Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: PLJ 2020 Lahore (Note) 172 ---Punjab Partition of Immovable Property Act, 2012 - Section 4 ---Legal Issues: --Partition of Jointly Owned Property and Local Commission Report - The petitioners challenged the lower court’s decision to issue a preliminary decree for partition based on the local commission’s report, arguing that the jointly owned property measuring 9 marlas and 3 sersahi could not be divided equitably among 27 co-owners. --Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction - The court clarified that its revisional jurisdiction is limited to correcting errors of fact and law, not re-evaluating decisions on discretionary matters of partition when subordinate courts have adhered to due process. ----Ruling: The court dismissed the revision petition, affirming that the lower courts acted appropriately in issuing judgments and decrees for partition, as the petitioners failed to demonstrate any jurisdictional error or illegality. ----Cited Precedents: 2007 SCMR 236, 2011 SCMR 762 ----Judgment Result: Revision petition dismissed. -----Background: This case concerns a property partition under Section 4 of the Punjab Partition of Immovable Property Act, 2012. A suit for partition was initiated by one of the co-owners for property jointly owned by 27 individuals. Following a preliminary decree and a report from a local commission, the trial court issued a final decree. Two of the co-owners challenged the partition mode, leading the appellate court to remand the case with instructions for appointing a fresh local commission. The new commission recommended a mode of partition that allocated portions jointly to groups of co-owners. Despite some objections regarding the infeasibility of joint ownership among so many parties, the trial court upheld the final decree, which the appellate court also affirmed. -----Issues: 1- Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in decreeing a partition arrangement for a property shared among 27 co-owners, given the practical difficulties in its division. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court dismissed the revision petition, concluding that: The property, measuring 9 marlas 3 sersahi, was impractical to divide among 27 co-owners in a feasible manner. The revisional jurisdiction's scope is limited to correcting factual and legal errors made by subordinate courts. Here, the court found no jurisdictional error, illegality, or significant oversight in the decisions of the lower courts. Both the trial and appellate courts had carefully considered the matter, and there was no basis to justify interference under the revisional jurisdiction’s restricted scope. -----Citations/Precedents: Aurangzeb Through L.Rs. and others vs. Muhammad Jafar (2007 SCMR 236) Bashir Ahmed vs. Ghulam Rasool (2011 SCMR 762)

Summary: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)- -S. 13(1), Explanation-Suit for pre-emption-Talb-i-Muwathibat, making of-Two hour delay in making the demand of Talb-i-Muwathibat-Such delay was fatal to a pre-emption suit. The Explanation to subsection (1) of section 13 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987 stated that, Talb-i-Muwathibat 'means immediate demand by the preemptor in the sitting or meeting (Majlis) in which he has come to know of the sale declaring his intention to exercise the right of pre-emption.' The use of the word immediate was significant and could not be undermined; a delay of two hours in making the demand of Talb-i-Muwathibat was not an immediate demand and such delay was fatal to a successful claim of pre-emption. Abdul Latif v. Dil Mir 2010 SCMR 1087 distinguished. In the present case the pre-emptor stated that he had made the demand at 5 pm but his two witnesses stated that they had informed him about the sale at 3 pm, which was when the demand for Talb-i-Muwathibat should have been made. The two hours delay in making the Talb-i-Muwathibat demand was fatal to the pre-emption suit because it was not made in terms of the said law, that is, immediately. Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 203-D-Federal Shariat Court, jurisdiction of-Scope-Mandate as per Art. 203-D of the Constitution is to answer questions as to whether a particular law or provisions of law is or is not repugnant to injunctions of the Holy Quran and Sunnah of Holy Prophet (peace and blessing of Allah be upon him). (b) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)- -Ss.7 & 25-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.203-D-Shariat petition-Custody of minor-Natural guardian-Rights-Petitioner contended that provisions of Ss.7 & 25 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, were anti-people, inhuman and un-Islamic as the same were to deprive natural guardian-Validity-Held, neither any law was enacted under S.25 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, nor it had prescribed any rule, rather it regulated situation where a ward was to leave or was removed from custody of a guardian of his person and natural/certified guardian moved Court for return of the ward-Title of guardianship did not entitle the guardian for return of custody of minor, unless he/she would establish that return of ward was in the interest of minor-Principle that father was natural guardian and lap of mother was cradle of God, was subservient and subordinate to welfare of minor as contemplated by S.25 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, which was also in accordance with Islamic Jurisprudence-Shariat petition was dismissed in circumstances. Ambreen Tariq Awan, Advocate v. Federal Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad PLJ 2013 MLD 1885 and Rahimullah Choudhury v. Mrs. Syeda Helali Begum and others 1974 SCMR 305 ref. Petitioners in person.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-- ----Ss. 9(2) & 22--Bankers Book Evidence Act, 1891, S. 2(8)--Suit for recovery--Dismissed-- Statement of account--Non-availability of date and name of manager of bank on statement of account--Non-speaking judgment--Challenge to--Suit filed by Bank was merely dismissed for reason that date and name of manager was not available on statement of account, hence not certified under Act--No finding has been given by Banking Court on leave application filed by respondent--Therefore, on face of it, impugned judgment is non-speaking and not sustainable--Appeal allowed. [Pp. 556 & 557] A, B & C

Summary: Dismissed because of being frivolous.

Summary: Dismissed because of being frivolous.

Summary: Dismissed because of being frivolous.