Summary: Summary pending

Summary: A decree in a suit for recovery of dower was passed on 15.03.2023 and a document styled "???? ????" dated 16.03.2023 was relied upon in execution petition to contend that the decree was satisfied, which plea was rejected by the Executing Court. Held that the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that whether the decree was satisfied immediately or not should be decided by the Executing Court by framing issues, in terms of Section 47 of the CPC, is misconceived inasmuch as Family Courts Act, 1964 ("the Act") establishes a protective procedural framework, recognising the inherent social imbalance in matrimonial disputes empowering the Court to devise its own procedure. By necessary implication, this protective framework extends to the Courts executing the decrees. Execution proceedings, therefore, cannot be permitted to transform into forums where vague, uncertain or potentially exploitative documents are allowed to defeat decrees duly passed in family matters without a clear, proven and lawful satisfaction of the decree. This Court cannot lose sight of the social realities in which women?particularly illiterate, domestic and dependent women?are often vulnerable to pressure, manipulation and unequal bargaining circumstances. These considerations, although social in nature, have legal consequences: they reinforce the need for strict scrutiny of compromises allegedly extinguishing women's post-marriage entitlements, especially when such compromises are executed within less than 24 hours of passing of a decree in favour of the woman and contain no definite terms regarding satisfaction of decretal rights. 126Crl. Appeal 56371/23 Shameer Khan Vs The State etc. Mr. Justice Muhammad Tariq Nadeem 19- 11- 2025 2025 LHC 6970

Summary: Horse Breeding Tenancy, though non-heritable, mandates fair consideration of legal heirs. Resumption of tenancy without a proper factual inquiry violates principles of natural justice. Alleged breaches must be established through on-site verification in presence of affected heirs. Heirs of deceased tenants are entitled to priority consideration, subject to suitability. Mechanical imposition of Tawan without examining compliance with breeding obligations is unlawful. 125Writ Petition- Family- Maintenance 9437-24 EJAZ-UR- REHMAN VS ADJ ETC. Mr. Justice Anwaar Hussain 19- 11- 2025 2025 LHC 6964

Summary: Inter alia following questions were raised: ? Whether, in the context of the special and stringent requirements of the law of pre-emption, the registration of a sale deed must be treated as "notice" so as to deem the pre-emptor to have acquired knowledge from the date of registration; or whether the statute requires proof of actual knowledge, regardless of whether the transaction was effected through a registered document, an unregistered document, or an oral sale? ? Whether verbal cross objections can be raised, at the revisional stage? Held: Date of registration of sale deed cannot be extended or treated as knowledge for the purpose of making talab-i-muwathibat inasmuch as the legislature, despite being fully aware of the nature of registered documents, has consciously refrained from prescribing that registration (of sale) shall be deemed knowledge of the respondent/ pre-emptor. The statutory scheme makes the actual acquisition of knowledge the determinative factor, not the availability of the document on the public record. Introducing the doctrine of constructive or deemed knowledge, for the purpose of making talb-i-muwathibat, would effectively rewrite the pre-emption law and make the requirements even more stringent, which is impermissible. Thus, for purpose of exercise of talb-i- muwathibat, the plea that registration of sale deems to be public notice and therefore, within knowledge of the pre-emptor cannot sustain. Further held that the raising of verbal objections at the revisional stage is a course that ought to be discouraged, as the procedural framework emphasizes formal pleadings and clearly articulated grounds. 124Writ Petition- Land- Lease 16125-

Summary: (a) Civil service- -Departmental proceedings-Dismissal from service-Principle-Major penalty of dismissal from service cannot be awarded without conducting regular inquiry or providing opportunity of being heard to a civil servant, as it amounts to violation of principles of natural justice. Faisal Ali v. District Police Officer, Gujrat and another 2025 SCMR 92; Usman Ghani v. The Chief Post Master, GPO, Karachi and others 2022 SCMR 745; Malik Muhammad Ramzan v. Commissioner Sargodha Division and others CPLA No.2768-L/2022; Naseeb Khan v. Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, Lahore and another 2008 SCMR 1369; Raja Muhammad Shahid v. Inspector General of Police and others 2023 SCMR 1135 and Federation of Pakistan through Chairman Federal Board of Revenue FBR House, Islamabad and others v. Zahid Malik 2023 SCMR 603 rel. (b) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)- Hafiz Abdul Rauf v. PASSCO Lahore and others CPLA No. 1792-L/2017 rel. Assisted by: Ms. Zainab Bashir, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 28.03.2023 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad (Karachi Bench) in Appeal No. 61(K)CS of 2018). (a) Civil service--- ----Departmental proceedings---Dismissal from service---Principle---Major penalty of dismissal from service cannot be awarded without conducting regular inquiry or providing opportunity of being heard to a civil servant, as it amounts to violation of principles of natural justice. Faisal Ali v. District Police Officer, Gujrat and another 2025 SCMR 92; Usman Ghani v. The Chief Post Master, GPO, Karachi and others 2022 SCMR 745; Malik Muhammad Ramzan v. Commissioner Sargodha Division and others CPLA No.2768-L/2022; Naseeb Khan v. Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, Lahore and another 2008 SCMR 1369; Raja Muhammad Shahid v. Inspector General of Police and others 2023 SCMR 1135 and Federation of Pakistan through Chairman Federal Board of Revenue FBR House, Islamabad and others v. Zahid Malik 2023 SCMR 603 rel. (b) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)--- ----S. 4---Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, R.5---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 10A & 212 (3)---Dismissal from service---Principle of natural service---Regular inquiry, non-conducting of---Service Tribunal partly accepted appeal of civil servant / respondent and converted punishment of dismissal from service into compulsory retirement---Validity---While imposing any major or minor penalty regular inquiry has to be conducted to establish charges against a civil servant, unless it is dispensed with, while disclosing sufficient reason in writing in terms of Rule 5(iii) of Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973---Law does not permit dispensation of regular inquiry even in cases where minor penalty is imposed unless there are sufficient reasons disclosed by competent authority for dispensation of regular inquiry---In order to ensure transparency and fair trial in departmental proceedings against a civil servant, adherence to law, rules and procedure prescribed therein must be made in letter and spirit---Fair trial is sine qua non as guaranteed under Article 10(A) of the Constitution, which has to be read into every statute, including Civil Servants Act, 1973, and cannot be ignored under any circumstances, irrespective of the fact that penalty imposed against a civil servant pursuant to such proceedings is major or minor in nature---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by Service Tribunal which did not suffer from any factual error or legal infirmity---Authorities failed to raise any substantial question of law of public importance in terms of Article 212(3) of the Constitution---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Hafiz Abdul Rauf v. PASSCO Lahore and others CPLA No. 1792-L/2017 rel. Jawad Mahmood Pasha, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (Via V.L. Lahore). Nemo for Respondents. Assisted by: Ms. Zainab Bashir, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 18th November, 2025.

Summary: Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 5 & 286---No violation of provisions of the Companies Act, 2017---Internal /personal grievances, matter of---Company jurisdiction, invoking of---Scope---On a version of oppression and mismanagement of the Company (Petitioner No. 1), petition was filed under section 286 of the Companies Act 2017by the Petitioners ( three in number) being collectively 82.5% shareholders in Petitioner No.1/Company whereas Respondent No. 2 was a 17.5% shareholder and a former Chief Executive Officer---Grievance of the Petitioners was that the password for the Company portal at SECP had been withheld by Respondent No. 2, who was not handing over the same, due to which they remained unable to file certain documents---Validity---Petitioners, on inquiry, remained unable to show as to which specific provisions of the Companies Act, 2017 (‘the Act, 2017’) were violated, but simply referred to S. 286 of the Act 2017 in generic manner, without showing any precise violations of law---It appeared, at best, to be a dispute inter se between the parties, for which the company jurisdiction could not be used as a prop to instigate settlement of personal grievances in the grab of the essence of oppression under the company jurisdiction---Petitioners, being vast majority shareholders and in control of Petitioner No. 1/ Company, failed in showing any form of oppression or mismanagement of the affairs of the Company, and inter se dispute orchestrated by the Petitioners could not be decided---Before a court may proceed to deliberate a matter further, first jurisdiction must be ascertained---The company jurisdiction of the High Court, provided by the legal cover under S. 5 of the Act, 2017, specifically holds for invocation of the company jurisdiction when there is an infringement under the Act, 2017 itself which the Company Court is empowered to entertain, i.e. when a provision of the Act, 2017 has been violated---Petitioners also failed in showing any such infringement or violation to the Company under the Act, 2017---Record (relevant letter) showed that SECP had asked the Petitioners to approach them for manual filing of the documents, which had not been done, despite nearly one year having elapsed---Said tardiness on behalf of the Petitioners created further doubt on the genuine motives of the Petitioners in pursuing present course of action against the Respondents---Since no affairs of the Company appeared to be conducted unlawfully or fraudulently, which is sine qua non for invoking S.286 of the Act 2017 or no violation of the Act, 2017 had been established by the Petitioners, present petition did not fulfill requirements to bring it within the ambit of the company jurisdiction---Petition was dismissed, in circumstances. 2021 CLD 7 and Tehzeb Bakers’ case 2024 CLD 113 ref. Yahya Iqbal for Petitioners. Danish Nayyar and Ms. Javeria Ali for Respondent No.2. Syed Hafiz Ebad for SECP.

Summary: The right of the petitioner to cross examine the PWs of respondent No.2 has been declined by dismissing his application. This is a final order as regards the decision of said application and case decided in terms of Section 115 CPC, therefore, could be called in question through revision petition and while hearing the said revision on merits, the question whether the matter falls within the three grounds provided for exercise of civil revision or not would be decided on its own merits in accordance with law. 135Writ Petition- Civil Proceedings- Temporary Injunction 5962-25 NADEEM AKHTAR VS ADJ ETC Mr. Justice Syed Ahsan Raza Kazmi 17- 11- 2025 2025 LHC 7122

Summary: Held that second application for submission of list of witnesses under Order XVI, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC") is not maintainable when first application of the plaintiff was dismissed and the order of dismissal was not challenged, more so when second application was filed naming different individuals required to be summoned as witnesses. Labelling the second application as one under Order XVI Rule 14, CPC and not under Rule 1 thereof is also misconceived argument. It is imperative to observe that Order XVI Rule 14 CPC is not a device for parties to fill gaps in their evidence. It vests a discretionary, suo motu power in the Court, which may be exercised if the Court itself finds a person necessary for effective adjudication even though such person is stranger. It is not intended to compensate for negligence or allow a litigant to expand the record after procedural time limits have expired. In these circumstances, allowing such applications would defeat the statutory discipline of Order XVI, Rule 1; undermine the requirement of timely disclosure, and open the door for parties to repeatedly repair their omissions. The discretion under Order XVI Rule 14 squarely belongs to the Court, which may call any stranger on its own assessment; it cannot be demanded as a matter of right by a party that has failed to comply with Rule 1 of Order XVI, CPC. 133ITR (Income Tax Reference) 53-22 CIR MULTAN VS M/S AL-HILAL INDUSTRIES MULTAN Mr. Justice Asim Hafeez 18- 11- 2025 2025 LHC 6774

Summary: (a) Muslim personal law / Family law----Maintenance of wife---Obligation of husband---Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Arts.2A, 3, 9, 25(3), 31, 34, 35, 37 & 38---Islamic Injunctions (Quran, Sunnah, Ijma, Ijtihad)---Status of wife and duty of support---Scope. Marriage in Islam is a contract creating reciprocal rights and obligations; one of the most fundamental rights of a wife is to be maintained by the husband in accordance with his financial means for the entire subsistence of the marriage. This obligation covers housing, food, clothing, healthcare and other essentials of a dignified life and is rooted in the Quran, Sunnah, juristic consensus and ijtihad, as well as in constitutional provisions which mandate protection of women from material and moral neglect. Once this obligation arises, it is legally enforceable, and any neglect in performance renders the husband liable in law. The accumulation of unpaid maintenance does not alter the marital bond or extinguish the wife’s right; it merely creates enforceable financial claims (arrears) against the husband. (b) Muslim personal law / Family law----Maintenance of wife---Quran and Sunnah---Extent of obligation---Divorced wife during ‘iddat’---Principles. Quranic verses (inter alia, Surah Al-Baqarah 2:233 & 241; Surah At-Talaq 65:1, 7; Surah An-Nisa 4:34) collectively establish that the husband/father must bear the reasonable cost of food, clothing and residence of his wife and children, and must also provide reasonable maintenance to a divorced wife during her waiting period, according to his means. The Sunnah reinforces this duty: (i) the Farewell Sermon commands kind and generous treatment of women in food and clothing; (ii) the Prophet (SAW), when asked about the wife’s rights, declared that she be fed and clothed as the husband does for himself, without humiliation or violence; and (iii) he permitted a wife, where the husband was neglectful, to take from his property what was reasonably necessary for herself and the children. Under classical fiqh, a settled maxim provides that “whoever is confined for the benefit of another, his maintenance is on that other,” which applies to the wife who, being confined to the matrimonial home, must be maintained by the husband so long as she is not recalcitrant or disobedient. (c) Family Courts Act, 1964 & Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961----Past maintenance---Absence of prior agreement---Jurisdiction of Family Court / Arbitration Council to grant arrears---Delay in approaching Court---Effect. Questions often arose whether, in the absence of a specific agreement, a wife could obtain a decree/certificate for past maintenance; whether an Arbitration Council or a Family Court could grant arrears; and from what date maintenance should run (cause of action, filing of application/suit, or date of order). A Division Bench of Lahore High Court in Sardar Muhammad v. Mst. Nasima Bibi (PLD 1966 (W.P) Lah. 703) held that (i) the husband’s obligation to maintain his wife commences with the solemnization of marriage, subject to recognized conditions; and (ii) a wife’s delay in approaching the Court, or her attempts to seek alternative remedies outside Court, does not take away her right to claim maintenance from the date when the cause of action first arose. The Courts (Arbitration Council or Family Court) are fully competent to grant arrears of maintenance, subject to limitation and the circumstances of each case. This view was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Muhammad Nawaz v. Mst. Khurshid Begum (PLD 1972 SC 302) and later reinforced in Mst. Farah Naz v. Judge Family Court, Sahiwal (PLD 2006 SC 457), thereby settling that past maintenance can be decreed, even without a prior written agreement, once neglect is proved. (d) Limitation Act, 1908----Art.120 & S.23---Suit for past maintenance---“Right to sue”---Continuing wrong---Successive causes of action---Six-year limitation---Whether operates as a rigid cap on arrears. Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 prescribes a six-year limitation period for suits where no specific period is otherwise provided, to be reckoned from the date when the “right to sue” accrues. In maintenance matters, the obligation is periodic and accrues month by month; each non-payment constitutes a fresh default and creates a recurring debt. Such non-payment is a “continuing wrong” within the meaning of S.23 of the Limitation Act; the cause of action arises de die in diem (day by day) so long as neglect continues. Failure by the wife to sue on an earlier instalment does not bar a later suit founded on subsequent defaults; successive causes of action may be independently pursued. While Art.120 applies to suits for recovery of past maintenance, it regulates only the time within which the suit must be brought, not the underlying validity or subsistence of the claim. Where the husband’s clear refusal or neglect to maintain is shown within six years preceding the suit, and the suit is filed within that period, the wife’s claim for arrears, covering the entire span of established neglect, is maintainable and is not automatically cut down to the last six years alone. In cases of ambiguity, limitation statutes should be construed in a manner that avoids depriving a party of substantive rights and prevents hardship, while still respecting the statutory framework. Cited Cases: • Sardar Muhammad v. Mst. Nasima Bibi and others PLD 1966 (W.P) Lahore 703 • Muhammad Nawaz v. Mst. Khurshid Begum and 3 others PLD 1972 SC 302 • Mst. Farah Naz v. Judge Family Court, Sahiwal and others PLD 2006 SC 457 • Venkopadhyaya v. Kavari Hengusu 2 Madras 36 • Holes v. Chard Union (1894) 1 Ch. 293 • Basawanewa Balappa v. Balappa Shivappa AIR 1936 Bombay 289 • Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim (deceased) through L.Rs and others 2025 SCMR 955 (e) Family law----Maintenance of wife---Arrears of maintenance as “debt”---Neglect proved---Effect. Once the Family Court determines, on evidence, that the husband has neglected to maintain his wife without her fault, arrears of maintenance are treated in law as a debt owed by the husband to the wife. That finding, having not been set aside by the first appellate Court and not challenged before the Supreme Court, became final. The husband cannot evade that debt by invoking technical pleas of limitation or by relying on a self-serving offer to pay only a truncated portion (e.g. last six years). Where the wife’s suit is held to be within limitation and her claim of continuous neglect is proved, she is entitled to recover the arrears for the entire period pleaded and established, and the Courts are bound to enforce such liability. (f) Practice and procedure----Family disputes---Technicalities of limitation---Approach of superior Courts. In matrimonial and maintenance disputes, the Courts are required to keep in view the constitutional and Islamic command to protect women from neglect and destitution. While limitation provisions must be applied where clearly attracted, they should not be extended by strained interpretation to defeat meritorious claims of vulnerable parties. The husband’s attempt to use Art.120 as a technical shield to avoid his long-standing obligation was, in the circumstances, rejected, and the decree for retrospective maintenance passed by the Family Court and restored by the High Court was maintained. Disposition: Appeal dismissed; judgment of the High Court restoring the Family Court decree for maintenance from June 2004 till subsistence of marriage upheld; no order as to costs.