Summary: The legal position of "State Subjects" as provided in Section 14B of the Act, 1951 was originally defined through the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Notification No. 1-L/84 dated 20.04.1927, which established a distinct legal identity for persons domiciled in the State. After the creation of AJ & K, this recognition was preserved through subsequent enactments, in 1974, the Interim Constitution of AJ&K reaffirmed this position by expressly incorporating the definition of "State Subject," thereby ensuring continuity of the historical status of AJ&K subjects 278 111493/25 Ghulam Abbas Vs Ghulam Haider Mr. Justice Muzamil Akhtar Shabir 12-09- 2025 2025 LHC 5546

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987 — Ss. 2(d) & 5 — “Sale” and “exchange” — Distinction — Burden of proof — Right of pre-emption — Scope. Under S. 5 of the Act, the right of pre-emption arises only in the case of a sale, defined in S. 2(d) as a permanent transfer of ownership of immovable property in exchange for valuable consideration, excluding agricultural land exchanged for better management. Where the vendee claimed that the impugned transaction was an exchange, the pre-emptor was required to establish, through cogent evidence, that the exchange was a disguised sale intended to defeat his pre-emptive right. — Held, that the burden of proof lay squarely on the pre-emptor; failure of the defendant to establish bona fide exchange did not, by itself, convert the transaction into a sale. The mere allegation that the mutation was in substance a sale, unsupported by evidence of price or consideration, was insufficient to attract pre-emption. — Trial Court and High Court misdirected themselves by focusing on the defendant’s evidence rather than examining whether the plaintiff discharged his burden. — Principle reaffirmed that right of pre-emption, being a restriction on ownership and a clog on alienation, must be strictly construed. (b) Pre-emption — Exchange — Determination — Question of fact and law — Requirement of pleading and proof. Whether an ostensible exchange in mutation was in reality a sale is a mixed question of law and fact which must be properly pleaded with material facts in the plaint and proved by substantive evidence. The plaintiff’s omission to deny that the transaction was made for better management, as recited in the mutation, coupled with absence of proof of price payment or promise thereof, rendered the plea of sale unsubstantiated. (c) Evidence — Mutation — Testimony of Patwari — Effect. Patwari (PW-2), during examination-in-chief, unequivocally confirmed that the transaction recorded in mutation No. 3437, dated 05-11-2008, was an exchange. His testimony supported the defendant’s stance and demolished the plaintiff’s assertion of sale. (d) Pre-emption — Nature and limitations. Right of pre-emption is not a matter of grace but a statutory right exercisable strictly within the parameters prescribed by law. It cannot be extended to transactions other than sale, nor can courts infer sale from ambiguous circumstances. When the evidence admits of multiple interpretations, the one that does not fetter the owner’s freedom of transfer should prevail. (e) Result — Decrees of courts below — Concurrent findings — Interference by Supreme Court. Concurrent findings of the trial, appellate, and High Courts were based on misreading of evidence and misapplication of law; therefore, Supreme Court rightly set aside those decrees, holding that the transaction was a genuine exchange, not a sale, and the plaintiff had no right of pre-emption. Disposition. Petitions converted into appeals. — CPLA No. 4649/2022 (by pre-emptor) dismissed. — CPLA No. 561/2023 (against pre-emptor) allowed. — Plaintiff’s suit dismissed. — No order as to costs. Held: Transaction held to be an exchange — no right of pre-emption available — appeals allowed accordingly.

Summary: (a) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)- -Ss.2(l) & 15-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.8, 12 & 54-Eviction petition-Landlord and tenant relationship, denial of-Proof-Payment of rent as the determining factor-Significance-Petitioner (the purported buyer and landlady) claiming to have purchased the demised property from respondent No.1 (purported tenant) through agreement to sell-Effect-Brief of the matter was that the respondents-FN-and-FS-were married in 2004, and-FS-had earlier purchased a house which became the-demised premises-; over the years, multiple agreements to sell were executed between the petitioner and respondent No.1-FN-, followed by a civil suit filed by the petitioner (purported buyer and landlady) in 2008 that was decreed in her favour upon conceding statement of respondent No.1-FN-, leading to a registered sale deed-Thereafter, applications under Section 12(2) C.P.C. were filed by-FS-and-PN-, resulting in the decree and sale deed being set aside through order dated 25.02.2016, which order was later set aside on 26.08.2020, reviving the earlier decree and sale deed; meanwhile, in 2017 the petitioner (purported buyer and landlady) filed eviction proceedings under Section 15 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, claiming respondent No.1 was her tenant, which were dismissed by the rent controller and the appellate court on the ground that landlord-tenant relationship was not proved, and thereafter, the High Court upheld these concurrent findings-The legal issue before Supreme Court was as to-whether the petitioner had established the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship so as to justify eviction under Section 15 of the 2009 Act-?-Held: The rent controller as well as the appellate court and the High Court concurrently held that neither had the petitioner (the purported buyer and landlord) been able to prove the existence of such the agreement to sell, nor the payment of rent at any material stage by respondent No.1 (purported tenant) to her-The conclusions drawn by three courts below did not suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence and therefore warranted no interference-Eviction could not be sought before the rent controller without establishing the relationship of landlord and tenant-It was emphasized that the relationship of landlord and tenant usually came into existence as a result of a tenancy agreement-One of the most important circumstances from which inference as to the existence of such relationship could be drawn was payment of rent-The fact that no rent was paid by the person in possession of the premises would negate the existence of such relationship-Payment of rent was not just a normal incidence of tenancy but a sine qua non for the relationship of landlord and tenant-To show that respondent No.1 was the petitioner’s tenant, the latter had to prove that respondent No.1 either undertook or was bound to pay rent as consideration for the possession or occupation of the demised premises-This could have been done through the production of rent receipts or witnesses deposing as to the payment of rent in their presence to respondent No.1-However, the non-payment of rent in the presence of a rent agreement, oral or written, would not by itself be sufficient to hold that there did not exist such relationship-The existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant could come into existence on execution of a rent agreement-The petitioner (the purported buyer and landlady) did not produce witnesses in whose presence a tenancy agreement with respondent No.1 (purported tenant) was created-There was no reason to interfere with the three concurrent orders / judgments passed by the rent controller, appellate court and the High Court-Leave to appeal was declined and the petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)- -Preamble-Existence of landlord and tenant relationship being the deriving factor conferring jurisdiction upon the Rent Tribunal-Scope-The 2009 Act proceeds on the assumption that there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties in an eviction petition-The object behind the enactment of the 2009 Act is set out in its Preamble, viz., -to regulate the relationship of landlord and tenant, to provide a mechanism for settlement of their disputes in an expeditious and cost effective manner and for connected matters-Where there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties before the Rent Controller, it would have no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. Mian Umar Ikram-ul-Haque v. Dr. Shahida Hasnain 2016 SCMR 2186 rel. (c) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)- -Ss.2(l) & 15-Landlord and tenant relationship, existence of-Proof-Onus to prove the existence of a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is on the landlord who seeks the eviction of a tenant. Respondent No. 1 in person. Farooq Siddiqui in person (Impleaded vide order dated 01.07.2025).

Summary: Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)- -Ss. 36(1), 36(2) & 36(3) ‘second proviso’-Central Excises Act (I of 1944), S.33(3)-Timeframe for passing order-in-original consequent to a show cause notice-Failure in adhering to such mandatory timeframe by the authorities-Effect-Order-in-original would be barred by time-Pivotal question requiring determination before the Supreme Court was-whether the timeframe provided for passing orders, post issuance of show cause notices was followed as required under the relevant statutes-?-Held: Despite two corrigendum issued, the events to invoke either Sections 36(1) and 36(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (‘ST Act’) were not disclosed-It was only in the second corrigendum that Section 36(1) of the Act with disclosing event required under the relevant law, was introduced for the first time-Nonetheless, the record reflected that under second proviso to Section 36(3) of the Act, the order under the relevant subsection was to be made within 120 days of the issuance of the show cause notice or within such extended period as the commissioner might, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, fixed, provided that such extended period in no case could exceed 60 days-The show cause notice was issued on 30.06.2000 and inconsideration thereof the order in original was passed on 02.02.2001, which was much beyond the timeframe required under the law-However, in appeal (Civil Appeal No. 636 of 2018) relating to sales tax there was no extension in timeframe within Section 36(3) of the Act; thus, the order in original should have been passed in 120 days-The orders in original were time barred-Civil Appeal No. 635 of 2018 related to excise duty under Central Excises Act, 1944 (‘the Act’) and related rules-Timeframe provided in the Act and related rules for passing order post show cause notice is 45 days under Section 33(3), which was flouted, hence the order in original in the appeal too was time-barred-The provisions prescribing timeframe for passing order in original, consequent to a show cause notice, were held to be mandatory-The orders-in-original, were barred by time-Impugned judgments were set aside and appeals were allowed, in circumstances. Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore 2025 SCMR 1280 rel.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -Ss.5, Sched. & 17-A-Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), Ss.5 & 9-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.14, 25, 35 & 185(3)-Wife’s entitlement to maintenance in a non-consummated marriage-Scope-Maintenance allowance to wife, denial of-Marriage not being consummated, ground of-Legality-Wife’s right to maintenance flows unconditionally from solemnization of a valid marriage-Obligation of husband to pay maintenance-Exception stated-Husband to prove that wife repudiated the marital relationship-Brief facts were that the petitioner/wife and the respondent/husband contracted marriage on 02.11.2012 through a valid nikahnama, with rukhsati mutually scheduled for February 2013, however, the respondent/husband delayed rukhsati for more than a year-Petitioner/wife filed a suit for maintenance before the family court, whereby, Rs.3,000 per month was decreed in her favour from the date of marriage-On appeal, the district court enhanced the amount to Rs.5,000 per month-During the proceedings, the respondent/husband divorced the petitioner/wife on 02.05.2014-High Court, however, set aside the decrees of the lower courts, holding that since the marriage had not been consummated, the petitioner/wife was not entitled to maintenance-The petitioner/wife thereafter approached the Supreme Court seeking restoration of her right to maintenance-Pivotal questions for determination before the Supreme Court were as to (i)-When does a Muslim woman become entitled to maintenance within a marriage-? and, (ii)-under what circumstances, if any, may a husband be excused from his marital obligation to pay maintenance to his wife-?-Held: Islamic principles, Constitutional and statutory protections, and judicial precedents affirmed that the wife’s right to maintenance flew unconditionally from the solemnization of a valid marriage and constituted a binding legal duty-A husband could only be excused from paying maintenance where he could prove through clear, cogent, and compelling evidence that the wife had wholly and unjustifiably withdrawn from the marital relationship including its emotional, residential, and relational aspects-The burden of proof lay squarely on the husband-This exception in favour of the husband was to be narrowly construed to support structural gender inequalities which demanded a cautious and rights-oriented approach to interpreting such exceptions, ensuring that maintenance remained a shield against economic vulnerability, not a tool of coercion-In the present case, there was no dispute that the parties entered into a valid marriage, nor was there any allegation, much less evidence, that the petitioner/wife refused consummation or cohabitation without reasonable cause-On the contrary, the record revealed that the respondent/husband failed to provide a marital abode, made no arrangements for rukhsati, and did not take steps to fulfill his basic obligations under the marital contract-There was similarly no factual or legal basis in the record to invoke the narrow exception to the respondent’s/husband’s obligation of maintenance-No credible evidence had been led to suggest that the petitioner/wife willfully withdrew from the marital relationship or refused cohabitation without valid cause-The wife’s inability to cohabit due to the husband’s own failure to facilitate rukhsati did not defeat her claim to maintenance-Petitioner/wife could not be penalized for non-consummation that resulted from the respondent’s/husband’s own inaction-Petitioner’s/wife’s right to maintenance accrued upon the solemnization of marriage and continued throughout the subsistence of the marital bond-Considering that the divorce took place during the pendency of the said litigation, the maintenance period was to continue till the period of iddat-The denial of maintenance in the present case, in light of the respondent’s/husband’s default and the absence of any fault on part of the petitioner/wife, was contrary to law and was accordingly set aside-Impugned judgment was set aside-The petitioner’s/ wife’s entitlement to maintenance from the date of valid marriage was affirmed in the sum for Rs. 5000/- per month adjudicated upon by the district court and also included maintenance for the period of iddat-The petition was accepted, converted into an appeal, and allowed. (b) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)- -S.5-Marriage-Essence and meaning-Essentials of a valid marriage stated-Marriage under Islamic law is regarded both as an act of devotion (ibadat) and a social transaction (muamalat)-Marriage, like other contracts requires declaration and acceptance for its constitution and both must be expressed in such a manner as to demonstrate the intention, without any sort of ambiguity-The essential requirements of a valid marriage include offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul), exchanged either directly or through representatives or guardians, along with free and informed consent-These elements align with the statutory requirements for a valid civil contract and marriage is now established under our jurisprudence to be a solemn civil contract (‘aqd’)-In Pakistan, every marriage solemnized under Muslim law must be registered under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and the Nikahnama serves as the principal documentary proof. Muhammad Yousaf v. Huma Saeed 2024 SCMR 1078; Shayara Bano v. Union of India AIR 2017 SC 4609 and Mst. Khurshid Bibi v. Baboo Muhammad Amin PLD 1967 SC 97 rel. Mohammed Salim v. Shamsudeen (2019) 4 SCC 130 and Saleem Ahmed v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2014 FSC 43 ref. (c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S.5, Sched.-Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.5-Marriage not consummated-Wife’s right to seek maintenance-Scope-Essence and foundation of marriage emphasized-While marriage under Islamic law is indeed a civil contract, it is far more than a mere legal arrangement; it is the foundation of a deeply personal and moral relationship rooted in mutual respect, compassion, and shared responsibility-The Qur’an describes the marital relationship as one of love (mawaddah) and mercy (rahmah)and enjoins equitable treatment, protection, and financial support as essential obligations within this framework underscoring the spiritual and emotional dimensions that animate the marital union-Upon entering marriage, the wife commits not simply to a legal contract but to a marital relationship, a bond of care, dignity, and cohabitation-This relational commitment, rather than any notion of physical submission or patriarchal obedience, is what gives rise to the right of maintenance-Maintenance flows not from dominance, but from the mutual obligations and moral fabric that underpin the marital bond-Any interpretation that reduces this right to the wife’s subordination negates the ethical core of the relationship as envisioned by both the Qur’an and constitutional values such as dignity, equality, and non-discrimination-The entitlement to maintenance, thus, must be understood as a recognition of the wife’s role in nurturing the marital relationship, not as a reward for submission, but as a legal and moral consequence of her commitment to that relationship. (d) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S.5, Sched.-Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.5-Wife’s right to maintenance in non-consummated marriage-The-maintenance-obedience-concept-Conditioning a wife’s right to maintenance upon physical obedience incompatible with the Quranic vision of marriage-Notion of-surrender-lies at the heart of what jurists have historically termed the-maintenance-obedience complex-This is the idea that a wife’s entitlement to maintenance is conditional upon her obedience, most often defined in terms of physical availability for conjugal relations-In classical jurisprudence, particularly within the Hanafi and Hanbali schools, this was expressed through the doctrine of ihtibās, which refers to the wife’s seclusion or retention in the marital home for the husband’s access-However, this reductive formulation, which treats marriage as a transactional exchange of physical obedience for material support, is incompatible with the Qur’anic vision of marriage as a solemn covenant based on affection and compassion-The institution of marriage is not premised on the wife’s-surrender-but on mutual commitment, emotional and physical companionship, cooperation, and shared responsibility-A commitment that actualizes dignity, justice and social well-being-It aims to establish a moral and familial order rooted in justice and compassion and entails mutual moral control, and not one-sided authority-Accordingly, maintenance should not be viewed as a quid pro quo for physical obedience, but as an inherent legal and ethical obligation arising from the marital contract-It is intended to protect the wife’s dignity, autonomy, and financial security-Interpretations that condition this entitlement on physical submission not only distort Islamic legal principles but also enable coercive control-A just and contemporary approach guided by Maqāsid al-Sharīʿah, constitutional norms, and feminist jurisprudence must displace obedience-based reasoning in favor of frameworks that center equality, welfare, and mutual respect. Mehvish Kazmi v. Parvaiz Hussain PLD 2022 SC (AJ&K) 1 ref. (e) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -Ss.5, Sched. & 17A-Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.9-Wife’s right to seek maintenance despite marriage not being consummated-Scope-A wife’s entitlement to maintenance accrues immediately upon the solemnization of a valid marriage-Maintenance as an obligation arising directly from the marital contract has also been affirmed by the statutory framework of Pakistan, which treats maintenance as an absolute and enforceable right, rather than a conditional or discretionary entitlement-Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 empowers a wife to initiate proceedings before the Family Court for the recovery of maintenance upon the husband’s failure or neglect to provide for her, without requiring proof of consummation, cohabitation, or obedience-Similarly, Section 17A of the Family Courts Act, 1964 enhances the enforceability of such claims by introducing an expeditious, summary procedure for the recovery of arrears of maintenance-Together, these statutes form a beneficial and pro-women legal framework that affirms maintenance as a substantive, unqualified right flowing from the existence of a valid marriage not from performance, obedience, or physical availability-A wife’s entitlement to maintenance accrues immediately upon the solemnization of a valid marriage. Yasmeen Bibi v. Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan PLD 2016 SC 613; Saif-ur-Rehman v. ADJ Toba Tek Singh 2018 SCMR 1885 and Muhammad Nawaz v. Khurshid Begum PLD 1972 SC 302 rel. Zeeshan Iftikhar Butt v. Maria Asif 2019 CLC 777; Rashid Ahmad Khan v. Nasim Ara PLD 1968 Lahore 93 and Sardar Muhammad v. Nasima Bibi PLD 1966 Lahore 703 ref. (f) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S.5, Sched.-Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), Ss.5 & 9-Wife’s right to seek maintenance despite marriage not being consummated-Formal inception/commencement of the marital relationship as a determining factor-Solemnization of marriage as a legal genesis of marital relationship-Scope-‘Rukhsati’-Meaning, concept and effect-The term rukhsati literally means-to depart-or-to take leave-and it holds no independent legal status under Islamic or statutory law-While the solemnization of marriage marks the formal commencement of the marital relationship, the expression of acceptance at the time of marriage is the ultimate evidence of a woman’s willingness to enter into the marital relationship and to discharge her matrimonial obligations-A wife’s right to maintenance becomes absolute when she demonstrates such willingness, which is reinforced from her waiting for rukhsati to be effected-To condition a wife’s entitlement to maintenance on rukhsati or consummation undermines legal certainty and enables husbands to evade their financial responsibilities by invoking social customs or delaying performance-Such an approach imposes an unconstitutional burden on women and reinforces patriarchal norms that make a woman’s financial rights contingent upon her physical availability or subservience-This is incompatible with the dignity and equality promised under the Constitution. Muhammad Sharif v. ADJ 2007 SCMR 49 and Haseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Begum PLD 2022 SC 686 rel. Najam-ur-Rehman v. Masooma Hassan 2023 CLC 991 and Shamim Akhtar v. ADJ, Sialkot 1991 CLC 1142 ref. (g) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S.5, Sched.-Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), Ss.5 & 9-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.14, 25 & 35-Accrual of a wife’s right to maintenance immediately upon solemnization of a valid marriage regardless of its consummation-Husband’s obligation to pay maintenance-Exception stated-Husband to prove that wife repudiated the marital relationship-The husband may be excused from paying maintenance only in very limited circumstances where he can prove, through clear and cogent evidence, that the wife has wholly and unjustifiably repudiated the marital relationship, including emotional, residential, and relational aspects-The burden of proof lies squarely on the husband-Absent such proof, the obligation to provide maintenance persists-A refusal to cohabit arising from abuse, neglect, coercive control, behaviour or absence of appropriate living arrangements does not amount to nushūz or unjustifiable repudiation of the marital relationship by the wife-Where the husband fails to effect rukhsati, does not provide a residence, withholds the agreed dower, or fails to facilitate travel documentation (e.g., a visa), the wife’s non-cohabitation cannot be construed as voluntary withdrawal from marital relationship-In such cases, wife’s entitlement to maintenance remains intact-Conditioning a wife’s entitlement to maintenance on proof of consummation creates an untenable and constitutionally suspect standard-It forces women to disclose intimate and deeply private aspects of their married life in public judicial proceedings, contrary to their constitutional right to dignity and privacy under Article 14 of the Constitution-Denying maintenance under these circumstance weaponizes patriarchal customs and undermines the ethical foundations of Islamic law-This exception, therefore, must be narrowly construed and reformulated through the lens of Maqāsid al-Sharīʿah, constitutional guarantees of equality, dignity, and social justice under Articles 14, 25 and 35 of the Constitution, and progressive jurisprudence-The above lens provides that unreasonable and unjustified denial or withdrawal of the wife from a marital relationship is the only exception to grant of maintenance-A wife’s right to maintenance is neither contingent upon consummation or rukhsati, nor subject to the discretion of the husband. Haseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Begum PLD 2022 SC 686 and Muhammad Sharif v. ADJ 2007 SCMR 49 rel. Tariq Mehmood v. Farah Shaheen 2010 YLR 349; Najam-ur-Rehman v. Masooma Hassan 2023 CLC 991 and Abdul Fahim v. Mst. Shahnaz Begum 2003 CLC 1450 ref. (h) Administration of justice- (i) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S.5, Sched.-Family cases-Judicial language and reasoning-Scope and significance-The language employed by courts in family law cases does more than resolve individual disputes; it actively shapes public understanding of rights and obligations within marriage and the broader family structure-Judicial language carries normative force-It influences how justice is perceived, internalized, and practiced-Terms such as-surrender,- or-submit-are rooted in patriarchal frameworks and reinforce outdated notions of gender hierarchy and female subordination-These expressions cast women as passive recipients in marriage rather than equal partners, undermining their legal and constitutional status-It is therefore imperative that judicial reasoning and expression be firmly anchored in the constitutional values of dignity, equality, and non-discrimination, while also reflecting the lived realities of litigants and the prevailing social context-Judges, particularly in family law matters, are not merely arbiters of individual disputes; they are reformers and thought leaders capable of guiding society toward progressive and inclusive thinking-They bear a Constitutional and ethical duty to adopt gender-sensitive, rights-based language that affirms the equal legal status of women as full and autonomous persons-Judicial decisions must avoid stereotypes, promote tolerance, and embody the principles of substantive justice-In fulfilling this transformative role under the Constitution, the judiciary does more than interpret law; it reshapes societal attitudes and advances equality through every word it speaks-Language is never neutral-It either reinforces the status quo or propels society toward a more just and equal future. Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl, Distinguished Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law, Dr. Muhammad Zubair Abbasi, Lecturer in Law, School of Law and Social Sciences, University of London and Ms. Fatima Yasmin Bokhari, CEO Musawi, Advocate High Court, assisted by Barrister Khadija Yasmin Bokhari, Advocate High Court, Amici Curiae. Assisted by Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk and Ms. Uzma Zahoor, Civil Judge/Research Officer, Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Summary: (Against the order dated 01.10.2024 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi passed in W.P. No. 2014 of 2021). (a) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)--- ----Ss.2(l) & 15---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.8, 12 & 54--- Eviction petition---Landlord and tenant relationship, denial of---Proof---Payment of rent as the determining factor---Significance---Petitioner (the purported buyer and landlady) claiming to have purchased the demised property from respondent No.1 (purported tenant) through agreement to sell---Effect---Brief of the matter was that the respondents “FN” and “FS” were married in 2004, and “FS” had earlier purchased a house which became the “demised premises”; over the years, multiple agreements to sell were executed between the petitioner and respondent No.1 “FN”, followed by a civil suit filed by the petitioner (purported buyer and landlady) in 2008 that was decreed in her favour upon conceding statement of respondent No.1 “FN”, leading to a registered sale deed---Thereafter, applications under Section 12(2) C.P.C. were filed by “FS” and “PN”, resulting in the decree and sale deed being set aside through order dated 25.02.2016, which order was later set aside on 26.08.2020, reviving the earlier decree and sale deed; meanwhile, in 2017 the petitioner (purported buyer and landlady) filed eviction proceedings under Section 15 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, claiming respondent No.1 was her tenant, which were dismissed by the rent controller and the appellate court on the ground that landlord-tenant relationship was not proved, and thereafter, the High Court upheld these concurrent findings---The legal issue before Supreme Court was as to“whether the petitioner had established the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship so as to justify eviction under Section 15 of the 2009 Act”?---Held: The rent controller as well as the appellate court and the High Court concurrently held that neither had the petitioner (the purported buyer and landlord) been able to prove the existence of such the agreement to sell, nor the payment of rent at any material stage by respondent No.1 (purported tenant) to her---The conclusions drawn by three courts below did not suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence and therefore warranted no interference---Eviction could not be sought before the rent controller without establishing the relationship of landlord and tenant---It was emphasized that the relationship of landlord and tenant usually came into existence as a result of a tenancy agreement---One of the most important circumstances from which inference as to the existence of such relationship could be drawn was payment of rent---The fact that no rent was paid by the person in possession of the premises would negate the existence of such relationship---Payment of rent was not just a normal incidence of tenancy but a sine qua non for the relationship of landlord and tenant---To show that respondent No.1 was the petitioner’s tenant, the latter had to prove that respondent No.1 either undertook or was bound to pay rent as consideration for the possession or occupation of the demised premises---This could have been done through the production of rent receipts or witnesses deposing as to the payment of rent in their presence to respondent No.1---However, the non-payment of rent in the presence of a rent agreement, oral or written, would not by itself be sufficient to hold that there did not exist such relationship---The existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant could come into existence on execution of a rent agreement---The petitioner (the purported buyer and landlady) did not produce witnesses in whose presence a tenancy agreement with respondent No.1 (purported tenant) was created---There was no reason to interfere with the three concurrent orders / judgments passed by the rent controller, appellate court and the High Court---Leave to appeal was declined and the petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)--- ----Preamble---Existence of landlord and tenant relationship being the deriving factor conferring jurisdiction upon the Rent Tribunal---Scope---The 2009 Act proceeds on the assumption that there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties in an eviction petition---The object behind the enactment of the 2009 Act is set out in its Preamble, viz., “to regulate the relationship of landlord and tenant, to provide a mechanism for settlement of their disputes in an expeditious and cost effective manner and for connected matters”---Where there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties before the Rent Controller, it would have no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. Mian Umar Ikram-ul-Haque v. Dr. Shahida Hasnain 2016 SCMR 2186 rel. (c) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)--- ----Ss.2(l) & 15---Landlord and tenant relationship, existence of---Proof---Onus to prove the existence of a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is on the landlord who seeks the eviction of a tenant. Sh. Muhammad Sulaman, Advocate Supreme Court along with Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Respondent No. 1 in person. Farooq Siddiqui in person (Impleaded vide order dated 01.07.2025). Date of hearing: 2nd September, 2025.

Summary: (On appeal from the judgments dated 24.08.2017 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in E.T.R. No. 01 of 2005, S.T.R. No. 33 of 2005 and S.T.R. No. 10 of 2006). Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 36(1), 36(2) & 36(3) ‘second proviso’---Central Excises Act (I of 1944), S.33(3)---Timeframe for passing order-in-original consequent to a show cause notice---Failure in adhering to such mandatory timeframe by the authorities---Effect---Order-in-original would be barred by time---Pivotal question requiring determination before the Supreme Court was “whether the timeframe provided for passing orders, post issuance of show cause notices was followed as required under the relevant statutes”?---Held: Despite two corrigendum issued, the events to invoke either Sections 36(1) and 36(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (‘ST Act’) were not disclosed---It was only in the second corrigendum that Section 36(1) of the Act with disclosing event required under the relevant law, was introduced for the first time---Nonetheless, the record reflected that under second proviso to Section 36(3) of the Act, the order under the relevant subsection was to be made within 120 days of the issuance of the show cause notice or within such extended period as the commissioner might, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, fixed, provided that such extended period in no case could exceed 60 days---The show cause notice was issued on 30.06.2000 and inconsideration thereof the order in original was passed on 02.02.2001, which was much beyond the timeframe required under the law---However, in appeal (Civil Appeal No. 636 of 2018) relating to sales tax there was no extension in timeframe within Section 36(3) of the Act; thus, the order in original should have been passed in 120 days---The orders in original were time barred---Civil Appeal No. 635 of 2018 related to excise duty under Central Excises Act, 1944 (‘the Act’) and related rules---Timeframe provided in the Act and related rules for passing order post show cause notice is 45 days under Section 33(3), which was flouted, hence the order in original in the appeal too was time-barred---The provisions prescribing timeframe for passing order in original, consequent to a show cause notice, were held to be mandatory---The orders-in-original, were barred by time---Impugned judgments were set aside and appeals were allowed, in circumstances. Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore 2025 SCMR 1280 rel. Ali Sibtain Fazli, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Hasham Ahmed Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (through video-link from Lahore). Mrs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate Supreme Court, Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General (Law), FBR for Respondents. Date of hearing: 11th September, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 28.04.2015 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in W.P. No. 29864 of 2014). (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Ss.5, Sched. & 17-A---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), Ss.5 & 9---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.14, 25, 35 & 185(3)---Wife’s entitlement to maintenance in a non-consummated marriage---Scope---Maintenance allowance to wife, denial of---Marriage not being consummated, ground of---Legality---Wife’s right to maintenance flows unconditionally from solemnization of a valid marriage---Obligation of husband to pay maintenance---Exception stated---Husband to prove that wife repudiated the marital relationship---Brief facts were that the petitioner/wife and the respondent/husband contracted marriage on 02.11.2012 through a valid nikahnama, with rukhsati mutually scheduled for February 2013, however, the respondent/husband delayed rukhsati for more than a year---Petitioner/wife filed a suit for maintenance before the family court, whereby, Rs.3,000 per month was decreed in her favour from the date of marriage---On appeal, the district court enhanced the amount to Rs.5,000 per month---During the proceedings, the respondent/husband divorced the petitioner/wife on 02.05.2014---High Court, however, set aside the decrees of the lower courts, holding that since the marriage had not been consummated, the petitioner/wife was not entitled to maintenance---The petitioner/wife thereafter approached the Supreme Court seeking restoration of her right to maintenance---Pivotal questions for determination before the Supreme Court were as to (i)“When does a Muslim woman become entitled to maintenance within a marriage”? and, (ii)“under what circumstances, if any, may a husband be excused from his marital obligation to pay maintenance to his wife”?---Held: Islamic principles, Constitutional and statutory protections, and judicial precedents affirmed that the wife’s right to maintenance flew unconditionally from the solemnization of a valid marriage and constituted a binding legal duty---A husband could only be excused from paying maintenance where he could prove through clear, cogent, and compelling evidence that the wife had wholly and unjustifiably withdrawn from the marital relationship including its emotional, residential, and relational aspects---The burden of proof lay squarely on the husband---This exception in favour of the husband was to be narrowly construed to support structural gender inequalities which demanded a cautious and rights-oriented approach to interpreting such exceptions, ensuring that maintenance remained a shield against economic vulnerability, not a tool of coercion---In the present case, there was no dispute that the parties entered into a valid marriage, nor was there any allegation, much less evidence, that the petitioner/wife refused consummation or cohabitation without reasonable cause---On the contrary, the record revealed that the respondent/husband failed to provide a marital abode, made no arrangements for rukhsati, and did not take steps to fulfill his basic obligations under the marital contract---There was similarly no factual or legal basis in the record to invoke the narrow exception to the respondent’s/husband’s obligation of maintenance---No credible evidence had been led to suggest that the petitioner/wife willfully withdrew from the marital relationship or refused cohabitation without valid cause---The wife’s inability to cohabit due to the husband’s own failure to facilitate rukhsati did not defeat her claim to maintenance---Petitioner/wife could not be penalized for non-consummation that resulted from the respondent’s/husband’s own inaction---Petitioner’s/wife’s right to maintenance accrued upon the solemnization of marriage and continued throughout the subsistence of the marital bond---Considering that the divorce took place during the pendency of the said litigation, the maintenance period was to continue till the period of iddat---The denial of maintenance in the present case, in light of the respondent’s/husband’s default and the absence of any fault on part of the petitioner/wife, was contrary to law and was accordingly set aside---Impugned judgment was set aside---The petitioner’s/ wife’s entitlement to maintenance from the date of valid marriage was affirmed in the sum for Rs. 5000/- per month adjudicated upon by the district court and also included maintenance for the period of iddat---The petition was accepted, converted into an appeal, and allowed. (b) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)--- ----S.5---Marriage---Essence and meaning---Essentials of a valid marriage stated---Marriage under Islamic law is regarded both as an act of devotion (ibadat) and a social transaction (muamalat)---Marriage, like other contracts requires declaration and acceptance for its constitution and both must be expressed in such a manner as to demonstrate the intention, without any sort of ambiguity---The essential requirements of a valid marriage include offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul), exchanged either directly or through representatives or guardians, along with free and informed consent---These elements align with the statutory requirements for a valid civil contract and marriage is now established under our jurisprudence to be a solemn civil contract (‘aqd’)---In Pakistan, every marriage solemnized under Muslim law must be registered under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and the Nikahnama serves as the principal documentary proof. Muhammad Yousaf v. Huma Saeed 2024 SCMR 1078; Shayara Bano v. Union of India AIR 2017 SC 4609 and Mst. Khurshid Bibi v. Baboo Muhammad Amin PLD 1967 SC 97 rel. Mohammed Salim v. Shamsudeen (2019) 4 SCC 130 and Saleem Ahmed v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2014 FSC 43 ref. (c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.5--- Marriage not consummated---Wife’s right to seek maintenance---Scope---Essence and foundation of marriage emphasized---While marriage under Islamic law is indeed a civil contract, it is far more than a mere legal arrangement; it is the foundation of a deeply personal and moral relationship rooted in mutual respect, compassion, and shared responsibility---The Qur’an describes the marital relationship as one of love (mawaddah) and mercy (rahmah)and enjoins equitable treatment, protection, and financial support as essential obligations within this framework underscoring the spiritual and emotional dimensions that animate the marital union---Upon entering marriage, the wife commits not simply to a legal contract but to a marital relationship, a bond of care, dignity, and cohabitation---This relational commitment, rather than any notion of physical submission or patriarchal obedience, is what gives rise to the right of maintenance---Maintenance flows not from dominance, but from the mutual obligations and moral fabric that underpin the marital bond---Any interpretation that reduces this right to the wife’s subordination negates the ethical core of the relationship as envisioned by both the Qur’an and constitutional values such as dignity, equality, and non-discrimination---The entitlement to maintenance, thus, must be understood as a recognition of the wife’s role in nurturing the marital relationship, not as a reward for submission, but as a legal and moral consequence of her commitment to that relationship. (d) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.5---Wife’s right to maintenance in non-consummated marriage---The “maintenance-obedience” concept---Conditioning a wife’s right to maintenance upon physical obedience incompatible with the Quranic vision of marriage---Notion of “surrender” lies at the heart of what jurists have historically termed the “maintenance-obedience complex”---This is the idea that a wife’s entitlement to maintenance is conditional upon her obedience, most often defined in terms of physical availability for conjugal relations---In classical jurisprudence, particularly within the Hanafi and Hanbali schools, this was expressed through the doctrine of ihtibās, which refers to the wife’s seclusion or retention in the marital home for the husband’s access---However, this reductive formulation, which treats marriage as a transactional exchange of physical obedience for material support, is incompatible with the Qur’anic vision of marriage as a solemn covenant based on affection and compassion---The institution of marriage is not premised on the wife’s “surrender” but on mutual commitment, emotional and physical companionship, cooperation, and shared responsibility---A commitment that actualizes dignity, justice and social well-being---It aims to establish a moral and familial order rooted in justice and compassion and entails mutual moral control, and not one-sided authority---Accordingly, maintenance should not be viewed as a quid pro quo for physical obedience, but as an inherent legal and ethical obligation arising from the marital contract---It is intended to protect the wife’s dignity, autonomy, and financial security---Interpretations that condition this entitlement on physical submission not only distort Islamic legal principles but also enable coercive control---A just and contemporary approach guided by Maqāsid al-Sharīʿah, constitutional norms, and feminist jurisprudence must displace obedience-based reasoning in favor of frameworks that center equality, welfare, and mutual respect. Mehvish Kazmi v. Parvaiz Hussain PLD 2022 SC (AJ&K) 1 ref. (e) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Ss.5, Sched. & 17A---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.9---Wife’s right to seek maintenance despite marriage not being consummated---Scope---A wife’s entitlement to maintenance accrues immediately upon the solemnization of a valid marriage---Maintenance as an obligation arising directly from the marital contract has also been affirmed by the statutory framework of Pakistan, which treats maintenance as an absolute and enforceable right, rather than a conditional or discretionary entitlement---Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 empowers a wife to initiate proceedings before the Family Court for the recovery of maintenance upon the husband’s failure or neglect to provide for her, without requiring proof of consummation, cohabitation, or obedience---Similarly, Section 17A of the Family Courts Act, 1964 enhances the enforceability of such claims by introducing an expeditious, summary procedure for the recovery of arrears of maintenance---Together, these statutes form a beneficial and pro-women legal framework that affirms maintenance as a substantive, unqualified right flowing from the existence of a valid marriage not from performance, obedience, or physical availability---A wife’s entitlement to maintenance accrues immediately upon the solemnization of a valid marriage. Yasmeen Bibi v. Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan PLD 2016 SC 613; Saif-ur-Rehman v. ADJ Toba Tek Singh 2018 SCMR 1885 and Muhammad Nawaz v. Khurshid Begum PLD 1972 SC 302 rel. Zeeshan Iftikhar Butt v. Maria Asif 2019 CLC 777; Rashid Ahmad Khan v. Nasim Ara PLD 1968 Lahore 93 and Sardar Muhammad v. Nasima Bibi PLD 1966 Lahore 703 ref. (f) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), Ss.5 & 9---Wife’s right to seek maintenance despite marriage not being consummated---Formal inception/commencement of the marital relationship as a determining factor---Solemnization of marriage as a legal genesis of marital relationship---Scope---‘Rukhsati’---Meaning, concept and effect---The term rukhsati literally means “to depart” or “to take leave” and it holds no independent legal status under Islamic or statutory law---While the solemnization of marriage marks the formal commencement of the marital relationship, the expression of acceptance at the time of marriage is the ultimate evidence of a woman’s willingness to enter into the marital relationship and to discharge her matrimonial obligations---A wife’s right to maintenance becomes absolute when she demonstrates such willingness, which is reinforced from her waiting for rukhsati to be effected---To condition a wife’s entitlement to maintenance on rukhsati or consummation undermines legal certainty and enables husbands to evade their financial responsibilities by invoking social customs or delaying performance---Such an approach imposes an unconstitutional burden on women and reinforces patriarchal norms that make a woman’s financial rights contingent upon her physical availability or subservience---This is incompatible with the dignity and equality promised under the Constitution. Muhammad Sharif v. ADJ 2007 SCMR 49 and Haseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Begum PLD 2022 SC 686 rel. Najam-ur-Rehman v. Masooma Hassan 2023 CLC 991 and Shamim Akhtar v. ADJ, Sialkot 1991 CLC 1142 ref. (g) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), Ss.5 & 9---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.14, 25 & 35---Accrual of a wife’s right to maintenance immediately upon solemnization of a valid marriage regardless of its consummation---Husband’s obligation to pay maintenance---Exception stated---Husband to prove that wife repudiated the marital relationship---The husband may be excused from paying maintenance only in very limited circumstances where he can prove, through clear and cogent evidence, that the wife has wholly and unjustifiably repudiated the marital relationship, including emotional, residential, and relational aspects---The burden of proof lies squarely on the husband---Absent such proof, the obligation to provide maintenance persists---A refusal to cohabit arising from abuse, neglect, coercive control, behaviour or absence of appropriate living arrangements does not amount to nushūz or unjustifiable repudiation of the marital relationship by the wife---Where the husband fails to effect rukhsati, does not provide a residence, withholds the agreed dower, or fails to facilitate travel documentation (e.g., a visa), the wife’s non-cohabitation cannot be construed as voluntary withdrawal from marital relationship---In such cases, wife’s entitlement to maintenance remains intact---Conditioning a wife’s entitlement to maintenance on proof of consummation creates an untenable and constitutionally suspect standard---It forces women to disclose intimate and deeply private aspects of their married life in public judicial proceedings, contrary to their constitutional right to dignity and privacy under Article 14 of the Constitution---Denying maintenance under these circumstance weaponizes patriarchal customs and undermines the ethical foundations of Islamic law---This exception, therefore, must be narrowly construed and reformulated through the lens of Maqāsid al-Sharīʿah, constitutional guarantees of equality, dignity, and social justice under Articles 14, 25 and 35 of the Constitution, and progressive jurisprudence---The above lens provides that unreasonable and unjustified denial or withdrawal of the wife from a marital relationship is the only exception to grant of maintenance---A wife’s right to maintenance is neither contingent upon consummation or rukhsati, nor subject to the discretion of the husband. Haseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Begum PLD 2022 SC 686 and Muhammad Sharif v. ADJ 2007 SCMR 49 rel. Tariq Mehmood v. Farah Shaheen 2010 YLR 349; Najam-ur-Rehman v. Masooma Hassan 2023 CLC 991 and Abdul Fahim v. Mst. Shahnaz Begum 2003 CLC 1450 ref. (h) Administration of justice--- ----Amicus curiae---Significance, concept and purpose---The institution of the amicus is essential to ensuring that adjudication remains informed, inclusive, and principled---It is imperative that Constitutional courts of the country continue to institutionalize this practice, especially in matters of significant public consequence or global relevance---The amicus curiae serve as a vital bridge between law and justice, local realities and global perspectives, the bench and the academy---Embracing this inclusive model of judicial deliberation enhances not only the legitimacy and quality of judgments, but also affirms the judiciary’s commitment to learning, openness, and Constitutional dialogue. (i) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Family cases---Judicial language and reasoning---Scope and significance---The language employed by courts in family law cases does more than resolve individual disputes; it actively shapes public understanding of rights and obligations within marriage and the broader family structure---Judicial language carries normative force---It influences how justice is perceived, internalized, and practiced---Terms such as “surrender,” or “submit” are rooted in patriarchal frameworks and reinforce outdated notions of gender hierarchy and female subordination---These expressions cast women as passive recipients in marriage rather than equal partners, undermining their legal and constitutional status---It is therefore imperative that judicial reasoning and expression be firmly anchored in the constitutional values of dignity, equality, and non-discrimination, while also reflecting the lived realities of litigants and the prevailing social context---Judges, particularly in family law matters, are not merely arbiters of individual disputes; they are reformers and thought leaders capable of guiding society toward progressive and inclusive thinking---They bear a Constitutional and ethical duty to adopt gender-sensitive, rights-based language that affirms the equal legal status of women as full and autonomous persons---Judicial decisions must avoid stereotypes, promote tolerance, and embody the principles of substantive justice---In fulfilling this transformative role under the Constitution, the judiciary does more than interpret law; it reshapes societal attitudes and advances equality through every word it speaks---Language is never neutral---It either reinforces the status quo or propels society toward a more just and equal future. Rana Rashid Akram Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Umer Ijaz Gilani, Advocate Supreme Court along with Respondent No. 1 in person. Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl, Distinguished Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law, Dr. Muhammad Zubair Abbasi, Lecturer in Law, School of Law and Social Sciences, University of London and Ms. Fatima Yasmin Bokhari, CEO Musawi, Advocate High Court, assisted by Barrister Khadija Yasmin Bokhari, Advocate High Court, Amici Curiae. Assisted by Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk and Ms. Uzma Zahoor, Civil Judge/Research Officer, Supreme Court of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 8th July, 2025.

Summary: (On appeal from the judgments dated 24.08.2017 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in E.T.R. No. 01 of 2005, S.T.R. No. 33 of 2005 and S.T.R. No. 10 of 2006). Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 36(1), 36(2) & 36(3) ‘second proviso’---Central Excises Act (I of 1944), S.33(3)---Timeframe for passing order-in-original consequent to a show cause notice---Failure in adhering to such mandatory timeframe by the authorities---Effect---Order-in-original would be barred by time---Pivotal question requiring determination before the Supreme Court was “whether the timeframe provided for passing orders, post issuance of show cause notices was followed as required under the relevant statutes”?---Held: Despite two corrigendum issued, the events to invoke either Sections 36(1) and 36(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (‘ST Act’) were not disclosed---It was only in the second corrigendum that Section 36(1) of the Act with disclosing event required under the relevant law, was introduced for the first time---Nonetheless, the record reflected that under second proviso to Section 36(3) of the Act, the order under the relevant subsection was to be made within 120 days of the issuance of the show cause notice or within such extended period as the commissioner might, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, fixed, provided that such extended period in no case could exceed 60 days---The show cause notice was issued on 30.06.2000 and inconsideration thereof the order in original was passed on 02.02.2001, which was much beyond the timeframe required under the law---However, in appeal (Civil Appeal No. 636 of 2018) relating to sales tax there was no extension in timeframe within Section 36(3) of the Act; thus, the order in original should have been passed in 120 days---The orders in original were time barred---Civil Appeal No. 635 of 2018 related to excise duty under Central Excises Act, 1944 (‘the Act’) and related rules---Timeframe provided in the Act and related rules for passing order post show cause notice is 45 days under Section 33(3), which was flouted, hence the order in original in the appeal too was time-barred---The provisions prescribing timeframe for passing order in original, consequent to a show cause notice, were held to be mandatory---The orders-in-original, were barred by time---Impugned judgments were set aside and appeals were allowed, in circumstances. Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore 2025 SCMR 1280 rel. Ali Sibtain Fazli, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Hasham Ahmed Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (through video-link from Lahore). Mrs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate Supreme Court, Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General (Law), FBR for Respondents. Date of hearing: 11th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S. 54---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 8, 42 & 54---Suit for declaration, partition, possession and permanent injunction---Inheritance---Share of daughter, denial of---Plea of execution of an agreement to sell and receiving of share in inheritance---Failure to seek specific performance of agreement to sell within time---Absence of mutation and non-registration of sale---Contradictory evidence---Suit was decreed concurrently---Validity---Law assists the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights---Once the claim was denied by a co-owner, the applicants were under a legal obligation to approach the competent court and assert their claim against respondent/plaintiff, and their failure to do so raised serious questions about the credibility and maintainability of their stance---Such inaction reflected gross negligence and demonstrated a lack of bona fide intent, especially in matters relating to partition of joint property and enforcement of alleged sale agreements---Benefit of any equitable relief cannot be extended to those who have failed to act within the legal framework and prescribed time limits---If a valid and lawful sale had truly occurred, it would have been duly reflected in the revenue record and appropriate legal formalities such as registration of the sale deed and mutation would have been completed---Absence of these essential steps undermined the credibility of their claim---Mere attestation of agreement to sell does not establish the valid execution or consent of all co-sharers, especially in the absence of independent and consistent corroborative evidence---Overall evidence presented by the applicants lacked coherence, consistency and legal reliability---Contradiction between the statements of key witnesses cast serious doubt on the genuineness of the agreement to sell and reflected an attempt to create a false narrative---Mere production of a document could not affect the rightful claim of the respondent, whose existence as a legal heir was undisputed---Civil revision was dismissed, in circumstances. 2020 YLR 871; 2021 CLC 1987; 2021 CLC 2011; PLD 2021 Lahore 533; 2021 SCMR 829; 2020 SCMR 832 and 2021 SCMR 305 ref. (b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S. 54---Agreement to sell---Creation of title---Scope---Agreement to sell does not create any title over the property; it does not confer ownership of the land---Person in whose favour such an agreement is executed cannot claim a decree of title and even if the agreement includes an acknowledgment of receipt of earnest money or partial payment, it merely grants a right to seek execution of another document, the sale deed, until the same is duly executed and registered and the title formally transferred. Muhammad Israr v. Jehanzeb and others 2025 SCMR 841 and Muhammad Iqbal and others v. Nasrullah 2023 SCMR 273 rel. (c) Islamic law--- ----Inheritance---Execution of an agreement to sell by co-sharers---Right of deprived female/daughters---Scope---Right of inheritance of vulnerable members of society, including females, is a fundamental right that must be protected---Islamic law (Shariah) and statutory provisions clearly guarantee inheritance rights and any attempt to deprive legal heirs of what is rightfully theirs must be viewed with strict scrutiny---Regrettably, a disturbing practice has developed where parties, in defiance of Shariah and the law, resort to nefarious and frivolous pleas to deprive rightful heirs of their shares, which calls for the Courts to vigilantly safeguard the inheritance rights of women and other vulnerable heirs. Tanvir Sarfraz Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2025 SCMR 98 ref. Ajmair Ali Bhutto for Applicants. Nadeem Ahmed Khoso and Shehryar Imdad Awan, Assistant Advocate General Sindh for Respondents. Date of hearing: 4th September, 2025.