Summary: (a) Constitutional Law – Right to Fair Treatment – Domicile Requirement in Competitive Examination: ----Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977, S. 7––CSS Competitive Examination Rules, 2019, Rr. 5 & 10––FPSC advertisement clause 2(d) Eligibility criteria for CSS Examination––Cut-off date for submission of requisite documents including domicile certificate––Appellant’s application rejected and result withheld on grounds of non-submission of domicile certificate by the deadline of 31.12.2022––Appellant contended that she was domiciled in District Swat prior to the cut-off date but obtained the certificate later––Held, both Rule 5 of the CSS CE Rules, 2019 and clause 2(d) of the advertisement explicitly required that a candidate must “have” domicile—not merely obtain a certificate—to qualify by the cut-off date––Distinction drawn between having domicile and possessing a domicile certificate––Impugned decision by FPSC appeared to have conflated the two terms, failing to appreciate the substantive legal concept of domicile versus the evidentiary function of the certificate––Appeal allowed; FPSC’s rejection order set aside; matter remanded for reconsideration based on legal possession of domicile, not procedural delay in certification. ---Cited Case: • Central Bank of India v. Ram Narain PLD 1956 SC (Ind.) 81 "Domicile meaning and import. (A) As against the very term domicile, the expression 'domicile certificate' too had come up for consideration before a division bench of this court in the case of 'Afsar Khan vs. Tribunal FCR' reported in 2005 CLC 1392, and it was held as under, Domicile certificate means the official confirmation of the place of permanent residence of a citizen. Apparently it has nothing to do with castes or Tribes. A person belonging to Nasar sub-caste can neither be denied right of citizenship nor of domicile if The meets the criteria laid down by the love, the rules and The guidelines given by the Supreme Court. More the unambiguous certificate issued by the Tribal Elders of one of the recognized case of Bhittani Trine also confirms the entitlement of the petitioner to the ban and liabilities of the Tribe being a resident of the area In this very judgment this court has also ruled that the right to have a domicile in any part of Pakistan was tracing it origin in a fundamental right guaranteed to a citizen of Pakistan in Art. 15 of the Constitution of Pakistan. (B) The law attributes to every person at birth a domicile which is called a domicile of origin. This domicile may be changed and a new domicile, which is called a domicile of choice acquired but the two kinds of domicile differ in the following respects: (1) The domicile of origin is received by operation of law at birth; the domicile of choice is acquired later by the actual removal of an individual to another country accompanied by his animus manendi. (2) The domicile of origin is retained until the acquisition of a domicile of choice; it cannot be divested by mere abandonment and is never destroyed though it remains in abeyance during the continuance of domicile of choice, the domicile of choice is lost by abandonment whereupon the domicile of origin is acquired, the domicile. Of choice; when is once lost, is destroyed but may be acquired anew by fulfilling the same conditions as are required in the first instance.

Summary: Background The case revolves around multiple civil petitions challenging the Islamabad High Court's judgment dated 31.01.2023, which found the appointments of various individuals to posts in the Bureau of Emigration & Overseas Employment (BE&OE) to have been made in violation of the law. The High Court referred the matter to the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) to determine the petitioners' eligibility for their respective posts. The petitioners, who had been regularized through a Cabinet Sub-Committee's decision, disputed this outcome and brought the matter before the Supreme Court. ---- Issues: 1) Whether the regularization of petitioners' appointments to various positions in BS-16 to BS-18 in the BE&OE was lawful. ---2) Whether the Cabinet Sub-Committee had the authority to regularize appointments in BS-16 and above, which typically require FPSC involvement. ---3) Whether the appointments and subsequent regularization of petitioners were consistent with applicable rules and regulations, including the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion, and Transfer) Rules, 1973. ---4) Whether the High Court was correct in referring the petitioners' cases to the FPSC for further evaluation. --- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court upheld the Islamabad High Court's decision, stating that the petitioners' appointments were made in violation of the law, as the proper recruitment procedures were not followed. The appointments were regularized by the Cabinet Sub-Committee, but the Court noted that the Sub-Committee lacked the legal authority to regularize appointments in BS-16 and above without involving the FPSC. The Court emphasized that under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, appointments to BS-16 and above are to be made through competitive examinations conducted by the FPSC. The Cabinet Sub-Committee's decision to regularize these appointments was, therefore, void ab initio and without lawful authority. The Court further ruled that the FPSC should determine the fitness and eligibility of the petitioners under the law, in line with the High Court's judgment. The Court rejected the argument that the regularization of petitioners constituted a "past and closed transaction," noting that any illegal act cannot be protected under such a doctrine. The petitions were dismissed, and the matter was referred to the FPSC to assess the petitioners' qualifications and eligibility for the posts they held. ---- Citations/Precedents: Province of Punjab v. Dr. Javed Iqbal (2021 SCMR 767) Federation of Pakistan v. Fazal-e-Subhan (PLD 2024 SC 515) Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Sher Aman (2022 SCMR 406) Messrs State Oil Company Limited v. Bakht Siddique (2018 SCMR 1181) Shahid Pervaiz v. Ejaz Ahmad (2017 SCMR 206)

Summary: Background: Muhammad Anwar, the respondent, was an employee of the Central Directorate of National Savings, where he was initially appointed as Assistant Director (BPS-17) and later promoted to Director (BPS-19). Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him, resulting in the imposition of a major penalty. However, his appeal against this penalty was allowed by the Federal Service Tribunal, and the Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision. After his retirement on May 15, 2016, the respondent sought proforma promotion to benefit from upgraded posts in the Directorate. The Federal Service Tribunal declared him "qualified for promotion" and directed the competent authority to consider him for proforma promotion. The Ministry of Finance challenged the Tribunal's decision in the Supreme Court. --- Issues: 1) Whether the Federal Service Tribunal had the jurisdiction to declare the respondent "qualified for promotion" and direct the competent authority to consider him for proforma promotion. ---2) Whether a civil servant who has retired after attaining the age of superannuation is eligible for promotion. ---3) Whether the Tribunal can substitute its opinion on the respondent’s fitness for promotion in place of the competent authority’s evaluation. ---- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Jurisdiction of the Tribunal: The Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Service Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by declaring the respondent "qualified for promotion." Under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion, and Transfer) Rules, 1973, the authority to evaluate the fitness and qualification of a civil servant for promotion rests exclusively with the designated forums, such as the Departmental Promotion Committee or the Central Selection Board. The Tribunal does not have the power to determine the fitness of a civil servant for promotion, as this is a subjective evaluation conducted by the competent authority. ---- Eligibility for Promotion Post-Retirement: The Court emphasized that a civil servant who has retired after reaching the age of superannuation cannot claim the right to be considered for promotion to a higher post. However, such a civil servant may be considered for proforma promotion under the Fundamental Rules (FR) 17(1) if it can be shown that the civil servant was wrongfully prevented from being promoted during their service due to no fault of their own. In this case, the respondent’s claim for proforma promotion was distinct from a regular promotion and required separate consideration. ---- Proforma Promotion: The Tribunal’s direction to consider the respondent for proforma promotion was upheld. The Court found that the Tribunal was justified in directing the competent authority to consider the respondent’s case for proforma promotion, as the respondent had been exonerated from the disciplinary charges. However, the Tribunal overstepped by declaring the respondent "qualified for promotion," as that decision must be made by the competent authority based on a proper evaluation process. ---- Outcome: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal to the extent of setting aside the Tribunal’s declaration that the respondent was "qualified for promotion." However, the Court upheld the Tribunal’s direction to consider the respondent for proforma promotion and expected the competent authority to take action on this matter at the earliest. --- Citations/Precedents: Mian Abdul Malik v. Dr. Sabir Zameer Siddiqui and others (1991 SCMR 1129) Abid Hussain Shirazai v. Secretary Ministry of Industries and Production (2005 SCMR 1742) Muhammad Yousaf v. Chairman Railway Board (1999 SCMR 1559) Muhammad Anis and others v. Abdul Haseeb and others (PLD 1994 SC 539) Dr. Alyas Qadeer Tahir v. Secretary Ministry of Education (2014 SCMR 997)

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973-- ----Art. 199--Petitioners were serving as Divisional Account Officers--Participation and qualified departmental promotional examination Part-I--Completion of practical training--Issuance of notification regarding conducting of Part-II examination by FPSC--Retrospective effect-- Direction to--Peshawar High Court in W.P. No. 1806/2017 where vide judgment dated 06.11.2019 Court inter-alia held that notification dated 09.3.2017 cannot be applied retrospectively to DAOs who had already successfully went through Part-I of departmental examination and also completed prescribed training in accordance with rules and regulation prevailing before impugned notification--Consequently, Peshawar High Court allowed writ petition to that extent and directed respondent department to conduct departmental Divisional Officers Examination within six months--Prayer of petitioners in said writ petition for regularizing their services in BPS-17 with all benefits was specifically declined--Judgment of Peshawar High Court was challenged by department in Civil Appeal No. 597/2020--However, said appeal was dismissed and judgment of Peshawar High Court was upheld by honorable Supreme Court--Respondents are directed to issue necessary direction to conduct departmental Divisional Account Officers examination Part-II within six months positively as per rule and regulations prevailing prior .to impugned notification and resolution-- However, prayer of petitioners for regularizing their services against post of DAO in BPS-17, is declined being also not allowed in similar matter by Peshawar High Court and upheld by honourable Supreme Court--Petition allowed. [Pp. 612, 613 & 614] A, B & C

Summary: Background: The petitioners filed civil petitions challenging the decisions made by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, where a difference of opinion arose between two members of the Tribunal. The Acting Chairman, Mr. Rana Zahid Mahmood, and Member Mr. Muhammad Javed Ghani expressed divergent views on the matter under appeal. However, the issue was not referred to the Chairman of the Tribunal as per the legal requirements under section 3A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, leading to questions regarding the proper procedure for resolving such differences in opinion within the Tribunal. ----Issues: 1) Whether the opinion of an Acting Chairman carries the same weight as that of a Chairman under section 3A(2)(c) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. --2) Whether the matter should have been referred to the Chairman for a decision when there was a split opinion between the members of the Tribunal. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Qazi Faez Isa, held that the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, specifically distinguishes between a Chairman and an Acting Chairman. The Court noted that section 3A(2)(c) of the Act explicitly refers to the opinion of the Chairman when there is a split decision among Tribunal members. The Court emphasized that the legislature, in its wisdom, did not include an Acting Chairman in this provision, and therefore, the interpretation must be strictly limited to the text of the law. The Court underscored that the principle of statutory construction requires that exceptions to general rules be interpreted narrowly. Given that the Act does not extend the authority of an Acting Chairman to make binding decisions in cases of split opinions, the Court determined that the proper course of action was to refer the matter to the Chairman of the Tribunal. Consequently, the Court remanded the matter back to the Chairman of the Tribunal for a decision on the appeals, instructing that the case be given priority and decided within three months due to its age. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 3A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 Section 3(7) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973

Summary: [Discussion on Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1997] The appellant was not recommended for appointment due to his lower position on the merit list. The court determined that there was no legal infirmity in the FPSC's decision and dismissed the appeal.

Summary: under the relevant provision of the Federal Public Service ommission Ordinance, L977. -

Summary: [Discussion on provision of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, L977] The appellant had applied for the post of Chairman Quality Control/Deputy Director General (E&M)/Director CDL in response to an advertisement. After completing the recruitment process, the FPSC recommended another candidate (respondent no. 3) for the position. The appellant filed a representation challenging the eligibility of respondent no. 3, but it was turned down by the FPSC. The appellant then filed a review petition, which was also dismissed. The appellant subsequently filed an appeal and a writ petition. During the hearing, the appellant's counsel argued that respondent no. 3 was not eligible at the time of application, while the Deputy Attorney General representing the FPSC argued that respondent no. 3 was declared eligible and ranked highest on the merit list. After considering the arguments and examining the record, the court found that the appellant was not recommended for the position due to being low on the merit list. The court observed that the FPSC had dismissed the appellant's representation and review petition after considering the relevant matters. The court did not find any legal infirmity justifying interference with the decisions of the FPSC. Therefore, the court concluded that the appeal was without merit and dismissed it. The related writ petition was also dismissed as it became irrelevant after the filing of the appeal.