite suspension/blacklisting, especially in the absence of any live dispute, fresh cause of action or persisting default---Moreover, Art.18 of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of trade, business, or profession to every citizen---The continued suspension of the appellant offend the spirit of Art. 18 and deprives the appellant of its Constitutional protection---The right to carry on lawful business cannot be curtailed without cogent reason, and any such restriction must stand the test of legality, proportionality and procedural fairness---Since suspension of its sales tax registration, the appellant (registered person) was unable to conduct business---Pertinently, the department had taken no step to review the suspension status of the appellant even after Order-in-Original had been passed---The absence of any further proceedings or inquiry to justify the continued suspension clearly showed that the department's stance was unsustainable---Mere suspicion or past audit observations could not justify indefinite denial of business---Thus, the punitive measures such as suspension or blacklisting must be rooted in objective facts, should not be excessive in duration and must be subjected to periodic review---There was no indication on record that the department had ever reviewed the status of suspension or issued a fresh notice to justify its continuation---Said lack of action confirmed that the suspension had lapsed into an indefinite punishment without legal mandate---Even otherwise, after the appellant's entire case was adjudicated under S. 11 of the Act, 1990, there remained no reason for suspension status of the registered person as there was no further pending liability, no prosecution initiated, nor was there any show-cause under progress---In such a scenario, the continued presence of the appellant's name in the suspension is highly unjustified---Continuation of suspension of the appellant, despite Order-in-Original being passed under S. 11 and in the absence of any fresh material or cause, was not tenable under the law---Such action amounted to denial of lawful business opportunity, infringed Art. 18 of the Constitution, and lacked support of S. 21(2) of the Act, 1990---Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue set-aside the impugned suspension order, and the department was directed to restore the appellant's status---Appeal, filed by the Registered Person (AoP), was allowed accordingly. Imran Rashid and Farooq Ejaz for Appellant. Farooq Anwar, D.R. for Respondent. Date of hearing: 17th June, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss.2(43A), 3(9A), 40(c) & 11---Failure of registered person to integrate a retail outlet fully or partially with the FBR's Computerized System for real-time reporting, offence of---Provision for recovery of tax shortfalls under S. 11 of the Act, 1990, applicability of---Imposition of penalty for violations exclusively covered under other specific provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990---Whether penalties and default surcharge for non-integration can be imposed under S. 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, or must be confined to the specific penal mechanism under S. 33 of the Act, 1990?---The Commissioner Inland Revenue(the CIR) sought to impose penalties and default surcharge on Tier-1 retailers for failing to fully integrate their retail outlets with the FBR's computerized POS system---The Department relied on S. 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 as the jurisdictional basis to issue show-cause notices and recover such penalties---The Registered Persons challenged this and the Appellate Tribunal set aside the penalty orders---High Court was then called upon to decide as to "whether S. 11 (a machinery provision dealing with recovery of tax shortfalls) could legally be invoked to impose penalties for regulatory breaches under Ss. 2(43A), 3(9A), 40C read with Serial Nos. 24 and 25 of S. 33 (which specifically prescribed penalties for non-integration)?"---Held: While S. 33 of the Act, 1990 governed the creation of liability for specified offences, it did not itself supply the procedural means for recovering such penalty from the Registered Person, if there was no simultaneous tax shortfall---Any proceedings for penalty under serial No.24 or 25 was to be rooted in the express penalty provisions, and the recovery was to follow the adjudication process prescribed by the Act, 1990 or other relevant enabling provisions, but could not default to S. 11 of the Act, 1990 in the absence of a short levied tax---Although S. 33 of the Act, 1990, prescribed various offences and their corresponding penalties, it did not itself provide any independent procedural mechanism for the issuance, adjudication, or recovery of such penalties---Therefore, in the absence of such procedure, reliance could not be placed on a general provision like S. 11 of the Act 1990, which was confined to tax assessment and recovery, to fill that gap by implication---In the present case, the respondents' alleged failure to fully or partially integrate their retail outlet did not, ipso facto, result in a quantifiable shortfall of sales tax that could be brought within the ambit of S. 11 of the Act, 1990---Instead, this default constituted an independent regulatory offence for which a specific penalty was prescribed under Serial Nos.24 and 25 of S. 33 of the Act, 1990---Reliance on S. 11 of the Act, 1990 as the sole jurisdictional basis for issuing a show cause notice to impose penalty and default surcharge for partial or complete non-integration under Ss.2(43A), 3(9A), and 40C of the Act, 1990 was misconceived in law and contrary to the statutory framework---Such action was ultra vires the express scheme of the Act, 1990, which required that the prescribed penalty for these specific regulatory breaches be imposed strictly under the enabling provisions of S. 33 of the Act, 1990, following due process and in accordance with the procedure established by law---Accordingly, the show-cause notice and the consequential order passed pursuant thereto had rightly been set-aside to the extent that they sought to impose penalty and default surcharge solely by invoking S. 11 of the Act, 1990 for violations that were required to be prosecuted exclusively under the specific penal provisions of S. 33 of the Act, 1990---Consequently, the order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue was upheld to this extent having correctly appreciated the statutory distinction and the limits of jurisdiction prescribed under the Act, 1990---Present reference applications were decided against the applicant department. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss.2(43A), 3(9A), 40(c) &11---Failure to integrate a retail outlet fully or partially with the FBR's Computerized System for real-time reporting, offence of---Provision for recovery of tax shortfalls under S. 11 of the Act, 1990, applicability of---Imposition of penalty for violations exclusively covered under other specific provisions of same statute---Legality and scope---Section 11 of the Act, 1990 is a machinery provision and its statutory object is to empower the Officer of Inland Revenue to detect, assess, and recover any tax, which has either escaped assessment, has not been paid, or has been erroneously refunded---The operative words are "tax not levied or short-levied or erroneously refunded" demonstrating that its entire scope is tethered to the quantification and recovery of a shortfall in tax revenue---The legislative intent of S. 11 of the Act, 1990 is clear from its text, it addresses tax revenue shortfall and its recovery, not regulatory penalties imposed for stands alone statutory breaches unrelated to any deficit in the tax payable---The said provision is silent regarding the creation of offences or the independent imposition of penalties for regulatory breaches that do not necessarily result in a quantifiable tax default---Its scope is not punitive but compensatory and restorative in nature, to protect the exchequer from actual revenue loss---Conversely, the offences for failure to integrate a retail outlet fully or partially with the Board's Computerized System for real-time reporting are distinctly prescribed under Ss. 2(43A), 3(9A) & 40C of the Act, 1990, while the penal consequences for such breaches are codified under S. 33 of the Act, 1990, particularly at Serial Nos. 24 and 25 further observed that the Table appended to S. 33 of the Act, 1990 including inter alia Serial Nos.24 and 25, prescribes various statutory offences along with the corresponding penalties for each specific breach---These provisions clearly adopt a specific general legislative framework, the specific provision, i.e., S. 33 of the "Act" defines the nature of the offence and stipulates the quantum of penalty or default surcharge applicable thereto---However, the Act, 1990 is conspicuously silent on any detailed procedure for the assessment, computation, or recovery of such penalties where no ascertainable tax shortfall is determined---Section 33 of the Act, 1990 by its design, is declaratory in nature---It creates liability, but does not itself furnish a procedural machinery for quantification or recovery---This structural distinction is well entrenched in the jurisprudence that machinery provisions must operate within the express confines of the substantive charging provisions they support---Any attempt to expand a machinery provision, such as S. 11 of the Act, 1990 to cover penalties for purely regulatory defaults (as described at Serial Nos.24 and 25, or similar entries in the Table amounts to reading into the statute a jurisdiction, which the Legislature has not conferred. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal/tax statutes---Penal provisions---Applicability and scope---Where a fiscal statute provides a penal consequence for breach of a statutory duty, such penal consequence must be enforced strictly within the four corners of the enabling provision---Where a special provision exists, it overrides the general provision to the extent of any overlap, a principle that applies with even greater force where penal consequences are involved---Tax statutes, particularly those prescribing penalties or default surcharges, must be construed strictly---Penal provisions cannot be broadened by administrative construction or implication---It is incumbent upon the department to establish clear statutory authority for each element of any penalty imposed, and an officer must demonstrate precise adherence to the express language of the statute to justify the levy of any penalty or surcharge---Where the legislature has created a distinct penalty for a regulatory contravention without linking it to an ascertainable tax shortfall, the penalty must be enforced strictly under the special provision, not by resorting to a general recovery mechanism intended for unpaid tax. Government of Punjab through Secretary Irrigation and Power and another v. Kunjah Textile Mills Ltd. and others 2025 SCMR 239 rel. Syed Muhammad Abbas, Malik Ittat Hussain Awan, Barrister Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, Dr. G.M. Chaudhry, Manzoor Hussain along with Yousaf Khan, S.O. I.R. (Hqrs) R.T.O., Rawalpindi for Applicant. Atif Waheed, Ch. Imran-ul-Haq, Muhammad Musawar Gill, Zahid Shafiq and Mehmood Subhani, Bilal-ud-Din Butt, Raja Basit Iqbal, Qazi Hafee-ur-Rehman, Ameer-ul-Azeem and Umair Mehmood for Respondent No.1. Date of hearing: 17th April, 2025.

Summary: (a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 159(1) & 159(2)---Proceedings of election of Board of directors assailing of---Material irregularities in proceedings---Effect---Petitioner, being shareholder of the Private Limited Company (‘the Company’), challenged the election process of the Board of Directors of the Company---Held: Section 159(1) of the Companies Act, 2017 (‘the Act, 2017’) mandates that the existing Board of Directors shall, through a duly convened meeting, fix the number of directors to be elected in the upcoming general meeting---Record revealed that no such resolution was passed by the existing Board to fix the number of directors to be elected---Furthermore, the respondents failed to produce any documentary evidence establishing compliance with the statutory requirements of Ss. 159(1) & 159(2) of the Act, 2017---Such non-compliance strikes at the root of the election process and renders the entire exercise invalid, vitiating the election proceedings---High Court declared the election of the Board of Directors of the Company as illegal, void ab initio and without lawful authority, being violative of the mandatory provisions of the Act, 2017 and set aside the entire election process and resolutions passed ;consequently, directing the existing Board of Directors to proceed election process in compliance with provisions of Ss. 159(1) & 159(2) of the Act, 2017---Petition, filed by shareholder of Company, was allowed accordingly. Tariq Aziz and others v. Makhdum Ahmed Mahmud and others 2022 CLD 1279 and Shahid Mahmood & Company (Pvt.) Limited and 2 others v. Zahid Mahmood and 5 others 2025 CLD 408 ref. Dewan Salman Fibre Limited v. Dewan Petroleum (Pvt.) Limited 2016 CLD 1049 distinguished. (b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 159(1), 159(2) & 160---Power of the Court to declare election of Directors invalid---Locus standi/threshold---Scope---Petitioner, being shareholder of the Private Limited Company (‘the Company’), challenged the election process of the Board of Directors of the Company---Held: Petitioner, along with supporting shareholders, held more than 10% of the voting power, thereby satisfying the threshold prescribed under S. 160 of the Companies Act, 2017 (‘the Act, 2017’)---Section 160 of the Act 2017 empowers the Court to declare election proceedings invalid where material irregularities or violations of law are established---Petitioner had alleged serious procedural irregularities, including: (i) absence of proper attendance and voting records; (ii) failure to count votes cast in favor of the petitioner; (iii) lack of procedural transparency throughout the election process; and (iv) denial of effective participation to shareholders---The cumulative effect of these irregularities constituted fundamental procedural lapses that undermined the legitimacy and fairness of the election---Accordingly, such defects warranted judicial scrutiny and intervention under the mandate of S. 160 of the Act 2017---High Court declared the election of the Board of Directors of the Company as illegal, void ab initio, and without lawful authority, being violative of the mandatory provisions of the Act 2017, and set aside the entire election process and resolutions passed; consequently, directing the existing Board of Directors to proceed election process in compliance with provisions of Ss. 159(1) & 159 (2) of the Act, 2017---Petition, filed by shareholder of Company, was allowed accordingly. Mrs. Hijab Fatima Tariq and 2 others v. Kohat Cement Co. Ltd. and others 2017 CLD 436 distinguished. (c) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss.159(1), 159(2) & 160---Proceedings of election of Board of Directors, assailing of---Limitation---Petitioner, being shareholder of the Private Limited Company (‘the Company’), challenged the election process of the Board of Directors of the Company---Objection qua limitation was raised as petition before the Court was filed after about one and half month of the impugned election---Validity---The delay in filing petition had been satisfactorily explained---Petitioner applied for certified copies of relevant minutes on the very next day of impugned proceedings, however, only uncertified copies were provided after about fifteen days ; certified copies were re-applied for but, unrebuttedly, were never issued---Accordingly, the delay stood duly explained---Therefore, there was no merit in the contention that the petition was barred by limitation, particularly when there had been a failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Ss. 159(1) & (2) of the Companies Act, 2017---High Court declared the election of the Board of Directors of the Company as illegal, void ab initio and without lawful authority, being violative of the mandatory provisions of the Act 2017, and set aside the entire election process and resolutions passed ; consequently, directing the existing Board of Directors to proceed election process in compliance with provisions of Ss. 159(1) & 159 (2) of the Act, 2017---Petition, filed by shareholder of Company, was allowed accordingly. (d) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 159(1) & 159(2)---Proceedings of election of Board of Directors, assailing of---Material irregularities in impugned proceeding---The word ‘shall’ is used in a provision of law---Scope---Petitioner, being shareholder of the Private Limited Company (‘the Company’), challenged the election process of the Board of Directors of the Company---Held: Section 159(1) of the Companies Act, 2017 (‘the Act 2017’), mandates that the existing Board of Directors shall, through a duly convened meeting, fix the number of directors to be elected in the upcoming general meeting---When a statute requires that a thing should be done in a particular manner or form, it has to be done in such manner, otherwise it would not be in-compliance with the legislative intent---When the word ‘shall’ is used in a provision of law, it is to be construed in its ordinary grammatical meaning and normally the use of word ‘shall’ by the legislature brands a provision as mandatory, especially when an authority is required to do something in a particular manner---High Court declared the election of the Board of Directors of the Company as illegal, void ab initio and without lawful authority, being violative of the mandatory provisions of the Act 2017 and set aside the entire election process and resolutions passed ; consequently, directing the existing Board of Directors to proceed election process in compliance with provisions of Ss.159(1) & 159 (2) of the Act, 2017---Petition, filed by shareholder of Company, was allowed accordingly. Atta Muhammad Qureshi v. The Settlement Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore PLD 1971 SC 61; Hakim Ali v. Muhammad Salim 1992 SCMR 46; Khyber Tractors (Pvt.) Ltd v. Pakistan through Ministry of Finance PLD 2005 SC 842; Zia Ur Rehman v. Syed Ahmed Hussain 2014 SCMR 1015; The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala v. Messrs Super Asia Mohammad Din and Sons 2017 SCMR 1427; Abdul Khaliq v. Sardar Sanaullah Zehri 2019 CLC 1543; Shahdost Dashti v. Federation of Pakistan 2019 CLC 1750; Muhammad Andleeb Raza v. Muhammad Nazar 2019 YLR 1974 and Haji Abdul Karim and others v. Florida Builders (Pvt.) Limited PLD 2012 SC 247 ref. Ali Raza Khokhar for Petitioner. Ahmad Rafay Alam for Respondents Nos. 1 to 4. Ruman Bilal for Respondent No.5-SECP. Date of hearing: 1st July, 2025.

Summary: (Against the order dated 26.03.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in S.T.R. No. 8 of 2024). Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 2(37), 6,7,8,22,23,26 & 73---Input tax, claim of---Issuance of fake/ flying invoices, allegation of---Proof---Allegation was that the registered person /company did not purchase any coal from the local suppliers but unlawfully claimed input tax on the basis of fake/ flying invoices issued by dubious suppliers, therefore, causing loss to the national exchequer--- Order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue in favour of registered person was concurred with by the High Court---Validity---Pertinently, the proceedings in the matter were initiated pursuant to issuance of Show Cause Notice wherein the respondents were not confronted with any invoices, the value of which was above Rs. 50,000/---No material or evidence whatsoever was provided to substantiate the allegation to the effect that the suppliers as mentioned in the Show Cause Notice were blacklisted during the tax period under consideration---In the present case, Show-Cause Notice and the Order-in-Original were passed on vague and frivolous allegations and certain conclusions had been made on mere presumptions only, whereas, no material or evidence had been produced to substantiate the same---Notably, while passing the Order-in-Original, the Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue exceeded his jurisdiction while travelling beyond the very premises, whereas the respondents were never confronted with the allegations made in the Show-Cause Notice or entries as reflected in the bank statement which were subsequently furnished by the respondents, showing the details of the total amount and the particulars of suppliers from whom purchases were made---While initiating the proceedings against the respondents, there was no material or evidence available on record to make out a case against the respondents of illegal or inadmissible claim of input tax adjustment, whereas the entire proceedings and the Order-in-Original passed in the present case was based on presumptions, whereas no inquiry or verification was made by the Department in respect of alleged fake/flying invoices---Thus, the Tribunal and the High Court were justified to set aside both the Order-in-Original and the Order-in-Appeal, while recording concurrent findings on facts which did not suffer from any illegality or error---Petition for leave to appeal, filed by Department, was dismissed, in circumstances. Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-IV, Large Taxpayer Unit, Karachi v. Messrs Al-Abid Silk Mills Limited A-39, Manghopir Road, Site Karrachi 2023 SCMR 1797 ref. Malik Itaat Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court, Syed Rafaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record along with Kamran Ullah, Additional Commissioner along with Yousaf Khan, S.O. for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 30th June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act, 1990 – Ss. 2(37), 6, 7, 8, 22, 23, 26, 33, 34, 46 & 47 – Input Tax Adjustment – Fake/Flying Invoices – Factual Inquiry and Onus of Proof - Disallowance of input tax claim on allegation of fake/flying invoices—Held, respondents were confronted by the Inland Revenue Department through a show cause notice requiring proof of actual purchases for tax period July 2019 to June 2020—Despite production of withholding certificates and bank statements, Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue disallowed input adjustment of Rs. 55 million for lack of physical delivery evidence (challans, bilties, etc.), citing violation of Section 73 and issuance by blacklisted suppliers—Tribunal, however, after scrutinizing factual record and hearing both parties, found the Department failed to conclusively establish tax fraud or falsity of documentation—ATIR order, setting aside liability, upheld by High Court—Held, findings of fact recorded by ATIR were based on evidence and required no interference. (b) Constitution of Pakistan – Art. 185(3) – Leave to Appeal – Concurrent Findings of Fact by ATIR and High Court - Scope of interference under Article 185(3)—Held, where the Appellate Tribunal and High Court concurrently found that the Department failed to discharge its burden to prove issuance of fake invoices or non-compliance with Section 73, Supreme Court will not disturb findings unless clear error of law or misreading of record is demonstrated—Petitioner failed to point out any such legal infirmity—Leave to appeal declined. (c) Sales Tax Act, 1990 – Ss. 73 & 2(37) – Tax Fraud and Banking Channel Requirements - Compliance with Section 73 (banking channel requirement)—Held, mere absence of physical documentation like delivery challans or bilties does not per se establish tax fraud under Section 2(37) where banking transactions and withholding records are available—Burden lies on Department to establish that invoices were fictitious and unsupported by actual movement of goods—Failure to do so renders action unsustainable. (d) Appellate Jurisdiction – Role of Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and High Court in Tax References Function of ATIR and High Court in tax disputes—Held, ATIR is final fact-finding authority in tax matters—Once Tribunal has examined the factual and legal matrix and found no conclusive proof of tax fraud or statutory breach, High Court rightly declined to interfere—Civil petition for leave to appeal against such concurrent findings held not maintainable. Disposition: Civil Petition dismissed. Leave to appeal declined. Impugned judgment of Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench) upheld. Orders of ATIR restored.

Summary: Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 11E & 33---Principle amount already paid---Show Cause Notice, issuance of---Default surcharge and penalty, imposition of---Scope---Contention of the Appellant / Registered Person (company engaged in the business of manufacturing of un-dyed cotton yarn) was that while calculating the period the Officer Inland Revenue (OIR) failed to appreciate the fact that the return was filed on 18th of the next month and the payment was made till 15th of the next month of the sales tax return; that the tax withheld was paid when the invoice was claimed in that month---Validity---The statute allowed the registered person to pay the principal amount of tax within six months and also claim the input tax within six months ; the tax would be withheld at the time of payment---In the present case, when the show cause notice was issued the principal amount of tax was already paid, therefore, the default surcharge and penalty provisions were not applicable in the case of the taxpayer---Thus, the OIR charged default surcharge and penalty without properly looking into the facts of the case and the legal provisions applicable in the case of the registered person---Moreover, the OIR failed to apply his mind regarding the norms in Spinning Mills Industry that after receiving Cotton Lint it had to pass certain lab tests, resultantly, purchase return often occurred---On the other hand, in a sales tax period, month end liability was calculated as per law and procedures on month end---When all principle amount was admittedly paid, no question of default surcharge and penalty could be called for at all---Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue annulled the Order-in Original passed by the OIR---Appeal, filed by the registered person/Company, was allowed accordingly. CIR v. Coca Cola Pakistan Limited 2022 PTD 1400 and Quetta Electricity Supply Company Limited v. CIR STA No.362/KB of 2018 ref. Ahmad Nawaz Khurram for Appellant. Nemo. for Respondent. Date of hearing: 23rd June, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 47---Sales Tax Reference, filing of---Limitation---Scope---Condonation of delay---Sufficient cause / reason, absence of---Effect---Application seeking condonation of delay in filing reference application was filed by Registered Person/Company (Applicant) while assailing order passed by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue ('Tribunal')---Ground taken by the Applicant was that though the impugned order was served on its (Applicant's)authorized representative after ten days of passing by the Tribunal but the same was handed over to the Applicant after a month or so, thus, period of limitation starts from said communication instead of date of serving to representative---Validity---Period of limitation for filing the reference application under S. 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, ('the Act 1990 ') is thirty (30) days from the communication of the order of the Appellate Tribunal or the Commissioner (Appeals), as the case may be---In the present case, the (instant) reference application was filed with a delay of as many as 16 days, whereas the same was to be filed within thirty days---Ground urged by the Applicant through (present) application is vague and unpersuasive as the applicant has merely annexed an affidavit executed by his authorized representative, who personally received the impugned order; it is further noted that the said (impugned) order was subsequently provided to the applicant (after about month of passing of the same), pursuant to his contact and request---Said sequence of events clearly establishes that the passing of the impugned order was within the knowledge of the Applicant---Pertinently, the authorized representative of the Applicant, being a registered tax practitioner, was well aware of the statutory period of limitation for filing a tax reference under S. 47 of the Act, 1990 which prescribes a specific time frame for instituting reference application but despite receiving the impugned order, he could provide the same to the applicant himself on or before the expiry of limitation, but instead of handing over the same, he kept it with him for almost sixteen days, without any solid explanation or reason---In case of time barred proceedings, defaulting party must explain the delay of each day caused in preferring valid proceedings in accordance with law---In the present case, no sufficient cause is pleaded even in the instant application, so the Applicant deserves no leniency---Law helps the vigilant and not the indolent---Application for condonation of delay, filed by Registered Person, was dismissed---Reference application, being barred by time, was dismissed, in circumstances. State Bank of Pakistan through Governor and another v. Imtiaz Ali Khan and others 2012 SCMR 280; Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another PLD 2010 SC 705; Rehmat Din and others v. Mirza Nasir Abbas and others 2007 SCMR 1560; Muhammad Nawaz and others v. The State 2004 SCMR 945; Nazakat Ali v. WAPDA through Manager and others 2004 SCMR 145 and Aftab Iqbal Khan Khichi and another v. Messrs United Distributors Pakistan Ltd. Karachi 1999 SCMR 1326 ref. (b) Limitation--- ----Principles---Law of limitation provides an element of certainty in the conduct of human affair---Thus, statutes of limitation and prescriptions are statutes of peace and repose---In order to avoid the difficulty and errors that necessarily result from lapse of time, the presumption of coincidence of fact and right is rightly accepted as final after a certain number of years---Whoever wishes to dispute said presumption must do so, within that period; otherwise his rights, if any, will be forfeited as a penalty for his neglect---In other words, the law of limitation is a law which is designed to impose quietus on legal dissensions and conflicts---Limitation requires that persons must come to Court and take recourse to legal remedies with due diligence---Question of limitation cannot be termed as mere technicality---Importantly, with the afflux of time certain rights do accrue in favour of the adversary which cannot be taken away in a slipshod manner---Object for framing the law for the purpose of regulating the limitation was to push the parties to file their respective claims within the stipulated period---Time period provided for filing the proceedings in terms of suit, appeal, review, revision petition or any application cannot be lightly ignored or brushed aside---Question of limitation is as important as jurisdiction of the Court. Zahid Shafiq for Applicant. Malik Itaat Hussain Awan for Respondents. Yousaf Khan, S.O. IR (Hqrs), RTO, Rawalpindi for Respondents.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 40, 45B, 46 & 47---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Proceedings regarding under-invoicing / suppression of sales, conducting of---Sales Tax Reference Application, pendency of---Raid / search by Department, assailing of---Constitutional petition, filing of---Maintainability---Sales Tax Reference had been filed by the respondent/Department against the Order passed by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), whereby recovery proceedings initiated against the sole proprietorship concern (petitioner) on the basis of show-cause notice for alleged adjustment of inadmissible input tax upheld relevant Order-in-Original and Order-in-Appeal were annulled---As such, the scope of pending Sales Tax Reference was limited to the validity of impugned orders therein regarding recovery of alleged sales tax---Therefore, the vires of impugned raid and search operation, which were conducted during pendency of appeal of the petitioner before ATIR, did not fall within the scope and ambit of pending Sales Tax Reference before the Division Bench of this/High Court---Similarly, another constitutional petition having been instituted by the petitioner with respect to relevant FIR emanated from criminal proceedings initiated by the respondent /Department and as such, it was distinct in terms of scope, cause of action and prayer made therein in comparison to the instant constitutional petition which had impugned the raid and search operation alleging the same to be in derogation to the express provisions of S. 40 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 (‘the Act’)---Pertinently, the constitutional challenge qua breach of statutory rights lies with the Single Bench of High Court and on account of difference in the scope of cited matters, there was no reason to club present petition with referred cases---Further, S. 45B of the Act provides remedy of appeal against specific orders passed under specified Sections of the Act, whereas, S. 46 of the Act provides for appeals to the ATIR against specified orders---The stated remedy of appeal is not available to assail statutory infringements which is examined by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review under Art. 199 of the Constitution---Hence, the objections qua maintainability were baseless and the same were overruled accordingly---In the present case, record established that the raid and seizure of record by respondent was unlawful being in derogation to the express provisions of S. 40 of the Act---High Court declared the impugned search and seizure operation conducted by respondent /Officer at the business / office premises of the petitioner as unlawful having no legal effect directing the respondents to forthwith return the seized record of the petitioner and were restrained to use the same against the petitioner---Constitutional petition, filed by registered person, was allowed accordingly. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 38, 40 & 40B---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 103---Search/ raid under warrant---Requirements, non-compliance of---Effect---Fiscal matters---Independent witnesses, non-involvement of---Effect---It is explicitly clear from the provisions of S. 40 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (‘the Act’) that discretion to obtain warrant is not unfettered ; there must be a reason to believe that some useful or relevant record required with respect to any proceedings under the Act is available at a particular place; which is an extraordinary power granted by the Act in addition to other powers (such as, to have access to premises, stocks and records, to call for information and posting of an officer at the premises of a tax payer under Ss. 38, 38A and 40B of the Act)---The exercise of power of search, being harsh in nature, has been made dependent upon certain conditions with the objective to place a check on unbridled, arbitrary and capricious use of power---The analysis of established facts of the present case on the touchstone of the requirements of law encapsulated in S.40 of the Act proves that the concerned Officer /Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue –Assessment and Processing (respondent) did not obtain specific search warrant in the name of petitioner (sole proprietor concern) from the concerned Magistrate---The name of petitioner was conspicuously missing in the warrant---Generally, a proprietorship concern merely reflects and denotes a different business name distinct from the name of its individual owner and the latter is personally liable for such concern, however, where a person has more than one proprietorship business concerns with different lines of business, it is obligatory to disclose the name of the concern(s) regarding which search warrant is required---A search warrant obtained in the name of one business concern cannot be used to raid and confiscate record of the other business concerns---If their offices were situated at the same place, there was no impediment to list the names and address of all concerns owned by one person regarding which search warrant was required---Respondent included the name of three business concerns in the said application but conspicuously omitted to include the name of petitioner for which no legally tenable explanation had been provided---Respondent had also not been able to demonstrate the nexus of another concern with the petitioner since the same was not reflected in the NTN of the petitioner available on record---No specific order of audit or inquiry or investigation or proceedings was identified or relied upon in the application for warrant under the provisions of the Act---The search operation was conducted at such time (on 24.07.2024) when Order-in-Appeal (dated 11.10.2023) was already in field and further appeal of the petitioner before ATIR was pending---Said proceedings were not disclosed in the application for obtaining warrant---Similarly, the proceedings qua suspension and blacklisting of the petitioner were also not disclosed or made basis for reasons of belief of respondent---Rather, respondent disclosed in the application for warrant that the petitioner was supervised under S. 40B of the Act for purchases and sales of coal and during scrutiny, it was found that the petitioner was involved in under invoicing and suppression of sales which provides him a reason to believe that documents placed at the business premises of the petitioner would be helpful in determining the correct amount of sales and invoice prices---However, the respondent had miserably failed to establish that an officer of the Department had been appointed at the business premises of petitioner or any other business concern of the petitioner in terms of S. 40B of the Act by placing on record any order of the Board to said effect---As such, the premises on the basis of which search warrant was obtained fell to the ground---Moreover, S.40(2) of the Act unequivocally requires that the officer who had obtained search warrant shall make such search in his presence in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C., S. 103 whereof, obligates that search and seizure must be carried out in the presence of independent witnesses---The respondent/Department had admitted the seizure of record in the absence of any independent witness and the explanation rendered in said behalf that the said provisions of law did not apply to fiscal matters was unacceptable being in violation of express mandate of law---As such, the raid and seizure of record by respondent was unlawful being in derogation to the express provisions of S. 40 of the Act---High Court declared the impugned search and seizure operation conducted by respondent /Officer at the business / office premises of the petitioner as unlawful having no legal effect directing the respondents to forthwith return the seized record of the petitioner and were restrained to use the same against the petitioner---Constitutional petition, filed by registered person, was allowed accordingly. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Federal Secretariat, Islamabad and 4 others v. Messrs Master Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director 2003 PTD 1034; Collector of Sales Tax and others v. Messrs Food Consults (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2007 PTD 2356 and Pakistan Chipboard (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive Officer v. Federation of Pakistan through Revenue Division and 5 others 2015 PTD 1520 ref. Alif Plastic Industry v. Federation of Pakistan and others (W.P. No. 20175 of 2012) and Chief Commissioner Inland Revenue Regional (RTO) Peshawar v. Paper World (Pvt.) Ltd. Amangarh, Nowshera 2020 SCMR 105 distinguished. Barrister Muhammad Umer Riaz, Rana Rehan and Barrister Ali Aun Awan for Petitioner. Ms. Riaz Begum, Advocate / Legal Advisor and Syed Ali Raza Abbas, Assistant Attorney General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 2nd June, 2025. (v) The acts of raid and seizure could not have been undertaken during subsistence of stay order passed by ATIR;