Summary: (a) Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940): ----Secs. 8, 9, 15, 17 & 26-A Scope and Power of Court in Making an Arbitration Award Rule of Court—Objections to Award—Jurisdiction of Court under Sections 17 & 26-A—Duty of Court to Examine Validity of Award Before Making it Rule of Court—Remand for Fresh Decision with Evidence. The dispute arose from a contract awarded to the contractor for constructing a bridge, leading to arbitration under Sections 8 and 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Civil Judge rejected objections to the arbitrators' award but modified it regarding the adjustment of mobilization advance under Section 15 of the Act. The appellate court observed that the trial court erred in disposing of objections casually, without framing proper issues or recording evidence, and merely assuming that it could not review the reasoning or evidentiary basis of the award. Under Section 17 of the Act, the court is not a mere post office to mechanically endorse an award but is obligated to ensure that the award is free from patent illegality or misconduct. Section 26-A mandates arbitrators to state reasons in sufficient detail for their conclusions, enabling the court to evaluate the legal soundness of the award. Failure to do so justifies remission or setting aside of the award. The appellate court held that the trial court had failed in its duty and remanded the case for a fresh decision after framing proper issues, recording evidence, and applying the relevant legal principles. ----Cited Cases: A. Qutubuddin Khan v. Chec Millwala Dredging Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. (2014 SCMR 1268) M/s. Awan Industries Ltd. v. The Executive Engineer, Lined Channel Division (1992 SCMR 65) Karachi Dock Labour Board v. Messers Quality Builders Ltd. (PLD 2016 SC 121) Karachi Metropolitan Corporation v. Associated Constructors Ltd. (1984 CLC 1077) Umer Din through L.Rs. v. Mst. Shakeela Bibi and others (2009 SCMR 29) Allah Din & Company v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan (2006 SCMR 614) The Director Industries And Mineral Development v. Dada Bhoyhormusjee & Sons (1990 MLD 301) -----Disposition: Appeal accepted; impugned order set aside; case remanded to the Civil Judge for fresh decision after framing issues, recording evidence, and considering the relevant legal principles.

Summary: Background: This case involves a civil revision petition filed against the judgment of the Additional District Judge-V, East Islamabad. The dispute centers on the sale of a plot of land and the application of arbitration clauses related to the transaction. The first purchaser sold the land to the second purchaser, and both parties agreed to arbitrate disputes arising from the agreement. The first purchaser later filed a civil suit for specific performance, which was stayed by the court pending the outcome of arbitration. The first purchaser challenged the stay in this revision petition, arguing that there was no arbitration clause in the agreement. -----Issues: 1- Whether the absence of an explicit arbitration clause in the agreement dated 02.08.2003 invalidates the stay of proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. ----2- Whether the court can stay proceedings when arbitration has already commenced and the award is pending. ----3- Whether the appellate court's decision to stay the civil suit pending arbitration was lawful. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome The Islamabad High Court upheld the appellate court’s decision, stating that the absence of an explicit arbitration clause in the agreement did not bar the stay of the proceedings. The court reasoned that the parties had mutually agreed to arbitrate the dispute and had even participated in arbitration proceedings, where an award had been rendered. The court emphasized that once parties have opted for arbitration, they should await the final decision of the arbitration tribunal. Thus, the civil revision petition was dismissed, and the parties were directed to proceed with the arbitration outcome. -----Citations/Precedents: Farid Virani v. Feroz Virani (PLD 2013 Sindh 386) – Emphasized the objective of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to prevent litigation when arbitration agreements exist. Mrs. Rubby Hameedullah & others v. Dr. Arif & others (2010 YLR 3331) – Clarified that when a party brings a suit ignoring an arbitration agreement, the defendant's remedy is to request a stay under Section 34. Sqn. Ldr. (R.) Khurram Zaman v. Mrs. Afia Zafar & others (2008 CLD 662) – Highlighted the right of a party to stay legal proceedings and proceed with arbitration as agreed. Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume II – Defined arbitration as the resolution of disputes through an arbitrator outside of court proceedings.

Summary: Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----Ss. 34, 126 & 278---Power to stay legal proceedings, where there is an arbitration agreement---Scope---Parties to the dispute in the main petition not parties to the agreement or in the arbitration clause---Effect---Exclusive jurisdiction of High Court while functioning as a Company Bench over certain company-related matters---Scope---Third party interest---Factual controversies---Applicants sought stay in the main petition and for referring the dispute regarding rectification of register to the arbitration---Validity---Where all parties to the main petition were not parties to the arbitration clause, which constituted a separate agreement, bifurcation of judicial action could not be allowed, which would not only cause inevitable delay in the resolution of the dispute but could also lead to conflicting decisions, increased litigation costs, and harassment of the parties---Right to arbitrate could not be enforced by anyone who is not a party to the agreement containing the arbitration clause, thus, proceedings in the main petition could not be stayed under S. 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (Act)---Non-signatory could not compel arbitration except under exceptional circumstances---In the absence of any contract, an agent could not personally enforce contracts entered into by them on behalf of their principal, nor were they personally bound by them---Court may refuse to stay the proceedings if it is satisfied that there is no sufficient reason to refer the matter to arbitration and that a substantial miscarriage of justice or inconvenience to the parties would occur---Staying proceedings under S.34 of the Act is discretionary and not mandatory---There is no fixed rule for determining when a stay should be refused, however, each case has different facts, and the decision to grant or refuse a stay depends on the specific facts and circumstances of each case---Court can make an objective assessment and decide whether the stay of legal proceedings should be granted or refused---Section 34 of the Act, implies that the Court should first examine whether the arbitration clause applies to the dispute and if it does, the Court must determine whether the nature of the dispute is such that the ends of justice would be better served by a decision of the Court or by the private forum chosen and agreed upon by the parties---Matters involving third-party rights and factual controversies related to companies should be resolved by the courts established under Company Law, which have the authority to frame issues and admit both oral and documentary evidence for adjudication of the dispute---Application for staying the proceedings and for referring the matter to arbitration was dismissed, in circumstances. Case law referred. Iftikhar-ud-Din Riaz, M. Haroon Mumtaz, Ahmad Abdul Rehman, Asfand Mir for Applicant (C.M. No.3 of 2023) / Respondents Nos.1 to 3 (in main petition): Hafiz Talha for Respondent 4 (in main petition). Zaki Rehman for Respondent No.5 (in main petition). Arshad Tayebaly, Arshad Nazir Mirza, Talha Javed, Saad Amir, Amna Iqbal, Shakoh Zulqarnain and Nadia Iffat for Petitioners (in C.M. No.3 of 2023). Date of hearing: 24th June, 2024.

Summary: Background: The Civil Aviation Authority of Pakistan ("CAA") filed a civil revision petition challenging the order dated 26.04.2024 of the Civil Court, Islamabad, which had appointed a new umpire, Justice Paracha, in an arbitration dispute between CAA and LTH Joint Venture ("LTH-JV"). The original umpire, Justice Jillani, had recused himself after LTH-JV raised concerns of bias. The contract between CAA and LTH-JV, related to the construction of Islamabad International Airport, provided for arbitration in case of disputes. The appointment of an umpire was contested after the recusal of the originally appointed umpire. -----Issues: 1- Whether LTH-JV had sufficient grounds for seeking the recusal of the originally appointed umpire, Justice Jillani. ----2- Whether the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to appoint a new umpire under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. ----3- Whether CAA’s contention that the vacancy should have been filled by the arbitrators, as per the terms of the contract, is valid. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Islamabad High Court held that the Civil Court had overstepped its jurisdiction by appointing a new umpire without first requiring LTH-JV to follow the contractual procedure for appointing an umpire. The contract between CAA and LTH-JV, as well as the Arbitration Act, stipulated that the arbitrators were responsible for appointing the umpire. The Court emphasized that a written notice should have been sent to the arbitrators, asking them to fill the vacancy created by Justice Jillani’s recusal. Only after such a notice, if the arbitrators failed to act within 15 days, could LTH-JV approach the court under Section 8(2) of the Arbitration Act for the appointment of an umpire. The Court set aside the order of the Civil Court, allowing LTH-JV to request the arbitrators to fill the vacancy. If the arbitrators fail to do so, LTH-JV could then pursue the matter in court. -----Citations/Precedents: Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar (AIR 1979 SC 1457) D. Gobindram Vs. Messrs Shamji K. & Co. (AIR 1961 SC 1285) Vedprakash Vs. Union of India (AIR 1984 Delhi 325) Food Corpn. of India Vs. A. Muhammad Yunus (AIR 1987 Kerala 231) Misti Enterprises Vs. Britannia Engineering Products & Services Ltd. (AIR 1993 Calcutta 272) Union of India Vs. D.P. Singh (AIR 1961 Patna 228) Union of India Vs. Raghunath Singh & Co. (AIR 1980 SC 103) Parbhat General Agencies Vs. Union of India (AIR 1971 SC 2298) Keshavsinh Dwarkadas Kapadia Vs. Indian Engineering Company (AIR 1972 SC 1538)

Summary: Background: A revision application was filed by three applicants, collectively referred to as "Mangeh’s three sons," who claimed to have purchased 7 Jarebs of land from the plaintiff. The plaintiff, the owner of the disputed land ("Suit Land"), argued that the applicants had only been granted possession on a temporary contract (Muqqata). Upon the expiration of this agreement, the applicants refused to vacate the land. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration, possession, and injunction. Both the trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. -----Issues: 1- Whether Mangeh’s three sons had valid ownership rights to the 7 Jarebs of the Suit Land. -----2- Whether the plaintiff, as a co-owner, could enter into a binding agreement without the consent of the other co-owners. -----3- Whether the private faisla (arbitration) and the alleged sale agreement were legally enforceable. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The courts concluded that the plaintiff held only a one-third share in the Suit Land. Without the consent of the other co-owners, any agreement to sell the entire property was invalid. The private faisla lacked enforceability as it was not signed by the plaintiff or witnessed, nor was the alleged sale agreement registered. The applicants, as defendants, failed to raise a counter-claim for specific performance or produce evidence to substantiate their claim to the land. Both the trial court and the appellate court found no jurisdictional error or material irregularity in the evidence or procedure, affirming the plaintiff's entitlement to peaceful and vacant possession of the land. The High Court dismissed the revision application, upholding the findings of the lower courts. -----Citations/Precedents: Judgment of the Senior Civil Judge Kandhkot in FC Suit No. 33/2020 (dated 21.09.2022). Judgment of the District Judge/MCAC Kashmore at Kandhkot in Civil Appeal No. 82/2022 (dated 01.02.2023). Legal principles under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).

Summary: ----Ss. 14, 16 & 20---Award passed by arbitrators unanimously---Scope---Remitting (re-referring) matter to Arbitrators or umpire---Reconsideration---Scope---Provincial Government filed appeal against the order passed by the Civil Court whereby the award made by the umpire was made rule of court---Argument of the Appellant (Provincial Government) was that as earlier, during the proceedings before the Court, Arbitrators had passed award unanimously, the Court had wrongly accepted application of respondents/Company for remitting/re-referring the matter to the umpire---Contention of the respondents/ company was that it was provided under S. 16 of the Arbitration Act 1940 ('the Act 1940') that the award could be remitted to the arbitrators or the umpire for reconsideration, therefore, the Trial Court had rightly remitted the award to the umpire, instead of arbitrators---Question as to whether in a case when an unanimous award has been passed, the matter may be re-referred/remitted to the arbitrators who passed the award or it could be referred to an umpire---Held, that S. 16 of the Act 1940 and Rr. 2, 4 & 5 of the First Schedule of the Act 1940 clearly demonstrate that the umpire can only take cognizance in the matter if there are the circumstances provided under R. 4, which, inter alia, include that both arbitrators could not agree on a particular issue---Therefore, an umpire cannot be called upon to act under R. 5 if the circumstances as provided under R. 4 do not arise---Thus, the contention of the respondents/company went counter to the scheme of S. 16 of the Act 1940, which clearly envisaged that where award had left undetermined any of the matters referred to arbitration, or where it determined any matter not referred to arbitration and such matter could not be separated without affecting the determination of the matter referred to, the Court was competent to remit the award or any matter referred to arbitration of the arbitrators or umpire for reconsideration-- -This clearly implies that if the ambiguity, as stated in S. 16 of the Act 1940, arises out of the award passed by the arbitrators, then the matter shall be referred to the arbitrators and in case the same is arising out of the award passed by the umpire, then obviously the same has to be referred for reconsideration to the umpire---Indeed, the word "reconsideration" is a determining fact implying the intention of legislation because the award passed by the arbitrator cannot be reconsidered by the umpire as the role of umpire comes into play only when there is disagreement between the arbitrators---Thus, the impugned order of the Trial Court remitting the award to the umpire was patently illegal and the entire edifice built upon the said order had to crumble to the ground being coram non judice and against the letter and spirit of S. 16 of the Act 1940 read with the First Schedule of the Act 1940---High Court set-aside the impugned order of the Trial/Civil Court to the extent of remitting the award to the umpire, the award passed by the umpire; and the impugned judgment/order of the Trial Court making the disputed award passed by the umpire as rule of the Court were also set aside and the matter was sent back to the Trial Court to redecide the application of the respondents/company, which it had filed under S. 16 of the Act 1940---Appeal, filed by the Provincial Government, was allowed accordingly. Muhammad Farooq Shah v. Shakirullah 2006 SCMR 1657 ref. Yasir Khalid, A.A.G. for Appellants. Barrister Muhammad Yaseen Raza Khan and Barrister Muhammad Ibrahim Khan Afridi, Amicis Curiae for Respondents. Date of hearing: 20th May, 2024.

Summary: Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----Ss. 14, 16 & 20---Award passed by arbitrators unanimously---Scope---Remitting (re-referring) matter to Arbitrators or umpire---Reconsideration---Scope---Provincial Government filed appeal against the order passed by the Civil Court whereby the award made by the umpire was made rule of court---Argument of the Appellant (Provincial Government) was that as earlier, during the proceedings before the Court, Arbitrators had passed award unanimously, the Court had wrongly accepted application of respondents/Company for remitting/re-referring the matter to the umpire---Contention of the respondents/ company was that it was provided under S. 16 of the Arbitration Act 1940 ('the Act 1940') that the award could be remitted to the arbitrators or the umpire for reconsideration, therefore, the Trial Court had rightly remitted the award to the umpire, instead of arbitrators---Question as to whether in a case when an unanimous award has been passed, the matter may be re-referred/remitted to the arbitrators who passed the award or it could be referred to an umpire---Held, that S. 16 of the Act 1940 and Rr. 2, 4 & 5 of the First Schedule of the Act 1940 clearly demonstrate that the umpire can only take cognizance in the matter if there are the circumstances provided under R. 4, which, inter alia, include that both arbitrators could not agree on a particular issue---Therefore, an umpire cannot be called upon to act under R. 5 if the circumstances as provided under R. 4 do not arise---Thus, the contention of the respondents/company went counter to the scheme of S. 16 of the Act 1940, which clearly envisaged that where award had left undetermined any of the matters referred to arbitration, or where it determined any matter not referred to arbitration and such matter could not be separated without affecting the determination of the matter referred to, the Court was competent to remit the award or any matter referred to arbitration of the arbitrators or umpire for reconsideration-- -This clearly implies that if the ambiguity, as stated in S. 16 of the Act 1940, arises out of the award passed by the arbitrators, then the matter shall be referred to the arbitrators and in case the same is arising out of the award passed by the umpire, then obviously the same has to be referred for reconsideration to the umpire---Indeed, the word "reconsideration" is a determining fact implying the intention of legislation because the award passed by the arbitrator cannot be reconsidered by the umpire as the role of umpire comes into play only when there is disagreement between the arbitrators---Thus, the impugned order of the Trial Court remitting the award to the umpire was patently illegal and the entire edifice built upon the said order had to crumble to the ground being coram non judice and against the letter and spirit of S. 16 of the Act 1940 read with the First Schedule of the Act 1940---High Court set-aside the impugned order of the Trial/Civil Court to the extent of remitting the award to the umpire, the award passed by the umpire; and the impugned judgment/order of the Trial Court making the disputed award passed by the umpire as rule of the Court were also set aside and the matter was sent back to the Trial Court to redecide the application of the respondents/company, which it had filed under S. 16 of the Act, 1940---Appeal, filed by the Provincial Government, was allowed accordingly. Muhammad Farooq Shah v. Shakirullah 2006 SCMR 1657 ref. Yasir Khalid, A.A.G. for Appellants. Barrister Muhammad Yaseen Raza Khan and Barrister Muhammad Ibrahim Khan Afridi, Amici Curiae for Respondents. Date of hearing: 20th May, 2024.

Summary: The National Command Authority Foundation (NCAF) entered into an agreement with Sheikh Sarosh Iftikhar, a land developer, for the purchase of land. The agreement was made on 09.02.2021, involving a land purchase of 751 Kanal and 77 square feet for a total consideration of Rs.550 million. An earnest money of Rs.50 million was paid by Iftikhar, along with post-dated cheques for the remaining amount. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Iftikhar invoked the force majeure clause and requested an extension for payment. NCAF terminated the contract on 23.08.2021, leading Iftikhar to file a petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and an application for a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.). The Civil Judge Class-I, Rawalpindi, allowed both applications on 19.07.2023. NCAF appealed the decision.----Issues:Whether the application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, was justifiable despite the admitted default in payment by the respondent.Whether the force majeure clause invoked by the respondent rendered the contract void.Whether the temporary injunction was appropriately granted pending arbitration.-----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal and the revision petition, affirming the decision to refer the matter to arbitration and grant the temporary injunction.----Application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940:The Court found that the existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties justified the application under Section 20. The dispute, including the default in payment and the invocation of the force majeure clause, was deemed appropriate for arbitration.The Court emphasized that questions regarding the reasons for default and the applicability of force majeure are to be determined by the arbitrator, not the Court.---Force Majeure Clause:The Court held that the invocation of the force majeure clause by the respondent did not render the contract void. This issue, like others, was to be addressed by the arbitrator as per the arbitration clause in the agreement.----Temporary Injunction:The temporary injunction was justified to preserve the subject matter of the dispute pending arbitration. The Court noted that the respondent had already deposited the remaining sale consideration as required.The Court found that the respondent had shown a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and potential irreparable loss, meeting the requirements for a temporary injunction.----Citations/Precedents:Lahore Stock Exchange Limited vs. Fredrick J. Whyte Group (Pakistan) Ltd. and others (PLD 1990 Supreme Court 48)Sezai Turkes Feyzi Akkaya Construction Company, Lahore through Project Director vs. Messrs Crescent Services, Lahore and another (1997 SCMR 1928)Messrs Sadat Business Group Ltd. vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and another (2013 CLD 1451)BNP (Pvt.) Limited vs. Collier International Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited (2016 CLC 1772)Industrial Fabrication Company through M.D. vs. Managing Director, Pak American Fertilizer Limited (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 154)Abdul Waheed vs. Additional District Judge and others (PLD 2021 Lahore 453)Samsons Group of Companies vs. Panther Developers and others (2022 CLD 932)Messrs Petrosin Products (Pvt.) Limited through Representative and others vs. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Privatization Commission of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 3 others (2000 MLD 785)-----Summary:The Lahore High Court upheld the Civil Judge?s decision to refer the dispute to arbitration and grant a temporary injunction, reinforcing the principle that arbitration clauses must be honored, and disputes arising from such agreements should be resolved through arbitration. The Court emphasized that contractual disputes, including those involving force majeure claims, should be addressed by arbitrators as specified in the agreement, ensuring that the judicial process does not preempt the arbitration mechanism.

Summary: Background:In the case before the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, the appellant, Waqas Yaqub, filed an appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. This appeal challenged the decision made on July 22, 2023, by the Civil Judge 1st Class, Rawalpindi, which dismissed his application under Section 34 of the Act. This application sought a stay of proceedings in a lawsuit involving a dispute between Waqas Yaqub and his brother Adeel Yaqub, co-partners in the Unique Wood Working Company. The partnership agreement included an arbitration clause stipulating that disputes should be resolved through arbitration, not litigation.---Issues:The core issue in this appeal was whether the appellant's actions in the trial court, particularly his requests for adjournments and filing a power of attorney, constituted "stepping into the proceedings" in a manner that would forfeit his right to seek arbitration under the arbitration clause of the partnership agreement.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The High Court overturned the trial court's decision, allowing the appeal. The court held that mere requests for adjournments and filing a power of attorney do not necessarily equate to taking steps in the proceedings that would indicate a clear intent to waive the right to arbitration. The High Court emphasized the importance of adhering to arbitration agreements and minimizing court interference in such matters, as supported by multiple precedents. The case was remanded back to the trial court with instructions to properly consider the application for staying the proceedings in accordance with the arbitration clause.----Citations/Precedents:Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Yuval Insurance Co Ltd [1978] 1 Lloyd?s Rep 357 - Cited for principles regarding steps in proceedings.Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Messrs Pak Saaf Dry Cleaners (PLD 1981 SC 553) - Arbitration should be preferred, and the court's intervention should be minimal.Pakistan Stone Development Company Limited v. Muhammad Yousaf and another (2018 CLC 877) - Each case's facts must determine the intent to proceed with litigation over arbitration.National Highway Authority v. Messrs Sambu Construction Co. Ltd. Islamabad (2023 SCMR 1103) - Courts should avoid overly intrusive examination of arbitral awards.Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd. (2024 SCMR 640) - Emphasizes the minimal court interference in arbitration.Karachi Dock Labour Board v. Messrs Quality Builders Ltd. (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 121) - Discusses different modes of arbitration interaction with the courts.Additional citations include judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan that further affirm the principles of minimal court interference in arbitration and emphasize adherence to arbitration agreements when present in contracts.

Summary: (a) Arbitration Act, 1940 – Section 20 – Party to Arbitration Agreement: ---- Requirement of privity of contract for invoking arbitration clause An arbitration agreement can only be enforced by parties to the agreement. A third party, even if a representative organization, cannot invoke an arbitration clause without explicit authorization by the actual parties to the agreement. (b) Arbitration Award – Application to Make Rule of Court: ---- Misconduct by arbitrator in adjudicating disputes involving a non-party Arbitration proceedings initiated by a party not privy to the agreement containing the arbitration clause are invalid. Awards rendered in such proceedings are liable to be set aside on the grounds of jurisdictional impropriety and lack of standing. (c) Contractual Obligations – Franchise Fees and OMC Margins: ---- Dual obligations under franchise agreements and OGRA notifications The imposition of Rental / OMC Margins in OGRA’s notifications for the maximum sale price of CNG does not relieve the CNG operators from their contractual obligations to pay franchise fees under agreements with PSO, unless expressly stated in the contract. (d) OGRA Notifications and Private Contracts: ---- Limited impact of statutory notifications on pre-existing contractual obligations Notifications issued by OGRA fixing the maximum sale price of CNG, including Rental / OMC Margins, do not override or modify pre-existing contractual agreements between private parties unless expressly authorized by law. (e) Representation in Arbitration: ---- Legal standing of a trade organization as a representative body A trade organization may represent its members in arbitration proceedings only when expressly authorized by the parties to the arbitration agreement. Without such authorization, the organization lacks standing, rendering the proceedings and any resultant award unenforceable. (f) Costs and Conduct of Arbitration: ---- Jurisdictional irregularities and costs imposed on non-compliance Where arbitration is initiated or pursued improperly, costs are imposed on the initiating party for engaging in proceedings that violate established contractual or statutory requirements. ----Disposition: The petition was dismissed, upholding the concurrent judgments of the lower courts that set aside the arbitration award and declared the arbitration proceedings initiated by APCNGA as unauthorized and invalid.