Summary: (Against order dated 25.01.2022 passed in C.R. No. 3308 of 2022 by Lahore High Court, Lahore). (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 42, 54 & 55---Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), 42---Suit for declaration with perpetual and mandatory injunction---Oral gift subsequently translated into mutation---Fraud---Exclusion of sisters/respondents from their right of inheritance---Essential ingredients of gift---Proof---Non-mentioning of necessary details as to offer and acceptance of gift in the written statement or evidence---Effect---Evidence beyond the scope of pleadings---Admissibility--- Suit of respondents/plaintiffs was decreed, however, the appeal and revision filed by the petitioners/defendants were dismissed by the Appellate and Revisional Court, respectively---Validity---Basic ingredients of a valid gift are: offer, acceptance and delivery of possession---No descriptions of making of offer as to gifting out of the disputed property to the petitioners by the donor, acceptance thereof by them, venue and names of witnesses in whose presence such transaction took place, had been given, which were necessary to be pleaded and proved --- Even the same had not been deposed during evidence either by the petitioners or their witnesses---A party cannot lead any evidence beyond its pleadings---No illegality was found in the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court as well as judgments and decrees passed by the trial and first Appellate Court warranting interference by Supreme Court---Thus, no case for grant of leave was made out---Leave was refused, in circumstances. Bilal Hussain Shah and another v. Dilawar Shah PLD 2018 SC 698; Khalid Hussain and others v. Nazir Ahmad and others 2021 SCMR 1986; Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim (deceased) through L.Rs. and others 2025 SCMR 955; Zulfiqar and others v. Shahdat Khan PLD 2007 SC 582; Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and others v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue and others 2014 SCMR 914; Combined Investment (Pvt.) Limited v. Wali Bhai and others PLD 2016 SC 730 and Saddaruddin (since deceased) through LRs. v. Sultan Khan (since deceased) through LRs and others 2021 SCMR 642 rel. (b) Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----S. 42(7)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)---Oral gift---Mutation---Independent transactions having two part---Burden of proof---Failure of the petitioners/donees to prove transactions of gift and mutation independently being beneficiary thereof---Effect---Petitioners instead of proving the gift and mutation thriving on the shortcomings of the evidence of respondents---Held: Oral gift has two parts i.e.firstly the fact of the oral gift which has to be independently established by proving through cogent and reliable evidence the three necessary ingredients of a valid gift, and secondly mutation on the basis of an oral gift has to be independently established and proved by adopting procedure provided in the Land Revenue Act, 1967, as well as the evidentiary aspects of the same in terms of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Petitioners could not lead any cogent, strong, unimpeachable and confidence inspiring evidence with regards to first part of alleged oral gift---Petitioners could not produce the stamp vendor, scribe, marginal witnesses, identifying witness, sub-registrar and revenue officials as well as Patwari, meaning thereby the best available evidence was withheld by the petitioners, which raised a serious adverse presumption under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Matters pertained to inheritable property, so the petitioners being alleged donees were under heavy burden to prove valid execution of oral gift because he could not take benefit from the shortcomings in the evidence of respondents, rather he had to stand on his own legs---Leave to appeal was refused, in circumstances. Mushtaq Ul Aarifin and others v. Mumtaz Muhammad and others 2022 SCMR 55; Mst. Parveen (deceased) through LRs. v. Muhammad Pervaiz and others 2022 SCMR 64; Mst. Hayat Bibi and others v. Alamzeb and others 2022 SCMR 13; Bashir Ahmed v. Muhammad Rafiq 2002 SCMR 1291; Muhammad Sarwar v. Mumtaz Bibi and others 2020 SCMR 276; Muhammad Nawaz and others v. Sakina Bibi and others 2020 SCMR 1021; Atta Muhammad and others v. Mst. Munir Sultan (deceased) through her LRs and others 2021 SCMR 73 and Farhan Aslam and others v. Mst. Nuzba Shaheen and another 2021 SCMR 179 rel. (c) Gift--- ----Mutation---Failure of donees to assign reasons prompting the donor to gift out the property to exclusion of female/daughters---Effect---No reason prompting the donor to gift out the disputed property to the petitioners, excluding his daughters (lawful heirs), had been impleaded, asserted and proved by the petitioners in their pleadings (written statement) and evidence --- It is rare for a gift to be made without some reasons like affection or in reward of some sincere service. Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Ismail 2002 SCMR 1938 and Faqir Ali and others v. Saina Bibi and others PLD 2022 SC 85 rel. Ajmal Raza Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 24th June, 2025.

Summary: Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----S.28---Enlargement of time for rendering an award---Application under S. 28 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, filing of---Locus standi---Whether such application could be maintained only by the arbitrator or also by any of the parties to the arbitration agreement---Powers and discretion of court to enlarge time for making an award---Scope---The petitioner’s application under S. 28 of Arbitration Act, 1940 (the Act) was dismissed by the lower court on the ground that it was only the arbitrator who could seek such extension, giving rise to the present petition---Core legal question for determination before the High Court was as to “Whether under S. 28 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, application for enlargement of time for making an arbitral award could only be filed by the arbitrator, or whether any party to the arbitration agreement also had the legal standing (locus standi) to move the court for such extension” ?---Held: plain language of S. 28 of the Act made it evident that there was no explicit or implicit requirement that an application for enlargement of time be filed by an arbitrator---The language of S. 28(1) of the Act did not specify as to who would have the standing to move the court for enlargement of time for making an award---In terms of S. 28 of the Act, any party to the arbitration agreement had legal standing to move the court for enlargement of time---Court had wide discretion and jurisdiction to enlarge the time limit for making an award especially where the request for extension of time was not a joint request made by both the parties to the arbitration agreement---Such extension could be sought and granted on more than one occasion---However, discretion vested in the court to grant extension of time ought not to be exercised in favor of a person who had adopted dilatory tactics---It was not for the High Court to determine whether or not extension was to be granted in the present matter as the said question was to be determined in the first instance by the civil court---Impugned order was not sustainable and was therefore set aside---Application filed by the petitioner was to be deemed pending before the civil court---Present civil revision petition was allowed, in circumstances. Civil Aviation Authority, Karachi v. Wrist Consultation (Pvt.) Ltd. 1998 SCMR 2393 rel. Aftab Ahmed Khan v. The Installment Supply, Private Ltd. and others 1961 ILR 503; Corporation Engineering (Pvt.) Limited v. Pak Arab Refinery Limited 2002 CLC 836; Sulaiman Ebrahim H. Jaffer v. Karachi Cooperative Housing Societies Union Ltd. PLD 1963 (W.P.) Karachi 316; Narsing Das Hiralal Limited and another v. Bisandayal Satyanarain Firm AIR 1954 Ori 29; Aniruddh Asharam Vyas v. Deepak Kantilal Ghiya Lnind 1970 GUJ 37; J.K. Enterprise v. Win Medicare Limited 1994 (45) DRJ; Engro Chemicals Pakistan Ltd. v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan 1996 CLC 344; J.W. Oliver v. Mian Dost Muhammad AIR 1935 Lahore 191 and Pakistan v. Gayer & Co., Karachi PLD 1964 Kar. 3 ref. Ali Ibrahim, Ambreen Khalid and Barrister Faiza Asad for Petitioner.

Summary: (a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed]--- ----Ss.263 & 265---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Investigation into the affairs of a company, challenge to---Initiation on the basis of a shareholder’s complaint---Complaint---Maintainability---Statutory threshold, requirement of---Potential misappropriation involving advance payment against purchase of land and failure in paying outstanding amount of provident fund, allegations of---Initiation of proceedings under inapplicable provision of law---Legality of proceedings---Briefly, the petitioner company challenged before the High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction a show cause notice issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) under S. 265 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, and a subsequent order appointing inspectors to investigate the affairs of the company on allegations relating to advance payment for purchase of land and non-payment of provident fund---The issue requiring determination before the High Court was “whether the SECP could lawfully invoke S. 265 to initiate an investigation on the basis of a single shareholder’s complaint, without fulfilling the statutory requirements and threshold prescribed under S. 263 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?”---Held: Impugned show cause notice was issued under S. 265 of the Ordinance, 1984 and a holistic reading of the same made it abundantly clear that the proceedings were not initiated by the SECP on its own and under its suo motu powers conferred by S. 265 by forming an in dependent and bipartisan opinion---Instead, the entire process was initiated on a complaint from an individual claiming to be a shareholder of the petitioner company---Thus, the SECP’s issuance of the impugned notice under S. 265 of the Ordinance, 1984, based on a shareholder complaint, was fundamentally flawed because it failed to meet the legally required threshold, specifically, the complaint must have been filed by 10% of the total voting power of the shareholders---Proceedings commenced by the SECP under S. 265, an inapplicable provision, on the basis of a complaint by a shareholder of the petitioner company were in clear contravention of statutory requirements and thus vitiated the legality of the proceedings---Impugned notice issued on the basis of misappropriation of payment against purchase of the land was not in essence of the third round of proceedings since it was regarding the same issue, transactions and allegations---Since it was an admitted fact that the documents submitted by the petitioner company in respect of the land were already available with the SECP, who had not yet given any findings in respect of the same due to pendency of these proceedings, the department retained the liberty to initiate separate and independent proceedings, if required according to the law---Impugned show cause notice and order were set aside---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed]--- ----S.265---Investigation into the affairs of a company---Scope---Under S.265 the SECP can appoint one or more competent persons as inspectors to investigate the affairs of a company and report thereon as directed---This power is exercised in two principal scenarios: (a) mandatorily, where the company by resolution in a general meeting or the Court by order declares that an investigation is warranted; and (b) at the Commission’s discretion, where circumstances suggest, inter alia, that the company’s business is being or has been conducted with intent to defraud creditors, members or others for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose, in an oppressive manner or where there is evidence of fraud, misfeasance, breach of trust, unauthorized business, deprivation of reasonable return to members, inadequate disclosure of information, allotment of shares for inadequate consideration, unsound business practices, or financial instability endangering solvency. (c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed]--- ----S.263---Investigation into the affairs of a company on the basis of a shareholder’s application---Initiation of proceedings---Legal framework---Section 263 is engaged on the happening of an event either on an application by members (holding certain threshold voting power) or on a report compiled under subsection (5) of S. 231 or by the registrar under subsection (6) of S. 261---If at all the SECP seeks to investigate into the affairs of a company on the basis of a shareholder’s application, it must have initiated proceedings under S. 263. (d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed]--- ----S.263---Investigation into the affairs of a company on the basis of a shareholder’s application---Statutory threshold of 10% of total voting power---Essence, significance and purpose of a statutory threshold---The statutory threshold is not a mere formality; it serves as a critical safeguard designed to prevent undue interference in a company’s internal affairs by individual shareholders or regulators without sufficient backing---This provision ensures that only a significant portion of shareholders can initiate regulatory action, thereby maintaining corporate independence and stability. (e) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.10A---Right to due process---Initiation of proceedings under an inapplicable provision---Legality of proceedings---Due process, violation of---Due process constitutes a fundamental constitutional right and no proceedings may be lawfully initiated except in strict adherence to due process and the prescribed procedural formalities---Any exercise conducted without due process of law is unconstitutional, illegal and void---Proceedings initiated underan inapplicable provision would vitiate the legality of proceedings. (f) Administration of justice--- ----When the legislature requires the doing of a thing in a particular manner then it is to be done in that manner and all other manners or modes of doing or performing that thing are barred. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance, Islamabad and another v. E-Movers (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2022 SCMR 1021 and Chairman, NAB v. Nasar Ullah PLD 2022 SC 497 rel. Salman Aslam Butt and Anique Salman Malik for Petitioner. Hafiz Munawar Iqbal and Syed Pervaiz Zahoor and Muhammad Waseem A. Rana, Makhdoom Ali Hamaza, Ms. Syeda Muneeza Fatima and Omer Azad Malik, SPPs for SECP for Respondents Nos.1 and 2. Muhammad Saeed Raja, DAG for Respondent No.3. Assisted by: Muhammad Yahya Khan Niazi, Judicial Law Clerk.

Summary: (Against the order dated 22.09.2015 passed by the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur in Writ Petitions Nos. 1478, 1479 and 1480 of 2010/BWP). Supreme Court Rules, 1980--- ----O. XX, R. 1---Proceedings, pendency of---Effect---Matter pending before Supreme Court pertaining to assailing of remand order passed by High Court wherein Supreme Court had not issued any restraining order---Validity---Pendency of any appeal, revision, or Constitutional petition does not, of itself, stay execution or implementation of the order assailed---Such principle is expressly embodied in Order XX Rule 1 of Supreme Court Rules, 1980---Administrative inaction premised on mere pendency of further proceedings, without any lawful restraint, is both unjustified and impermissible---Revenue Authority placed on record the order passed by Deputy Commissioner/District Collector, which showed that remanded matter had since been disposed of in accordance with law---Petition was disposed of. Rashid Baig v. Muhammad Mansha 2024 SCMR 1385 rel. Rana Shamshad Khan, Additional Advocate General, Punjab along with Nabeel Javed, SMBR for Petitioners (in all cases). M. Usman Arif, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1 (in all cases). Salman Mansoor, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 2, 3(b), 6-12, 14, 16-20, 24, 25 and 27 (in C.P. No. 2915-L of 2015). Date of hearing: 24th June, 2025. ORDER YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ.--- These petitions arise out of remand orders passed by the Lahore High Court over a decade ago, directing revenue authorities to re-decide the matter in accordance with law. Despite such clear directions, the Deputy Land Commissioner, Bahawalpur, failed to act, resulting in unreasonable and unexplained delay. 2. When questioned in Court, the learned Additional Advocate-General, Punjab, confirmed that there was no injunctive or restraining order passed by any Court that could justify the failure to act on the remand. This admission demonstrates that such failure was without any lawful justification. 3. This Court finds it necessary to address the disturbing practice of treating remand orders as optional or capable of indefinite suspension. A remand is not an invitation to delay and when superior courts issue remand directions, they are to be complied with faithfully and expeditiously. Such failure is contrary to the constitutional duty of all authorities to act in aid of judicial orders. 4. For clarity, it bears emphasis that the mere pendency of any appeal, revision, or constitutional petition does not, of itself, stay the execution or implementation of the order impugned. This principle is expressly embodied in Order XX Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, which provides: The filing of a petition for leave to appeal or an appeal shall not prevent execution of the decree or order appealed against, but the Court may, subject to such terms and conditions as it may deem fit to impose, order a stay of execution of the decree or order, or order a stay of proceedings, in any case under appeal to this Court. In reference to the above-stated rule, this Court has already recently clarified in the case of Rashid Baig v. Muhammad Mansha (2024 SCMR 1385) that mere pendency of a petition before this Court does not, by itself, operate as a stay of proceedings, which may only be lawfully restrained by an express injunctive order of the Court. Thus, administrative inaction premised on the mere pendency of further proceedings, without any lawful restraint, is both unjustified and impermissible. 5. It is particularly regrettable that despite the clear pronouncement of this Court in Rashid Baig's case (supra) expressing disapproval of such misuse of procedural pendency, the same practice continues unabated. This reflects not merely individual lapses, but a persistent pattern of administrative disregard for binding remand orders, which in itself constitutes systemic failure requiring urgent redress. 6. To address this matter, the Court required the personal attendance of the Senior Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab. He assured the Court that clear and comprehensive policy guidelines would be issued at the provincial level, directing all relevant authorities to implement remand orders promptly and without delay, unless expressly restrained by an injunctive order of a competent Court. He further undertook to ensure monitoring of compliance and to submit a report on the current status of all such pending remanded cases under his jurisdiction. Such measures are essential to uphold the foundations of lawful governance, and it must be reiterated that failure by the relevant authorities to observe established principles requiring prompt compliance with remand orders would frustrate the administration of justice and violate their constitutional duty. 7. As for the present matters, the Senior Member, Board of Revenue, has placed on record the order dated 05.11.2024 passed by the Deputy Commissioner/District Collector, Bahawalpur, which shows that the remanded matter has since been disposed of in accordance with law. These petitions have therefore become infructuous. 8. In view of the above, these petitions are disposed of as having become infructuous. However, before parting with this order, we direct the Board of Revenue, Punjab, to ensure that the promised policy guidelines are finalized, circulated to all relevant authorities, and strictly implemented. A compliance report, along with an updated status of all pending remanded cases in the province, shall be submitted to the Registrar of this Court within three months of this order. MH/C-17/SC Order accordingly.

Summary: (a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)- -S.17-Arbitration award-Award made rule of court merely on the ground that objections against it were barred by time-Duty of court to examine award on its own motion regardless of whether any objections or time-barred objections were filed or not-Scope-Court must ensure that award is free from any patent illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error-Facts of the matter in brevity were that the appellant/Capital Development Authority (CDA) awarded a construction contract to respondent company-Various disputes between the parties led them to arbitration-The sole arbitrator awarded Rs. 640 million to the respondent company-The appellant/CDA filed objections beyond the statutory limitation period which the Trial Court dismissed solely on grounds of delay and made the award rule of the court-The significant questions requiring determination by the High Court were as to (i) -Whether the objections filed against the arbitration award were rightly dismissed as time-barred without a substantive examination of the award itself?- and; (ii) -Whether the grounds raised for setting aside the award in appeal merit consideration despite the dismissal of objections on the ground of limitation?-Held: While deciding the objections filed to the award Trial Court failed to appreciate the true import of the statutory mandate under S. 17 of the 1940 Act-Record demonstrated that the Trial Court failed to fulfill its legal obligation under S. 17 of the 1940 Act-Trial Court made the award rule of the court solely on the ground that the objections filed by the appellant/CDA were time-barred-Record clearly revealed that the Trial Court did not undertake the essential judicial scrutiny of the award as required by law under S. 17 of the Act 1940-It failed to assess the contents, fairness or legality of the award and did not determine whether the award was within the bounds of the arbitrator’s authority or in violation of any provision of law, instead, the court dismissed the objections on the ground of limitation and proceeded to make the award rule of the court without applying the standards mandated by law-This failure constituted a miscarriage of justice and a deviation from the fundamental principles of due process and procedural fairness-Trial Court made the award rule of court simply because the appellant/CDA had filed time barred objections to the award-Impugned order did not show any application of judicious mind to the contents of the award so as to determine whether any provision of law was violated or whether there was any reason to remit the award for reconsideration-This failure on the part of the Trial Court rendered the impugned order unlawful and against the law-Trial Court while relying on the question of time barred objections failed to discharge its statutory duty and hastily proceeded to make the award rule of the court, thereby compromising the sanctity of the judicial process envisaged under S. 17 of the 1940 Act-It was not open to the court to bypass the scrutiny as established in S.17 of the 1940 Act on the ground of time-barred objections-Impugned order and decree were set-aside and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court to decide the same afresh in accordance with the law-Present appeal was disposed of, in circumstances. Pakistan Through General Manager, Pakistan Railway v. Messrs Q.M.R. Expert Consultants PLD 1990 SC 800 and Ameen General Enterprises v. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government PLD 2010 SC (AJ&K) 1 rel. National Logistic Cell (NLC) v. Hakas (Pvt.) Ltd. 2010 YLR 1448 and Rashida Begum v. Ch. Muhammad Anwar PLD 2003 Lah. 522 ref. (b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)- -S.17-Arbitration award-Court to examine award on its own motion regardless of whether any objections or time-barred objections were filed or not-Scope-Court must ensure that award is free from any patent illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error-Duties and role of court in examining the award before making it the rule of court stated-Section 17 imposes a direct and mandatory obligation upon the Court once an award is submitted for making it a rule of Court-The statutory language does not envisage the Court acting as a mere conduit for converting the award into a decree rather, the Court is required to perform an active judicial function-It mandates that the Court must examine the award to determine whether there exists any ground for remitting it back to the arbitrator for reconsideration or for setting it aside-Only if the Court finds no legal flaw or procedural irregularity in the award, and after the expiry of the prescribed period for filing objections or upon lawful rejection of any objections filed, may the Court pronounce judgment in accordance with the award, thereby rendering it executable as a decree of the Court-Importantly, the Court’s duty of judicial scrutiny is not contingent upon the filing of objections by either party, nor it is negated by the expiry of the limitation period for such objections-Even in the absence of objections or where objections are barred by time, the court remains under a legal obligation to examine the award on its own motion-The absence of objections does not absolve the Court from its responsibility to ensure that the award is not tainted by any apparent illegality, procedural irregularity, or violation of law-The Court’s role under S. 17 of the 1940 Act is not that of a mere post office, mechanically endorsing the award upon the expiry of the limitation period for objections rather the Court must exercise its independent judicial mind to ensure that the award is free from any patent illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error-While making an award rule of the Court, in case parties have not filed objections, the Court is not supposed to act in a mechanical manner, like a post office but must subject the award to its judicial scrutiny-This however does not mean that a Court will sit in appeal over the award and try to fish or dig out the latent errors in the proceedings of the award-It only means that even in the absence of objections or time barred objections, the award may be set aside and not made a rule of the Court, if it is a nullity or is prima facie illegal or for any other reason, not fit to be maintained; or suffers from an invalidity, which is self-evident or apparent on the face of the record-The Court’s role is thus not purely procedural rather it involves a measure of judicial scrutiny to ensure that the award does not suffer from any fundamental legal infirmities-The Court’s obligation to examine the legality and enforceability of the award before making it a rule of the Court is inherent in the statutory scheme governing arbitral proceedings-Section 17 of the 1940 Act, casts a positive duty upon the Court to independently examine whether there exists any cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award-This duty is not contingent upon the filing of objections within limitation but is inherent in the judicial function prescribed by the statute-No derogation can be made from this duty, as it forms a foundational safeguard within the arbitration process to prevent the enforcement of awards that are patently illegal, unenforceable or contrary to law-The Court’s power to scrutinize an arbitral award is limited to patent illegality or error apparent on the face of the award and does not extend to reappraisal of evidence or merits-The arbitrator is the final judge of facts and law and his findings are to be respected unless there is a manifest error or misconduct. Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd v. Aeroflot Russian International Airline 2018 SCMR 662; A. Qutubuddin Khan v. Chec Millwala Dredging Co. (Pvt.) Limited 2014 SCMR 1268; Mian Corporation through Managing Partner v. Messrs Lever Brothers of Pakistan Ltd. through General Sales Manager PLD 2006 SC 169 and Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation Karachi v. Messrs Mustafa Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2003 SC 301 rel. Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation v. Javaid Iqbal and others 2020 YLR 2306 and Capital Development Authority through its Chairman v. Messrs Signage Security Systems (Pvt.) Ltd. through Accounts and Administrative Manager 2021 YLR 194 ref. Mashooq Ali Sheikh, Director Works, CDA. Assisted by: Muhammad Yahya Khan Niazi, Judicial Law Clerk.

Summary: (a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) --- ----Ss.4, 9, 15, 18, 23, 24 & 25--- Compulsory acquisition of land--- Payment of compensation---Fair market value---Determination---Factors to be considered---Award based on revenue classification and annual average rate---Legality---Potential value of land and future utility---Commercial character---Surrounding developments, effect of---Enhancement of compensation---Scope---Delay of twenty-five years in granting fair value as compensation---Right to fair and timely compensation---Briefly, land in question was acquired for the construction of the Islamabad-Murree dual carriageway pursuant to a notification under S.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, followed by an award, whereby compensation was fixed at Rs.1,60,241 per Kanal---Dissatisfied landowners sought reference under S.18 of the Act, resulting in enhancement of compensation to Rs.4,80,000 per Kanal with 15% compulsory acquisition charges by the referee court; Both sides challenged this order through cross appeals---The core issue before the High Court was the “determination of fair market value of the acquired land at the time of notification under S.4, including whether future potential and comparable sale transactions could be considered, and whether compensation could be enhanced beyond the amount initially claimed?”---Held: It was evident that the required land not only possessed commercial value at the time of acquisition but also significant future potential---The existence of nearby facilities such as a hospital, college and university reflect the prevailing market rate and the expected appreciation of the land’s value---Moreover, viz limiting the award of compensation, foundational precondition for invoking the restrictive provisions of S.25 of the Act, 1894 was not met in the present case and accordingly, the objection seeking to limit the award of compensation by respondent to Rs.1,60,241/- per Kanal was devoid of merit---High Court found it necessary to express its deep concern over the prolonged delay faced by the appellants/land owners, who had waited for long 25 years to receive the fair value of their land---High Court further observed that some of the appellants had not lived long enough to see the rightful value of their property acknowledged, let alone received---Such unconscionable delay reflected not just institutional indifference but a broader apathy within the system that failed to respond to the plight of citizens, whose only fault was trusting the process---Present case, regrettably, reflected a failure not of one institution, but of the entire machinery responsible for ensuring timely and adequate compensation--- Impugned order passed by referee court was modified by enhancing the compensation amount from Rs.4,80,000/- to Rs.40,00,000/- (4 Million) per Kanal with 15% compulsory acquisition charges and 6% interest from the date of acquiring possession till the final payment--- Appeal filed by respondents (N.H.A) stood dismissed and that of the land owners was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) --- ----Ss.9, 23, 24 & 25---Compulsory acquisition of land---Compensation, awarding of---Fair market value---Determination---Classification of land in the revenue record and annual average price---Legality--- Determinative factors to be considered while assessing fair compensation---Scope---Value in the revenue record may not be conclusive for determination of compensation value---Courts are required to consider the amount that a willing purchaser would pay to a willing seller in an open market transaction---This principle emphasizes that compensation must be based on actual market dynamics rather than arbitrary or obsolete criteria---In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded to the owners of land compulsorily acquired, the following considerations are relevant and may be duly taken into account: firstly, the value of comparable land situated in adjacent Khasras and Mouzas; secondly, the increase in land prices occurring during the period of acquisition, culminating in the issuance of the final award; thirdly, the potential future value of the acquired land; fourthly, the recent transactions of land in the same vicinity, which serve as reliable indicators of the prevailing market rate and must be accorded due consideration; and finally, it is recognized that no rigid or mechanical formula can be prescribed for the calculation of compensation in cases of compulsory acquisition---Compensation must be fair, and reflective of all relevant considerations including the market value and the potential use of the land. Province of Punjab v. Begum Aziza 2014 SCMR 75 and Government of Pakistan v. Mst. Ayesha Bibi (Widow) 2024 SCMR 1323 rel. (c) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)--- ----Ss.9 & 25---Rate of compensation---Limitation on award beyond claimed amount---Applicability---Whether rate of compensation can be enhanced beyond the amount claimed by the appellants in the reference application and to what extent---Section 25 of the Act, 1894 reflects that it sets a condition precedent to the limit of the compensation that could be awarded, where claim is made or not made pursuant to a notice given under S.9 of the Act, 1894---A careful reading of both provisions reveals that S.25 cannot be pressed into service unless the statutory obligations under S.9 are fully satisfied---Section 9 mandates the issuance of public notice and personal service of individual notices to all persons known or believed to be interested in the land being acquired --- Such notices must provide a clear opportunity for the affected persons to file compensation claims, raise objections, and assert their interests within the stipulated timeframe. Government of Pakistan v. Mst. Ayesha Bibi (Widow) 2024 SCMR 1323 rel. Zulfiqar Ali Abbasi and Shahid Munir for Appellants (in Regular First Appeal No. 63 of 2011). Ms. Shahina Akbar for Appellant (in Regular First Appeal No. 10 of 2014). Ms. Shahina Akbar for Respondents (in Regular First Appeal No. 63 of 2011). Zulfiqar Ali Abbasi and Shahid Munir for Respondents (in Regular First Appeal No. 10 of 2014). Research Assistance by Muhammad Fahad Khattak. Date of hearing: 12th May, 2025. Inaam Ameen Minhas, J .--- Through this single judgment, I intend to decide the above titled two appeals as the same have arisen out of the same order.

Summary: (a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----S.17---Arbitration award---Award made rule of court merely on the ground that objections against it were barred by time---Duty of court to examine award on its own motion regardless of whether any objections or time-barred objections were filed or not---Scope---Court must ensure that award is free from any patent illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error---Facts of the matter in brevity were that the appellant/Capital Development Authority (CDA) awarded a construction contract to respondent company---Various disputes between the parties led them to arbitration---The sole arbitrator awarded Rs. 640 million to the respondent company---The appellant/CDA filed objections beyond the statutory limitation period which the Trial Court dismissed solely on grounds of delay and made the award rule of the court---The significant questions requiring determination by the High Court were as to (i) “Whether the objections filed against the arbitration award were rightly dismissed as time-barred without a substantive examination of the award itself?” and; (ii) “Whether the grounds raised for setting aside the award in appeal merit consideration despite the dismissal of objections on the ground of limitation?”---Held: While deciding the objections filed to the award Trial Court failed to appreciate the true import of the statutory mandate under S. 17 of the 1940 Act---Record demonstrated that the Trial Court failed to fulfill its legal obligation under S. 17 of the 1940 Act---Trial Court made the award rule of the court solely on the ground that the objections filed by the appellant/CDA were time-barred---Record clearly revealed that the Trial Court did not undertake the essential judicial scrutiny of the award as required by law under S. 17 of the Act 1940---It failed to assess the contents, fairness or legality of the award and did not determine whether the award was within the bounds of the arbitrator’s authority or in violation of any provision of law, instead, the court dismissed the objections on the ground of limitation and proceeded to make the award rule of the court without applying the standards mandated by law---This failure constituted a miscarriage of justice and a deviation from the fundamental principles of due process and procedural fairness---Trial Court made the award rule of court simply because the appellant/CDA had filed time barred objections to the award---Impugned order did not show any application of judicious mind to the contents of the award so as to determine whether any provision of law was violated or whether there was any reason to remit the award for reconsideration---This failure on the part of the Trial Court rendered the impugned order unlawful and against the law---Trial Court while relying on the question of time barred objections failed to discharge its statutory duty and hastily proceeded to make the award rule of the court, thereby compromising the sanctity of the judicial process envisaged under S. 17 of the 1940 Act---It was not open to the court to bypass the scrutiny as established in S.17 of the 1940 Act on the ground of time-barred objections---Impugned order and decree were set-aside and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court to decide the same afresh in accordance with the law---Present appeal was disposed of, in circumstances. Pakistan Through General Manager, Pakistan Railway v. Messrs Q.M.R. Expert Consultants PLD 1990 SC 800 and Ameen General Enterprises v. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government PLD 2010 SC (AJ&K) 1 rel. National Logistic Cell (NLC) v. Hakas (Pvt.) Ltd. 2010 YLR 1448 and Rashida Begum v. Ch. Muhammad Anwar PLD 2003 Lah. 522 ref. (b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----S.17---Arbitration award---Court to examine award on its own motion regardless of whether any objections or time-barred objections were filed or not---Scope---Court must ensure that award is free from any patent illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error---Duties and role of court in examining the award before making it the rule of court stated---Section 17 imposes a direct and mandatory obligation upon the Court once an award is submitted for making it a rule of Court---The statutory language does not envisage the Court acting as a mere conduit for converting the award into a decree rather, the Court is required to perform an active judicial function---It mandates that the Court must examine the award to determine whether there exists any ground for remitting it back to the arbitrator for reconsideration or for setting it aside---Only if the Court finds no legal flaw or procedural irregularity in the award, and after the expiry of the prescribed period for filing objections or upon lawful rejection of any objections filed, may the Court pronounce judgment in accordance with the award, thereby rendering it executable as a decree of the Court---Importantly, the Court’s duty of judicial scrutiny is not contingent upon the filing of objections by either party, nor it is negated by the expiry of the limitation period for such objections---Even in the absence of objections or where objections are barred by time, the court remains under a legal obligation to examine the award on its own motion---The absence of objections does not absolve the Court from its responsibility to ensure that the award is not tainted by any apparent illegality, procedural irregularity, or violation of law---The Court’s role under S. 17 of the 1940 Act is not that of a mere post office, mechanically endorsing the award upon the expiry of the limitation period for objections rather the Court must exercise its independent judicial mind to ensure that the award is free from any patent illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error---While making an award rule of the Court, in case parties have not filed objections, the Court is not supposed to act in a mechanical manner, like a post office but must subject the award to its judicial scrutiny---This however does not mean that a Court will sit in appeal over the award and try to fish or dig out the latent errors in the proceedings of the award---It only means that even in the absence of objections or time barred objections, the award may be set aside and not made a rule of the Court, if it is a nullity or is prima facie illegal or for any other reason, not fit to be maintained; or suffers from an invalidity, which is self-evident or apparent on the face of the record---The Court’s role is thus not purely procedural rather it involves a measure of judicial scrutiny to ensure that the award does not suffer from any fundamental legal infirmities---The Court’s obligation to examine the legality and enforceability of the award before making it a rule of the Court is inherent in the statutory scheme governing arbitral proceedings---Section 17 of the 1940 Act, casts a positive duty upon the Court to independently examine whether there exists any cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award---This duty is not contingent upon the filing of objections within limitation but is inherent in the judicial function prescribed by the statute---No derogation can be made from this duty, as it forms a foundational safeguard within the arbitration process to prevent the enforcement of awards that are patently illegal, unenforceable or contrary to law---The Court’s power to scrutinize an arbitral award is limited to patent illegality or error apparent on the face of the award and does not extend to reappraisal of evidence or merits---The arbitrator is the final judge of facts and law and his findings are to be respected unless there is a manifest error or misconduct. Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd v. Aeroflot Russian International Airline 2018 SCMR 662; A. Qutubuddin Khan v. Chec Millwala Dredging Co. (Pvt.) Limited 2014 SCMR 1268; Mian Corporation through Managing Partner v. Messrs Lever Brothers of Pakistan Ltd. through General Sales Manager PLD 2006 SC 169 and Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation Karachi v. Messrs Mustafa Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2003 SC 301 rel. Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation v. Javaid Iqbal and others 2020 YLR 2306 and Capital Development Authority through its Chairman v. Messrs Signage Security Systems (Pvt.) Ltd. through Accounts and Administrative Manager 2021 YLR 194 ref. Kashif Ali Malik, Amir Latif Gill and Qaisar Abbas Gondal for Appellant. Mashooq Ali Sheikh, Director Works, CDA. Muhammad Masood Khan, Muhammad Zeeshan Younas and Syed Faisal Hussain Shah for Respondent. Assisted by: Muhammad Yahya Khan Niazi, Judicial Law Clerk. Date of hearing: 25th March, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 86(2) & 286---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 23---Affairs of company---Subsidiary company holding shares in its holding company---Petition before Court---Limitation---Continuing wrong, doctrine of---Applicability---Petitioner invoked jurisdiction of Court alleging that subsidiary company was holding shares in its holding company---Plea raised by respondents was that the petition was barred by limitation---Validity---Remedy in S. 286 of Companies Act, 2017 is based on doctrine of continuing wrong which is also embodied in S. 23 of Limitation Act, 1908---Arrangement arrived between respondent companies in December 2021 amounted to financial assistance by subsidiary company to purchase its own shares in violation of S. 86(2) of the Companies Act, 2017---Each time in year 2022 to year 2024 respondent company with majority shares used financial assistance to purchase shares of holding company and then in year 2025 had made public offer---Affairs of subsidiary company were conducted unlawfully falling within the time-line envisaged in S. 286 of Companies Act, 2017---There was also no question of latches in such circumstances. B and T Ag v. Ministry of Defence 2023 SCC OnLine SC 657; Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Cyrus Investments (Pvt.) Ltd. (AIR ONLINE 2021 SC 179; Ramashankar Prosad v. Sindri Iron Foundry (P.) Ltd. AIR 1966 Cal 512; Surinder Singh Bindra v. Hindustan Fasteners Ltd. AIR 1990 Delhi 32; Bentonite Pakistan Ltd. v. Bankers Equity Ltd. 2023 SCMR 1353; Naila Naeem Younus v. Indus Services Ltd. 2022 SCMR 1171; Naeem Finance Ltd. v. Bashir Ahmed Rafiqui PLD 1971 SC 8; M. Imam-ud-Din Janjua v. Thal Development Authority PLD 1972 SC 123; Muhammad Tariq Badar v. National Bank of Pakistan 2013 SCMR 314; A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar 2025 INSC 274 and Hassan v. The State PLD 2013 SC 793 rel. (b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 86(4) & 286---'Court' and 'Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan'---Jurisdiction---Imposing of penalties---Power of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan under S. 86(4) of Companies Act, 2017 to penalize a company has no bearing on the power of Court under S. 286 of Companies Act, 2017. (c) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----S. 286 ---Complaint of oppression and mismanagement---Scope---Complaint of oppression is usually where petitioner is directly affected and complaint of mismanagement and prejudice to public interest is where petitioner is indirectly affected---Petitioner is permitted by S. 286 of Companies Act, 2017 to bring what would otherwise be a derivative action on behalf of company for correcting affairs of the company---Complaint under S. 286 of Companies Act, 2017 may be against mismanagement only; against oppression only; against both; against prejudice to public interest only; against the latter coupled with mismanagement or/and oppression---While acts underlying oppression and mismanagement may be overlapping, it is important to distinguish between the two. (d) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 2 (7)(d), 86 (2), 88, 158 (2), 286 & 301---Listed Companies (Buy-Back of Shares) Regulations, 2019, Regln. 13---Affairs of company---Complaint---Winding-up of company---Grounds---Opression of minority shares---Substantial shareholder---Subsidiary company holding shares in its holding company---Delay in election of directors---Petitioner was holding 16 % shares of company under winding-up, which was a public listed company---Petitioner alleged that shares of company under winding-up were put to public offer which had earlier been purchased by respondent company with majority shares---Validity---Grounds for winding-up a company are set-out in S.301 of Companies Act, 2017---Company may be wound up by the Court under S.301 (g)(iii) of Companies Act, 2017 if the company is - conducting its business in a manner oppressive to the minority members or persons concerned with the formation or promotion of the company---Oppression of minority members by the companyis a recognized ground for winding-up of that company---Where oppression of minority is established under S.286 of Companies Act, 2017, it is implicit that there should be cause to wind-up the company---Once threshold of oppression is crossed, the threshold of winding-up is automatically crossed---Where it is established under S.286 of Companies Act, 2017 that affairs of the company are being conducted, or are likely to be conducted, in an unlawful or fraudulent manner, or in a manner not provided for in its memorandum, a case for winding-up can be triggered under S.301 (g)(i), (ii), (iv) & (v) of Companies Act, 2017---Such acts committed by the Board of company under winding-up in collusion with respondent company with majority shares, oppressed minority shareholders such as the petitioner who were in the category of 'substantial shareholder' as defined in S.2(7)(d) of Companies Act, 2017 i.e. holding an interest of 10% or more in the company---Once oppression of minority shareholders was established, a case for winding-up was made out in view of S.301 (g)(iii) of Companies Act, 2017 and Court could then consider corrective orders under S.286 (2) of Companies Act, 2017---Violation of S.86(2) of Companies Act, 2017 to divert funds/assets of the company for no apparent gain to the company and deliberate violation 158(2) of Companies Act, 2017 to delay election of directors at the behest of the largest shareholder was also mismanagement by the Board of company under winding-up, conducting the affairs in unlawful and fraudulent manner within the meaning of S.286 of Companies Act, 2017---High Court in exercise of powers under Ss. 286 & 287 of Companies Act, 2017 declared that shares held by respondent company with majority shares were to be the property of company under winding-up as the same were deemed to have been purchased by the company from its shareholders under S.88 of Companies Act, 2017 as treasury shares subject to the conditions set-out in S.88 (3) of Companies Act, 2017---High Court directed Central Depository Company to amend central depository register accordingly---High Court directed the company to amend register of its members accordingly and make other consequential alterations to its record---High Court declared that public offer made by respondent company with majority shares stood abated as it was to acquire controlling shares of the company---High Court directed the Manger to the Offer to return the shares tendered by shareholders of the company to the respective shareholders---High Court directed Board of directors of the company to forthwith issue notice for calling an extra-ordinary general meeting of the company for electing directors---High Court further directed that Board of Directors of the company, constituted after election would then decide whether to retain treasury shares, to cancel them or to sell them as per Regln. 13 of Listed Companies (Buy-Back of Shares) Regulations, 2019 provided that, where the treasury shares would exceed the limit fixed by Regln. 9 of Listed Companies (Buy-Back of Shares) Regulations, 2019, the shares exceeding such limit were to be cancelled or sold---Petition was allowed accordingly. PLD 1988 Lah. 1; 2021 CLD 578; 2015 CLC 877; 2021 CLD 7; 1987 CLC 1408; 2007 CLD 1210; Matloob Ellahi Paracha v. Raja Arshad Mahmood PLD 2024 SC 663; Ghulam Nabi v. Muhammad Yaqub PLD 1983 SC 344; Khursheed Ismail v. Unichem Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. 1996 CLC 1863; Associate Biscuits International Ltd. v. English Biscuits Manufacturers (Pvt.) Ltd. 2003 CLD 815; Pakistan WAPDA v. Kot Addu Power Co. Ltd. PLD 2000 Lah. 461; Trevor v. Whitworth (1887) 12 AC 409; Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta AIR 2006 SC 3672; Belmont Finance Corporation v. Williams Furniture Ltd. and others (No.2) - [1980] 1 All ER 393; Charterhouse Investment Trust Ltd. v. Tempest Diesel Ltd. (1986) BCLC 1 (Ch D); Elder v. Elder and Whatson Ltd. (1952) SC 49; Scottish Cooperative Whole Sale Society Ltd. v. Meyer (1958) 3 All ER 66; Inam Ullah Khan v. AKSA Solutions Development Services (Pvt.) Ltd. 2019 CLD 355; Needle Industries (India) Ltd. v. Needle Industries Newey (India) Holding Ltd. (1981) 3 SCC 333; Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Cyrus Investments (Pvt.) Ltd., (AIR ONLINE 2021 SC 179) Loch v. John Blackwood; Neelofar Shah v. Ofspace (Pvt.) Ltd. 2013 CLD 114 and Shahamatullah Qureshi v. Hi-tech Construction Pvt. Ltd. 2004 CLD 640 ref. Barrister Sarfaraz Ali Metlo, Barrister Fayaz Ali Metlo, Athar Hussain along with Ms. Adeela Ansari and Atiya Manzoor for Petitioner. Abid S. Zuberi, Ayan Mustafa Memon, Muhammad Nawaz Khan, Saif Sohail and M. Arif Ansari for Respondent No.1. Arshad M. Tayebaly, Sameer Tayebaly and Aitzaz Manzoor Memon for Respondent No.2. Ali Almani, Furqan Mushtaq and Sami-ur-Rehman for Respondent No.3. Muzaffar Mirza, Imran Ahmed Shamsi, Syed Ebad-ur-Rehman along with Sabeel Shah, Deputy Director (Listed Companies), SECP for Respondent No.4. Nemo for Respondents Nos.5-8. Mayhar Kazi, Ahmed Imran Dewan and Sheheryar Malik for Respondent No.9. Syed Ghulam Shabbir Shah, Irtafa-ur-Rehman, Mukesh Kumar Talreja, Agha Shahzaib and Anas Habib Magoon for Applicants / Interveners. Dates of hearing: 7th, 10th, 15th, 17th, 23rd, 24th, 28th April, 5th, 6th and 8th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXIII, R. 1---Withdrawal of suit---Fresh suit, filing of---Maintainability---Principle---Unless plaintiff satisfies Court that the terms on which he received permission had been satisfied, there is no proper plaint before the Court, with the result that no proceedings on the plaint can be taken---Order of dismissal of suit can be passed only after it is found that plaintiff, on an objection taken, is not willing to comply with the terms on which he was permitted to withdraw the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit. Haji Abdul Rasheed Sodagar v. S.M. Lalita Roy and others PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 287 rel. (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 100, 114 & O.XXIII, R.1---Second appeal---Review of judgment---Non-compliance of condition on which earlier suit was permitted to be withdrawn---Applicant / plaintiff claimed to be daughter of deceased owner of suit land and his widows were limited owners who had transferred land beyond their entitlement and that land fell in legal share of applicant / plaintiff---Suit filed by applicant / plaintiff was dismissed by Trial Court but Lower Appellate Court allowed her appeal and suit was decreed---In second appeal filed by respondents / defendants Judge in Chambers of High Court set aside judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court---Validity---Power to review can only be exercised for the specific purpose of “correcting any error or supplying any omission” which appears on the surface of the record and can be detected without further elaborate inquiry or investigation---This may apply to accidental or arithmetical mistake due to some forgetfulness not involving a mental process of reasoning or appreciation of any law or the facts already proved or admitted---Judge in Chambers of High Court fell in error while making observations regarding conditional withdrawal of suit and non-payment of cost in the judgment under review while referring to some other suit having no concern with the lis, which had a different subject matter and legal basis---Division Bench of High Court set aside judgment under review as the same suffered from error apparent on the face of record which was so clear and manifest that it could not be permitted to remain on the record---Division Bench of High Court remanded the matter to Judge in Chambers of High Court for decision afresh on appeal filed by respondents / defendants---Review application was allowed in circumstances. Malang Dad v. Mst. Mah Pari and others PLD 1993 SC 06; Qamar Zaman and others v. Musammir Shah 2000 SCMR 1730; Muhammad Boota v. Allah Lok and 2 others 1984 CLC 3118; Muhammad Riaz and another v. Muhammad Siddique and another 2002 CLC 1045; Muhammad Siddique and 06 others v. Zafar Iqbal and 9 others 2005 CLC 33; Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others PLD 1970 SC 1; Capital Development Authority through Chairman v. Raja Muhammad Zaman Khan and another PLD 2007 SC 121; Mehmood Hassan Lark and others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited and others 2010 SCMR 1036; Faqir Muhammad Khan v. Mir Akbar Shah PLD 1973 SC 110; Zulfikar Ali BBhutto v. The State PLD 1979 SC 741 and Land Acquisition Officer and Assistant Commissioner Hyderabad v. Gul Muhammad through Legal Heirs PLD 2005 SC 311 rel. Syed Muhammad Hussain Shah Qadri for Applicant. Malik Muhammad Latif Khokhar for Respondents. Date of hearing: 4th June, 2025. (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.