Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 4B [as inserted by Finance Act 2015] & First Schedule, Part I, Division IIA---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 73(2)(a), 175F & Fourth Schedule, Part I, Entry 47---Federal Constitutional Court---Appellate jurisdiction---Super tax, vires of---Principle of intelligible differentia---Applicability---Fiscal matters, judicial interference in---Dispute pertained to insertion of Section 4B in Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 vide Finance Act, 2015 for raising revenue for internally displaced persons for tax year 2015---Validity---Provision of Section 4B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is intra vires the Constitution and has to be applied as enacted for tax year 2015 and onwards at the rates prescribed in Division IIA, Part I, of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---High Courts had expounded correct position in law by holding that Section 4B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was validly enacted as a “tax”---Provisions of Section 4B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 are neither discriminatory nor they create any unreasonable or hostile classification among persons forming the same class upon whom the charge is imposed---Such classification introduced under Section 4B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is income-based, rests on an intelligible differentia, and bears a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved---Provision of section 4B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 does not suffer from any inherent lack of legislative competence, nor does it, on its face, transgress any fundamental right in a manner sufficient to warrant its invalidation---Any perceived inequities or hardships arising from the operation of Section 4B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 fall primarily within the Legislative domain and do not, by themselves, justify judicial interference in fiscal matters---Provision of Section 4B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 squarely falls within Entry 47, Part-I of Fourth Schedule, to the Constitution, namely, ‘taxes on income’---Legislature was fully competent to impose, abolish, remit, alter, or regulate such tax through a Finance Act, as part of a Money Bill under Article 73(2)(a) of the Constitution---Federal Constitutional Court declared Section 4B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2011 (as inserted by Finance Act, 2015) to be intra vires the Constitution---Matter was disposed of accordingly. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 187 [as amended by Constitution (Twenty-seventh Amendment) Act (XXXII of 2025)]---Federal Constitutional Court---Inherent powers---Complete justice---Federal Constitutional Court has inherent power to transpose a party, should it be necessary for just and proper adjudication of a matter before it. (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 4C [as inserted by Finance Act 2022] & First Schedule, Part I, Division IIB---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 25, 73(2)(a), 175F & Fourth Schedule, Part I, Entry 47---Federal Constitutional Court---Appellate jurisdiction---High Earning Persons---Super tax, imposing of---Legislative competence---Reading down, principle of---Principle of intelligible differentia---Applicability---Dispute pertained to insertion of Section 4C in Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 vide Finance Act, 2022 on High Earning Persons and income arising to oil exploration and petroleum companies---Validity---Provision of Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is intra vires the Constitution and applies as enacted for tax year 2022 and onwards at the rates prescribed in Part-I of Division IIB, First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Legislature has plenary power to enact laws with retrospective and prospective effect subject to such laws not effecting past and closed transactions---There was no provision in Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 whereby closing of accounts of a tax year qualified as an event which had precluded imposition of fresh charge where none existed before, particularly when returns of income for tax year 2022 were yet to be filed---Federal Constitutional Court set aside the judgments passed by Division Benches of three High Cou2rts to the extent they held Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 not to apply retroactively to tax year 2022---Rates in Part I of Division IIB, First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 amended through Finance Act, 2023 was to apply for tax year 2023---Federal Constitutional Court further set aside judgment of Islamabad High Court to the extent it held the rates in amended Part I of Division IIB, First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 not to apply retroactively to tax year 2023---Definition of “income” for purposes of Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 in so far as it includes income from all sources is validly enacted---Federal Constitutional Court also set aside judgments of Islamabad High Court to the extent they read down Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Federal Constitutional Court further set aside the direction issued by Islamabad High Court, to Federal Board of Revenue to issue circular to implement judgment in question across Pakistan, as such direction was beyond its jurisdiction---Federal Constitutional Court declared that Classification of sectors through inclusion in First Proviso to Division IIB of Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and taxable under Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 at the rate of 10% for the tax year 2022 was reasonable; the differentia was intelligible and was permissible under Article 25 of the Constitution---Federal Constitutional Court set aside the judgments of three High Courts to the extent they declared contents of the first proviso to be discriminatory---Matter was disposed of accordingly. The Attock Oil Company Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2019 PTD 934; Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2022 PTD 1730; D.G.Khan Cement Company Limited v. Federal Board of Revenue and others 2018 PTD 287; D.G.Khan Cement Company Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2020 PTD 1186 and HBL Stock Fund and others v. Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue and others 2020 PTD 1742 rel. (d) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 4, 4B, 4C, 37A & Eighth Schedule---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 175F & Fourth Schedule, Part I, Entry 47---Federal Constitutional Court---Appellate jurisdiction---Super tax---Legislature, competence of---Super tax is a tax on income independent of tax levied under Section 4 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Parliament is competent under Entry 47, of Part I of the Fourth Schedule tothe Constitution, to levy “taxes on income”---Insofar as levy of super tax is concerned, Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is a self-contained provision and is a standalone tax on income---Provision of Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 as it applied to capital gains under Section 37A and Rules of the Eighth Schedule, Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was held to be applicable thereto, as it was within the ambit of Section 4C(2)(i) and (iv) of Income Tax Ordinance 2001. (e) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 4B, 4C, 53, Second Schedule & Fifth Schedule, Rr. 4AA & 4AB---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 73(2)(a), 175F & Fourth Schedule, Part I, Entry 47---Federal Constitutional Court---Appellate jurisdiction---High Earning Persons---Super tax, imposing of---Legislative competence---Dispute pertained to insertion of Sections 4B, 4C and Rules 4AA and 4AB into Fifth Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 on income arising to oil exploration and petroleum companies---Validity---Provisions of Section 4B and Section 4C, by virtue of Rules 4AA and 4AB of Fifth Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 would only apply to the income arising to oil exploration and petroleum (E&P) companies if it did not result in exceeding the aggregate rate of taxes provided in Fifth Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and their respective Petroleum Concession Agreements (PCAs)---Departmental determination / assessment of each PCA was to be undertaken by placing respective terms and conditions in juxtaposition with Regulation of Mines and Minerals (Government Control) Act, 1948 and applicable taxing law governing their respective PCAs, whether it was Income Tax Act, 1922, Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 or Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Provision of Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001was not to apply to E&P companies to the extent that its application would result in taxation exceeding the threshold stipulated in Rule 4 of Fifth Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Legislative intent underlying Rule 4 of Fifth Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was to provide a sector-specific framework recognizing the unique nature, risks, and investment requirements of petroleum and exploration industry---Imposing a super tax beyond prescribed threshold would effectively override such Legislative safeguard, impose excessive and disproportionate burden, and frustrate the purpose for which special provisions were enacted---In absence of clear and express intention of Legislature to abrogate or modify such sectoral thresholds, Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 could not be construed so as to operate in a manner inconsistent with Rule 4 of Fifth Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Matter was disposed of accordingly. (f) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S.4C [as inserted by Finance Act, 2022]---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 175F---Federal Constitutional Court---Appellate jurisdiction---Super tax, imposing of---Banking Companies---Scope---In case of banking companies, Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 would apply to them as enacted vide Finance Act, 2022 for tax year 2023 and onwards, at the rates applicable to tax year 2023 as amended by Finance Act, 2023---Matter was disposed of accordingly. (g) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 4C, 53, Second Schedule & Ninth Schedule---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 73(2)(a), 175F & Fourth Schedule, Part I, Entry 47---Federal Constitutional Court---Appellate jurisdiction---Super tax, imposing of---Legislative competence---Benevolent and Provident Funds---Dispute pertained to insertion of Section 4C to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 on income arising to Benevolent and Provident Funds---Validity---Provision of Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 would not apply to the income, particularly to the benevolent funds enjoying exemption from tax under Section 53, read with Second Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Such funds constituted a distinct class expressly exempted by the Legislature in furtherance of recognized charitable and welfare objectives---Subjecting such funds to a super tax would defeat the very purpose of statutory exemption and would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---In the absence of a clear and specific legislative intent to withdraw or curtail such exemption, Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 could not be construed so as to override the exemption granted to benevolent funds---Provident and benevolent funds whichheld valid exemption certificates under the Ninth Schedule read with the relevant entries in the Second Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 were not liable to pay super tax under Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Federal Constitutional Court directed such funds to furnish their exemption certificates issued for the relevant tax years to the concerned authorities of Inland Revenue,who would pass written orders absolving such funds of their liability to pay super tax under Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Matter was disposed of accordingly. For the Taxpayers: Makhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Haider Ali Khan, Hussain Ali Almani, Ms. Naila Irshad and Yawar Mukhtar, Advocates]. Salman Akram Raja, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Malik Ghulam Sabir; Asad Ladha and Moazin and Rashid, Advocates]. Khalid Javed Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court. Dr. Farogh Naseem, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Sardar Haseeb Iftikhar Ahmed, Advocate]. Sardar Ahmad Jamal Sukhera, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Sikandar Jamal Sukhera and Ms. Khadija Jamal Sukhera, Advocates]. Shehzad Ata Elahi, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Salman Sohail Khan, Advocate]. Sikandar Bashir Mohmand, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Ms. Shahkar Shahab, Khizer Hayat Khan, Hamza Azmat Khan and Abdullah Noor Advocates]. Ali Sibtain Fazli, Advocate Supreme Court. Malik Ahsan Mehmood, Advocate Supreme Court. Khurram Mumtaz Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court. Umar Azad Malik, Advocate Supreme Court. Barrister Saad Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court. Ch. Mumtaz-ul-Hassan, Advocate Supreme Court. Rashid Anwar, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Yousaf Khalid Anwar, Advocate High Court]. Abdul Aziz Nishtar, Advocate Supreme Court. Qazi Ghulam Dastagir, Advocate Supreme Court. Sajeel Shehryar Sawati, Advocate Supreme Court. Barrister Jahanzeb Awan, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Barrister Saif Mehmood Abbasi]. Mrs. Shireen Imran, Advocate Supreme Court. Umer Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court. Umer Akram Sahi, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Khalil Khan Sahibzada, Advocate]. Shehryar Kasuri, Advocate Supreme Court. Waseem Ahmad Malik, Advocate Supreme Court. Rana Mohammad Afzal, Advocate Supreme Court. Barrister Haroon Dugal, Advocate Supreme Court. Ajmal Ghaffar Toor, Advocate Supreme Court. Ms. Samia Faiz Durrani, Advocate Supreme Court. Abid Hussain Shaban, Advocate Supreme Court. Rai Azhar Iqbal Kharral, Advocate Supreme Court. Ajmal Khan, Advocate Supreme Court. Barrister Yousuf Kausar, Advocate Supreme Court. Adnan Haider, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Muhammad Zulqarnain Hashmi, Advocate]. Taimoor Aslam Malik, Advocate Supreme Court. Ijaz Ahmed Zahid, Advocate Supreme Court. Omer Asad Malik, Advocate Supreme Court. Hafiz Munawar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court. Dr. Ikram-ul-Haq, Advocate Supreme Court. Mohsin Mumtaz, Advocate Supreme Court. Hassan Kamran Bashir, Advocate Supreme Court. Mirza Mehmood Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Ms. Zaria Adnan, Saadullah Tahir and Javaid Chohan, Advocates]. Nouman A. Farooqui, Advocate Supreme Court. Mirza Mehmood Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court. Syed Ovais Ali Shah, Advocate Supreme Court. Qazi Umair Ali, Advocate Supreme Court. Naeem Suleman, Advocate Supreme Court. Syed Shahab Qutub, Advocate Supreme Court. Abdul Sattar Pirzada, Advocate Supreme Court. Qazi Umair Ali, Advocate Supreme Court. Muhammad Shoaib Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Zeeshan Shaukat, Advocate]. Isaac Ali Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court. Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record. Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record. Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record. Syeda B.H. Shah, Advocate-on-Record. Sheikh Mehmood Ahmed, Advocate-on-Record. Qazi Shehryar Iqbal, Advocate-on-Record. Naeem Ul Haq, Advocate High Court. Syed Jaffer Hussain, Advocate High Court. Shah Rukh Sheikh, Advocate High Court. Sardar Haseeb, Advocate High Court. Asad Zaman Tarar, Advocate High Court. Zeeshan Hashmi, Advocate High Court. Sheikh Aqeel Ahmad, Advocate High Court. Rana Usman Habib, Advocate High Court. Qaiser Amir [Legal Head, Frontier Foundry]. Ms. Rida Zahra [Legal Officer, Mari Petroleum]. Bilal Farrid Rana, [Head Legal, UBL]. Hafiz Bilal Bin Akbar [DD (L), DRAP]. For the Federation: Ch. Aamir Rehman, Addl. AGP [Assisted by: Miss Maryam Rashid, Advocate]. For the FBR: Mian Raza Rabbani, Advocate Supreme Court. Ms. Asma Hamid, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Mustafa Khalid, Faisal Khalid, Ms. Rabia Khan, Ms. Navail Haider and Ms. Zarwa Jamal, Advocates]. Dr. Shah Nawaz, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Ms. Sameena Mumtaz, Advocate]. Saalim Salaam Ansari, Advocate Supreme Court. Zeeshan Abdullah, Advocate Supreme Court. Muhammad Nasir Khan, Advocate Supreme Court. Malik Itaat Hussain Awan, Advocate Supreme Court. Muhammad Faisal Khalid, Advocate Supreme Court. Hafiz Ahsaan Ahmad Khokhar, Advocate Supreme Court. Ashtar Ausaf Ali, Senior Advocate Supreme Court. Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court. Ghulam Shoaib Jally, Advocate Supreme Court. Babar Bilal, Advocate Supreme Court. Riaz Azam Bhopera, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record. Ch. Zafar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court. Ibrar Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court. Shehzad Ahmed Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Malik Abdullah Raza, Advocate]. Muhammad Yahya Johar, Advocate Supreme Court. Munawar Ali Memon, Advocate Supreme Court. Ch. Imtiaz Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court. Dr. Abrar Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court. Ms. Humaira Bashir, Advocate Supreme Court. Mrs. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court. Dr. Raana Khan, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record. Mrs. Kausar Iqbal Bhatti, Advocate-on-Record. Muhammad Amir Malik, Advocate-on-Record. Ms. Ruqiya Samee, Advocate-on-Record. Jawaid Masood Tahir Bhatti, Advocate-on-Record. Mir Badshah Khan Wazir, Member Legal. Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, D.G. Law. Yousaf Khan, S.O I.R (Legal). Dates of hearing: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 26th and 27th January, 2026. SHORT ORDER

Summary: Though the Specific Relief Act, 1877 contains no express provision for return of sale consideration upon refusal of specific performance, its equitable scheme vests ample discretion in the Court to grant an alternate relief getting support from Order VII Rule 7 CPC so as to dispense substantial justice. In appropriate cases, return of the actual sale consideration stands on a higher footing than compensation and the Court, while eschewing technicalities, must act to meet the ends of justice. 32Crl. Appeal- Against Conviction- PPC 1566-19 ALLAH DITTA VS STATE ETC Mr. Justice Sardar Akbar Ali 26-01- 2026 2026 LHC 945

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002), S.3---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 14 & 19---Suit for recovery of damages under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002---Limited interim injunction, grant of---Principles---Preventing irreparable harm during pendency of suit---Allegations of sexual harassment were made by petitioner (lady) against the respondent---Suit for damages was filed by respondent against the petitioner claiming substantial reputational harm arising from sexual harassment allegations---Interim injunction was granted by Trial Court restraining the petitioner from making any statement regarding the subject matter of the alleged defamation until the disposal of the suit---Legality---At present preliminary stage, the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations could not be determined without recording of evidence---Repetition or continuous propagation of such allegations, while the matter was sub judice, would amount to conducting a parallel media trial, which was neither permissible nor desirable in the interest of justice and fair adjudication---Respondent had successfully established a prima facie case in his favour; the allegations levelled against him, if found to be untrue, were of such a nature that they directly struck at his dignity, honour and professional credibility---Material available on record prima facie showed that the suit raised serious triable issues requiring evidence, and therefore, the respondent could not be left remediless during pendency of the proceedings---Balance of convenience also tilted heavily in favour of respondent---If the injunction was not maintained, respondent would continue to suffer damage to his reputation on a daily basis---On the contrary, the petitioner would not suffer any irreparable prejudice by being restrained from making statements relevant to the controversy till the matter was decided on merits---Restraint imposed was temporary in nature and subject to the final outcome of the suit---Trial Court had rightly exercised its discretion by imposing a limited and reasonable restriction, instead of a blanket prohibition, thereby ensuring that the petitioner's right to speech was not completely curtailed---Impugned order, by restraining only such statements which were directly related to the matter in controversy, achieved a constitutional balance between two competing rights i.e. freedom of speech (Article 19) and inviolability of the dignity of man (Article 14) and did not amount to an unlawful curtailment of freedom of expression---Impugned order was a well-reasoned order based on sound legal principles and did not warrant interference by this Court---Constitutional petition was dismissed. Bonnard v. Perryman (1891) 2 Ch 269 and K.V. Ramaniah v. Special Public Prosecutor AIR 1961 Andh Pra 190 ref. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002), S.3---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 14 & 19---Public figure---Suit for recovery of damages under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002---Limited interim injunction, grant of---Principles---Prevent of irreparable harm during pendency of suit---Although, Courts exercise restraint while granting injunctions restraining speech, however, there is no absolute bar in law against grant of such relief where circumstances so warrant---Where a person of established reputation claims that false allegations are being repeatedly propagated, the court is empowered to protect such reputation from irreparable harm till final adjudication---Reputation, once damaged, cannot be restored merely through monetary compensation---For a public figure whose career and livelihood depend upon public perception and trust, continuous circulation of unproven allegations would cause harm which cannot be quantified in terms of money---If the reputation of a responsible citizen can be measured in terms of money, then, it will amount to issuing a license against a citizen and asking him to take money as compensation for the injury---In such circumstances, denial of interim protection would render the final relief, if granted, meaningless. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Interim injunction, grant/refusal of---Interference by High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction---Scope---Discretionary orders passed by a competent court, particularly those relating to grant or refusal of interim injunction, should not be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction unless the same are shown to be arbitrary, perverse or suffering from jurisdictional defect. Muhammad Saqib Jillani for Petitioner. Umar Tariq Gill for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing: 23rd January, 2026.

Summary: (1) Reckless and irresponsible conduct of CDA (2) Responsibilities of Public Authorities in contesting court matters (3) Sufficient cause in terms of Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC read with Article 164 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act

Summary: (Against judgment dated 14.10.2022 passed in C.R. No. 1281-P of 2019 by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar). (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.152 & O.XX, R.3---Wrong mentioning of property owner’s name in the judgement, grievance of---Clerical mistake in the judgment, correction of---Amendment in judgment---Scope---Brief facts were that the respondents instituted a suit for declaration and partition against the petitioners, which was dismissed by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, but upon remand by the High Court, the Appellate Court allowed the appeal; in that judgment, the Appellate Court inadvertently mentioned “BK” instead of “AK” as owner of the disputed property, whereupon the error was corrected under Section 152, C.P.C.; the petitioners’/defendants’ challenge to that correction failed before the Revisional Court and the High Court, leading to the filing of the present petition---The issue requiring determination was “whether substitution of the correct name in the judgment was a permissible clerical correction under Section 152, C.P.C. or an impermissible alteration of the judgment?”---Held: It was not disputed that while recording findings on certain issues, the Appellate Court in advertently mentioned the name of the father of the party instead of the party himself, despite the pleadings, evidence, and the rest of the judgment consistently identifying the correct person “AK” as the owner of the disputed property---The correction made by the Appellate Court did not introduce any new relief, alter the substantive findings, or re-open the merits of the case---It merely brought the judgment in conformity with the manifest intention of the Court as discernible from the record as a whole---Such a correction squarely fell within the ambit of an “error arising from accidental slip or omission” as contemplated by Section 152, C.P.C.---No illegality, irregularity, jurisdictional defect, or misreading of law was found in the impugned judgment of the High Court---Leave was refused and petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.152 & O.XX, R.3---Clerical or arithmetical mistake in judgment, amendment of---Correction of accidental slip---Scope---A combined reading of Section 152, C.P.C. and Order XX, Rule 3, C.P.C. makes it manifest that although a judgment, once signed, attains finality, the legislature itself has carved out a specific exception enabling correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes or errors arising from accidental slips or omissions---The scope of Section 152, C.P.C. are no longer res integra---The power conferred under Section 152 may be exercised “at any time” and even suo motu---However, such power, though wide, is discretionary and must be exercised having regard to the circumstances of each case, particularly where third-party rights may not be affected. Mst. Farosha v. Fazal Gul and others PLD 1983 SC 220 and Baqar v. Muhammad Rafique and others 2003 SCMR 1401 rel. Vinod Kumar Singh v. Banaras Hindu University and others 1989 MLD 3215 ref. Shah Khawar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Muhammad Taif Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 11 and 12. Date of hearing: 22nd January, 2026.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act (XLII of 2012)--- ----Ss. 24, 56, 60 & 62---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Proceedings by Punjab Revenue Authority, assailing of---Alternative remedy for service provider, availability of---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, invoking of---Scope---Petitioners (engaged in the business relating to selling of food items) filed constitutional petition being aggrieved of the proceedings conducted by the Punjab Revenue (authority/respondent) under S. 56 of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012 (‘the Act, 2012’)---Validity---Section 56 of the Act, 2012 bestows power upon the officers authorized by the authority to have access to premises, stocks, accounts and records of a registered person or a person liable for registration or whose business activities are covered under the Act, 2012 to ascertain the correct quantum of Punjab Sales Tax payable by the petitioners; Show-Cause Notices under S. 24 of the Act, 2012 were also issued to the petitioners---Section 60 of the Act, 2012 provides the power of adjudication in respect of certain cases of contravention or violation including tax fraud under the Act, 2012 or the Rules---Furthermore, S. 62 vests power of revision upon the authority---Therefore, the petitioners had alternate and efficacious remedies provided under the Act, 2012 ; in presence thereof invoking the constitutional jurisdiction would amount to stifling the normal course of law---Jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution is neither unbridled nor unrestricted, instead it is an extraordinary jurisdiction to be exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances---Wherever an efficacious and adequate remedy is available to a person invoking Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, it exercises restraint unless some compelling circumstances exist for invocation of such jurisdiction---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Syed Masood Ali v. Mst. Feroza Begum and another PLD 2025 SC 339; Muhammad Safeer and others v. Muhammad Azam and others PLD 2024 SC 838; Special Secretary-II (Law and Order), Home and Tribal Affairs Department. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others v. Fayyaz Dawar 2023 SCMR 1442 and Mian Azam Waheed and 2 others v. The Collector of Customs 2023 SCMR 1247 ref. Hafiz Muhammad Idrees and Hassan Askari Kazmi for Petitioner.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: A photocopy of the judgment without any stamp or mark of copying agency upon the same showing the source from which the same was obtained or copied does not have presumption of genuineness or authenticity attached to it. 40C.O. (Commercial) 5990/19 Addl.Registrar of Companies Vs Ms Mubarak Textile Mills Ltd & others Mr. Justice Shahid Karim 20- 01- 2026 2026 LHC 1097