Summary: (Against the order/judgment dated 30.09.2020 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, in Crl. A. No. 613 of 2012). (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 302(c)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Ocular account---Visual distance---Limitations of human eye---Benefit of doubt---Accused was convicted under section 302 (b), P.P.C. for qatl-i-amd and sentenced to imprisonment for life on four counts---Validity---In cases involving witness testimony, prosecution must establish credibility and reliability of its witnesses---Distance from which witnesses claimed to have observed the incident with graphic details was critical in assessing truthfulness and ability of their accounts---General rule is that at a distance of 500 meters (half a kilometer), even individuals with excellent visual acuity would struggle to discern specific details of an event, particularly when incident involves rapid moments, or if it occurs in an area that is not well lit or has obstructions that could hinder vision---Eyesight of a man, even under optimal conditions, is not designed for sustained observations of minute details at such a distance---Claim of witnesses was not only a tall claim but also one that was too far-fetched to be accepted by a prudent mind-- -No independent corroboration to ocular account furnished by three eye-witnesses was produced by the prosecution---Burden of proof laid with prosecution and it was required to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt---There was reasonable doubt regarding credibility of witnesses, primarily due to physical impossibility of observing incident from the stated distance, given the acknowledged limitations of human vision---There was insufficient evidence to support claims of prosecution regarding witnesses' ability to observe the incident from a distance of half a kilometer---Supreme Court extended benefit of doubt to accused, set aside conviction and sentence awarded to him and acquitted him from all charges ---Appeal was allowed. A study by Nyman, Lampinen, Antfolk, Korkman, and Santtila (2019) published in Journal of Law and Human Behavior rel. (b) Criminal trial--- ----Eye-witness, evidence of---Evidence disbelieved to the extent of co-accused persons---Effect---If eye-witnesses are disbelieved against some accused persons who were attributed effective roles, then same eye-witnesses cannot be believed against another accused person attributed a similar role unless such eye-witnesses receive independent corroboration regarding the other accused person. Iftikhar Hussain v. State 2004 SCMR 1185 rel. . Fakhar Hayat, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant. Nemo for the State. Shaukat Hayat, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 4th March, 2025.

Summary: Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.42 & 54---Suit for declaration and injunction---Gift---Proof---Declaration before Land Reforms Authorities---Respondent/plaintiff claimed to be owner in possession of suit land on the basis of gift made in her favour by her deceased father---Suit was decreed by Trial Court in favour of respondent/plaintiff but Lower Appellate Court dismissed the same---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction restored judgment and decree passed by Trial Court---Validity---At no material stage authorities and/or any sitting tenant disputed declaration made by deceased owner of land that he had gifted 909 acres of land, equivalent to 9,997 Produced Index Units ("PIUs") to his daughter---This was recognition of the gift by Land Reform Authorities that had resulted in deceased landlord escaping resumption of his land beyond 36,000 PIUs in favour of government---Other legal heirs/descendants of deceased land owner who were defendants in the suit had also not challenged such declaration dated 13-04-1959 and/or the document maintained by Land Reforms Authorities under which gift in favour of respondent/ plaintiff had been recognized and accepted---Declaration made by deceased land owner before Land Reforms Authorities was an admission as to the factum of gift in favour of his daughter who was a minor when the declaration was made---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by High Court---Appeal was dismissed. Qazalbash Waqf v. Chief Land Commissioner PLD 1990 SC 99; Muzammil Shah v. Deputy Land Commissioner, Mansehra PLD 2001 Pesh. 92; Syed Mohsin Naqvi v. Federal Land Commission 2010 YLR 3248; Kaneez Bibi v. Sher Muhammad PLD 1991 SC 466 and Riaz Ullah Khan v. Asghar Ali 2004 SCMR 1701 rel. Syed Amjad Shah, Advocate Supreme Court and Sh. Mahmood Ahmad, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants. Tahir Hussain Lughmani, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 24th February, 2025.

Summary: Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.42 & 54---Suit for declaration and injunction---Gift---Proof---Declaration before Land Reforms Authorities---Respondent/plaintiff claimed to be owner in possession of suit land on the basis of gift made in her favour by her deceased father---Suit was decreed by Trial Court in favour of respondent/plaintiff but Lower Appellate Court dismissed the same---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction restored judgment and decree passed by Trial Court---Validity---At no material stage authorities and/or any sitting tenant disputed declaration made by deceased owner of land that he had gifted 909 acres of land, equivalent to 9,997 Produced Index Units ("PIUs") to his daughter---This was recognition of the gift by Land Reform Authorities that had resulted in deceased landlord escaping resumption of his land beyond 36,000 PIUs in favour of government---Other legal heirs/descendants of deceased land owner who were defendants in the suit had also not challenged such declaration dated 13-04-1959 and/or the document maintained by Land Reforms Authorities under which gift in favour of respondent/ plaintiff had been recognized and accepted---Declaration made by deceased land owner before Land Reforms Authorities was an admission as to the factum of gift in favour of his daughter who was a minor when the declaration was made---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by High Court---Appeal was dismissed. Qazalbash Waqf v. Chief Land Commissioner PLD 1990 SC 99; Muzammil Shah v. Deputy Land Commissioner, Mansehra PLD 2001 Pesh. 92; Syed Mohsin Naqvi v. Federal Land Commission 2010 YLR 3248; Kaneez Bibi v. Sher Muhammad PLD 1991 SC 466 and Riaz Ullah Khan v. Asghar Ali 2004 SCMR 1701 rel. Syed Amjad Shah, Advocate Supreme Court and Sh. Mahmood Ahmad, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants. Tahir Hussain Lughmani, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 24th February, 2025.

Summary: Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----Ss. 14 & 17---West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance (II of 1962), S.18---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5 & 14---Condonation of delay-- -Wrong appellate forum---Petitioner/authorities were aggrieved of award being made rule of the Court, and preferred appeal before High Court but the same was dismissed for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction---Lower Appellate Court and High Court declined to condone the delay caused due to filing of appeal before High Court---Validity---Delay of time in filing of appeal, application or suit may be condoned but subject to plausible and reasonable explanation---One who seeks condonation of delay has to explain each and every day's delay---Petitioner/authorities could not put-forward reasonable and plausible justification/explanation for filing appeal after about two years of passing of judgment and decree by Trial Court---Earlier appeal filed before High Court was not a reasonable justification---Petitioner/ authorities could not claim to be treated in any manner differently from an ordinary litigant---Time consumed in pursuing appeal in wrong forum could not be condoned under section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908---Time spent in pursuing proceedings before wrong appellate forum could not be excluded for the purposes of filing of an appeal---If appeal was barred by time, provisions of section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908, could only be invoked, that too, by showing sufficient cause---Forum of appeal was regulated by jurisdictional value in plaint---In presence of section 18 of West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 there could be no doubt or complication to determine forum of appeal-- -Provisions of sections 5 and 14 of Limitation Act, 1908 would come into play only if delay appeared to be condonable because of the petitioners/authorities prosecuting their case with due diligence---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Messrs SKB-SNK Joint Venture Contractors through Regional Director v. Water and Power Development Authority and others 2022 SCMR 1615; East Pakistan v. Abdul Hamid Darfi and others 1970 SCMR 558; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Rais Pir Ahmad Khan 1981 SCMR 37; Federation of Pakistan v. Niaz Ahmad 1997 SCMR 959; Mst. Khadija Begum and 2 others v. Mst. Yasmeen and 4 others PLD 2001 SC 355; Dr. Syed Sibtain Raza Naqvi v. Hydrocarbon Development and others 2012 SCMR 377; Ghulam Ali v. Akbar alias Akoor and another PLD 1991 SC 957; Abdul Ghani v. Mst. Mussarat Rehana 1985 CLC 2529; Government of Pakistan v. Rafi Associates Limited 1985 CLC 2234; Abdul Ghani v. Ghulam Sarwar PLD 1977 SC 102; Syed Haji Abdul Wahid and another v. Syed Sirajuddin 1998 SCMR 2296; Raja Karamatullah and 3 others v. Sardar Muhammad Aslam Sukhera 1999 SCMR 1892; Akhtar Nasir Ahmed v. Province of Punjab through District Collector Gujrat and others PLD 2024 SC 1268; Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others PLD 2016 SC 872; Chief Executive Officer NPGCL, Genco-III, TPS, Muzaffargarrah v. Khalid Umar Tariq Imran and others 2024 SCMR 518; Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan Region and others v. Riaz Hussain Bukhari 2024 SCMR 1021; Kiramat Khan v. IG, Frontier Corp and others 2023 SCMR 866 and Imtiaz Ali v. Atta Muhammad and another PLD 2008 SC 462 rel. Shah Faisal Ilyas, A.A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 17th February, 2025.

Summary: ----Ss. 9, 115 & O. VII, Rr.10(2), 11(d)---Return of plaint owing to territorial jurisdiction of first court---Presenting the returned plaint before the court having territorial jurisdiction instead of filing a fresh suit---Appearance and participation of the petitioners in the returned suit without raising any objection---Doctrine of estoppel---Waiver by way of acknowledging the proceedings of Trial Court from the point at which the plaint was returned---Effect---Contention of the petitioners was that on the return of plaint respondent should have instituted a fresh suit instead of presenting returned plaint before the court of competent jurisdiction and the proceedings of the Trial Court should have started from the point as if the suit had been instituted for the first time---Validity---Return of plaint means the return of the entire record of the suit to the plaintiff, who may present the plaint (along with entire proceedings) to the court having territorial as well as pecuniary jurisdiction, therefore, on return of plaint, plaintiff is not authorized by the C.P.C. to bring a fresh plaint and on presentation of the same plaint, the court shall proceed with the suit from the point at which the plaint was returned---In the instant case on presentation of plaint, petitioners had appeared before Trial Court and started participating in the proceedings without raising any objection---Trial Court commenced examining the evidence of respondent and petitioners had cross-examined respondent's witness and had not raised any objection at the earliest possible opportunity that suit should not be tried from the point at which it was returned, and they had not claimed that they would submit a fresh written statement---Petitioners had participated in the proceedings from the point at which the Trial Court commenced the proceedings, therefore, they by their conduct had waived the objections and acknowledged the proceedings of the Trial Court from the point at which it was when the plaint was returned---Petitioners failed to demonstrate, if any prejudice had been caused to them by the proceedings held by the Court not having the territorial jurisdiction and by the proceedings held by the Trial Court from the point at which the plaint was presented, thus, application made by petitioners under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C., was barred by doctrine of waiver---Where a party participates in the proceedings before a Court whose authority to adjudicate upon does not suffer from inherent defect of jurisdiction, such party cannot afterwards raise objection on the proceedings conducted by such Court, therefore, Appellate Court had rightly set-aside the suit's rejection order passed by the Trial Court, which did not suffer from any error of law and of jurisdiction which may attract the provision of S.115, C.P.C.---Civil Revision was dismissed accordingly. Pakistan Telecommunication Ltd. v. Faizan Bibi PLD 2013 Sindh 80; Saleem Mehtab v. Refhan Best Food Ltd. 2010 MLD 1015 and Zubaida Begum v. Muhammad Saeed 1991 MLD 1312 ref. Abdul Hameed Khan v. Nasrullah PLD 2021 Bal. 59; Ata-ur-Rehman Qadri v. Capital Development Authority 2016 CLC 132; Gul Usman v. Deputy Commissioner 2014 CLC 1681; Lucky Enterprises v. Zeal Pak Cement PLD 2013 Sindh 277 and Muhammad Hussain v. Muhammad Shafi 2004 SCMR 1947 rel. Shahood Ahmed Khan Kakar for Petitioners. Saifullah Khan Durrani for Respondent 1. Saifullah Sanjrani, Assistant Advocate General (A.A.G.) for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Date of hearing: 15th August 2024.

Summary: ----Ss. 3 & 7---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 549---Pakistan Army Act (VI of 1953), S. 123---Illegal dispossession---Concurrent jurisdiction of Criminal Court and Court Martial---Delivery to military authorities of persons liable to be tried by Court-martial---Scope---Application was filed by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) contending that the respondent/proposed accused was an officer in PAF, therefore, he be handed over to PAF as he was to be tried by the Military Courts instead of Courts of ordinary jurisdiction---Such application was dismissed by the Trial Court---Validity---It was evident that Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005,was a special law and S. 4 thereof contained non-obstante clause---Relevant provisions of PAF Act, 1953, envisaged that S. 123 of the said Act is not applicable to the special laws---In that context, reference could be made to the provision of Ss. 71, 4(xi), 4(xvi) & 123 of PAF Act, 1953---In view of this legal position, the provisions of Ss. 3 & 4 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, shall prevail over the provision of S. 123 of PAF Act, 1953---Applicant had mainly stressed their prayer on the basis of decision of Cabinet Division as reflected in the Letter No. 556/ Rule-19/2024/926 dated 07-11-2024- --Prior to such decision of Cabinet Division, applications had been moved by the PAF for transferring the trial to Military/Court Martial which were dismissed and the dismissal orders were not challenged before the higher forum---When the trial was in progress and the complainant and one witness had been examined before the Trial Court, the applicant/PAF came with such plea that in view of the decision of the Cabinet Division, the Trial Court had no jurisdiction and that the trial of the accused was to be conducted by the Military/Martial Court-- -In fact, Federal Cabinet decision's letter No.556/ Rule-19/2024/926 dated 07-11-2024 was based on the provisions of S. 124 (2) of PAF Act 1953, and R. 6(2) of Criminal Procedure (Military Offender) Rules, 1970, which were not attracted in the present case as this case was governed under the provision of S. 123 of PAF Act, 1953, read with Rr. 2 & 3 of Criminal Procedure (Military Offender) Rules,1970---Moreover, in the said letter no reference had been made to the judicial order passed by the Trial Court on 01-11-2021 in which the question of jurisdiction had already been decided and the said order was not challenged before high forum, as such the same attained finality---Moreover, said letter regarding decision of Cabinet Division was quite silent with regard to judicial orders, as such the same had no value in the eye of law--- In the circumstances, the prayer sought by PAF for handing over the case/trial of accused to Military/Martial-Court would be violative of the principle "nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa" (no one should be judge of his own cause)---Petition filed by PAF was dismissed, in circumstances. Shah Zaman and another v. Federal Government and another 1995 SCMR 464; Muhammad Azam v. The Sessions Judge, Jhelum and 7 others 1980 PCr.LJ 999; Brigade Commander Headquarters Field Command NLC, Karachi v. The State 1996 MLD 69; Khalil Ahmed v. District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi and another 1990 PCr.LJ 1744 and Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad v. Zafar Awan, Advocate, High Court PLD 1992 SC 72 ref. Government of Sindh and others v. Messrs Saif Textile Mills Ltd. and 6 others 2003 SCMR 265; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Communication Islamabad and another v. Shuja Sharif and others 2023 SCMR 129; Government of Punjab through Secretary, Finance Department, Lahore v. Mubarik Ali Khan PLD 1993 SC 375; Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Zeal Pak Cement Factory Ltd. 2024 SCMR 628; Mst. Yasmeen Akhtar and others v. The Government of Sindh through Chief Secretary and 3 others 2020 PLC (C.S.) 1249 and Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2024 Islamabad 155 rel. (b) Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)--- ----Ss. 3 & 7---Illegal dispossession---Interim possession of the property---Scope---Trial Court allowed application for handing over the interim possession under S. 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 to the complainant---Validity---From perusal of S. 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, it appeared that the Court dealing with the application under S. 7 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, was authorized and had ample power to grant 'interim relief' under the said provision of law during the pendency of main application in favour of owner/occupier if during trial the Court was satisfied that the accused was prima facie not in 'lawful possession'---While dealing the matter, the conduct of the applicant/accused was also to be taken into consideration---Complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, was filed by complainant/respondent in the year 2018---Vide order dated 14.07.2018, inquiry report was called and after hearing the parties and in view of the inquiry report, Trial Court took cognizance and issued bailable warrants against the proposed accused to appear before the Court and furnish solvent surety of Rs.1 lac.---Letter was also sent by the Court on 28.08.2018 to J.A.G. branch of Pakistan Air Force Headquarter, in respect of the subject case, but the same was not responded to by the J.A.G. branch P.A.F. Headquarter---However, despite that applicant/accused never put his appearance before the Court, nor was represented by any counsel---Instead of appearing before the Trial Court and proceeding with the trial, the applicant/accused moved an application under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C., for his premature acquittal through his advocate which was dismissed and the said order was assailed before the High Court by means of filing a Cr. Misc. Application, which was also dismissed---In the said judgment too the High Court highlighted the conduct of the applicant/accused---Trial Court had also highlighted the unwarranted conduct of the applicant/accused in pursuing the case---In fact, the complaint under S. 3 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, was filed in the year 2018 and about 06 years had passed, however, the matter could not be disposed of on account of unwarranted conduct and attitude of the proposed accused---Record showed that after taking cognizance, Trial Court repeatedly issued summons to the accused but he deliberately failed to appear---When the proceedings under Ss. 87 & 88, Cr.P.C., were initiated against the accused then he appeared and surrendered before the Trial Court---Charge was framed on 30.11.2022 and the evidence of complainant and one witness had been recorded---From perusal of the record it also appeared that all the registered documents relating to the subject property had been verified in favour of the complainant---Verification reports depicted that all such documents produced by the complainant were genuine and had been issued from the concerned office/department---Provisions of S. 7 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, could be pressed, if during the Trial Court was satisfied that the accused/respondents were in unlawful possession---Petition filed by accused was dismissed, in circumstances. Atta Rasool and 3 others v. Haji Muhammad Rafique and 2 others 2019 PCr.LJ 1023 and Noorullah v. Muhammad Farrukh and 4 others 2023 YLR Note 9 rel. Kashif Hanif for Applicant (in Criminal Revision Application No. 25 of 2024) and for Respondent No.1 Criminal Revision Application No. 229 of 2024. Khaleeq Ahmed, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan, Rafique Ahmed Rajori, Additional Advocate General, Sindh and Zahoor Shah, Addl. P.G. Sindh for the State. Amjad Hussain Qureshi for Pakistan Air Force JAG for the Applicant (in Criminal Revision Application No. 229 of 2024). Umar Farooq for Respondent (in Criminal Revision Application No. 25 of 2024) and for Respondent No. 2, (in Criminal Revision Application No. 229 of 2024). Date of hearing: 1st March, 2025.

Summary: Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Maintenance allowance---Scope---Medical treatment-- -Petitioner/father of minor contended that law did not identify "medical treatment" under the head of maintenance---Validity---Word 'maintenance' in the context of Muslim family laws, as far as wife and children are concerned, is inclusive of many heads not explained but is not exhaustive---Maintenance cannot be limited by cap and has to be looked into with reference to each case---If medical treatment either for a wife or minor does not fall within the definition of maintenance, then no husband would take either his wife or children for medical treatment and those dependents (under the law) would then be deprived of such maintenance allowance---Maintenance in such context has a wide definition and is inclusive of every possible action for the wellbeing of children and wife, but within means---Medical treatment cannot be scrapped from definition of maintenance and cannot be disregarded as one of the components to be considered as part of maintenance---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Azizah Mohd, et al., Muslim Wifes Rights To Maintenance: Husbands Duty To Maintain A Working Wife In Islamic Law (2010) 18 IIUMLJ 103; MUSLIM_WIFE'S_RIGHTS_TO_MAINTENANCE_H USBAND'S_ DUTY_ TO_ MAINTAIN_ A_ WORKING_ WIFE_ IN_ ISLAMIC_ LAW_ AND_ THE_ LAW_ IN _ MALAYSIA Al-Mubarakpuri, Tuhfat al-Ahwadhi bi Sharh Jamia Altarmidhi, Second Edition, Vol. 4, Maktabat al-Salafiyyah, Medina (1965), p. 326; . kalamullah.com/Books/Hadith/Jami%20at-Tirmidhi%20Vol.%204%20-%201897-2605.pdf.Qudrat Ullah v. Additional District Judge, Renala Khud District Okara and others PLD 2024 SC 581; Haseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Begum and others PLD 2022 SC 686 and Humayun Hassan v. Arslan Humayun and another PLD 2013 SC 557 rel. Ch. Zulfiqar Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (Via video-link from Lahore). Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 18th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Sale of Goods Act (III of 1930)--- ----S. 4---Sale---Connotation---Sale occurs when ownership of goods is transferred to buyer and payment for such goods has been made---Payment must take the form of money, commonly referred to as price of goods---If ownership of goods is exchanged for anything other than money, such transaction cannot be classified as a sale; instead, it would be considered an exchange or barter. (b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 112(1), 153(7)(iii), 169 & 177---Amended assessment---Transfer of raw material---Pre-conditions of sale---Taxation officer interpreted transaction concerning transfer of raw materials as a sale and assessed the same under section 169 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Order of Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, setting aside amended assessment was maintained by High Court---Validity---Sale of goods as elucidated by section 153 (7) (iii) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 encompasses any transaction in which goods are sold, irrespective of whether payment is made in cash or on credit, and is applicable regardless of the existence of a formal written contract---According to such definition, it is mandated that a sale must involve receipt of consideration, which can be either cash or credit---There was absence of such critical element of consideration with respect to transactions in question---Transactions documented in ledgers merely represented a straightforward transfer of raw materials from one entity to another and was devoid of any characteristics of a sale---Tax obligations outlined in section 153 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 did not pertain to transfer of raw materials to sister concern---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused. Ahmad Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video link from Branch Registry Lahore). Nemo for Respondent. Date of hearing: 15th January, 2025.

Summary: ----S. 302(b)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 537---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Procedural lapses---Fair trial---Scope---Right to a competent and adequately prepared counsel---Accused was charged for committing murder of his wife by strangulating her---Record showed that the matter was transferred to the Trial Court on 23-01-2020---On the same day, the Trial Court recorded the depositions of the complainant and an eye-witness, however, their cross-examinations were deferred due to the absence of the appellant's original defence counsel, who had cited health concerns---Case was then adjourned to 01-02-2020, but on that date, defence counsel remained absent---Instead, an advocate assigned to represent the pauper accused appeared before the Court---Record did not confirm whether said advocate was appointed or provided with the case documents or granted sufficient time to prepare for the defense---Despite that, the Trial Court proceeded to conduct cross-examinations of complainant and an eye-witness, and record the depositions of the remaining five prosecution witnesses---All the said witnesses were cross-examined by the said advocate on the same day---Notably, the case diary indicated that original defence counsel later submitted a statement withdrawing his Vakalatnama---Sudden assumption of defense responsibilities by an advocate without documented access to the case files or adequate preparation time, rendered the cross-examinations ineffective and merely perfunctory---Said failure directly compromised the appellant's right to effective legal representation, particularly in a capital punishment case---Withdrawal of Vakalatnama of original defence counsel and the subsequent appointment of an advocate were executed without judicial scrutiny or the appellant's explicit consent, thereby violating the right to counsel of choice under Article 10-A of the Constitution---Right to a fair trial entailed not only access to legal representation but also the right to competent and adequately prepared counsel---Procedural lapses in the case reduced the trial to a mere formality, depriving the appellant of a meaningful defence---Absence of proper preparation in cross-examinations resulted in miscarriage of justice---It was a fundamental right of every accused to be represented by legal counsel of their own choice---In cases involving capital punishment, the law mandated that the accused must be provided with legal representation and in situations where the accused could not afford a lawyer, the State bore the responsibility of covering the legal expenses---Accordingly, the Sessions Court or Special Court was duty-bound to appoint a legal practitioner at the State's expense to defend the accused---Procedure adopted by the Trial Court was irregular and unlawful and such defects could not be cured under S. 537, Cr.P.C.---No evidence was on record to indicate that the cross- examinations of the prosecution witnesses were conducted by a duly authorized counsel representing the appellant---Instead, the record merely reflected that an advocate, whose formal appointment was not documented anywhere in the case files, undertook the cross-examinations---Such fact raised a strong presumption that the cross-examinations were either not conducted properly or not conducted at all, especially given the fact that on 01-02-2020, the court recorded the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and also conducted the cross-examinations of seven prosecution witnesses on the same day---Furthermore, there was no mention in the record of whether the subsequent appearance of appointed advocate was properly appointment or was provided with the necessary case documents or given adequate time to prepare---Such concern was particularly critical since his appointment coincided with the same day on which the prosecution evidence was recorded---Defense counsel played a pivotal role in safeguarding an accused's rights, including raising objections to improper questions, challenging the admissibility of evidence and ensuring that the accused received a fair trial---When an accused is deprived of competent legal representation or when a defence counsel is appointed without proper preparation, it severely undermines the fairness of the trial---Said issue becomes even more critical in cases where capital punishment is at stake, as the right to effective legal representation is a fundamental constitutional and legal safeguard---In the light of said deficiencies, the appellant's conviction and sentence could not be sustained, which was set aside and case was remanded for de novo trial and decision afresh---Appeal was partly allowed. Shafique Ahmed alias Shahjee v. The State PLD 2006 Kar. 377 and Abdul Ghafoor v. The State 2011 SCMR 23 rel. Akbar Ali Dahar for Appellant. Aitbar Ali Bullo, D.P.G. for the State. Date of hearing: 8th April, 2025.

Summary: ----Art. 9A---Right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment - Deforestation---Adverse effects---Forests, importance of---Forest cover in Pakistan has been rapidly decreasing, suggesting complicity and/or negligence of the Forest Department, which is supposed to protect forests---Deforestation results in unprecedented land-slides and flooding, and the diminishing forest cover is not sufficient to enable the sequestering of the green house gas emissions caused by burning fossils fuels, which exacerbates the effect of climate change, the consequences of which are suffered by the people---Pakistan is amongst the countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change---However, the Forest Department appears to view forests as a resource to be exploited which was a policy of the former colonizers---Future of the people of Pakistan depends in having adequate forest cover---Existing dwindling forests must be preserved and efforts should be made to stop deforestation---A viable future is dependent on preserving and conserving the environment and adopting sustainable environmental practices---Forests are natural rainfall catchment areas, and they also ensure against flooding and avalanches---Rain water flowing in to the streams and rivers must not be polluted---Unfortunately and regrettably sewage and industrial waste are released into water bodies killing the life bearing quality of water---Effects of deforestation and pollution long outlast lives---Trees are equally important in sequestering green house gases released by burning fossils fuels---Environment has been placed as a Fundamental Right (i.e. Article 9A) in the Constitution and its significance and importance must be brought to bear on everyone and effective preservation measures be taken. (b) Practice and procedure--- ----Every document filed in Court must have name of the person who submits/files it. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 9 & 9A---Right to life---Scope---Clean, healthy, and sustainable environment---Life worth living is one having a sustainable environment. Shah Faisal Ilyas, Additional Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa along with Sajid, Aman, SDFO, Forest Department on Court's Notice for Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Date of hearing: 24th October, 2024.