Summary: Public Procurement Rules, 2004--- ----R.25---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.175F(c)---Public procurement---Tender process---Additional security, demand of---Demand based on undisclosed engineer’s estimate---Legality---Transparency and fairness---Change in essential terms after advertisement---Effect---Advertisement, scope and significance of---Brief facts were that the petitioners invited tenders in which the respondent emerged successful and deposited earnest money on the advertised estimated cost; later, the petitioners demanded 8% additional security on the basis of an undisclosed engineer’s estimate, and upon refusal, rejected the bid, forfeited the earnest money, and debarred the respondent for six months; the respondent challenged this action through a writ petition, which was allowed by the High Court---The issue before the Federal Constitutional Court was “whether additional security could lawfully be imposed on the basis of a benchmark not disclosed in the tender notice?”---Held: Petitioner’s approach of computingthe 2% earnest money on the basis of the estimated cost expresslydisclosed in the advertisement, while switching to an undisclosedengineer estimate later on, was legally untenable, as it offended therequirements of transparency, consistency, and equal treatment inpublic procurement---Any midstreamdeparture from the stipulated tender terms, without prior public notice,and in the absence of legal/cogent justification, was inherently arbitrary,and undermined the principle of equal opportunity among bidders---Theintroduction of an additional security requirement by reference to abenchmark not disclosed in the advertisement, appeared to be patentlyarbitrary and incompatible with the requirements of transparency andfairness in the facts and circumstances of the case---No interference was required in the impugned judgment passed by the High Court---Leave was refused and the petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Habibullah Energy Limited and another v. WAPDA through Chairman PLD 2014 SC 47 and Ishaq Khan Khakwani and another v. Railway Board through Chairman and others PLD 2019 SC 602 rel. Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation and others AIR 2000 SC 2272 ref. Khalilullah Khalil, Advocate Supreme Court with Abid Shafi, Director (Law) for Petitioners. Mian Abdul Rauf, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent. Date of hearing: 3rd February, 2026.

Summary: Public procurement / tender process--- ----Notice Inviting Tenders (NIT)---Undisclosed engineer’s estimate---Additional security---Rejection of bid---Forfeiture of earnest money---Debarment---Transparency and fairness in public procurement--- Petitioners invited tenders for improvement and widening of road project---Respondent bidder was successful for Package-I and had deposited earnest money at 2% of estimated cost disclosed in advertisement---Petitioners subsequently demanded 8% additional security on basis of engineer’s estimate, asserting that bid was 22.5% below such estimate---Said engineer’s estimate, however, had not been disclosed in NIT---On bidder’s refusal to deposit additional security, bid was rejected, earnest money forfeited, and bidder debarred for six months---High Court set aside such action---Validity---Federal Constitutional Court held that where petitioners had themselves computed earnest money on basis of estimated cost expressly mentioned in advertisement, they could not later shift to an undisclosed benchmark for imposing additional burden upon bidder---Such course offended requirements of transparency, consistency, fairness and equal treatment in public procurement---Any change in essential tender terms or introduction of a fresh financial benchmark after commencement of bidding process, without prior disclosure or fresh advertisement, was arbitrary and legally untenable---Judgment of High Court was found consistent with governing law and principles of public procurement---Leave to appeal was refused and petition was dismissed. Habibullah Energy Limited and another v. WAPDA through Chairman (PLD 2014 SC 47); Ishaq Khan Khakwani and another v. Railway Board through Chairman and others (PLD 2019 SC 602); Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation and others (AIR 2000 SC 2272) rel. (a) Notice Inviting Tenders---Disclosure of material terms---Necessity--- In public procurement, all material and essential terms governing participation in the bidding process must be disclosed in the advertisement / Notice Inviting Tenders so as to ensure a free, fair, open, competitive and transparent process. An undisclosed criterion cannot subsequently be invoked to the prejudice of a bidder. (b) Additional security---Basis not disclosed in NIT---Effect--- Where the petitioners demanded additional security on the basis of an engineer’s estimate not mentioned in the advertisement, such demand was without lawful basis---A bidder could not be burdened with additional security calculated on a benchmark withheld from all participants at the time of tender. (c) Transparency, consistency and equal treatment---Public contracts--- The procuring agency, having calculated the 2% earnest money on the basis of the estimated cost expressly disclosed in the advertisement, could not lawfully switch to another undisclosed valuation standard later on---Such inconsistency violated the principles of transparency, fairness and equal treatment among bidders. (d) Change in essential tender terms after commencement of process---Propriety--- A change in an essential term or financial basis of tender after initiation of bidding process cannot be sustained unless the same is publicly notified through a fresh advertisement enabling all potential bidders to compete on equal footing---Midstream alteration of tender conditions is akin to changing the rules of the game after it has begun and is inherently arbitrary. (e) Rejection of bid, forfeiture of earnest money and debarment---Legality--- Where demand for additional security itself was founded on an undisclosed and impermissible basis, consequential actions of rejection of bid, forfeiture of earnest money and debarment of bidder could not be legally sustained. (f) Leave to appeal---Refusal of--- As the High Court had correctly applied the law and the settled principles of public procurement, no legal infirmity was found in the impugned judgment and no ground for interference was made out. Leave refused; petition dismissed.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XVIII, cross-examination---Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Arts. 144, 145, 146 & 148---Right of cross-examination---Scope and limitations---Harassing, irrelevant, repetitive, indecent, scandalous or insulting questions---Petitioner/defendant No.1 had already cross-examined PW-1 on seven dates over nearly two months and an extensive cross-examination of about thirty pages had been recorded---Trial Court, on objection by plaintiff’s counsel, held that prolonged cross-examination had become irrelevant to the controversy and amounted to misuse of right of cross-examination and abuse of process of Court---Supreme Court held that right of cross-examination, though valuable, was neither unlimited nor unbridled---Object of cross-examination was discovery of truth and not humiliation, intimidation, harassment or scandalizing of witness---Court was not required to remain a silent spectator where cross-examination was being abused by irrelevant, repetitive or offensive questions---Trial Court was competent to regulate proceedings and close petitioner’s right of further cross-examination where sufficient opportunity had already been afforded. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Shafi PLD 1967 SC 167 • Mir Hassan 1999 SCMR 1418 • Meera Shafi v. Ali Zafar PLD 2023 SC 211 (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Arts. 144, 145, 146 & 148---Questions in cross-examination---Reasonable grounds---Indecent, scandalous, insulting or annoying questions---Court’s power to forbid questions---Under Art.144, no question as to imputation could be asked unless person asking had reasonable grounds for thinking that imputation was well-founded---Under Art.145, Court could require reporting of circumstances where question was asked without reasonable grounds---Under Art.146, Court could forbid indecent or scandalous questions unless related to facts in issue or necessary matters---Under Art.148, Court was required to forbid questions intended to insult or annoy, or which appeared needlessly offensive in form---Such provisions empowered Court to protect witness from abusive cross-examination and ensure that questioning remained relevant to matters in controversy. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XVII, R.3---Failure to perform act necessary for progress of suit---Court’s power to proceed---Where a party, despite opportunity, failed to perform any act necessary for further progress of suit, Court could proceed to decide suit forthwith---Petitioner/defendant No.1 had been given more than adequate opportunity to cross-examine PW-1 but continued with questioning which Trial Court found irrelevant and harassing---Closure of further cross-examination in such circumstances was not illegal or irregular. (d) Administration of justice---- ----Control over proceedings---Protection of witnesses---Abuse of cross-examination---Court’s duty---Cross-examination must remain confined to relevant matters and may be used to test veracity, credibility, bias, interest, corruption or prior inconsistent statements of witness---Witnesses, including witnesses in adversarial litigation, must be treated with dignity and respect by Courts---Court has duty to intervene where witness is subjected to unnecessary harassment, intimidation, scandalizing or humiliation---Court should disallow irrelevant questions designed merely to prolong cross-examination or manipulate witness into error---Trial Court, therefore, lawfully protected PW-1 from further abusive cross-examination. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 151---Inherent powers of Court---Fixing specific date and time for cross-examination---Power to regulate proceedings---Petitioner contended that High Court lacked authority to fix and limit a specific date and time for conducting cross-examination---Supreme Court repelled contention and held that Courts possess ample inherent powers under S.151, CPC to make such orders as necessary to secure ends of justice and prevent abuse of process---Power to regulate judicial proceedings, including fixing specific date and time for cross-examination after repeated and sufficient lenience, fell within inherent jurisdiction of Court---Such exercise was lawful where required to ensure orderly and expeditious disposal of proceedings, maintain discipline in conduct of trial and protect witness from needless harassment or protraction. Cited Case: • NWFP Government v. Abdul Ghafoor through L.Rs PLD 1993 SC 418 (f) Judicial proceedings---- ----Presumption of correctness---Consent recorded in judicial order---Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art.129(e)---Petitioner asserted that no consent had been recorded before High Court for grant of limited opportunity of cross-examination, though impugned order itself recorded existence of such consent---Supreme Court held that strong and well-entrenched presumption existed in favour of correctness of judicial proceedings and veracity of judicial record---Such presumption could not be displaced by mere assertions or bald allegations but only by cogent, convincing and unimpeachable proof---No material was placed on record to rebut presumption or show that recital in High Court order was incorrect---Contention that no consent was recorded was wholly unsubstantiated and devoid of merit. Cited Cases: • Syed Ali Ahmed Shah v. Syed Shoukat Hussain Shah and others 2025 SCMR 361 • Fayyaz Hussain v. Akbar Hussain and others 2004 SCMR 964 (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 114 & O. XLVII, R.1---Review jurisdiction---Scope---Review not appeal in disguise---Review could be sought only on discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after due diligence, was not within knowledge or could not be produced at time of decree/order; some mistake or error apparent on face of record; or any other sufficient reason---Review Court does not act as appellate Court and review jurisdiction cannot be invoked for rehearing on merits or for correcting every alleged erroneous decision---Petitioner attempted to characterize recording of consent in High Court order as omission or error attributable to Court, but impugned judgment reflected conscious and reasoned exercise of jurisdiction and not accidental slip or error apparent on face of record---High Court rightly declined review. Cited Cases: • Syed Ali Ahmed Shah v. Syed Shoukat Hussain Shah 2025 SCMR 361 • Justice Qazi Faez Isa v. President of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 119 • M/s Habib and Co. v. Muslim Commercial Bank PLD 2020 SC 227 • Engineers Study Forum v. Federation of Pakistan 2016 SCMR 1961 • Government of Punjab v. Aamir Zahoor-ul-Haq PLD 2016 SC 421 • Haji Muhammad Boota v. Member (Revenue) BOR 2010 SCMR 1049 • Mehdi Hassan v. Province of Punjab 2007 SCMR 755 (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 114 & O. XLVII, R.1---Review jurisdiction---Limits---Error apparent on face of record---A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an allegedly erroneous decision is reheard and corrected---Review lies only for a patent error apparent on face of record, not for elaborate re-argument or reappraisal of merits---Where a party merely contended that all aspects had not been highlighted or argued more forcefully, such grievance could not constitute ground for review---No case for interference in review jurisdiction was made out. Cited Cases: • Smt. Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala Kumari AIR 1995 SC 455 • M/s Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1964 SC 1372 (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Interference with discretionary order regulating trial---High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, declined interference with Trial Court’s order closing further cross-examination after finding that Trial Court had acted within lawful authority to regulate proceedings and prevent harassment of witness---High Court nevertheless, with consent of parties, granted one final controlled opportunity for cross-examination under supervision of Trial Court---Supreme Court held that High Court had lawfully structured remaining opportunity of cross-examination in controlled and supervised manner and such exercise could not be termed without authority or in excess of jurisdiction. Disposition: Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.1078-L of 2025 was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused; Supreme Court upheld concurrent orders of Trial Court and Lahore High Court whereby petitioner’s right of further cross-examination was closed/regulated after repeated opportunities, and review order of High Court was maintained.

Summary: Presence of witnesses on the fateful day in the court is a condition precedent for closing the right of other party to cross-examine them and in their absence, the said right cannot be taken away. 20Service 37551/25 Karam Elahi Vs Medical Superintendent Lahore General Hospital etc Mr. Justice Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi 30- 01- 2026 2026 LHC 1233

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Opinion of Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar --- (a) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 186---Advisory jurisdiction of Supreme Court---Scope, nature and effect---President of Pakistan may seek opinion of Supreme Court on any question of law which he considers of public importance---Advisory jurisdiction, though not deciding a lis between parties in the ordinary sense, is a solemn constitutional jurisdiction requiring due deliberation, evaluation of arguments and formulation of opinion by the Court---Opinion rendered in Presidential Reference is not strictly binding like an inter-partes judgment, but carries significant credence, persuasive value and moral authority, and ought to be respected by constitutional organs---Questions referred to Supreme Court should not be ambiguous, indeterminate or incapable of formulation of opinion---Supreme Court is empowered to consider whether reference raises a constitutional question of public importance and to answer it accordingly. (b) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 4, 9, 10-A & 186---Presidential Reference concerning trial of Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto---Fair trial and due process---Larger Bench had opined that proceedings of trial by Lahore High Court and appeal before Supreme Court did not meet requirements of fundamental right to fair trial and due process enshrined in Arts. 4 and 9 of the Constitution and later expressly guaranteed under Art.10-A---Although conviction had attained finality after dismissal of review petition, advisory jurisdiction was invoked to examine grave blemishes and glitches in the murder trial which had damaged public confidence in fairness of proceedings---Reference was maintainable to the extent of constitutional questions relating to fair trial, due process and administration of justice. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 156, 160, 169, 170 & 173---Investigation and reinvestigation---Closed case---Effect---Police are required to conduct investigation impartially and collect evidence from all possible angles, including material favourable to accused---If evidence is insufficient, Investigating Officer may release accused under S.169, Cr.P.C.; if sufficient evidence exists, report is to be submitted under S.173, Cr.P.C.---After first investigation in murder case had been closed and cancellation report submitted before Magistrate, matter was resurrected years later without complaint by legal heirs or any aggrieved person and without lawful justification---No independent reasoning or cogent justification was available for reinvestigation---Reinvestigation must not be routinely ordered to favour influential persons or punish non-influential persons; if used improperly, it becomes a dangerous tool undermining integrity of criminal justice system and poses serious threat to administration of justice. Cited Cases: • Noor Mohd Holt Ltd. v. Department of Trade and others 1978 3 All ER 280 • Wiseman v. Borneman 1971 AC 297 (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 28, 190 & 526---Transfer of murder trial from Court of Sessions to High Court---Jurisdiction and procedure---Offence under S.302, PPC is ordinarily triable by Court of Sessions, while High Court may try such case only when lawfully transferred or otherwise within jurisdiction---Transfer of case from Sessions Court to Lahore High Court was allowed in slipshod manner on very next day after Sessions Judge framed charge, without notice to accused, without considering statutory parameters and without judicially examining whether transfer was necessary for ends of justice---Transfer was not sought for convenience or safety but had effect of depriving accused of ordinary forum and ordinary first appellate scrutiny---Such hurried transfer raised serious concerns regarding fairness and due process. (e) Administration of justice---- ----Bias---Judicial impartiality---Fair trial---Test for bias---Justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done---A Judge must decide cases according to law and conscience without fear, favour, affection, pressure, annoyance or external influence---Where circumstances create a reasonable apprehension in mind of prudent person that Judge may not act with complete impartiality, the proceedings are tainted---Bias may be personal, pecuniary, official, political, or arise from conduct showing prejudice, hostility, pressure or predisposition---In the murder trial under consideration, allegations of bias, pressure, annoyance with counsel and unusual haste created circumstances affecting appearance and substance of fair trial. Cited Cases: • Ms. Benazir Bhutto v. President of Pakistan 1998 SCMR 1405 • R. v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy 1924 1 KB 256 • Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors 1852 3 HLC 759 • Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) Ltd. v. Lannon 1969 1 QB 577 • R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte No.2 1999 1 WLR 876 • Porter v. Magill 2002 2 AC 357 • Ali Asad Zaidi v. The State PLD 2001 SC 663 • State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar AIR 2013 SC 364 (f) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 4, 9 & 10-A---Doctrine of natural justice and due process---Criminal trial---Presumption of innocence---Accused as favourite child of law---In every criminal trial, burden lies on prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; accused is not to be treated as an unfavourable child of law but remains entitled to all safeguards of fair trial---Scrutiny of prosecution evidence must be independent, impartial and free from bias or prejudice---Personal bias, preconceived mind or jaundiced eye of Judge tarnishes fairness of trial and undermines equal protection of law---No person can be condemned without fair opportunity to explain, contest and defend---Fair trial and due process are sacred obligations for every Court and tribunal. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Riaz v. Khurram Shahzad 2024 SCMR 51 • Junaid Wazir v. Superintendent of Police 2024 SCMR 181 • Federation of Pakistan v. Zahid Malik 2023 SCMR 603 • Umar Khan v. Chief Post Master, GPO Karachi 2022 SCMR 745 • Capital Development Authority v. Sabir Hussain 2023 SCMR 627 • Raja Muhammad Shahid v. Inspector General of Police 2023 SCMR 1135 • Government of Balochistan v. Ghulam Rasool 2024 SCMR 1185 • Inspector General of Police, Quetta v. Zia Muhammad 2023 SCMR 1583 (g) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Approver/accomplice evidence---Evidentiary value---Corroboration---Evidence of an approver is an acid test for Court; Court must examine whether such testimony is trustworthy and supported by independent reliable corroboration---An accomplice is generally unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars---Approver may be competent witness, but rule of prudence demands great care and caution before relying upon such testimony, particularly in capital cases---Corroboration must not be merely formal but must connect accused with commission of offence through independent and reliable evidence. (h) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 374 & 376---Confirmation of death sentence---Trial by High Court in original criminal jurisdiction---Where death sentence is awarded by Court of Sessions, proceedings are submitted to High Court for confirmation under S.374, Cr.P.C., and sentence cannot be executed unless confirmed---However, where High Court itself conducts murder trial and convicts accused under original jurisdiction, no further confirmation by a larger bench of High Court is required; rather remedy lies by appeal before Supreme Court under Art.185 of the Constitution---In such situation, constitutional and appellate scrutiny by Supreme Court assumes heightened importance. (i) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 185---Right of appeal---Murder trial conducted by High Court---Denial of ordinary appellate forum---Where murder trial is conducted by Court of Sessions, convict ordinarily has appeal before High Court and further remedy before Supreme Court---But where High Court withdraws case and tries it itself, accused is deprived of ordinary first appellate forum and can approach Supreme Court directly---Supreme Court, in such cases, should ordinarily be inclined to grant leave and examine case carefully to ensure safe administration of criminal justice, especially where death sentence is involved---In the case of Mr. Bhutto, direct appeal before Supreme Court after trial by High Court left no ordinary appellate reappraisal by High Court. (j) Media interviews and post-retirement disclosures---- ----Judicial conduct---Bias and public confidence---Subsequent interviews of former Judge suggesting pressure, annoyance with defence counsel, and external atmosphere surrounding proceedings could not by themselves unsettle a final judicial decision, but they were relevant in understanding cumulative circumstances showing fair trial concerns---Such disclosures, read with record of proceedings, corroborated apprehension that trial and appeal were not conducted in atmosphere required by constitutional guarantees of due process and impartial justice. (k) Sentence---- ----Death penalty---Mitigating circumstances---Role of Judge---Judge must not be influenced by appeasement, flattery, malice, annoyance with counsel, or emotional pressure while deciding punishment---Criminal Court retains power to consider mitigating circumstances and impose lesser sentence where justice so demands---In murder cases before Supreme Court, Court may confirm death sentence, alter it to life imprisonment, or grant acquittal depending on record---In Bhutto review proceedings, submission seeking commutation rather than acquittal was recorded, but Court still had power to consider whether punishment could be altered---On independent appraisal of record and peculiar circumstances, death sentence was not safe to maintain; life imprisonment would have met ends of justice. Cited Case: • Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto v. The State PLD 1979 SC 741 (l) Administration of justice---- ----Delay in answering Presidential Reference---Effect---Reference was answered after nearly thirteen years---Delay in adjudication undermines confidence in justice system, as justice delayed is justice denied---Courts must decide matters within reasonable time because prolonged pendency can prejudice rights of parties and create possibility of injustice---Proper balance in Court docket is necessary so that powerful or constitutionally significant matters do not unjustly eclipse other important matters, yet matters raising fundamental fairness concerns are not left unanswered. (m) Islamic jurisprudence---- ----Doctrine of repentance---Question framed in Presidential Reference---No opinion by larger Bench---One question in Reference sought opinion regarding doctrine of repentance under Islamic jurisprudence, but no opinion was rendered by Supreme Court on that question---Where trial itself was found to have been unfair and proceedings below were tainted by denial of fair trial and due process, unresolved question of repentance remained unanswered and did not alter conclusion regarding constitutional infirmities in trial process. (n) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 186---Reporting of opinion to President---After recording opinion on questions arising from Reference, office was directed to report opinion through proper channel to worthy President of Pakistan in terms of Art.186 of the Constitution. Disposition: Opinion was rendered in Reference No.01/2011 under Art.186 of the Constitution; Supreme Court, through the larger Bench, had already opined that the trial of Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and appellate proceedings did not meet requirements of fair trial and due process under Arts.4 and 9 of the Constitution and later Art.10-A; Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar, in his separate opinion, further examined advisory jurisdiction, reinvestigation, transfer of trial to High Court, bias, natural justice, approver evidence, confirmation of death sentence, right of appeal, media interviews, mitigating circumstances and doctrine of repentance; office was directed to report the opinion to the President of Pakistan through proper channel.

Summary: MUHAMMAD YOUSAF and others-Respondents (Against judgment dated 19.10.2018 passed in W.P. No. 2672-P of 2017 by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar and stay application). Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)- -S.13-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.115-Eviction proceedings-Tenant denying landlord’s title-Remedy for the tenant-Maintainability of ejectment petition-Scope-Respondents instituted a suit for recovery of produce and ejectment against the petitioners which was decreed; the petitioners’ appeal, revision petition, and constitutional petition before the High Court all failed, whereafter they approached the Supreme Court through filing of the present petition-Issue before the Supreme Court was as to-whether the tenant, while retaining possession, could dispute the landlord’s title on the basis of an alleged ownership claim, and whether ejectment proceedings in such circumstances remained maintainable?-Held: Where a person entered into possession as a tenant, he was estopped from disputing the title of the landlord so long as he continues to retain possession under the tenancy-The principle of estoppel was embodied in Article 115 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, which debarred a tenant from denying the title of the landlord during the continuance of tenancy-Unless and until the tenant established his alleged proprietary rights before a competent forum, the relationship between the parties continued to be regulated by tenancy law-If a tenant disputed the proprietary title of the landlord, he had to first vacate and surrender possession, and only thereafter could contest title-As regards the second question as to maintainability of ejectment proceedings was concerned, even if the tenant asserted acquisition of ownership rights by purchase of a share in the property, such assertion by itself did not render ejectment proceedings incompetent, particularly because the Rent Controller exercised a limited jurisdiction and could not adjudicate upon complicated questions of title-Impugned judgment of the High Court did not warrant any interference-Leave was refused and petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Mst. Seema Begum v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2009 SC 45; Barkat Masih v. Manzoor Ahmad (deceased) through L.Rs. 2006 SCMR 1068; Nazir Ahmad v. Mst. Sardar Bibi and others 1989 SCMR 913; Ghulam Mustafa and others v. Mst. Muhammadi Begum and others 1991 SCMR 432; Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani 2002 SCMR 1540 and Waheed Ullah v. Mst. Rehana Nasim and others 2004 SCMR 1568 rel.

Summary: (a) Trade Organizations Act (II of 2013)- -S.21(4)-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.14-Statutory appeal filed at High Court (Lahore), maintainability of-Impugned order passed at Islamabad-Legality-Territorial jurisdiction of the High Court in circumstances, determination of-Relevant provision not specifying as to which High Court to have jurisdiction-Effect-Constitutional principles governing territorial jurisdiction, consideration of-Dominant object-test, applicability of-Scope-Briefly, the appellant applied for registration / licence as a trade organization under the Trade Organizations Act, 2013; during pendency, respondent had also applied; the Regulator allowed the appellant’s application but rejected the respondent’s; respondent appealed under S.21(2) of the Act, 2013, and the Federal Cabinet Committee allowed the appeal; and the appellant then filed the present appeal under S.21(4) of the Act, 2013 challenging that appellate order-Held: If High Court was to entertain the present appeal merely because the appellant or some of its members had operations/offices within Punjab, the jurisdictional discipline emphasized by the Supreme Court, particularly the-dominant object-test and the disapproval of contrived forum selection, could be diluted, and the door for forum shopping could open in matters arising from federal appellate orders passed at Islamabad-Present appeal was held to be not maintainable before the High Court (Lahore) for want of territorial jurisdiction-Consequently, the same was returned to the appellant for presentation before the competent forum, i.e., the Islamabad High Court, if so advised-Office was directed to return the present appeal along with annexures to the appellant in terms of O.VII, R.10 of the C.P.C.-The appellant was at liberty to seek appropriate relief regarding exclusion of time/condonation of delay on the basis of time spent bona fide before the High Court in present proceedings, in accordance with law, including the principle underlying S.14 of the Limitation Act, 1908-Appeal was not maintainable and same was returned, in circumstances. (b) Trade Organizations Act (II of 2013)- -S.21(4)-Remedy of appeal before the High Court-Relevant provision not specifying which High Court has been conferred such jurisdiction-Effect-Territorial jurisdiction of the High Court-Determination-Constitutional principles governing territorial jurisdiction in circumstances - Applicability and scope-The High Court within whose territorial limits the impugned act was done/proceedings were taken, and where the dominant and integral cause of action lies, would have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal-Territorial jurisdiction is to be determined with reference to the sit us of the proceedings and the place where the impugned order was passed. Rechitt and Colman (U.K.) PLC v. Sheikh Soap Factory and another PLD 1993 SC 129 and Taufiq Asif and others v. General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf and others PLD 2024 SC 610 rel. (c) Jurisdiction- -It is well settled that jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter; therefore, the issue of jurisdiction is to be determined prior to entering upon or expressing any opinion on merits of the controversy between the parties. (d) Jurisdiction- -Statutory appeal-Statute not specifying which High Court to assume jurisdiction-Effect-Territorial jurisdiction of the High Court in circumstances-Determination-Appellant filing appeal before the High Court of his choice due to respondent being a federal body-Legality-Where the ultimate relief relates to an act done or proceeding taken within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular High Court, no other High Court can assume jurisdiction merely because one of the reliefs touches upon an act of a federal body. Qamar Hanif Ramay, Assistant Attorney General for the Federation of Pakistan.

Summary: (Against judgment dated 19.10.2018 passed in W.P. No. 2672-P of 2017 by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar and stay application). Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)--- ----S.13---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.115---Eviction proceedings---Tenant denying landlord’s title---Remedy for the tenant---Maintainability of ejectment petition---Scope---Respondents instituted a suit for recovery of produce and ejectment against the petitioners which was decreed; the petitioners’ appeal, revision petition, and constitutional petition before the High Court all failed, whereafter they approached the Supreme Court through filing of the present petition---Issue before the Supreme Court was as to “whether the tenant, while retaining possession, could dispute the landlord’s title on the basis of an alleged ownership claim, and whether ejectment proceedings in such circumstances remained maintainable?”---Held: Where a person entered into possession as a tenant, he was estopped from disputing the title of the landlord so long as he continues to retain possession under the tenancy---The principle of estoppel was embodied in Article 115 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, which debarred a tenant from denying the title of the landlord during the continuance of tenancy---Unless and until the tenant established his alleged proprietary rights before a competent forum, the relationship between the parties continued to be regulated by tenancy law---If a tenant disputed the proprietary title of the landlord, he had to first vacate and surrender possession, and only thereafter could contest title---As regards the second question as to maintainability of ejectment proceedings was concerned, even if the tenant asserted acquisition of ownership rights by purchase of a share in the property, such assertion by itself did not render ejectment proceedings incompetent, particularly because the Rent Controller exercised a limited jurisdiction and could not adjudicate upon complicated questions of title---Impugned judgment of the High Court did not warrant any interference---Leave was refused and petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Mst. Seema Begum v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2009 SC 45; Barkat Masih v. Manzoor Ahmad (deceased) through L.Rs. 2006 SCMR 1068; Nazir Ahmad v. Mst. Sardar Bibi and others 1989 SCMR 913; Ghulam Mustafa and others v. Mst. Muhammadi Begum and others 1991 SCMR 432; Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani 2002 SCMR 1540 and Waheed Ullah v. Mst. Rehana Nasim and others 2004 SCMR 1568 rel. Muhammad Javed Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (via video link, Peshawar). Abdul Sattar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 to 6 (via video link Peshawar). Nemo for other Respondents. Date of hearing: 29th January, 2026.