Summary: (a) National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act (XXX of 2016)--- ----S. 21---National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (Service) Regulations, 2021---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Declaration---Petitioner assailed appointment of respondent to the post of Director Strategy Management Office---Plea raised by authorities was that petition was not maintainable as post in question was non-statutory---Validity---Relief claimed was declaration that actions of authorities leading to creation of post in question and hiring of respondent to such office were illegal and ultra vires the provisions of National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act, 2016 and National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Service Regulations, 2021---Objection that office in question was not a public office was irrelevant---Objection was overruled in circumstances. Ghulam Murtaza v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 PLC (C.S) 1188 rel. (b) National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act (XXX of 2016)--- ----S. 21---National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (Service) Regulations, 2021---Notification SRO No.346(I)/2024 dated 25-01-2024---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Aggrieved person---Scope---Principle of locus poenitentiae---Applicability---Petitioner assailed appointment of respondent to the post of Director Strategy Management Office---Plea raised by authorities was that the petitioner was not an aggrieved person, therefore, petition was not maintainable---Validity---Recruitment process was tailored for such purpose and respondent was appointed as Director SMO without written test and transparent recruitment process such as the one that petitioner participated in, and the respondent was appointed to a post higher than that held by petitioner---Petitioner qualified the test of an aggrieved person for the purposes of Art. 199 of the Constitution---Creation of post in question without approval of Board, prescriptions of TORs for such post prescribing a minimum age less than the age prescribed for the office of Director in NPG-1 under National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (Service) Regulations, 2021, act of publishing Amended Regulations in the Official Gazette without presenting the same to NEECA Board and seeking its approval, together with stand-alone manner in which recruitment for the post of Director SMO was carried out in contrast to other posts during phase-1 of recruitment in NEECA involving IBA, all of which cumulatively tainted the recruitment process---Recruitment criteria and maximum age for the post of Director Strategy Management Office were prescribed in a mala fide manner to tailor recruitment process to benefit certain individual---Post of Director SMO was never legally created and terms and conditions for such position were never prescribed---Appointment of respondent was illegal, who had discharged services against the post of Director Strategy Management Office---Doctrine of locus poenitentiae could not protect illegal appointment of respondent---High Court declined to make any order regarding recovery which could not be affected from respondent for services that he had discharged while holding the office prior to issuance of a declaration that his appointment was illegal---High Court declared appointment of respondent together with creation of post of Director Strategy Management Office to be unlawful and of no legal effect---High Court also declared that Notification SRO No.346(I)/2024 dated 25-01-2024 was devoid of legal authority having never been approved by the NEECA Board---High Court directed that management of NEECA should not continue to act in breach of National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority Act, 2016 and National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (Service) Regulations, 2021---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances. Ghulam Murtaza v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 PLC (C.S) 1188; Shahid Mehmood v. BISP (2024 PLC (C.S) 1103; Engineer-in-Chief Branch v. Jalaluddin PLD 1992 SC 207; Shams-ur-Rehman v. Military Accountant General 2020 SCMR 188; Mst. Sajida Javed v. Director of Secondary Education 2007 PLC (C.S.) 364 and Shahbaz Latif v. DIG Pakistan Railways Headquarters PLD 2025 SC 560 rel. Raja Adnan Aslam for Petitioner. Fahad Khan Tareen, Assistant Attorney General. Jameel Hussain Qureshi along with Ali Ata Hashmi, Assistant Director, National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority. Qamar ul Haq Khan Niazi for Respondent No.4. Zafar Ullah Khan, Law Officer, Power Division. Date of hearing: 7th May, 2025.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 199 & 212---Civil service---Disciplinary proceeding against civil servant, challenging of--- Invoking const itutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Mala fide alleged by civil servant---Effect---Petitioner (Officer Inland Revenue) challenged the Fact Finding Inquiry Report recommending disciplinary proceeding alleging that ongoing disciplinary proceeding was tainted with mala fide---Arguments of the petitioner, invoking constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, was that no final order was passed, hence, no department remedy was available---Validity---As per the Fact Finding Inquiry Report disciplinary action against the petitioner had been recommended together with other officials of the respondents-FBR, including Commissioners and Additional Commissioners ; which (the second set of proceeding) initiated by respondents-FBR eventually was under challenge before the concerned forum---Constitutional bar under Art.212 of the constitution will exclude judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution, if the issue was about the terms and conditions of service of any civil servant---Argument of the petitioner (that no final order was passed, hence, no department remedy was available) was also not tenable, because, disciplinary proceeding being sub judice had not been concluded---No justification to interfere in the ongoing disciplinary proceeding was made out, however, competent authority shall conclude the disciplinary proceeding expeditiously, and should take into account the factors raised---Petition was disposed of. Ahmad Ullah and others v. District Education Officer (Male), Buner and others 2024 SCMR 2004 ref. M.A. Rahman v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1988 SCMR 691 and Syed Muhammad Abbas Rizvi and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment Division, Islamabad and others 2014 PLC (C.S.) 1363 distinguished. Zamir Hussain Ghumro and Faizan Hussain Memon for Petitioner. Muhammad Akbar Khan, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan for Respondent No.1. Mukesh Kumar Khatri for Respondent No.4. Date of hearing: 16th October, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Employee of District judiciary---Disciplinary proceedings---Show-cause notice, assailing of---Constitutional petition--Maintainability---Petitioner was alleged to have secured employment on the basis of forged documents---Petitioner assailed final show-cause notice issued to him by authorities during departmental disciplinary proceedings---Validity---Show-cause notice, whether initial or final, was not amenable to Constitutional jurisdiction unless it was shown to be a nullity in law---Issuance of show-cause notice was a procedural step intended to afford the employee an opportunity to explain his conduct and did not by itself constitute adverse determination of rights---Constitutional Courts do not sit as appellate forums over departmental inquiries---Petitioner was to exhaust remedies available under service rules, including right to reply, personal hearing and appeal, when the adverse order was passed---Premature judicial intervention undermined disciplinary framework and set a deleterious precedent for circumventing lawful accountability---Mere show-cause notice filed at a stage when no final determination had been made, failed to meet threshold of maintainability under Art. 199 of the Constitution---High Court declined to interfere in the matter as it was premature, misconceived, legally deficient and factually unsubstantiated---High Court directed the competent authority to proceed with the disciplinary inquiry strictly in accordance with the law, ensuring due process and affording petitioner a fair defence opportunity---Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly. (b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)--- ----S.21---Locus poenitentiae, principle of---Scope---Provision of S. 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897, provides a statutory basis for revisiting prior administrative orders---Power to issue orders includes power to amend, vary, or rescind them, provided such exercise is undertaken in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as the original order---Provision of S. 21 General Clauses Act, 1897 empowers competent authority to reopen a matter where new and credible evidence emerges, especially in fraud or misrepresentation cases. Muhammad Ali Pirzado for Petitioner. Liaquat Ali Shar, Additional Advocate, General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 27th October, 2025.

Summary: Balochistan Local Government (Election) Rules, 2013--- ----R.63(7)---Elections for the post of Chairman, District Council---Tie in votes between the two candidates---Draw of lots to determine outcome in tied-vote election---Scope---Plea that in event of tie of votes each successful candidate will serve a half-term---Legality---Brief facts were that the petitioner filed present constitutional petition challenging the notification, whereby, respondent No.5 was declared the Chairman, District Council, arising out of local government elections conducted under the Balochistan Local Government (Election) Rules, 2013, where the petitioner and Respondent No.5 had polled equal votes and the Returning Officer held a draw of lots---Question for determination before the High Court was as to “whether, in a tied-vote election, the draw of lots could lawfully decide a single winner for the full term under the 2013 Rules?”---Held: In case of equal votes between the contested candidates for the Chairman of the District Council, the returning officer had to conduct a draw of lots in presence of witnesses---Returning officer was further required to record the procedure in the election register, obtaining the signatures and thumb impressions of the candidates as proof that the draw was conducted transparently and in their presence---Consequently, the winning candidate was to be elected for the full term---Petitioners plea/claim lacked legal foundation---No infirmity or perversity was found in the election process---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Habib-ur-Rehman Baloch for Petitioner. Zahoor Ahmed Baloch, Additional A.G., Anwar Naseem Kasi, D.A.G. and Ali Jan Tarak, Law Officer, Provincial Election Commissioner, Quetta for Official Respondents. Shabbir Ahmed Sherani for Respondent No. 5. Date of hearing: 6th October, 2025.

Summary: A claim of maintenance by dependent parents against their sons, being a family dispute rooted in familial obligations, squarely falls within the domain of "family affairs" and is therefore well within the jurisdiction of the Family Court. To read Entry No.3 as confined only to wife and child would be to read into the statute a restriction that the legislature consciously omitted. 176C.O. (Commercial) 78664/24 Fatima Fertilizer Company Limited & 1 other Vs . . Mr. Justice Ch. Sultan Mahmood 24- 10- 2025 2025 LHC 7187

Summary: (a) Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 ---- ----S. 13—Talb-i-Muwathibat—Immediacy and substance of declaration—Form not prescribed but intent must be unequivocal—Plaintiff claimed that upon receiving information of the sale at 07:00 a.m. on 07-06-2001 he made Talb-i-Muwathibat; informer (PW-3) stated he learnt of the sale at his uncle’s dera with 15–20 houses between that dera and plaintiff’s, indicating lapse of time before any intimation—Further, the plaintiff’s utterance, as proved (“… بس خواہش ظاہر کی …”), reflected only a desire to pre-empt, not a clear, immediate assertion of the right—Held, requirements of S. 13 were not met; mere expression of desire is insufficient and the immediacy stood compromised. (b) Pre-emption—Proof of talbs—Standard—Where evidence creates doubt about whether Talb-i-Muwathibat was promptly and properly made, the doubt enures to the benefit of the vendee—Plaintiff failed to discharge the onus to prove a valid and immediate Talb-i-Muwathibat on the facts. (c) Civil procedure—Concurrent findings—Interference—Where courts below misapplied S. 13 or relied on doubtful proof of the foundational talb, interference is warranted—Concurrent decrees for pre-emption set aside. Held, that the plaintiff did not prove a valid Talb-i-Muwathibat; benefit of doubt goes to the vendees. Petition converted into appeal and allowed; judgments and decrees of the courts below set aside; pre-emption suit dismissed, no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Customs Act ( IV of 1969)- (b) Customs Act ( IV of 1969)- (c) Customs Act ( IV of 1969)-

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]- Cotman v. Brougham [1918] AC 514, [1918-19] All ER Rep 265, [1918] UKHL 358; Re Introductions Ltd. [1968] 2 All ER 1221; [1969] 1 All ER 887; Anglo Overseas Agencies Ltd. v. Green and another [1960] 3 All ER 244 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Merchant Navy Club 2004 PTD 1304 ref. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Muhammad Abdur Rauf Khan PLD 1963 SC 209; Hamdard Dawakhana v. Commissioner of Income Tax PLD 1980 SC 84 and Fauji Foundation v. Shamimur Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457 rel. (b) Interpretation of statutes- -Fiscal statute-Exemption clause-Application and interpretation-Firstly, the onus lies on the taxpayer to show that his case comes within the exemption-Secondly, if two reasonable interpretations are possible the one against the taxpayer will be adopted-But, thirdly, if the taxpayer’s case comes fairly within the scope of the exemption then he cannot be denied the benefit of the same on the basis of any supposed intention to the contrary of the legislature or authority granting it. Oxford University Press v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2019 SCMR 235 rel. (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]- -Second Sched. Pt.1, Cl.93-Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Second Sched., Pt.1, Cl.59-Income tax-Exemption-Essential elements / components-The exemption clause can be said to contain three-elements-The income for which exemption is sought (i) must be from-investments in securities of the Federal Government and house property-; (ii) either the said sources of income or the income itself must be-held under trust or other legal obligations wholly, or in part only, for religious or charitable purposes-; and (iii) the income must be-actually applied or finally set apart for application thereto-.

Summary: (Against order dated 08.11.2022 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.P. No. D-5641 of /2022). (a) Customs Act ( IV of 1969)--- ----S. 27A---Customs Rules, 2001, R.592---Mutilation of consignment (goods)---Type/Kind of imported goods (“rollers”) not identified in relevant list---Scope and effect---Request moved by the importer for mutilation of consignment (goods) was turned down vide Order-in-Original on the ground that the consignment of “rollers” does not qualify for mutilation under Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1969 (‘the Act 1969’) for not being identified in list given under Rule 592 of the Customs Rules, 2001(‘the Rules, 2001’); however, the High Court allowed said request---Validity---Section 27A of the Act 1969 allows mutilation or scrapping of goods as are notified by the Federal Board of Revenue (Board) and in the manner as prescribed by the Rules 2001; only such goods which are found in consonance with the said requirement shall be subjected to duty on such rates as may be applicable to the goods as if they had been imported in the mutilated form or as scrapped---The list available under Rule 592 of the Rules 2001 is restricted and not inclusive of “any other item ” except those identified therein---Rule 592 was subjected to few amendments and omissions, however, the “rollers” were never identified by the said Rule in any form (serviceable/unserviceable)---Rule 592 of the Customs Rules, 2001 appears to suggest that it is restricted and not inclusive of other items---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned order passed by the High Court; consequently the order of rejection for mutilation, stood restored---Petition for leave to appeal, filed by Collectorate, was converted into appeal and allowed accordingly. (b) Customs Act ( IV of 1969)--- ----S. 27A---Customs Rules, 2001, R. 592---Mutilation of consignment (goods)---Form of goods (i.e. serviceable or unserviceable)---Request moved by the importer for mutilation of consignment (goods) was turned down vide Order-in-Original; however, the High Court allowed said request observing that the goods (the rollers) were imported in unserviceable conditions---Validity---Observation of the High Court was misconceived for the reason that it was never the case of the respondent/importer that the goods were imported in unserviceable condition---The outright request for the mutilation by the importer itself suggested that those goods were serviceable goods and hence ought to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1969, read with Rule 592 of the Customs Rules, 2001---Rule 592 provides that the “identified goods” (old and new items) if imported in serviceable conditions along-with scrap consignment or imported separately as scrap and found serviceable, may be mutilated and scrapped as the case may be within the meaning of Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1969; said Rule is then followed by short list identifying the categories of good; the rollers admittedly were not included---As for as impugned order was concerned that the mutilation rule was not applicable, was totally contrary to the facts of the case---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned order passed by the High Court; consequently the order of rejection for mutilation, stood restored---Petition for leave to appeal , filed by Collectorate, was converted into appeal and allowed accordingly. (c) Customs Act ( IV of 1969)--- ----S. 27A---Customs Rules ,2001, R. 592---S.R.O.450(I)/2001 dated 18.06.2001---Mutilation of consignment (goods)---Type/Kind of imported goods (“rollers”) not identified in relevant list---Scope and effect---Request moved by the importer for mutilation of consignment (goods) was turned down vide Order-in-Original on the ground that the consignment of “rollers” did not qualify for mutilation under Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1969 (‘the Act 1969’) for not being identified in list given under Rule 592 of the Customs Rules, 2001 (‘the Rules, 2001’); however, the High Court allowed said request observing that “decades old rule which includes the list of 9 items is beyond comprehension not to re-use thousands of other unserviceable items which could be imported for re-use of the material, which could be an important step towards achieving better and green environment, which aspect could not be ruled out”---Validity---The Rules, 2001, specially Rule 592 has undergone many changes and it cannot be said that the Legislature and/or FBR were not conscious about the list and its contents---Had it been the intention of Legislature, as opined by the High Court, there was no wisdom in providing list of “goods” with the Rule 592 of the Rules 2001---Rule 592 of the Rules 2001was amended from time to time such as on 27.06.2011, 08.08.2017 and it was lastly amended through S.R.O. 1540(I)/2018 dated 21.12. 2018 which shows the consciousness---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned order passed by the High Court; consequently the order of rejection for mutilation, stood restored---Petition for leave to appeal, filed by Collectorate, was converted into appeal and allowed accordingly. Muhammad Khalil Dogar, Advocate Supreme Court, K.A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record, Saad Atta Rabbani, Additional Collector and Farhad Ullah, Deputy Collector for Petitioner [through video-link from Karachi]. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 24th October, 2025.

Summary: (Against judgment/order dated 08.05.2023 and 06.05.2024 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Income Tax Cases Nos. 633 to 638 of 2001 and Income Tax Reference Application No. 220 of 2008, respectively). (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]--- ----Second Sched., Pt.1, Cl. 93---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Second Sched., Pt.1, Cl. 59---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)---Income tax exemptions---Scope and preconditions---Essential elements and components---Charitable purpose---Meaning, extent and application---Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited filed seven connected civil petitions arising from income tax assessments for tax years 1993-94 to 1998-99 under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and tax year 2003 under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, in which the appellate tribunal had earlier allowed exemption on income from ‘house property’ under clause (93) of the Second Schedule (1979 Ordinance) and clause (59) (2001 Ordinance), but the High Court later reversed those findings---Core issue befor e the Supreme Court was “whether the petitioner was legally entitled to income-tax exemption by establishing that its income was derived from house property held under legal obligation for charitable purposes and was actually applied or finally set apart for such charitable application”?---Held: Insofar as the first “element” for exemption from tax was concerned, it appeared to be clear that the income in question was derived from “house property”---Therefore it was appropriate to move on to the second “element”, which had been the principal point of dispute between the parties---This itself could be regarded as having two “sub-components”: (i) the income must be held under trust or “other legal obligations”, which must (ii) be “wholly, or in part only, for … charitable purposes” (it being common ground that no “religious” purposes were involved in the case)---It was not enough for the petitioner simply to show that the sub-clause was a “charitable purpose” as the exemption clause required that the sources of income or the income be held under some “legal obligation”, either wholly or in part, for a “charitable purpose”---Sub-clause (2) could be regarded as a “charitable purpose” within the meaning of the definition clause---Therefore, while disagreeing with the High Court, Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner’s situation, in the facts and circumstances of the case, came within the definition clause---An examination of the order of the tribunal showed that there was no affirmative and actual finding of fact that the income in question was either actually applied or “finally” set aside for purposes of achieving the objects set out in sub-clause (2)---The entire discussion related to a matter of law, i.e., whether the sub-clause in question could be regarded as a “charitable purpose”---A finding in favor of the petitioner was recorded in this regard, but that was not enough---The tribunal also had to apply its mind as to whether the third “element” of the exemption clause existed during the periods in question and absent any such finding the benefit of the exemption clause could not be extended to the petitioner---In our view, while the finding of the tribunal might have sufficed for purposes of the second “element” of the exemption clause, it was wholly deficient for the third “element”---The reasoning appeared simply to amount to this: that because the second “element” was found to exist therefore the third was equally found to (or must) exist---But, the tribunal failed to appreciate that while the determination of the second “element” was a question of law (or perhaps a mixed question of law and fact) the third “element” was a separate requirement, which was only a question of fact---The existence of the one could not, and did not, inevitably, as seemed to have been concluded by the tribunal, lead to the other---To conclude that the one existed did not show or mean that the other did as well---The positive obligation that lay on the petitioner in this regard was not discharged---And since the tribunal was the last finder of fact the exercise in relation to the third “element” could not be carried out by either the High Court (which in any case decided against the petitioner) or the Supreme Court---This deficiency was fatal for the petitioner’s case---Even when the exemption clause was viewed in its totality the last portion thereof had to be clearly established, at the latest, by or before the final forum designated to determine questions of fact---This was patently not the situation at hand---Petitioner had failed to make out a case for entitlement to the exemption clause---Leave to appeal was refused and the petitions were dismissed, in circumstances. Cotman v. Brougham [1918] AC 514, [1918-19] All ER Rep 265, [1918] UKHL 358; Re Introductions Ltd. [1968] 2 All ER 1221; [1969] 1 All ER 887; Anglo Overseas Agencies Ltd. v. Green and another [1960] 3 All ER 244 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Merchant Navy Club 2004 PTD 1304 ref. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Muhammad Abdur Rauf Khan PLD 1963 SC 209; Hamdard Dawakhana v. Commissioner of Income Tax PLD 1980 SC 84 and Fauji Foundation v. Shamimur Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457 rel. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal statute---Exemption clause---Application and interpretation---Firstly, the onus lies on the taxpayer to show that his case comes within the exemption---Secondly, if two reasonable interpretations are possible the one against the taxpayer will be adopted---But, thirdly, if the taxpayer’s case comes fairly within the scope of the exemption then he cannot be denied the benefit of the same on the basis of any supposed intention to the contrary of the legislature or authority granting it. Oxford University Press v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2019 SCMR 235 rel. (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]--- ----Second Sched. Pt.1, Cl.93---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Second Sched., Pt.1, Cl.59---Income tax---Exemption---Essential elements / components---The exemption clause can be said to contain three “elements”---The income for which exemption is sought (i) must be from “investments in securities of the Federal Government and house property”; (ii) either the said sources of income or the income itself must be “held under trust or other legal obligations wholly, or in part only, for religious or charitable purposes”; and (iii) the income must be “actually applied or finally set apart for application thereto”. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner (in all cases via video-link, Karachi). Munawar Ali Memon, Advocate Supreme Court, Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record, M. Masood, Additional Commissioner, (via video-link, Karachi) and Dr. Ishtiaq, D.G. (Law) for Respondents. Date of hearing: 21st April, 2025.