Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Per Amin-ud-Din Khan, J. (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199 (1)(b)(ii)---Writ of quo warranto against Judge of High Court---Restraining from judicial work---Non-deciding of objection---Appellant was a sitting Judge of High Court who had been restrained from performing his official work by Chief Justice of that High Court in a petition filed against him assailing his appointment as Judge of High Court---Validity---Judge of High Court could not be restrained from performing his judicial function through interim order in Constitutional petition of quo-warranto filed against him in that High Court---Supreme Court set aside restraining order passed against appellant till final decision of Supreme Judicial Council---Supreme Court expected that Division Bench of High Court would first decide office objection(s) and proceed in accordance with law---Appeal was allowed. Malik Asad Ali and others' case PLD 1998 SC 161 fol. Per Shahid Bilal Hassan, J., agreeing with Amin-ud-Din Khan, J. (b) High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders--- ----Volume V, Chapter 1-A, Rr. 9 & 9A---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), Ss. 21 & 24-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199 (1)(b)(ii)---Writ of quo warranto---Office objection---Non-deciding of objection---Effect---Locus poenitentiae, principle of---Speaking order---Appellant was a sitting Judge of High Court who had been restrained from performing his official work by Chief Justice of that High Court in a petition filed against him assailing his appointment as Judge of High Court, without first deciding office objection raised against that petition---Validity---Nature of proceedings in objection cases are administrative---While hearing an objection case, under Volume V, Chapter 1-A, Rules 9 & 9-A of High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, High Court was performing an administrative function and only after the office objection was “overruled”, the case was matured on judicial side and would formally enter domain of jurisdiction of High Court---Since the proceedings germane to dealing with objections of office raised on presentation of Constitutional petitions, appeals, etc., were of administrative nature, absence of power of review was not obstacle to recall any earlier order if it is found to be contrary to law---Authority competent to pass an order even in absence of express provision, under section 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897, can also revoke, rescind or recall the same until the definite act is taken---Supreme Court set aside restraining order passed against appellant-Judge---Supreme Court restored the position ante and directed High Court to first decide fate of office objections through speaking order and to proceed with the matter in accordance with law---Appeal was allowed. Zahid Hussain and another v. The State 1998 SCMR 611; Capital Development Authority through Chairman and another v. Mrs. Shaheen Farooq and another 2007 SCMR 1328; Captain Faisal Ghazanfar Chaudhry v. Civil Aviation Authority through its Director General, Lahore and others 2019 CLC 1737; Shehzad Ahmad v. Asad Niaz and 2 others PLJ 2020 Lah. 557; Farman Ali v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2013 SC 392; Muhammad Boota v. Basharat Ali PLD 2014 Lah. 1; 2014 CLD 64; Rana Naveed Ahmad Khan v. Province of Punjab through Secretary LG and CD PLD 2014 Lah. 436; Pakistan Lawyers Forum (Registered) through its President v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice, Human Rights, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 2005 Lah. 107 and Tahira Naseem v. Arshad Mehmood and others 2021 PCr.LJ 682 rel. Munir A. Malik, Sr. Advocate Supreme Court, Ch. Atif Rafiq, Advocate Supreme Court, M. Abid Hussain Saqi, Advocate Supreme Court, Abid S. Zuberi, Advocate Supreme Court, (Assisted by Ghulam Mustafa Shah, Advocate), Riasat Ali Azad, Advocate Supreme Court, Waqar Rana, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner with petitioner. Mansoor Usman Awan, A.G.P., Ch. Aamir Rehman, Addl. A.G., Dr. Mirza Muhammad Usman, Advocate-on-Record (On behalf of AG Islamabad) on Court's Notice. Mian Dawood, Advocate High Court Respondent No. 1 (via video link Lahore) Nemo for other Respondents. Date of hearing: 30th September, 2025.

Summary: The transfer of suit property by General Attorney in favour of his sons without the express permission of the principal was unlawful when the alleged consideration against executed General Power of Attorney was not proved. Hence, the Impugned Judgment of the Appellate Court was set aside and that of the Trial Court was upheld. 232Misc. Writ 74726/24 Sat Bharai Vs Mehar Sher Muhammad etc Mr. Justice Ahmad Nadeem Arshad 30- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5826

Summary: The following points are discussed in this revision application :- i. Whether non-appearance of the pre- emptor in the witness box was fatal to his right of pre-emption or not? ii. The pre-emptor and purchaser are real brothers, so in such situation Talb-i-Muwathibat is not proved. iii. Non-mentioning of specific portion of house in the plaint by the pre-emptor when he was received information about sale is fatal. iv. Effect of non-production of postman. v. Evidence record by local commission. 231Civil Revision- Civil Revision (against Decree)- Declaration 408-15 MST FARHAT IQBAL VS JAVED IQBAL ETC Mr. Justice Abid Hussain Chattha 30- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5913 PLJ 2025 Lahore 1048 (Bahawalpur Bench)

Summary: The core questions requiring determination are as under: (i) Whether the Trial Court was justified in discarding the forensic report regarding the signatures on the cheque, and in holding that the presumption of correctness under Section 118 of the Act stood rebutted? (ii) Whether the Court can inquire into the existence/probability of the underlying transaction with reference to the financial capacity of the lender of amount for which a negotiable instrument is executed? Held that the forensic report with regard to the signatures on the cheque opined only to the extent that they were "probably" of the respondent. At this juncture, it is imperative to note that whenever a forensic comparison is undertaken, whether it pertains to signatures or to thumb impressions, the evidentiary value of the expert's report essentially depends on the degree of certainty expressed therein. If the expert opines in terms of "probably," or in terms of expressions like "may be," "appears to be," the clarity of the impression is doubtful, such opinion cannot be treated as a conclusive proof. The element of probability diminishes its decisiveness, and in such cases corroboration from other independent evidence and surrounding circumstances becomes indispensable before any adverse finding can be drawn against a party. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant that financial capacity of a plaintiff in suit for recovery under Order XXXVII, CPC, is irrelevant, is also misconceived. Where the issuance of a cheque by a borrower or taking of a loan is admitted, the financial capacity of the lender may not assume much significance. However, in cases where liability is denied and the lender has also failed to furnish details of the alleged transaction, it becomes essential to scrutinize and establish the lender's financial capacity in order to assess the plausibility of the claim. The appellant/plaintiff's case had to stand on its own legs, as he cannot be allowed to unjustly enrich himself, simply on account of the presumption of correctness albeit rebuttable attached to a negotiable instrument, which otherwise stood neutralized after grant of leave to defend. The non-existence of the consideration on account of lack of financial capacity was so probable in the present case that a person of ordinary prudence cannot believe that in the year 2006, the appellant could have a hefty amount of Rs.20,000,000/- lying in cash at his home. 229Crl. Misc. 53550/25 Mirza Yahya Baig Vs The State etc. Mr. Justice Muhammad Amjad Rafiq 30- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5989

Summary: (a) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)- -S. 13(2)(i)-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)-Landlord seeking ejectment of tenant and recovery of arrears of rent-Claim of arrears filed by landlord after four years without any credible evidence-Burden on landlord to prove claim of rent-High Court allowed the ejectment petition along with recovery of rent-Legality-Respondent / landlord filed an ejectment application before the rent controller against petitioners / tenants seeking possession of the shop in question along with recovery of rent from 2016 onwards-The respondent / landlord claimed that the tenancy agreement had expired in 2016, yet the petitioners retained possession after locking the premises-The petitioners submitted a reply asserting that they had already handed over vacant possession and paid all dues but did not contest further and were proceeded against ex-parte-The rent controller allowed the ejectment application but rejected the rent arrears claim which was affirmed in appeal-However, High Court set aside the concurrent findings, granting ejectment along with recovery of rent from January 2016 to January 2024, leading to the present petition before the Supreme Court-Held: Both the rent controller and the appellate authority concurrently found that the respondent / landlord failed to discharge the burden of proving rent arrears or continued possession by the petitioners after 2016-These findings were based on appreciation of evidence, or the lack thereof, and did not suffer from any legal infirmity or jurisdictional error-No witness was produced to support the claim that the petitioners / tenants continued to occupy the premises after 2016-The individual named-S-, in whose purported assurance the respondent / landlord allegedly refrained from taking possession, was neither impleaded as a party nor summoned as a witness, therefore, such omission constituted withholding of the best available evidence-Furthermore, the statutory regime under Section 13(2)(i) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 prescribed a period of sixty days for initiating proceedings in cases of non-payment of rent, in the absence of a fixed timeline in the tenancy agreement-In the present case, the tenancy agreement expired in 2016 and the ejectment application was filed in 2020 and no explanation was offered for this extraordinary delay, nor was there any plea of acknowledgment or revival of the tenancy in the interceding period-The unexplained lapse of nearly four years was fatal to the claim, both on grounds of limitation and laches-The finding of the High Court that the respondent/landlord was entitled to rent for eight years, in the absence of proof of possession or an ongoing tenancy, disregarded fundamental rules of evidence-The landlord, having admitted that the shop remained locked and having produced no cogent evidence to show that the petitioners/tenants used or benefited from the premises during that period, cannot be awarded rent merely because the tenants failed to actively contest the proceedings-Impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances. (b) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 199-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-High Court substituting its own view on disputed questions of fact-Scope-Reappraisal of evidence by High Court-Permissibility-High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, may not substitute its own view on disputed questions of fact unless there is gross misreading or non-reading of material evidence, or findings that are wholly perverse or unsupported by the record-The High Court is not an appellate forum to reappraise evidence merely on grounds of perceived injustice unless the conclusions arrived at by the subordinate fora are shown to be legally untenable. Fozia Mazhar v. ADJ Jhang PLD 2024 SC 771 rel. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)- -Art. 129(g)-Withholding of best available evidence-Effect-Not impleading a party, having a close proximity to the matter, or summoning it as a witness can constitute withholding of the best available evidence-Such omission operates adversely against the party who fails to produce material witnesses without explanation. (d) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 199-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-Concurrent findings-Interference-Permissibility-Interference in concurrent findings by High Court is permissible only when such findings are shown to be illegal, perverse, or based on extraneous considerations. State Life Insurance v. Jaffar Hussain 2009 CLD 610 and Allies Book Corporation v. Sultan Ahmad 2006 SCMR 152 rel. (e) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)- -Art. 117-Burden of proof on party asserting a claim-Scope-The burden of proof rests with the party asserting a claim, and the absence of rebuttal by the other side does not automatically result in the success of the claim, particularly when the claim is unsupported by credible evidence.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.115---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5 & First Sched., Art.162-A---Civil revision---Office objection---Civil revision filed before the High Court was within time but was re-submitted after removing office objection---Civil revision was re-submitted beyond the period allowed by the Office---Limitation---Condonation of delay, seeking of---Sufficient cause---The applicants filed a civil revision challenging a judgment dated 08.05.2025 and obtained a certified copy on 19.05.2025, which was received by them on 17.07.2025---The civil revision was first filed on 08.09.2025, but on 11.09.2025 the office of the Court raised objections and returned the file for removal of those objections---The file was received back by the applicants on 16.09.2025, and the civil revision was ultimately re-filed on 27.09.2025---No explanation was provided for the period between receiving the file with objections and the date of re-filing---Question requiring determination before the High Court was “whether the delay in re-filing the civil revision, after receiving the file back with objections, could be condoned when no explanation was given for the intervening period?”---Held: For the interregnum period no explanation seeking condonation of delay was given, therefore, the delay could not be condoned---Office of the High Court raised certain objections to the civil revision on 11.09.2025 with the stipulation that it was to be re-filed, whereupon, the case file was received by the applicants on 16.09.2025, however, it was re-filed on 27.09.2025, thus, even if it was considered that when the civil revision was filed, it was within time, however, when the office objections were raised and time was given to remove the same, period of limitation started to run against the applicants as and when the file was received by the applicant and since no valid explanation had been given for the interregnum period (when the file was received and re-filed) as it was not the case of the applicants that they were not aware of the office objections or had not received any intimation qua the same, as they received the case file on 16.09.2025, however, they re-filed the same on 27.09.2025, therefore, when the civil revision was re-filed, the period of limitation as contemplated in S.115 C.P.C and Art.162-A of the Limitation Act, 1908 had already elapsed and as no sufficient cause had been given for the interregnum period, hence, the delay in re-filing the civil revision, which was re-filed after the expiry of period of limitation of the civil revision, thus, could not be condoned---Since the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the present revision petition had been dismissed, therefore, present revision petition was also dismissed being barred by time. Asad Ali and 9 others v. The Bank of Punjab and others PLD 2020 SC 736 rel. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.115---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5 & First Sched., Art.162-A---Civil revision---Limitation---Delay---Previously, t he limitation for filing a civil revision was provided in S.115 of C.P.C (90 days from the date of order, judgment and decree), however, since S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was not applicable, hence, the delay could not have been condoned, however, in view of an amendment made in First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 a new Article (Article 162-A) has been inserted, which spells out the period for filing a civil revision, thus, as a natural corollary to that S.5 of the Act has been made applicable to S.115 C.P.C, however, in order to seek refuge of the said provision sufficient cause has to be given by the applicants for seeking condonation of delay. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.5---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115---Civil revision---Office objection---Re-submission of civil revision beyond the period allowed by the Office---Limitation---When office of High Court raises an objection to a petition and gives time for removing the same, if till the expiry of the prescribed period, the objection is not removed or no permission is sought from the Court for extension in the given time, the limitation will start running from the date when the given/prescribed time expires. Chief Executive, PESCO Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others v. Afnan Khan and another 2021 SCMR 2100 rel. Saleem Khan v. Mst. Zeenat and others 2023 CLC 1217; Khalid Meer and others v. Faqeerullah Minhaj and others PLD 2018 Lah. 697 and Naheed Ahmad v. Asif Riaz and 3 others PLD 1996 Lah. 702 ref. (d) Limitation--- ----Void order---Even a void order has to be assailed within the period of limitation prescribed under the law. Chief Engineer, Gujranwala Electric Power Company (GEPCO), Gujranwala, v. Khalid Mehmood and others 2023 PLC 65; Muhammad Sharif and others v. MCB Bank Limited and others 2021 SCMR 1158; Abid Hussain v. Secretary Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan through Chief of Air Staff, Islamabad 2021 SCMR 645; Haji Wajdad v. Provincial Government through Secretary Board of Revenue, Government of Balochistan, Quetta and others 2020 SCMR 2046; Ghulam Hussain Ramzan Ali v. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Karachi 2015 PTD 107; Ghulam Hussain Ramzan Ali v. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Karachi 2014 SCMR 1594; Gen. (R.) Parvez Musharraf v. Nadeem Ahmed (Advocate) and another PLD 2014 SC 585 and Messrs Blue Star Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax and others 2013 SCMR 587 rel. (e) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.5---Condonation of delay---Scope---Each and every day consumed for approaching a court beyond the period of limitation has to be explained. Sadiq Ali v. Government of Punjab and others 2023 PLC (CS) 310; Shahin Shah v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Irrigation Department, Peshawar and others 2022 SCMR 1810; Lal Khan through legal heirs v. Muhammad Yousaf through legal heirs PLD 2011 SC 657; Qaiser Mushtar Ahmad v. Controller of Examination and others PLD 2011 SC 174 and Muhammad Amjad Senior Superintendent of Police (Operations), Lahore and others 2010 PLC (C.S.) 838 rel. Shahid Rafiq Mayo for Petitioners.

Summary: (On appeal against the judgment dated 11.10.2024 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench (Dar-ul-Qaza), Swat, in Writ Petition No. 358-M of 2022). (a) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)--- ----S. 13(2)(i)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)---Landlord seeking ejectment of tenant and recovery of arrears of rent---Claim of arrears filed by landlord after four years without any credible evidence---Burden on landlord to prove claim of rent---High Court allowed the ejectment petition along with recovery of rent---Legality---Respondent / landlord filed an ejectment application before the rent controller against petitioners / tenants seeking possession of the shop in question along with recovery of rent from 2016 onwards---The respondent / landlord claimed that the tenancy agreement had expired in 2016, yet the petitioners retained possession after locking the premises---The petitioners submitted a reply asserting that they had already handed over vacant possession and paid all dues but did not contest further and were proceeded against ex-parte---The rent controller allowed the ejectment application but rejected the rent arrears claim which was affirmed in appeal---However, High Court set aside the concurrent findings, granting ejectment along with recovery of rent from January 2016 to January 2024, leading to the present petition before the Supreme Court---Held: Both the rent controller and the appellate authority concurrently found that the respondent / landlord failed to discharge the burden of proving rent arrears or continued possession by the petitioners after 2016---These findings were based on appreciation of evidence, or the lack thereof, and did not suffer from any legal infirmity or jurisdictional error---No witness was produced to support the claim that the petitioners / tenants continued to occupy the premises after 2016---The individual named “S”, in whose purported assurance the respondent / landlord allegedly refrained from taking possession, was neither impleaded as a party nor summoned as a witness, therefore, such omission constituted withholding of the best available evidence---Furthermore, the statutory regime under Section 13(2)(i) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 prescribed a period of sixty days for initiating proceedings in cases of non-payment of rent, in the absence of a fixed timeline in the tenancy agreement---In the present case, the tenancy agreement expired in 2016 and the ejectment application was filed in 2020 and no explanation was offered for this extraordinary delay, nor was there any plea of acknowledgment or revival of the tenancy in the interceding period---The unexplained lapse of nearly four years was fatal to the claim, both on grounds of limitation and laches---The finding of the High Court that the respondent/landlord was entitled to rent for eight years, in the absence of proof of possession or an ongoing tenancy, disregarded fundamental rules of evidence---The landlord, having admitted that the shop remained locked and having produced no cogent evidence to show that the petitioners/tenants used or benefited from the premises during that period, cannot be awarded rent merely because the tenants failed to actively contest the proceedings---Impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside---Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---High Court substituting its own view on disputed questions of fact---Scope---Reappraisal of evidence by High Court---Permissibility---High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, may not substitute its own view on disputed questions of fact unless there is gross misreading or non-reading of material evidence, or findings that are wholly perverse or unsupported by the record---The High Court is not an appellate forum to reappraise evidence merely on grounds of perceived injustice unless the conclusions arrived at by the subordinate fora are shown to be legally untenable. Fozia Mazhar v. ADJ Jhang PLD 2024 SC 771 rel. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art. 129(g)---Withholding of best available evidence---Effect---Not impleading a party, having a close proximity to the matter, or summoning it as a witness can constitute withholding of the best available evidence---Such omission operates adversely against the party who fails to produce material witnesses without explanation. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Concurrent findings---Interference---Permissibility---Interference in concurrent findings by High Court is permissible only when such findings are shown to be illegal, perverse, or based on extraneous considerations. State Life Insurance v. Jaffar Hussain 2009 CLD 610 and Allies Book Corporation v. Sultan Ahmad 2006 SCMR 152 rel. (e) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art. 117---Burden of proof on party asserting a claim---Scope---The burden of proof rests with the party asserting a claim, and the absence of rebuttal by the other side does not automatically result in the success of the claim, particularly when the claim is unsupported by credible evidence. Muhammad Sohaib, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. M. Amin Khattak Lachi, Advocate Supreme Court for the State. Date of hearing: 24th September, 2025.

Summary: Held that once a petition is dismissed as withdrawn, the legal effect is final and conclusive, and no reliance can be placed upon the earlier admitting note to revive or continue the proceedings. The contention that the petition was admitted through a speaking order, which indicates that there was no justification for the petitioners to withdraw the same, does not constitute a valid ground to prevent the withdrawal followed by filing of the second revision petition. 235Crl. Appeal 246877/18 Ameer Hussain Vs The State etc Mr. Justice Sardar Akbar Ali 29-09- 2025 2025 LHC 5869

Summary: (a) Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ----Ss. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 9, read with Arts. 14 & 19 of the Constitution----Defamation as civil wrong----Concurrent civil and criminal remedies----Right to reputation and freedom of expression----Law and scope----Offence of defamation is provided in S.499, P.P.C. (with S.500 prescribing punishment) while civil defamation has historically been entertained under S.9, C.P.C. as a tort based on justice, equity and good conscience----Defamation Ordinance, 2002 is a special law codifying and consolidating the civil law of defamation, without extinguishing the concurrent tort remedy or the criminal regime under P.P.C.----Under the Ordinance, any wrongful act, publication or circulation of a false oral, written or visual statement that injures a person’s reputation (by lowering him in the estimation of others, or exposing him to ridicule, unjust criticism, hatred, dislike or contempt) is actionable (S.3), and once defamation is proved, publication of defamatory matter is actionable without proof of special damage (S.4)----Court may grant general, special or aggravated damages and order apology or retraction as restorative relief (S.9)----Sections 5, 6 and 7 provide a structured defence framework (truth, fair comment, good faith, absolute and qualified privilege) which balances the right to reputation, a facet of human dignity under Art.14 of the Constitution, against freedom of expression under Art.19, ensuring that truthful, fair and good-faith speech is protected while maliciously injurious speech is not----Civil standard of proof applies, and one appeal lies from the Trial Court’s decision. Cited cases: Liberty Papers Ltd. v. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan PLD 2015 SC 42; Ch. Zulfiqar Ali Cheema v. Farhan Arshad Mir PLD 2015 SC 134; Mir Shakeelur Rehman v. Yahya Bakhtiar PLD 2010 SC 612; Khondkar Abu Taleb v. The State PLD 1967 SC 32; M. Moosa v. Mahomed PLD 1968 SC 25; Adeeb Javedani v. Yahya Bakhtiar 1995 CLC 1246; Capt. Benaras Khan v. Commodore Akhtar Hanif 1988 CLC 1093; Government of Punjab v. Mst. Kamina 1990 CLC 404. (b) Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ----Ss. 2(e), 3 & 4----Defamation----Essential ingredients----Reasonable person test and seriousness of impact test----Standard of proof in civil defamation----To establish a civil claim under the Ordinance, claimant must show: (i) existence of a defamatory statement capable of harming reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person; (ii) reference to or identification of the claimant; and (iii) publication to at least one person other than the claimant----Under S.3, core inquiry is injury to reputation, which may consist of lowering in estimation of others, ridicule, unjust criticism, hatred, dislike or contempt; truth or falsity is not examined at the initial stage of determining injurious character but becomes relevant at the defence stage under S.5----Court must first apply the reasonable person test, i.e. how a reasonable member of society would naturally understand the words in their ordinary meaning, not how the claimant subjectively feels----If the words are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, court must then apply the seriousness of impact test, requiring proof that the statement actually caused or was likely to cause serious damage to reputation in its real context, assessed through factors such as nature and gravity of the allegation, scale and audience of publication, claimant’s social/professional standing and likely influence on persons who know the claimant----Serious harm may be proved by direct evidence (testimonies showing altered conduct or opinion) or by reasonable inference from surrounding circumstances, but it cannot rest on hypothetical or presumed injury alone----Standard is the civil one, namely balance of probabilities, and criminal concepts or thresholds cannot be imported into civil defamation claims to raise the evidentiary burden beyond that required by the Ordinance----Confusion in earlier case-law between falsity, malice and injury to reputation is clarified and separated by the Court. Cited cases: Muhammad Akram v. Farman Bi PLD 1990 SC 28; Lachaux v. Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27 (relied upon for serious harm test). (c) Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ----Ss. 2(e), 3, 4, 5(g) & 7----Publication----Internal communication to inquiry committee regarding workplace harassment----Privileged/qualified privileged communication----No wider circulation proved----Whether actionable defamation made out----Respondent, a consultant at the Hospital and Assistant Professor at affiliated medical college, filed suit for Rs.500 million under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 on the basis of a handwritten letter authored by Petitioner (Medical Director/CEO) and addressed only to a 13-member Inquiry Committee looking into harassment complaints----Letter recounted various incidents and complaints of alleged sexual harassment of female medical officers and students by Respondent----Petitioners admitted authorship and reference to Respondent but pleaded that it was an internal communication placed before the competent Inquiry Committee in connection with an ongoing inquiry, and that it was written in good faith, within official mandate and was privileged----Respondent in plaint pleaded circulation of the letter only to the members of the Inquiry Committee; in evidence he attempted to improve his case by alleging circulation to students and general public, without any supporting evidence or corroboration----Held, evidence beyond pleadings must be disregarded, and no publication beyond the Inquiry Committee was proved----Intended addressees were the members of a formally constituted Inquiry Committee, performing an official duty; for purposes of the reasonable person test, the “reasonable person” in context is a reasonable member of such Inquiry Committee, not the general public----Seen objectively, a reasonable member of the Inquiry Committee would read the letter as information placed before it in the discharge of its inquiry function and not as a defamatory campaign; no material was brought on record to show that, in their estimation, Respondent’s reputation was lowered or that they treated him as a person of diminished standing on account of the letter----Restricted internal communication to a body acting under an official mandate, without proof of wider publication or reputational impact, does not satisfy the ingredients of actionable defamation under Ss.3 and 4 of the Ordinance, particularly when it falls within the protective scope of qualified privilege/good-faith reporting. Cited cases: Rehmat v. Zubaida Begum 2021 SCMR 1534; Nazir Ahmad v. M. Muzaffar Hussain 2008 SCMR 1639 (admissions); Muhammad Aslam v. Muhammad Anwar 2023 SCMR 1371; Pak Suzuki Motors Co. Ltd. v. Faisal Jameel Butt 2023 CLD 934 (evidence beyond pleadings). (d) Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 ----S. 4(3)(a), (d) & (e), read with Defamation Ordinance, 2002----Workplace harassment inquiries----Confidentiality of complainants and witnesses----Non-production of victims as witnesses to “prove truth” of harassment allegations in civil defamation suit----Effect----Under S.4(3)(a) of the Act, statements and evidence obtained during a harassment inquiry must remain confidential; under S.4(3)(d) & (e), no adverse action is to be taken against complainant or witnesses and the Inquiry Committee must ensure that no hostile environment is created to pressurize them----Insistence by civil courts that complainant female doctors or students must appear to prove “truth” of harassment allegations in a defamation suit stemming from an internal complaint would undermine statutory confidentiality, expose victims to secondary harassment, and frustrate the protective purpose of the Act----Trial Court and High Court erred in drawing adverse inference against Petitioners merely because the complainant women were not produced as witnesses; such approach was termed “absurd” and contrary to the scheme of the Act----Furthermore, Respondent’s own document (Ex.P-13), a letter from the Dean of the College, confirmed that an inquiry on allegations of sexual harassment against Respondent was pending and that relevant individuals had been called, thereby supporting the existence of complaints and the context in which the impugned letter was written----It was not the function of the defamation court to sit in judgment over the merits of harassment allegations; its remit was confined to examining whether an actionable wrong of defamation, as defined by law, was made out. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) & Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Pleadings, burden of proof and evidentiary threshold in defamation claims----Improvement in testimony beyond pleadings----Injury to reputation, psychological harm and professional loss----Need for proof----Respondent pleaded only that the letter was sent to the Inquiry Committee but, while deposing as PW-1, improved his version by alleging its circulation to students and general public; such improvement being beyond the pleadings and unsupported by any independent witness or documentary proof, could not be relied upon----Respondent relied on his educational qualifications, letters of appreciation and a letter of exoneration from the Dean but produced no evidence that any member of the Inquiry Committee or any other relevant person altered their conduct or opinion towards him on account of the letter, nor that his social or professional standing suffered any concrete or serious setback----Bare assertions of being “perturbed, shocked, mentally stressed” and of family having a “bad impression” were not corroborated and, in any event, were irrelevant to the seriousness of impact test when the publication itself stood confined to an inquiry body and not to family or general public----On the balance of probabilities, Respondent failed to prove publication beyond the limited internal context, failed to prove serious reputational injury even within that context, and failed to substantiate alleged psychological or professional damage----Trial Court and High Court misdirected themselves by declaring the letter defamatory without first applying the reasonable person and seriousness of impact tests to the specific audience, content and context. (f) Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ----Ss. 3, 4, 5(g) & 7----Intention, malice, good faith and privilege----Handwritten internal letter to Inquiry Committee regarding harassment allegations----Whether indicative of malice----Effect----Trial Court inferred malice from the fact that the letter was handwritten and that complainant female doctors were not produced as witnesses, and High Court affirmed, focusing on “malice” rather than on core ingredients of actionable defamation----Supreme Court held such reasoning to be illogical and contrary to the statutory framework; the letter explicitly acknowledged the sensitivity of the issue for female complainants and their families and was written to the Inquiry Committee to maintain confidentiality, not to publicize allegations----Handwritten form, in the circumstances, signified care and responsibility rather than malice----Record showed that complaints of harassment against Respondent were already pending, and the letter merely compiled and transmitted information of concern to the competent forum as part of institutional procedure----On cumulative assessment of correspondence and circumstances, Petitioners’ version of acting in good faith and within institutional process inspired greater confidence on the balance of probabilities----Held, the impugned letter was a privileged communication, made honestly and in good faith to a body charged with investigating workplace harassment; no actionable defamation or injury to reputation stood established----Civil petition was converted into appeal and allowed; judgments and decree of Trial Court and High Court were set aside.