Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Punjab Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-- ----S. 5---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 9 & 199---Constitutional petition---Right to life---Clean water---Untreated sewerage effluent---Petitioner was aggrieved of disposal of untreated sewerage effluent into fresh water canal which water was the only source of drinking and irrigation---Validity---Canal in question was a vital water source used for both irrigation and drinking purposes by humans and animals and also for agriculture---Ground water of locality was highly brine and unfit for consumption, leaving the canal as primary source of potable water---Discharging untreated sewerage waste into the canal was leading to contamination of water and posing severe health risks to residents of the area---High Court directed Director-General of Punjab Environmental Protection Agency to visit the spot forthwith and conduct the environmental assessment of water contamination on urgent basis and take prompt actions to save human life of the area, posing an imminent public health crisis, exacerbating deplorable condition of already vulnerable population in the region---Petition was allowed accordingly. D.G. Khan Cement Company Ltd. v. Government of Punjab through Chief Secretary, Lahore and others 2021 SCMR 834; Shahab Usto v. Government of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others 2017 SCMR 732; Fifth Edition of Halsbury’s Laws of England (Environmental Quality and Public Health); Goldsmith v. Tunbridge Wells Improvement Commissioners; Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Assn. Ltd. v. British Cleanese Ltd.; Overseas Tankship U.K. Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engg. Co. Ltd. (Wagon Mound No. I case) (1886) LR I Ch App 349; Dell v. Chesham Urban District Council, (1921) 3 KB 427 and Raja Zahoor Ahmed and others v. Capital Development Authority through Chairman and others 2022 SCMR 1411 rel. Muhammad Farooq Warind and Muhammad Asif for Petitioner. Sardar Muhammad Shahzad Khan Dhukkur, Assistant Attorney General. Muhammad Azfal Ch., Sardar Abdul Basit Balouch and Rai Shujaat Hussain for Respondents Nos.8, 10 and 11. Anwaar Hussain and Rai Mazhar Hussain Kharal, Assistant Advocates General along with Sajid Riaz Chief Officer, Municipal Committee Khanpur in Person for the Government of the Punjab. Date of hearing: 3rd July, 2025.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)- -Ss. 12 & 22-Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 55-Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell-Failure to establish payment of earnest money by the vendee-Non-performance of contractual obligation by the vendee within stipulated time was fatal for his case of specific performance-Time being essence of contract-Principle and applicability-Explicit mention of consequences for non-performance of contractual terms in the agreement would infer that time would be of essence of the contract-Facts in brevity were that the appellant (vendee), a tenant of the suit shop, filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 17.02.2009, under which the respondents (vendors) had agreed to sell the shop for Rs. 800,000, with full payment to be made by 31.10.2010, failing which possession was to revert to the vendors-Appellant (vendee) alleged having paid Rs.200,000 in installments, but the vendors stated to have avoided execution of the sale deed-The Trial Court decreed the suit subject to deposit of Rs. 800,000, and the appellate court upheld the decree, however, in revision, the High Court set aside both judgments by dismissing the suit-Primary question for determination before the Supreme Court was as to-Whether a vendee, who failed to perform contractual obligations within the stipulated period where time was expressly made the essence of the contract, was entitled to a decree for specific performance?-Held: Comparison of the pleadings and the testimony of the appellant/vendee revealed that the amount in question was not paid to the vendors as earnest money-Even the agreement to sell was completely silent about any such payment-During cross-examination, it was admitted by the vendee that no earnest money was paid to the vendors, which clearly demonstrated that he had misstated in the plaint about the factum of payment of earnest money-High Court, therefore, correctly observed that the vendee had not come to the Court with clean hands and thus was not entitled to discretionary relief-In the present case, prior to the execution of the agreement, its terms were admittedly discussed and read over to both parties-The vendee willingly undertook the burden of obtaining clearance within the time stipulated in the agreement-It was clear from the terms of the agreement that time was the essence of the contract, and this was understood by both parties, particularly, in view of the fact that the consequences of non-performance of the contractual terms by the vendee were also explicitly set out in the said agreement-Thus, such default on the part of the vendee was fatal to his suit-Present case related to a contract in commercial transaction and the Court could take judicial notice of the fact that the price of real estate was constantly escalating-The clear intention of the parties, as it appeared from the stipulation of the agreement, was to treat time as essence of the contract-Exercise of jurisdiction, under these circumstances in favour of the vendee when character of the property or other circumstances would render such exercise likely to result in injustice, would be against the settled norms of justice-Both the Courts below failed to consider the above legal and factual aspects of the case, thus arrived at a wrong conclusion, decreeing the suit of the appellant, but the High Court rightly took notice of the same while setting aside the judgments and decrees of the Courts below-Appeal lacking any merit was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)- -S.55-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.12-Time being essence of the contract-Principle-Applicability-Determinative factor-Intention of the contracting parties-Where there is a clear intention of the parties, as appears from the stipulation of the agreement, to treat time as essence of the contract then the Court cannot attribute a different intention to the parties and cannot specifically enforce the contract at the instance of the vendee, who has failed to perform his part of the obligation within the stipulated time-In cases relating to specific performance, equity, which governs the rights of the parties, does not rigidly adhere to the express terms of the contract-Instead, the Court examines the substance of the agreement to ascertain whether the parties intended that performance be completed within a specific time period and whether the parties in substance intended that the completion should take place within a reasonable time.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 17.10.2018 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revision No. 2220 of 2016). (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 12 & 22---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 55---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell---Failure to establish payment of earnest money by the vendee---Non-performance of contractual obligation by the vendee within stipulated time was fatal for his case of specific performance---Time being essence of contract---Principle and applicability---Explicit mention of consequences for non-performance of contractual terms in the agreement would infer that time would be of essence of the contract---Facts in brevity were that the appellant (vendee), a tenant of the suit shop, filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 17.02.2009, under which the respondents (vendors) had agreed to sell the shop for Rs. 800,000, with full payment to be made by 31.10.2010, failing which possession was to revert to the vendors---Appellant (vendee) alleged having paid Rs.200,000 in installments, but the vendors stated to have avoided execution of the sale deed---The Trial Court decreed the suit subject to deposit of Rs. 800,000, and the appellate court upheld the decree, however, in revision, the High Court set aside both judgments by dismissing the suit---Primary question for determination before the Supreme Court was as to “Whether a vendee, who failed to perform contractual obligations within the stipulated period where time was expressly made the essence of the contract, was entitled to a decree for specific performance?”---Held: Comparison of the pleadings and the testimony of the appellant/vendee revealed that the amount in question was not paid to the vendors as earnest money---Even the agreement to sell was completely silent about any such payment---During cross-examination, it was admitted by the vendee that no earnest money was paid to the vendors, which clearly demonstrated that he had misstated in the plaint about the factum of payment of earnest money---High Court, therefore, correctly observed that the vendee had not come to the Court with clean hands and thus was not entitled to discretionary relief---In the present case, prior to the execution of the agreement, its terms were admittedly discussed and read over to both parties---The vendee willingly undertook the burden of obtaining clearance within the time stipulated in the agreement---It was clear from the terms of the agreement that time was the essence of the contract, and this was understood by both parties, particularly, in view of the fact that the consequences of non-performance of the contractual terms by the vendee were also explicitly set out in the said agreement---Thus, such default on the part of the vendee was fatal to his suit---Present case related to a contract in commercial transaction and the Court could take judicial notice of the fact that the price of real estate was constantly escalating---The clear intention of the parties, as it appeared from the stipulation of the agreement, was to treat time as essence of the contract---Exercise of jurisdiction, under these circumstances in favour of the vendee when character of the property or other circumstances would render such exercise likely to result in injustice, would be against the settled norms of justice---Both the Courts below failed to consider the above legal and factual aspects of the case, thus arrived at a wrong conclusion, decreeing the suit of the appellant, but the High Court rightly took notice of the same while setting aside the judgments and decrees of the Courts below---Appeal lacking any merit was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----S.55---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.12---Time being essence of the contract---Principle---Applicability---Determinative factor---Intention of the contracting parties---Where there is a clear intention of the parties, as appears from the stipulation of the agreement, to treat time as essence of the contract then the Court cannot attribute a different intention to the parties and cannot specifically enforce the contract at the instance of the vendee, who has failed to perform his part of the obligation within the stipulated time---In cases relating to specific performance, equity, which governs the rights of the parties, does not rigidly adhere to the express terms of the contract---Instead, the Court examines the substance of the agreement to ascertain whether the parties intended that performance be completed within a specific time period and whether the parties in substance intended that the completion should take place within a reasonable time. Ghulam Hussain Awan, Advocate Supreme Court and Mian Ghulam Hussain, Advocate-on-Record / Absent for Appellant. Ch. Naseer Ahmed Bhutta, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via VL from Lahore). Date of hearing: 2nd July, 2025. SHAKEEL AHMAD, J.--- This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 17.10.2018 passed in Civil Revision No. 2220 of 2016 by the Lahore High Court, Lahore (“the High Court”), whereby and whereunder the concurrent judgments and decrees of the Courts below were set aside. While dismissing the suit of the appellant, he was held entitled to get back the amount of Rs. 700,000/- deposited by him in pursuance of the interim order of the trial Court dated 07.07.2011.

Summary: Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----S. 126---Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), Ss. 6 & 118---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2---Suit for recovery of amount---Dishonored cheque---Terms contract of “guarantee”, “surety”, “principal debtor” and “creditor”---Guarantee cheque---Proof---Suit filed by respondent / plaintiff was decreed against appellant / defendant as the cheque given by him was dishonored on presentation---Contention of appellant / defendant was that the cheque issued by him was of guarantee---Validity---There are three distinct parties in a contract of guarantee: the “surety,” the “principal debtor,” and the “creditor”---Appellant/defendant did not qualify either as a surety or a third-party guarantor but he squarely fell within the definition of the “principal debtor”---Subject cheque, was a negotiable instrument under S. 6 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and was governed by the statutory presumptions enshrined in S. 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881---No material illegality, irregularity, misreading, or non-reading of evidence was pointed out by appellant/defendant---Trial Court rightly appreciated the evidence and correctly applied settled legal principles in decreeing the suit under O.XXXVII, C.P.C.---High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decreed passed against appellant / defendant---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Azizur Rehman v. Liaquat Ali 2007 SCMR 1820; Haji Karim and another v. Zikar Abdullah 1973 SCMR 100; Rab Nawaz Khan v. Javed Khan Swati 2021 SCMR 1890; Muhammad Arshad and another v. Citibank N.A. Lahore 2006 SCMR 1347; Col. (Retd.) Ashfaq Ahmed and others v. Sh. Muhammad Wasim 1999 SCMR 2832; Najaf Iqbal v. Shahzad Rafique 2020 SCMR 1621; Messrs State Engineering Corporation Ltd. v. National Development Finance Corporation and others 2006 SCMR 619; Khizar Hayat v. Malik Akhtar Mehmood 2024 SCMR 1208; Bazm-e-Salat and others v. Messrs United Bank Ltd PLD 1989 Kar. 150; ICDS Ltd. v. Beena Shabbeer and another (2002) 6 SC Cases 426; Muhammad Akhtar v. Zahar Khan 2006 CLD 737 and Muhammad Nawaz v. Qazi Muhammad Rashid 2018 CLD 104 ref. Ch. Umar Hayat Kamran Rajoka for Appellant. Naseer Ahmad Jaura for Respondent. Date of hearing: 19th June, 2025. (e) as to order of endorsement: that the endorsements appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in the order in which they appear thereon;

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: During the pendency of the suit, when an interlocutory order authenticated by higher forums attains finality, such order cannot be challenged again alongwith the final order/judgment as same is exception to the general principle that interim order merges into final order. 332Regular First Appeal (R.F.A) (Final Decree) 23970/25 Tahir Javed Vs Muhammad Sharif Mr. Justice Hassan Nawaz Makhdoom 02- 07- 2025 2025 LHC 4635 PLJ 2025 Lahore 798 (DB)

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 12—Specific performance—Essential prerequisites—Clean hands doctrine—Misstatement in pleadings—Equitable relief rightly denied- Vendee filed suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 17.02.2009. He claimed to have paid Rs. 200,000 as part payment; however, no mention of earnest money was made in the agreement to sell. Moreover, during testimony, the vendee contradicted his own pleadings. The Supreme Court held that the vendee had misstated material facts and approached the court without clean hands. Relief of specific performance being discretionary in nature could not be granted in such circumstances. Held: Party seeking equity must come with clean hands; false pleadings disentitle relief. Cited Case: Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 483) (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 55—Specific performance—Time as essence of contract—Express stipulation—Failure to perform within agreed time fatal to relief sought Agreement to sell fixed 31.10.2010 as deadline for payment and execution. The vendee failed to pay full consideration within stipulated period despite having over 20 months. The Supreme Court emphasized that the express terms of the agreement, including forfeiture clause and deadline, showed that time was the essence of the contract. Delay rendered vendee disentitled to relief. Held: Where time is expressly stipulated as essence and performance not rendered within such time, suit for specific performance must fail. Cited Cases: • Fazal-ur-Rehman v. Ahmed Saeed Mughal (2004 SCMR 436) • Mussarat Shaukat Ali v. Sofia Khatoon (1994 SCMR 2189) (c) Equity—Contract for sale of immovable property—Commercial character—Escalating property values—Equitable jurisdiction to be exercised cautiously Court noted that the suit property was commercial in nature and real estate prices were constantly escalating. In such cases, courts should exercise equitable jurisdiction for specific performance with caution, particularly where delay in performance would unjustly enrich one party. Held: Equity does not aid a party whose default, delay or misrepresentation would lead to injustice. (d) Civil Procedure—Appellate and revisional jurisdiction—High Court’s interference—Concurrent findings reversed—Proper consideration of law and fact The trial and appellate courts decreed the suit in favour of the vendee. However, the Supreme Court held that both courts below failed to appreciate legal and factual issues regarding misrepresentation and time-bound performance. The High Court correctly reversed the concurrent findings and dismissed the suit. Held: Revisional jurisdiction rightly exercised where lower courts misconstrued law and overlooked material facts. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Judgments and decrees of trial and appellate courts set aside by High Court were upheld. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 159(1) & 159(2)---Proceedings of election of Board of directors assailing of---Material irregularities in proceedings---Effect---Petitioner, being shareholder of the Private Limited Company (‘the Company’), challenged the election process of the Board of Directors of the Company---Held: Section 159(1) of the Companies Act, 2017 (‘the Act, 2017’) mandates that the existing Board of Directors shall, through a duly convened meeting, fix the number of directors to be elected in the upcoming general meeting---Record revealed that no such resolution was passed by the existing Board to fix the number of directors to be elected---Furthermore, the respondents failed to produce any documentary evidence establishing compliance with the statutory requirements of Ss. 159(1) & 159(2) of the Act, 2017---Such non-compliance strikes at the root of the election process and renders the entire exercise invalid, vitiating the election proceedings---High Court declared the election of the Board of Directors of the Company as illegal, void ab initio and without lawful authority, being violative of the mandatory provisions of the Act, 2017 and set aside the entire election process and resolutions passed ;consequently, directing the existing Board of Directors to proceed election process in compliance with provisions of Ss. 159(1) & 159(2) of the Act, 2017---Petition, filed by shareholder of Company, was allowed accordingly. Tariq Aziz and others v. Makhdum Ahmed Mahmud and others 2022 CLD 1279 and Shahid Mahmood & Company (Pvt.) Limited and 2 others v. Zahid Mahmood and 5 others 2025 CLD 408 ref. Dewan Salman Fibre Limited v. Dewan Petroleum (Pvt.) Limited 2016 CLD 1049 distinguished. (b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 159(1), 159(2) & 160---Power of the Court to declare election of Directors invalid---Locus standi/threshold---Scope---Petitioner, being shareholder of the Private Limited Company (‘the Company’), challenged the election process of the Board of Directors of the Company---Held: Petitioner, along with supporting shareholders, held more than 10% of the voting power, thereby satisfying the threshold prescribed under S. 160 of the Companies Act, 2017 (‘the Act, 2017’)---Section 160 of the Act 2017 empowers the Court to declare election proceedings invalid where material irregularities or violations of law are established---Petitioner had alleged serious procedural irregularities, including: (i) absence of proper attendance and voting records; (ii) failure to count votes cast in favor of the petitioner; (iii) lack of procedural transparency throughout the election process; and (iv) denial of effective participation to shareholders---The cumulative effect of these irregularities constituted fundamental procedural lapses that undermined the legitimacy and fairness of the election---Accordingly, such defects warranted judicial scrutiny and intervention under the mandate of S. 160 of the Act 2017---High Court declared the election of the Board of Directors of the Company as illegal, void ab initio, and without lawful authority, being violative of the mandatory provisions of the Act 2017, and set aside the entire election process and resolutions passed; consequently, directing the existing Board of Directors to proceed election process in compliance with provisions of Ss. 159(1) & 159 (2) of the Act, 2017---Petition, filed by shareholder of Company, was allowed accordingly. Mrs. Hijab Fatima Tariq and 2 others v. Kohat Cement Co. Ltd. and others 2017 CLD 436 distinguished. (c) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss.159(1), 159(2) & 160---Proceedings of election of Board of Directors, assailing of---Limitation---Petitioner, being shareholder of the Private Limited Company (‘the Company’), challenged the election process of the Board of Directors of the Company---Objection qua limitation was raised as petition before the Court was filed after about one and half month of the impugned election---Validity---The delay in filing petition had been satisfactorily explained---Petitioner applied for certified copies of relevant minutes on the very next day of impugned proceedings, however, only uncertified copies were provided after about fifteen days ; certified copies were re-applied for but, unrebuttedly, were never issued---Accordingly, the delay stood duly explained---Therefore, there was no merit in the contention that the petition was barred by limitation, particularly when there had been a failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Ss. 159(1) & (2) of the Companies Act, 2017---High Court declared the election of the Board of Directors of the Company as illegal, void ab initio and without lawful authority, being violative of the mandatory provisions of the Act 2017, and set aside the entire election process and resolutions passed ; consequently, directing the existing Board of Directors to proceed election process in compliance with provisions of Ss. 159(1) & 159 (2) of the Act, 2017---Petition, filed by shareholder of Company, was allowed accordingly. (d) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 159(1) & 159(2)---Proceedings of election of Board of Directors, assailing of---Material irregularities in impugned proceeding---The word ‘shall’ is used in a provision of law---Scope---Petitioner, being shareholder of the Private Limited Company (‘the Company’), challenged the election process of the Board of Directors of the Company---Held: Section 159(1) of the Companies Act, 2017 (‘the Act 2017’), mandates that the existing Board of Directors shall, through a duly convened meeting, fix the number of directors to be elected in the upcoming general meeting---When a statute requires that a thing should be done in a particular manner or form, it has to be done in such manner, otherwise it would not be in-compliance with the legislative intent---When the word ‘shall’ is used in a provision of law, it is to be construed in its ordinary grammatical meaning and normally the use of word ‘shall’ by the legislature brands a provision as mandatory, especially when an authority is required to do something in a particular manner---High Court declared the election of the Board of Directors of the Company as illegal, void ab initio and without lawful authority, being violative of the mandatory provisions of the Act 2017 and set aside the entire election process and resolutions passed ; consequently, directing the existing Board of Directors to proceed election process in compliance with provisions of Ss.159(1) & 159 (2) of the Act, 2017---Petition, filed by shareholder of Company, was allowed accordingly. Atta Muhammad Qureshi v. The Settlement Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore PLD 1971 SC 61; Hakim Ali v. Muhammad Salim 1992 SCMR 46; Khyber Tractors (Pvt.) Ltd v. Pakistan through Ministry of Finance PLD 2005 SC 842; Zia Ur Rehman v. Syed Ahmed Hussain 2014 SCMR 1015; The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala v. Messrs Super Asia Mohammad Din and Sons 2017 SCMR 1427; Abdul Khaliq v. Sardar Sanaullah Zehri 2019 CLC 1543; Shahdost Dashti v. Federation of Pakistan 2019 CLC 1750; Muhammad Andleeb Raza v. Muhammad Nazar 2019 YLR 1974 and Haji Abdul Karim and others v. Florida Builders (Pvt.) Limited PLD 2012 SC 247 ref. Ali Raza Khokhar for Petitioner. Ahmad Rafay Alam for Respondents Nos. 1 to 4. Ruman Bilal for Respondent No.5-SECP. Date of hearing: 1st July, 2025.

Summary: 339Election Petition 65282/24 Muhammad Yar Vs Naveed Aslam Khan Lodhi etc Mr. Justice Anwaar Hussain 01- 07- 2025 2025 LHC 4571 PLD 2025 Lahore 692