Summary: Balochistan Local Government (Election) Rules, 2013--- ----R.63(7)---Elections for the post of Chairman, District Council---Tie in votes between the two candidates---Draw of lots to determine outcome in tied-vote election---Scope---Plea that in event of tie of votes each successful candidate will serve a half-term---Legality---Brief facts were that the petitioner filed present constitutional petition challenging the notification, whereby, respondent No.5 was declared the Chairman, District Council, arising out of local government elections conducted under the Balochistan Local Government (Election) Rules, 2013, where the petitioner and Respondent No.5 had polled equal votes and the Returning Officer held a draw of lots---Question for determination before the High Court was as to “whether, in a tied-vote election, the draw of lots could lawfully decide a single winner for the full term under the 2013 Rules?”---Held: In case of equal votes between the contested candidates for the Chairman of the District Council, the returning officer had to conduct a draw of lots in presence of witnesses---Returning officer was further required to record the procedure in the election register, obtaining the signatures and thumb impressions of the candidates as proof that the draw was conducted transparently and in their presence---Consequently, the winning candidate was to be elected for the full term---Petitioners plea/claim lacked legal foundation---No infirmity or perversity was found in the election process---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Habib-ur-Rehman Baloch for Petitioner. Zahoor Ahmed Baloch, Additional A.G., Anwar Naseem Kasi, D.A.G. and Ali Jan Tarak, Law Officer, Provincial Election Commissioner, Quetta for Official Respondents. Shabbir Ahmed Sherani for Respondent No. 5. Date of hearing: 6th October, 2025.

Summary: A claim of maintenance by dependent parents against their sons, being a family dispute rooted in familial obligations, squarely falls within the domain of "family affairs" and is therefore well within the jurisdiction of the Family Court. To read Entry No.3 as confined only to wife and child would be to read into the statute a restriction that the legislature consciously omitted. 176C.O. (Commercial) 78664/24 Fatima Fertilizer Company Limited & 1 other Vs . . Mr. Justice Ch. Sultan Mahmood 24- 10- 2025 2025 LHC 7187

Summary: (a) Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 ---- ----S. 13—Talb-i-Muwathibat—Immediacy and substance of declaration—Form not prescribed but intent must be unequivocal—Plaintiff claimed that upon receiving information of the sale at 07:00 a.m. on 07-06-2001 he made Talb-i-Muwathibat; informer (PW-3) stated he learnt of the sale at his uncle’s dera with 15–20 houses between that dera and plaintiff’s, indicating lapse of time before any intimation—Further, the plaintiff’s utterance, as proved (“… بس خواہش ظاہر کی …”), reflected only a desire to pre-empt, not a clear, immediate assertion of the right—Held, requirements of S. 13 were not met; mere expression of desire is insufficient and the immediacy stood compromised. (b) Pre-emption—Proof of talbs—Standard—Where evidence creates doubt about whether Talb-i-Muwathibat was promptly and properly made, the doubt enures to the benefit of the vendee—Plaintiff failed to discharge the onus to prove a valid and immediate Talb-i-Muwathibat on the facts. (c) Civil procedure—Concurrent findings—Interference—Where courts below misapplied S. 13 or relied on doubtful proof of the foundational talb, interference is warranted—Concurrent decrees for pre-emption set aside. Held, that the plaintiff did not prove a valid Talb-i-Muwathibat; benefit of doubt goes to the vendees. Petition converted into appeal and allowed; judgments and decrees of the courts below set aside; pre-emption suit dismissed, no order as to costs.

Summary: (Against order dated 08.11.2022 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.P. No. D-5641 of /2022). (a) Customs Act ( IV of 1969)--- ----S. 27A---Customs Rules, 2001, R.592---Mutilation of consignment (goods)---Type/Kind of imported goods (“rollers”) not identified in relevant list---Scope and effect---Request moved by the importer for mutilation of consignment (goods) was turned down vide Order-in-Original on the ground that the consignment of “rollers” does not qualify for mutilation under Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1969 (‘the Act 1969’) for not being identified in list given under Rule 592 of the Customs Rules, 2001(‘the Rules, 2001’); however, the High Court allowed said request---Validity---Section 27A of the Act 1969 allows mutilation or scrapping of goods as are notified by the Federal Board of Revenue (Board) and in the manner as prescribed by the Rules 2001; only such goods which are found in consonance with the said requirement shall be subjected to duty on such rates as may be applicable to the goods as if they had been imported in the mutilated form or as scrapped---The list available under Rule 592 of the Rules 2001 is restricted and not inclusive of “any other item ” except those identified therein---Rule 592 was subjected to few amendments and omissions, however, the “rollers” were never identified by the said Rule in any form (serviceable/unserviceable)---Rule 592 of the Customs Rules, 2001 appears to suggest that it is restricted and not inclusive of other items---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned order passed by the High Court; consequently the order of rejection for mutilation, stood restored---Petition for leave to appeal, filed by Collectorate, was converted into appeal and allowed accordingly. (b) Customs Act ( IV of 1969)--- ----S. 27A---Customs Rules, 2001, R. 592---Mutilation of consignment (goods)---Form of goods (i.e. serviceable or unserviceable)---Request moved by the importer for mutilation of consignment (goods) was turned down vide Order-in-Original; however, the High Court allowed said request observing that the goods (the rollers) were imported in unserviceable conditions---Validity---Observation of the High Court was misconceived for the reason that it was never the case of the respondent/importer that the goods were imported in unserviceable condition---The outright request for the mutilation by the importer itself suggested that those goods were serviceable goods and hence ought to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1969, read with Rule 592 of the Customs Rules, 2001---Rule 592 provides that the “identified goods” (old and new items) if imported in serviceable conditions along-with scrap consignment or imported separately as scrap and found serviceable, may be mutilated and scrapped as the case may be within the meaning of Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1969; said Rule is then followed by short list identifying the categories of good; the rollers admittedly were not included---As for as impugned order was concerned that the mutilation rule was not applicable, was totally contrary to the facts of the case---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned order passed by the High Court; consequently the order of rejection for mutilation, stood restored---Petition for leave to appeal , filed by Collectorate, was converted into appeal and allowed accordingly. (c) Customs Act ( IV of 1969)--- ----S. 27A---Customs Rules ,2001, R. 592---S.R.O.450(I)/2001 dated 18.06.2001---Mutilation of consignment (goods)---Type/Kind of imported goods (“rollers”) not identified in relevant list---Scope and effect---Request moved by the importer for mutilation of consignment (goods) was turned down vide Order-in-Original on the ground that the consignment of “rollers” did not qualify for mutilation under Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1969 (‘the Act 1969’) for not being identified in list given under Rule 592 of the Customs Rules, 2001 (‘the Rules, 2001’); however, the High Court allowed said request observing that “decades old rule which includes the list of 9 items is beyond comprehension not to re-use thousands of other unserviceable items which could be imported for re-use of the material, which could be an important step towards achieving better and green environment, which aspect could not be ruled out”---Validity---The Rules, 2001, specially Rule 592 has undergone many changes and it cannot be said that the Legislature and/or FBR were not conscious about the list and its contents---Had it been the intention of Legislature, as opined by the High Court, there was no wisdom in providing list of “goods” with the Rule 592 of the Rules 2001---Rule 592 of the Rules 2001was amended from time to time such as on 27.06.2011, 08.08.2017 and it was lastly amended through S.R.O. 1540(I)/2018 dated 21.12. 2018 which shows the consciousness---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned order passed by the High Court; consequently the order of rejection for mutilation, stood restored---Petition for leave to appeal, filed by Collectorate, was converted into appeal and allowed accordingly. Muhammad Khalil Dogar, Advocate Supreme Court, K.A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record, Saad Atta Rabbani, Additional Collector and Farhad Ullah, Deputy Collector for Petitioner [through video-link from Karachi]. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 24th October, 2025.

Summary: (Against judgment/order dated 08.05.2023 and 06.05.2024 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Income Tax Cases Nos. 633 to 638 of 2001 and Income Tax Reference Application No. 220 of 2008, respectively). (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]--- ----Second Sched., Pt.1, Cl. 93---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Second Sched., Pt.1, Cl. 59---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)---Income tax exemptions---Scope and preconditions---Essential elements and components---Charitable purpose---Meaning, extent and application---Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited filed seven connected civil petitions arising from income tax assessments for tax years 1993-94 to 1998-99 under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and tax year 2003 under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, in which the appellate tribunal had earlier allowed exemption on income from ‘house property’ under clause (93) of the Second Schedule (1979 Ordinance) and clause (59) (2001 Ordinance), but the High Court later reversed those findings---Core issue befor e the Supreme Court was “whether the petitioner was legally entitled to income-tax exemption by establishing that its income was derived from house property held under legal obligation for charitable purposes and was actually applied or finally set apart for such charitable application”?---Held: Insofar as the first “element” for exemption from tax was concerned, it appeared to be clear that the income in question was derived from “house property”---Therefore it was appropriate to move on to the second “element”, which had been the principal point of dispute between the parties---This itself could be regarded as having two “sub-components”: (i) the income must be held under trust or “other legal obligations”, which must (ii) be “wholly, or in part only, for … charitable purposes” (it being common ground that no “religious” purposes were involved in the case)---It was not enough for the petitioner simply to show that the sub-clause was a “charitable purpose” as the exemption clause required that the sources of income or the income be held under some “legal obligation”, either wholly or in part, for a “charitable purpose”---Sub-clause (2) could be regarded as a “charitable purpose” within the meaning of the definition clause---Therefore, while disagreeing with the High Court, Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner’s situation, in the facts and circumstances of the case, came within the definition clause---An examination of the order of the tribunal showed that there was no affirmative and actual finding of fact that the income in question was either actually applied or “finally” set aside for purposes of achieving the objects set out in sub-clause (2)---The entire discussion related to a matter of law, i.e., whether the sub-clause in question could be regarded as a “charitable purpose”---A finding in favor of the petitioner was recorded in this regard, but that was not enough---The tribunal also had to apply its mind as to whether the third “element” of the exemption clause existed during the periods in question and absent any such finding the benefit of the exemption clause could not be extended to the petitioner---In our view, while the finding of the tribunal might have sufficed for purposes of the second “element” of the exemption clause, it was wholly deficient for the third “element”---The reasoning appeared simply to amount to this: that because the second “element” was found to exist therefore the third was equally found to (or must) exist---But, the tribunal failed to appreciate that while the determination of the second “element” was a question of law (or perhaps a mixed question of law and fact) the third “element” was a separate requirement, which was only a question of fact---The existence of the one could not, and did not, inevitably, as seemed to have been concluded by the tribunal, lead to the other---To conclude that the one existed did not show or mean that the other did as well---The positive obligation that lay on the petitioner in this regard was not discharged---And since the tribunal was the last finder of fact the exercise in relation to the third “element” could not be carried out by either the High Court (which in any case decided against the petitioner) or the Supreme Court---This deficiency was fatal for the petitioner’s case---Even when the exemption clause was viewed in its totality the last portion thereof had to be clearly established, at the latest, by or before the final forum designated to determine questions of fact---This was patently not the situation at hand---Petitioner had failed to make out a case for entitlement to the exemption clause---Leave to appeal was refused and the petitions were dismissed, in circumstances. Cotman v. Brougham [1918] AC 514, [1918-19] All ER Rep 265, [1918] UKHL 358; Re Introductions Ltd. [1968] 2 All ER 1221; [1969] 1 All ER 887; Anglo Overseas Agencies Ltd. v. Green and another [1960] 3 All ER 244 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Merchant Navy Club 2004 PTD 1304 ref. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Muhammad Abdur Rauf Khan PLD 1963 SC 209; Hamdard Dawakhana v. Commissioner of Income Tax PLD 1980 SC 84 and Fauji Foundation v. Shamimur Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457 rel. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal statute---Exemption clause---Application and interpretation---Firstly, the onus lies on the taxpayer to show that his case comes within the exemption---Secondly, if two reasonable interpretations are possible the one against the taxpayer will be adopted---But, thirdly, if the taxpayer’s case comes fairly within the scope of the exemption then he cannot be denied the benefit of the same on the basis of any supposed intention to the contrary of the legislature or authority granting it. Oxford University Press v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2019 SCMR 235 rel. (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]--- ----Second Sched. Pt.1, Cl.93---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Second Sched., Pt.1, Cl.59---Income tax---Exemption---Essential elements / components---The exemption clause can be said to contain three “elements”---The income for which exemption is sought (i) must be from “investments in securities of the Federal Government and house property”; (ii) either the said sources of income or the income itself must be “held under trust or other legal obligations wholly, or in part only, for religious or charitable purposes”; and (iii) the income must be “actually applied or finally set apart for application thereto”. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner (in all cases via video-link, Karachi). Munawar Ali Memon, Advocate Supreme Court, Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record, M. Masood, Additional Commissioner, (via video-link, Karachi) and Dr. Ishtiaq, D.G. (Law) for Respondents. Date of hearing: 21st April, 2025.

Summary: (Against judgment/order dated 08.05.2023 and 06.05.2024 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Income Tax Cases Nos. 633 to 638 of 2001 and Income Tax Reference Application No. 220 of 2008, respectively). (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]--- ----Second Sched., Pt.1, Cl. 93---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Second Sched., Pt.1, Cl. 59---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)---Income tax exemptions---Scope and preconditions---Essential elements and components---Charitable purpose---Meaning, extent and application---Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited filed seven connected civil petitions arising from income tax assessments for tax years 1993-94 to 1998-99 under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and tax year 2003 under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, in which the appellate tribunal had earlier allowed exemption on income from ‘house property’ under clause (93) of the Second Schedule (1979 Ordinance) and clause (59) (2001 Ordinance), but the High Court later reversed those findings---Core issue befor e the Supreme Court was “whether the petitioner was legally entitled to income-tax exemption by establishing that its income was derived from house property held under legal obligation for charitable purposes and was actually applied or finally set apart for such charitable application”?---Held: Insofar as the first “element” for exemption from tax was concerned, it appeared to be clear that the income in question was derived from “house property”---Therefore it was appropriate to move on to the second “element”, which had been the principal point of dispute between the parties---This itself could be regarded as having two “sub-components”: (i) the income must be held under trust or “other legal obligations”, which must (ii) be “wholly, or in part only, for … charitable purposes” (it being common ground that no “religious” purposes were involved in the case)---It was not enough for the petitioner simply to show that the sub-clause was a “charitable purpose” as the exemption clause required that the sources of income or the income be held under some “legal obligation”, either wholly or in part, for a “charitable purpose”---Sub-clause (2) could be regarded as a “charitable purpose” within the meaning of the definition clause---Therefore, while disagreeing with the High Court, Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner’s situation, in the facts and circumstances of the case, came within the definition clause---An examination of the order of the tribunal showed that there was no affirmative and actual finding of fact that the income in question was either actually applied or “finally” set aside for purposes of achieving the objects set out in sub-clause (2)---The entire discussion related to a matter of law, i.e., whether the sub-clause in question could be regarded as a “charitable purpose”---A finding in favor of the petitioner was recorded in this regard, but that was not enough---The tribunal also had to apply its mind as to whether the third “element” of the exemption clause existed during the periods in question and absent any such finding the benefit of the exemption clause could not be extended to the petitioner---In our view, while the finding of the tribunal might have sufficed for purposes of the second “element” of the exemption clause, it was wholly deficient for the third “element”---The reasoning appeared simply to amount to this: that because the second “element” was found to exist therefore the third was equally found to (or must) exist---But, the tribunal failed to appreciate that while the determination of the second “element” was a question of law (or perhaps a mixed question of law and fact) the third “element” was a separate requirement, which was only a question of fact---The existence of the one could not, and did not, inevitably, as seemed to have been concluded by the tribunal, lead to the other---To conclude that the one existed did not show or mean that the other did as well---The positive obligation that lay on the petitioner in this regard was not discharged---And since the tribunal was the last finder of fact the exercise in relation to the third “element” could not be carried out by either the High Court (which in any case decided against the petitioner) or the Supreme Court---This deficiency was fatal for the petitioner’s case---Even when the exemption clause was viewed in its totality the last portion thereof had to be clearly established, at the latest, by or before the final forum designated to determine questions of fact---This was patently not the situation at hand---Petitioner had failed to make out a case for entitlement to the exemption clause---Leave to appeal was refused and the petitions were dismissed, in circumstances. Cotman v. Brougham [1918] AC 514, [1918-19] All ER Rep 265, [1918] UKHL 358; Re Introductions Ltd. [1968] 2 All ER 1221; [1969] 1 All ER 887; Anglo Overseas Agencies Ltd. v. Green and another [1960] 3 All ER 244 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Merchant Navy Club 2004 PTD 1304 ref. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Muhammad Abdur Rauf Khan PLD 1963 SC 209; Hamdard Dawakhana v. Commissioner of Income Tax PLD 1980 SC 84 and Fauji Foundation v. Shamimur Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457 rel. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal statute---Exemption clause---Application and interpretation---Firstly, the onus lies on the taxpayer to show that his case comes within the exemption---Secondly, if two reasonable interpretations are possible the one against the taxpayer will be adopted---But, thirdly, if the taxpayer’s case comes fairly within the scope of the exemption then he cannot be denied the benefit of the same on the basis of any supposed intention to the contrary of the legislature or authority granting it. Oxford University Press v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2019 SCMR 235 rel. (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]--- ----Second Sched. Pt.1, Cl.93---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Second Sched., Pt.1, Cl.59---Income tax---Exemption---Essential elements / components---The exemption clause can be said to contain three “elements”---The income for which exemption is sought (i) must be from “investments in securities of the Federal Government and house property”; (ii) either the said sources of income or the income itself must be “held under trust or other legal obligations wholly, or in part only, for religious or charitable purposes”; and (iii) the income must be “actually applied or finally set apart for application thereto”. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner (in all cases via video-link, Karachi). Munawar Ali Memon, Advocate Supreme Court, Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record, M. Masood, Additional Commissioner, (via video-link, Karachi) and Dr. Ishtiaq, D.G. (Law) for Respondents. Date of hearing: 21st April, 2025.

Summary: 177ITR (Income Tax Reference) 41034/17 COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE Vs MS. M. FAISAL LAHORE Mr. Justice Hassan Nawaz Makhdoom 24- 10- 2025 2025 LHC 6475

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.42, 8, 54 & 39---Suit for declaration, possession, mesne profit, permanent injunction, cancellation of document and partition---Islamic law---Will deed---Legality---Respondents/plaintiffs claimed their share in the ownership/inheritance of their ancestor---Applicants/defendants took a plea the a will deed had been executed in favour of their father qua the whole inherited property---Trial decreed the suit while cancelling the will deed and referring the matter to revenue hierarchy for partition---Appellate court upheld the findings of the trial court---Validity---Muslim may validly bequeath only up to one-third of his estate, and such bequest in favour of a legal heir shall not take effect without the consent of the remaining heirs after the death of the testator---Right to execute a will cannot be exercised to the detriment or exclusion of other legal heirs, as such a disposition would directly infringe upon their vested rights of inheritance---Co-owner or co-sharer cannot alienate or transfer more than his own entitlement in a joint property---Other legal heirs neither assented to the will nor accepted its validity, thus, the estate of the deceased was rightly ordered by the courts below to devolve upon all heirs under the principles of inheritance, rendering the alleged will deed ineffective in law beyond one-third of the property---Trial court had already referred the matter to revenue authorities for effecting partition of the property in accordance with law, thus, once the jurisdiction of the revenue hierarchy had already been invoked through the judgment of the Trial Court, there remained no necessity for High Court to render any further findings on the question of jurisdiction or partition---Civil revision was dismissed, in circumstances. PLD 1977 SC 220; 1968 SCMR 214; PLD 1989 SC 568; PLD 1986 Kar. 73; 2021 MLD 531; 2007 CLC 1790; PLD 1967 SC 200; 2007 SCMR 497; 1999 SCMR 971; 1992 SCMR 2182; 2022 CLC 1700; 2002 CLC 808; 2015 CLC 298; 2001 CLC 1323; 1988 CLC 931; 1997 CLC 2012; 1991 MLD 145; 1995 SCMR 1489; 2022 CLC 692; 2004 SCMR 877; 2010 SCMR 1868; 1991 MLD 145 and PLD 2023 Sindh 231 ref. Rab Nawaz and another v. Akbar Ali and others 1989 SCMR 93; Ali Gohar v. Sher Ayaz 1989 SCMR 130; Muhammad Hussain v. Wahid Bux 2004 SCMR 1137; Muhammad Shamim through legal heirs v. Nasir Fatima through legal heirs and others 2010 SCMR 18; Mahomed Hussain Haji Ghulam Mahomed Alam v. Alshabai and others AIR 1935 Bombay 84; Muhammad Aslam Rashid and 2 others v. Dr. Muhammad Anwar Saeed and 4 others 1997 CLC 2012; Ihsan Ilahi and others v. Hukam Jan PLD 1967 SC 2000; Abdul Razzaq and 8 others v. Shah Jehan and 5 others 1995 SCMR 1489 and Zakirullah Khan and others v. Faizullah Khan and others 1999 SCMR 971 rel. (b) Islamic law--- ----Execution of will contrary to Muhammad Law or the statutory requirements---Duty of Court---Scope---Once the will deed is brought on record and it appears to be contrary to the principles of Muhammad Law or the statutory requirements, it becomes the judicial duty of the court to examine its legality, as the same directly affects the rights of other legal heirs---Any outlook that seeks to deprive lawful heirs of their rightful shares under a void or invalid will cannot be overlooked or allowed to stand. Akram v. Vakeel Muhammad and others 2022 CLC 1700 rel. (c) Islamic law--- ----Will---Nature and scope---Will, according to various schools of thought, is indeed a recognized instrument through which a person expresses his intention regarding the disposition of his property, however, such intention and disposition are not absolute in nature but are subject to certain legal limitations prescribed by the law, therefore, while interpreting or relying upon a will deed, it must be examined strictly within the framework of the legal and religious parameters governing testamentary disposition. Ghulam Dastagir A. Shahani and Abdul Rehman A. Bhutto for Applicants. Muhammad Qasim Khan and Abdul Waris Bhutto, Assistant Advocate General, Sindh for Respondents. Date of hearing: 20th October, 2025.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of a High Court, invoking of---Territorial incompetency---Scope and effect---Federation of Pakistan, impleading of---Scope---Whether Islamabad High Court possessed the territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the present constitutional petition emanating from a matter that occurred in territorial jurisdiction of Sindh High Court?---Held: The gravamen of the petitioner's grievance stems from the impugned confiscation order, passed by the respondent (an authorized officer of Department of Plant Protection -Samples Collector at Karachi), which mandated the confiscation and destruction of the imported consignments---Impugned order revealed that it was issued from and signed by the authority situated in Karachi, Sindh---The entire chain of events, from the physical inspection of the consignments at the Karachi port, the drawing of samples, the issuance of the remedial directive, to the final confiscation order, transpired exclusively within the territorial limits of Karachi---Petitioner itself lodged its application for clearance with the office of respondent (Department of Plant Protection) in Karachi---Consequently, the cause of action, in its entirety, arose within the Jurisdiction of the High Court of Sindh---Petitioner, in an attempt to bridge said jurisdictional gap, had impleaded the Federation of Pakistan as respondent (No. 1)---However, a scrutiny of the petition revealed a conspicuous absence of any substantive allegations, overt acts, or specific pleadings of mala fide against the Federation---It was manifest that respondent No. 1/Federation had been made a party merely as a proforma respondent, a tactic that could not be permitted to confer jurisdiction upon this (Islamabad High) Court when the root of the dispute and the party against whom the primary relief was sought were squarely located elsewhere---Mere impleading of the Federation, without any specific allegations or cause of action against it, was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of a court when the real dispute and the effective authority resided in a different Province---Rationale underpinning said principle was to prevent the abuse of the judicial process and to ensure that constitutional petitions were adjudicated by the High Court within whose territory the aggrieved person resided or the cause of action substantially arose---In the present case, the inclusion of the Federation was a colourable device that did not vest this (Islamabad High) Court with jurisdiction---Petitioner's recourse, if any, laid before the competent Court in Karachi, where real respondent (Department of Plant Protection -Samples Collector) was located and where the entire cause of action had crystallized---Islamabad High Court refrained from commenting on the merits of the substantive legal arguments raised by the petitioner regarding the validity of the impugned confiscation order---Constitutional Petition, solely on the ground of territorial incompetence, was dismissed. Messrs Sethi and Sethi Sons through Humayun Khan v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others 2012 PTD 1869 ref. Barrister Qaim Ali Chohan for Petitioner. Raja Zamir ud Din Ahmed, A.A.G. for Federation of Pakistan. Ms. Huma Nazir Kayani, Entomologist for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing: 23rd October, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending