Summary: (a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----Ss.11, 28 & 31(3)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115---Agreement for Package-2, ‘Orange line metro train project’---Arbitration clause---Reference to arbitral tribunal---Application for bifurcation/separate adjudication of multiple sub-claims, dismissal of---Interlocutory order of arbitral tribunal---Challenge before the civil court, legality of---Judicial non-interference in ongoing arbitration---Scope---Expiry of initial arbitral period (four months where contract silent)---Effect---Order passed after expiry but before formal enlargement of time---Enlargement of time by court for making award, powers of---Where such enlargement is granted after statutory time-limit---Legality---Retrospective operation of enlargement of time---Scope---Facts: Lahore Development Authority (LDA) and respondent executed a contract for Package-2 of the Orange Line Metro Train Project containing an arbitration clause; upon disputes, arbitration proceedings commenced before an arbitral tribunal where the respondent filed multiple sub-claims, and LDA applied to the tribunal for separation/bifurcation and separate adjudication of each sub-claim; the tribunal dismissed that application, LDA challenged the said order before the civil court, which dismissed the challenge and affirmed the tribunal’s decision, leading the LDA to file present civil revision petition before the High Court---Issues:---(i) “Whether an interlocutory/procedural order of an arbitral tribunal (refusing bifurcation of sub-claims) was independently amenable to challenge before the civil court?”;(ii) “Whether the tribunal’s order, made after expiry of the initial arbitral period but before formal enlargement of time by court, was legally sustainable?”; and (iii) Whether petitioner’s application for separation and individual adjudication of sub-claims was rightly dismissed?”---Held: As regards issue (i); there was no independent substantive right to challenge each interlocutory or procedural order passed by the arbitral tribunal---The legislature’s deliberate omission of such a right in the Act of 1940 underscored the principle that the arbitral tribunal was considered to be the master of its own procedure, particularly where it was composed of technical experts best suited to manage complex factual and procedural issues---Thus, the petitioner’s application for separation of sub-claims constituted a challenge to the tribunal’s case management discretion, which was not permissible under the Act---As per the principle of judicial non-intervention, arbitration had to proceed without interruption or judicial oversight of interlocutory matters---The application filed by the petitioner before the civil court challenging the arbitral tribunal’s order dated was thus not maintainable and was rightly dismissed---Consequently, the present civil revision, being an extension of the same challenge, was also not maintainable---As regards issue (ii); where the extension in time was granted by court after the expiry of the original period but before the making of the award, the order operated retrospectively, thereby validating the proceedings conducted beyond the original time limit---Similarly, where the extension was granted after the making of the award, it encompassed the situation where the award was rendered after the expiry of time and the subsequent enlargement by the Court related back, rendering the award valid as if made within the extended period---In such circumstances, there could be no doubt that the extension of time operated retrospectively---As regards issue (iii); while subscribing to the principle of minimal judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings, High Court observed that the expert arbitral tribunal was the master of its own procedure---In the absence of any allegation of bias, violation of the principles of natural justice, or a demonstrable and grave prejudice that could not otherwise be compensated, a court should be loath to interfere with such procedural determinations---Therefore, on the merits of the application itself, High Court found no compelling reason to substitute its own view for that of the expert arbitrators---Impugned order was passed in accordance with law---Present civil revision petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Messrs National Construction Co. v. WAPDA PLD 1987 SC 461 and Civil Aviation Authority, Karachi v. KIST Consultants (Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore 1998 SCMR 2393 ref. (b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----S.11---Arbitral tribunal---Interlocutory / procedural order---Challenge before civil court---Permissibility---Whether an interlocutory order passed by an arbitral tribunal, which does not finally determine the rights of the parties, is amenable to challenge before a civil court---Permitting parties to approach civil courts to challenge every procedural or interlocutory order passed by a arbitral tribunal would defeat the very object of arbitration, opening the floodgates for recalcitrant parties to delay proceedings and transforming the arbitrator into a trial court and the Civil Court into a court of first appeal for every minor procedural decision---The scheme of the Act of 1940 reveals no provision granting a right to challenge interlocutory order---If, however, a party is genuinely aggrieved by an arbitrator’s conduct, such as undue delay, partiality or biased procedure, the appropriate remedy lies under S. 11 of the Act of 1940, which empowers the Court to remove an arbitrator or umpire in certain circumstances---Arbitration, as a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), provides a speedy, efficient and cost-effective substitute for conventional and often protracted litigation---Particularly in commercial and complex disputes, arbitration is preferred due to its procedural flexibility, technical expertise and finality---Accordingly, if a party alleges misconduct, undue delay or procedural impropriety, it may invoke the provisions of S. 11 ibid for removal of the arbitrator. Injum Aqeel v. Latif Muhammad Chaudhry and others 2023 SCMR 1361 rel. (c) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----S.28 & First Sched. Para 3---Arbitral tribunal---Power of court to enlarge time for making award---Situation where no time-frame is provided---Scope---In the contract between the parties where the arbitration clause does not specify the time-frame for completion of arbitration proceedings, para 3 of first Schedule of Arbitration Act, 1940 shall come into play which shows that a period of four months is prescribed for making the award, which commences either from the date the arbitrator enters upon the reference or from the date he is called upon to act by notice in writing---The court possesses the discretion to enlarge the time for making an award “from time to time.” (d) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----S.28---Arbitral award beyond prescribed time, issuing of---Enlargement of time by court---Where such enlargement is granted after statutory time-limit---Order passed after expiry but before formal enlargement of time---Legality---Retrospective validation---Scope---Where award was given by arbitrator beyond period of limitation either prescribed by Arbitration Act itself or any rules or bye-laws or provided in agreement by which parties were governed, same could be extended by court either before or after giving of award as court had unfettered discretion under S. 28 of the Act to extend period of limitation---Moreover, extension of time granted under S. 28 of the Arbitration Act would operate retrospectively. Province of Sindh and 4 others v. Waseem Construction Co.' 1991 CLC 66 and Messrs Everest Corporation v. Messrs Dacca Mercantile Company, Karachi and 4 others 1993 MLD 1303 ref. (e) Estoppel--- ----Principle---A party cannot approbate and reprobate---A party cannot participate in proceedings or hold its peace while awaiting a potential favourable outcome and then, upon an adverse ruling, opportunistically challenge the very jurisdiction it had tacitly affirmed. WAPDA and another v. Messrs Khanzada Muhammad Abdul Haque Khan Khattak and Company PLD 1990 SC 359 rel. Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation v. Messrs Sheikh Muhammad Latif and another 1999 M L D 2773 ref. Sahabzada Muzaffar Ali for Petitioner. Bakhtawar Bilal Soofi for Respondent No.1. M. Waleed Waheed Ch., Registrar of Arbitral Tribunal, in person. Date of hearing: 14th October, 2025.

Summary: The impugned Notification dated 04.09.2025 issued by Director General (Food) fixing maximum retail price of indigenous wheat under the Punjab Price Control of Essential Commodities Act, 2024 is unconstitutional and unlawful in view of the deregulation plan approved by the Provincial Cabinet vide Policy Notification dated 22.04.2025 which guarantees that no anti-hoarding actions shall be taken against the privately held declared wheat stocks; there shall be no ban on inter-district and inter-provincial movement of wheat; and the Government of the Punjab is only competent to purchase wheat stocks, if required, through open and competitive bidding under the Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014. Therefore, coercive measures against the declared wheat stocks of the Petitioners under anti-hoarding enactments leading to confiscation of wheat stocks and its forced sale to private flour mills are without any lawful authority. 169Writ Petition- Land- Acquisition of Land 4874-20 HAJI MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN SHAH VS SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE ETC Mr. Justice Rasaal Hasan Syed 28- 10- 2025 2025 LHC 7782

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----S. 21---Territorial jurisdiction---Objection as to place of suing---Stage for raising objection---Objection to territorial jurisdiction must be taken at the earliest possible opportunity before or at settlement of issues and specifically pleaded---Where no such objection raised before Trial Court, no issue framed and trial concluded on merits, objection cannot be entertained for first time at appellate stage unless consequent failure of justice shown---Defect in territorial jurisdiction treated as technical irregularity after full trial---Appellate Court erred in reversing decree on ground of territorial jurisdiction which was neither pleaded nor raised in memo of appeal nor resulted in any failure of justice. (b) West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 & Family Courts Rules, 1965 ----R. 6---Territorial jurisdiction---Suit for maintenance, dowry articles and gold ornaments---Such claims not falling within proviso relating to dissolution of marriage or dower---Even if question of territorial jurisdiction arguable, same stood waived by failure of respondent to raise objection at trial stage---Proceedings allowed to conclude without demur---Non-suiting wife after full trial held unjustified. (c) Civil procedure ----Framing of issues---Jurisdictional objection---Effect of non-framing---Where jurisdictional objection not raised and no issue framed, parties lead evidence and court decides matter on merits---Jurisdictional plea deemed waived---Such plea cannot subsequently be resurrected at appellate stage. (d) Appellate jurisdiction ----Scope---Appellate Court confined to grounds raised---Appellate Court cannot suo motu introduce and decide a new point of territorial jurisdiction not pleaded, not raised in grounds of appeal and not resulting in failure of justice---Such exercise held legally unsustainable. (e) Administration of justice ----Fair trial---Non-suiting after full trial---Plaint filed, written statement submitted, issues framed, evidence recorded and judgment passed on merits---Setting aside decree on purely technical ground at appellate stage held contrary to settled principles of justice. Cited cases: • Khan Muhammad Tareen v. Nasir and Brother Coal Company 2018 SCMR 2121 • Faqir Muhammad v. Pakistan 2000 SCMR 1312 • Chief Engineer, Hydel (North) and Project Director, WAPDA v. Zafarullah Shah 2003 SCMR 686 Disposition: Petition converted into appeal; appeal allowed; judgment of Islamabad High Court set aside; matter remanded to Appellate Court for decision afresh on merits on the basis of evidence already recorded before the Trial Court.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 140A---Local Government---Role---Petitioner was elected Chairman District Council and was aggrieved of authorities excluding him during making of arrangements of Mela in his district---Validity---Exclusion of elected local representatives from decision-making processes at district or municipal level had defeated the purpose of Art.140A of the Constitution---Provincial Government was bound under Art.140A of the Constitution to devolve political, administrative and financial powers to elected Local Government institutions and to ensure their meaningful participation in district administration---All executive officers at district level, including Deputy Commissioner were to ensure that matters concerning local development, planning and service delivery were to be undertaken in consultation with elected District Council and its committees---High Court refrained Provincial Government from taking any action that would curtail, suspend or render ineffective the Constitutionally protected functioning of elected Local Governments---Governance, under the Constitution has been envisioned through public participation and democratic representation at all levels---Local Government institutions are not a concession but a Constitutional command---Will of people, expressed through their elected local representatives must form the foundation of district management and development planning---Any attempt to bypass or marginalize such institutions undermines the democratic fabric and violates Art.140A of the Constitution---High Court further directed the authorities to ensure Constitutional mandate of Local Government in the form of District Council, as envisaged in the Constitution, in letter and spirit by giving lead of making arrangements for Mela in question---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Metropolitan Corporation, Islamabad through Mayor v. Chairman C.D.A. (Capital Development Authority) Islamabad and another PLD 2021 Isl. 144 and Muhammad Razzaq and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2024 Lah. 238 rel. Muhammad Akram Shah for Petitioner. Arbab Nasruminallah, Additional Advocate General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 14th October, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)- -S.13-Pre-emption-Talb-i-Muwathibat (immediate demand/jumping demand), execution of-The sole issue was whether the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) proved immediate declaration (Talb-i-Muwathibat) as required by law-Pre-emptor to prove execution of talbs-Onus-Doubt in execution of talbs-Effect-Any doubt regarding proper performance of talbs must be resolved in favour of the vendee-The case concerned a parcel of land which was sold to the petitioners/vendees through a registered sale deed-The respondent/plaintiff claimed a superior right of pre-emption, alleging that he had performed the required talbs (formal declarations) and stated that upon learning of the sale at 7:00 a.m. on 7 June 2001 from-UD-in the presence of another witness, he made a declaration to exercise his right-The courts below accepted his version and decreed the suit, but the Supreme Court examined whether the Talb-i-Muwathibat i.e. the immediate demand, was duly and validly performed by the respondent/plaintiff (pre-emptor) so as to sustain his right of pre-emption-Held: The onus was on the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) to substantiate his claims by producing compelling evidence that demonstrated the completion of Talb-i-Muwathibat-Statement of witness (informer) produced by plaintiff/pre-emptor suggested that enough time had passed between when the witness (informer) first learnt of the sale and when he relayed this information to the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor)-Consequently, it undermined the assertion that the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) made the declaration at the stated time-This doubt created uncertainty on whether the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) truly executed the Talb-i-Muwathibat as claimed-Respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) upon gaining awareness of the sale, did not immediately formally declared his intention to exercise his right of pre-emption, but merely expressed a desire to do so-This was not sufficient to meet the requirements of Section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act of 1991-If any doubt arose regarding the execution of the talbs, the benefit of that doubt must favour the vendee-Given these circumstances, the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) had failed to prove the execution of Talb-i-Muwathibat-The judgments and decrees rendered by the courts below were set aside, and the suit brought forth by the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) was dismissed-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -Ss.5, Sched., 12A, 17A & 21A-Dependent parent claiming maintenance from sons-Jurisdiction of family court-Scope-Competence to entertain and adjudicate parental maintenance claims-Striking off defence-Penal provision-Strict construction-Impermissibility in suits filed by parents-Briefly, respondent-mother instituted a suit before the family court seeking maintenance from her sons on the ground of dependency and lack of independent income-During pendency of the proceedings, the family court fixed interim maintenance and directed payment by the 14th of each month-Upon alleged non-payment, the family court struck off the defence under S.17-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964 while decreeing the suit and initiating coercive proceedings-The appeal against said orders was dismissed by the district court leading to the filing of the constitutional petition-Pivotal questions requiring determination before the High Court were as to-whether a parent could institute a suit for maintenance against children before the family court-?; and, -whether S.17A of the Family Courts Act, 1964 was applicable to maintenance claims filed by parents-?-Held: Claim of maintenance by dependent parents against their sons, being a family dispute rooted in familial obligations, squarely fell within the domain of-family affairs-and was, therefore, well within the jurisdiction of the family court-As statutory provisions did not expressly define the nature of relationship between the person claiming maintenance and the party against whom maintenance was sought; principles of Islamic law which were the primary source governing family relations had to be applied-Under Islamic jurisprudence, the obligation of sons to maintain their dependent parents squarely fell within the scope of maintenance-Family Court possessed jurisdiction to decide all ancillary issues necessary for complete and effective adjudication of disputes within its domain-The ‘Schedule’ to the Family Courts Act, 1964 was inclusive and had to be interpreted purposively to advance the true spirit and objective of the statute-A mother or father, if left dependent and without means, could competently invoke jurisdiction of the family court to seek maintenance from their sons-Section 17-A was not attracted to the present dispute wherein a mother had sought maintenance from her sons-However, the authority to pass a final decree for maintenance inherently included the power to grant interim relief pendente lite as an ancillary or necessary measure to prevent destitution during litigation, therefore, the family court was fully empowered to fix and direct the payment of interim maintenance during the pendency of a suit filed by any parent and enforce such judicial orders-Impugned orders of the courts below were set aside and the matter was remanded to the family court to decide the same afresh-Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S.5, Sched.-Dependent mother seeking maintenance from sons-Jurisdiction of family court-Scope-A mother, if left dependent and without sufficient means, may competently invoke the jurisdiction of the family court to seek maintenance from her sons. (c) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art.199-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-Objection not raised through a specific prayer in a constitutional petition, non-entertaining of-Scope-If an objection had not been pressed through any specific prayer in a constitutional petition before the High Court, then any adjudication on such factual controversy at that stage may effectively result in High Court assuming the role of a court of first instance, thereby, prejudicing the right of appeal of the party who may feel aggrieved by such determination-Thus, findings on such a factual objection should be eschewed and the matter should left open to be examined and decided by the Trial Court in accordance with law.

Summary: (On appeal against the order/judgment dated 19.06.2014 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in C.R. No. 1147 of 2008). Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)--- ----S.13---Pre-emption---Talb-i-Muwathibat (immediate demand/jumping demand), execution of---The sole issue was whether the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) proved immediate declaration (Talb-i-Muwathibat) as required by law---Pre-emptor to prove execution of talbs---Onus---Doubt in execution of talbs---Effect---Any doubt regarding proper performance of talbs must be resolved in favour of the vendee---The case concerned a parcel of land which was sold to the petitioners/vendees through a registered sale deed---The respondent/plaintiff claimed a superior right of pre-emption, alleging that he had performed the required talbs (formal declarations) and stated that upon learning of the sale at 7:00 a.m. on 7 June 2001 from “UD” in the presence of another witness, he made a declaration to exercise his right---The courts below accepted his version and decreed the suit, but the Supreme Court examined whether the Talb-i-Muwathibat i.e. the immediate demand, was duly and validly performed by the respondent/plaintiff (pre-emptor) so as to sustain his right of pre-emption---Held: The onus was on the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) to substantiate his claims by producing compelling evidence that demonstrated the completion of Talb-i-Muwathibat---Statement of witness (informer) produced by plaintiff/pre-emptor suggested that enough time had passed between when the witness (informer) first learnt of the sale and when he relayed this information to the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor)---Consequently, it undermined the assertion that the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) made the declaration at the stated time---This doubt created uncertainty on whether the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) truly executed the Talb-i-Muwathibat as claimed---Respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) upon gaining awareness of the sale, did not immediately formally declared his intention to exercise his right of pre-emption, but merely expressed a desire to do so---This was not sufficient to meet the requirements of Section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act of 1991---If any doubt arose regarding the execution of the talbs, the benefit of that doubt must favour the vendee---Given these circumstances, the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) had failed to prove the execution of Talb-i-Muwathibat---The judgments and decrees rendered by the courts below were set aside, and the suit brought forth by the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) was dismissed---Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances. Sh. Usman Karim-ud-Din, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (Through Video Link Lahore). Nemo for Respondent. Date of hearing: 27th October, 2025.

Summary: ----Ss.5, Sched., 12A, 17A & 21A---Dependent parent claiming maintenance from sons---Jurisdiction of family court---Scope---Competence to entertain and adjudicate parental maintenance claims---Striking off defence---Penal provision---Strict construction---Impermissibility in suits filed by parents---Briefly, respondent- mother instituted a suit before the family court seeking maintenance from her sons on the ground of dependency and lack of independent income---During pendency of the proceedings, the family court fixed interim maintenance and directed payment by the 14th of each month---Upon alleged non-payment, the family court struck off the defence under S.17-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964 while decreeing the suit and initiating coercive proceedings---The appeal against said orders was dismissed by the district court leading to the filing of the constitutional petition---Pivotal questions requiring determination before the High Court were as to “whether a parent could institute a suit for maintenance against children before the family court”?; and, “whether S.17A of the Family Courts Act, 1964 was applicable to maintenance claims filed by parents”?---Held: Claim of maintenance by dependent parents against their sons, being a family dispute rooted in familial obligations, squarely fell within the domain of “family affairs” and was, therefore, well within the jurisdiction of the family court---As statutory provisions did not expressly define the nature of relationship between the person claiming maintenance and the party against whom maintenance was sought; principles of Islamic law which were the primary source governing family relations had to be applied---Under Islamic jurisprudence, the obligation of sons to maintain their dependent parents squarely fell within the scope of maintenance---Family Court possessed jurisdiction to decide all ancillary issues necessary for complete and effective adjudication of disputes within its domain---The ‘Schedule’ to the Family Courts Act, 1964 was inclusive and had to be interpreted purposively to advance the true spirit and objective of the statute---A mother or father, if left dependent and without means, could competently invoke jurisdiction of the family court to seek maintenance from their sons---Section 17-A was not attracted to the present dispute wherein a mother had sought maintenance from her sons---However, the authority to pass a final decree for maintenance inherently included the power to grant interim relief pendente lite as an ancillary or necessary measure to prevent destitution during litigation, therefore, the family court was fully empowered to fix and direct the payment of interim maintenance during the pendency of a suit filed by any parent and enforce such judicial orders---Impugned orders of the courts below were set aside and the matter was remanded to the family court to decide the same afresh---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Dependent mother seeking maintenance from sons---Jurisdiction of family court---Scope---A mother, if left dependent and without sufficient means, may competently invoke the jurisdiction of the family court to seek maintenance from her sons. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Objection not raised through a specific prayer in a constitutional petition, non-entertaining of---Scope---If an objection had not been pressed through any specific prayer in a constitutional petition before the High Court, then any adjudication on such factual controversy at that stage may effectively result in High Court assuming the role of a court of first instance, thereby, prejudicing the right of appeal of the party who may feel aggrieved by such determination---Thus, findings on such a factual objection should be eschewed and the matter should left open to be examined and decided by the Trial Court in accordance with law. Muhammad Faizan-ur-Rehman for Petitioner. Sami Ullah Azeem for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4. Muhammad Umar Sheikh for Respondent No. 5 Amicus Curiae: Muhammad Saad Khan. Date of hearing: 27th October, 2025.