Summary: (Against the Judgment dated 27.08.2024 passed by the Sindh Service Tribunal at Karachi in Appeals Nos. 1267/2021, 1305/2021, 634/2019, 1200/2021, 144/2022, 125/2019, 1011/2019, 11/2020, 30/2020, 92/2020, 94/2020, 95/2020, 96/2020, 97/2020, 98/2020, 102/2020, 104/2020, 126/2019, 705/2021, 950/2019, 951/2019, 952/2019, 1097/2021, 1100/2021, 1101/2021, 1115/2021, 1116/2021, 1149/2021, 1150/2021, 1153/2021, 1154/2021, 1155/2021, 1156/2021, 1158/2021, 1161/2021, 1166/2021, 1169/2021, 1172/2021, 1173/2021, 1174/2021, 1177/2021, 1178/2021, 1179/2021, 1199/2021, 1202/2021, 1212/2021, 1219/2021, 1221/2021, 1265/2021, 1302/2021, 29/2022, 1182/2021, 1170/2021, 1152/2021, 1090/2021, 636/2019, 635/2019, 1167/2021, 1157/2021, 1270/2021, 1129/2021, 1271/2021, 637/2019, 1304/2021, 93/2020, 1168/2021, 1293/2021, 1269/2021, 1294/2021, 1230/2021, 1229/2021, 1272/2021, 1275/2021, 1196/2021, 1277/2021, 1279/2021, 1117/2021, 1195/2021, 1266/2021, 1151/2021, 1245/2021, 1218/2021, 96/2022, 1309/2021, 1220/2021, 1092/2021, 1198/2021, 1183/2021, 1246/2021). (a) Civil service--- ----Removal from service---Petitioners were appointed by following due process but were subsequently removed from service---Constitution of a committee by the Supreme Court to resolve the factual controversy---The controversy arose from the petitioners' removal from service despite being appointed through a formal recruitment process and allegedly fulfilling all codal formalities---It was contended that although a list of 166 similarly appointed employees had been accepted and their salaries released pursuant to a consent order, the petitioners claimed they were also covered in that list but were not reinstated that two scrutiny reports were compiled indicating that the petitioners were not at fault and the responsibility lay with the ex-director, however, the department still issued show-cause notices and removed the petitioners from service; that the service tribunal failed to properly consider these facts and previous judgments/orders, including the verification of their credentials already deemed genuine---Held: The grievance, rather the contention, of the petitioners that they were not fully covered in the list of the 166 employees and their credentials were already scrutinized by the competent authority, was not considered properly before dismissing the service appeals---In order to thrash out and reconcile the controversy to some logical end, it was deemed most advantageous and expedient to constitute a three-member committee to scrutinize the cases of the present petitioners to assess whether they fell within the category of the aforesaid 166 employees and were thus entitled for restoration/appointment in service or not---The law officer along with officials present in court also assured that the committee would consider the credentials/antecedents of all the petitioners as well as the reports and the list of employees compiled earlier, with an independent application of mind, for reaching a just and proper conclusion in the matter---All civil petitions were converted into appeals by ordering certain directions to be followed in the matter---Appeals were disposed of, in circumstances. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 212---Sindh Service Tribunals Act (XV of 1973), Ss. 4 & 5---Service Tribunal---Jurisdiction, powers and scope---The factual controversy with regard to the recruitment process and verification of documents germane to the appointments are required to be resolved by the Service Tribunal, being the first fact-finding forum in service matters---The Service Tribunal exercised exclusive jurisdiction in the matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants and for the matters connected therewith or ancillary thereto---The fundamental philosophy of the appellate jurisdiction is to ensure checks and balances by means of re-evaluation and re-examination of the orders passed by the lower fora or authority---The wisdom of setting up a Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution was to deal with and decide matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants---The Service Tribunal may, on appeal, confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against and for the purpose of deciding any appeal it is deemed to be a civil court---The astuteness of discretion in judicial power is meant to serve and advance the cause of justice in a judicious manner in aid of justice. Malik Naeem Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.Ps.Nos.948-K to 994-K of 2024). Petitioners in person (in C.Ps. Nos. 915-K, 916-K, 917-K, 946-K, 995-K to 1004-K, 1019-K to 1025-K, 1028-K to 1034-K, 1037-K, 1065-K of 2024 and 2-K of 2025). Nemo for Petitioners (in C.Ps. Nos. 944-K, 1035-K, 1036-K, 1066-K to 1071-K, 1088-K and 1089-K of 2024). Sibtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General, Sindh, Shahab Qamar Ansari, Secretary Colleges Education and Iqbal Ahmed, Additional Secretary for Respondents. Date of hearing: 3rd June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan – Art. 212 – Jurisdiction of Service Tribunal – Obligation to Adjudicate Service Matters on Factual and Legal Grounds Failure to adjudicate relevant facts—Scope—Held, Service Tribunal is the primary fact-finding forum for adjudication of service matters and is duty-bound to consider material on record and claims of similarly placed employees—Petitioners asserted inclusion in a previously scrutinized and judicially acknowledged group of 166 appointees whose appointments had been regularized—Tribunal dismissed appeals without addressing whether petitioners fell within that protected category—Supreme Court held this omission constituted failure to discharge judicial function—Tribunal must evaluate records and recruitment process fairly and not disregard relevant reports and past judicial findings while dismissing service appeals. (b) Civil Servants – Appointment and Termination – Validity of Recruitment Process and Scope of Judicial Review Recruitment against 289 advertised posts—Petitioners alleged lawful appointments through merit-based selection in 2011—Service books prepared but salaries withheld and appointments subsequently terminated without establishing personal fault—Scrutiny committee’s 2016 report acknowledged that fault lay with the Director (Colleges), not the appointees—Held, blanket termination without verifying individual credentials and documentary compliance amounts to arbitrary exercise of power—Right to fair adjudication includes opportunity to produce evidence and have claims assessed on merit—Court directed formation of scrutiny committee to verify petitioners’ inclusion in protected group and compliance with codal formalities. (c) Administrative Law – Executive Oversight and Committee-Based Review – Validity and Binding Nature Constitution of verification committee—Held, where large-scale terminations arise from administrative irregularities not attributable to individual employees, a fact-based assessment is essential to distinguish bona fide appointees—Supreme Court directed formation of a high-level three-member committee to scrutinize individual claims of petitioners—Committee to assess inclusion in prior approved list of 166 employees, verify documents, and restore service accordingly—Exercise to be completed within two months independently and without being influenced by impugned judgment of Tribunal. (d) Principles of Natural Justice – Right to be Heard – Due Process in Service Terminations Lack of meaningful hearing prior to removal—Held, issuance of show cause notices followed by perfunctory hearings without individualized assessment violates the right to due process—Where petitioners’ service credentials were previously accepted and appointments documented, department was required to prove specific irregularity in each case—Blanket removal, particularly after Tribunal’s directions for scrutiny, is unsustainable in law—Judicial review warranted to ensure compliance with principles of fairness and non-discrimination. (e) Precedent and Consistency – Judicial Endorsement of Similarly Placed Employees Previous judgments and departmental reports—Effect—Held, earlier Service Tribunal judgments dated 29.05.2018 and 11.05.2015, and Supreme Court orders dated 24.01.2019 and 08.04.2021 upheld appointments of similarly situated employees based on departmental scrutiny—Petitioners were entitled to parity of treatment if found within same factual matrix—Tribunal failed to consider binding precedents and prior factual findings—Reassessment directed to ensure consistent application of law. Disposition: Civil Petitions converted into appeals and disposed of with directions to constitute a verification committee within ten days. Committee to complete scrutiny within two months and reinstate petitioners found covered under previously approved category of 166 employees, subject to document verification.

Summary: (a) Sindh Terms of Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 2015 (XI of 2016)- -Ss.2(g), 3, 14, S.O. 15 & Sched.-Sindh Industrial Relations Act (XXIX of 2013), Ss.34(7), 47(3) & 48(3)-Closing down of an establishment by the employer-Grievance petition by the employees-Payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement in service, grant of-Due process and mandatory procedure to be followed for seeking approval before closing of establishment by employer, requirement of-Scope-Facts in brevity were that the petitioner being engaged in printing ceramic tiles for other manufacturers applied under Standing Order 15 of the Sindh Terms of Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 2015 to close its factory due to technological changes rendering its business unviable-Employees alleged the closure was in retaliation to trade union activities and filed grievance petitions, which were dismissed by the Labour Court-On appeal, the Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside the dismissal and ordered compensation for the employees in lieu of reinstatement-The High Court upheld this order, holding that the closure was not in accordance with law as no application had been made to the government through the proper channel-Pivotal question for determination before the Supreme Court was as to-Whether the petitioner company’s application for closure of its establishment fulfilled the legal requirement of seeking closure approval under Standing Order 15 of the 2015 Act, and if compensation in lieu of reinstatement granted to the employees was justified?-Held: The petitioner filed the application for seeking permission to close down the factory before a wrong forum, and after lapse of fifteen days, presumed that their application, by fiction of law was allowed, which was a completely wrong understanding of the law by the petitioner-Had the (petitioner) approached and filed an application through the proper channel, which could be the office of the Chief Secretary, with the request to place it before the provincial cabinet for approval, and if such application was then moved to the Government through the Chief Secretary, there was a possibility that the Chief Minister could have placed such application before the Cabinet for consideration-Labour Appellate Tribunal correctly held that the application for closing down the factory was not submitted to the government, therefore it could not be deemed to have been granted upon the expiry of fifteen days-High Court had also expressed distinctly that the petitioner company had not legally closed down the establishment, hence the Labour Appellate Tribunal rightly directed the petitioner’s company to deposit the amount due as payment to the workers within one month, in view of the length of their service, instead of reinstating them in service, which was not possible-Since, in the present case, due to certain reasons, the petitioner had already closed down the whole establishment unlawfully, therefore, the reinstatement of employees in a closed down establishment was otherwise not possible, and had reinstatement been ordered, it could have no positive effect except being an academic exercise without any implementation or execution-Therefore, in order to secure the lawful service dues in such peculiar set of circumstances, the best devise was to grant reasonable compensation to the workmen for their wrongful removal from service-Had the application for closure of the factory been moved through the Chief Secretary for consideration by the Government/Cabinet, the situation would have been much different, with the rider that if the application for permission to close down was not decided within fifteen days of its submission, the said application could be deemed to have been granted/allowed and appeal against such decision could have been filed within thirty days of the order-Moreover, the violation of Standing Orders had been made punishable under Section 7 of the 2015 Act-No illegality or perversity in the concurrent findings recorded by Labour Appellate Tribunal as well as the High Court were found-Leave was refused and petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Mustafa Impex’s case PLD 2016 SC 808 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art.91-Rules of Business, 1973, Rr.16, 17, 18 & 20-Supremacy and role of the Cabinet in Executive decision-making-Scope-The Cabinet, being the supreme body of the Executive, with a high constitutional status, cannot and ought not to be treated as a mere rubber stamp for decision making by the Prime Minister-Constitution envisaged a Parliamentary form of Government which was based on decision making by the Cabinet-To turn the Cabinet into a rubber stamp in pursuit of decision making by the Prime Minister to the exclusion of his Cabinet would violate the letter and spirit of the Constitution, as it would reduce a cabinet form of government into a prime ministerial one which is a concept alien to the Constitution. (c) Maxim- -Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria- (No man can take benefit of his own wrong)-Ignorantia juris non excusat- (Ignorance of law is not excuse)-Scope and applicability-The legal maxim-nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria-delineates that no man can take advantage of his own wrong-If a person sets up a strategy to thwart the legal rights of others, he cannot be allowed to take benefit of his wrong-At the same time, another legal maxim-ignorantia juris non excusat-cannot be ignored, which describes that ignorance of the law is no excuse and nobody can get away from being held accountable for being in violation of the law by merely pleading that he was unaware of the consequences. (d) Interpretation of statutes- -Intent of legislature to be given full effect-Statutes should be interpreted in a way that they are made practicable and courts should avoid such construction of law that may defeat the explicit intention of the lawmakers or may lessen the impact of a statute or its provision to vainness-The legislature's intention can be deduced from the language of the statute or its provision which cannot be diverged while interpreting it, for the simple reason that the main object before a court is to get to the bottom of the legislature’s intention for enacting the law. (e) Sindh Terms of Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 2015 (XI of 2016)- -Ss.2(g), 2(k), 3, S.O. 15 & Sched.-Closing down of an establishment by the employer-Absence of procedural legal framework-Legislative and regulatory reforms, requirement of-Necessity for structured process, employee dues protection, and speaking orders-Scope-There must be some well-structured procedure and mechanism to deal with and decide the applications submitted to the Government for closing down the establishment in terms of Standing Order 15 of the Sindh Terms of Employment (Standing Orders) Act 2015-No doubt, the powers are given to the Government, but there is no procedure to decide such application except providing the outer limit of 15 days; that, too, is in favour of the employer, to presume that his application is allowed if it was not decided or responded to within fifteen days-Therefore, a clean slate is accorded to the employer to immediately shut down the whole business/establishment without checking whether the action is bona fide or mala fide or, while doing so, if the full and final accrued dues of employees have been settled or not-On the contrary, while assuming jurisdiction to accord permission, it is the responsibility of the Government to ensure that the close down is bona fide and permission is granted after ensuring the payment of dues to the employees-Apparently, this cumbersome exercise cannot be done by the Government itself as it involves microscopic details, therefore, there is a need to enact a fool-proof procedure to deal with, examine, and decide such applications after hearing the employer and employees/their representative/Trade Union/CBA, and then render a speaking order so that an aggrieved person may file an appeal in the Labour Court in terms of Standing Order 15 of the 2015 Act-Therefore, some necessary amendments in the 2015 Act or some rules or Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are required to be enacted in the best interest of workers, to save them from unlawful removal from service in case of mala fide attempts/schemes, and also from deprivation of their lawful dues in case bona fide of employer is proved-Necessary attention of the Government was invited to take necessary action regarding the above aspect of the matter.

Summary: (On appeal against the judgment, dated 31.01.2023 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Constitutional Petition No. D-1134 of 2022). (a) Sindh Terms of Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 2015 (XI of 2016)--- ----Ss.2(g), 3, 14, S.O. 15 & Sched.---Sindh Industrial Relations Act (XXIX of 2013), Ss.34(7), 47(3) & 48(3)---Closing down of an establishment by the employer---Grievance petition by the employees---Payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement in service, grant of---Due process and mandatory procedure to be followed for seeking approval before closing of establishment by employer, requirement of---Scope---Facts in brevity were that the petitioner being engaged in printing ceramic tiles for other manufacturers applied under Standing Order 15 of the Sindh Terms of Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 2015 to close its factory due to technological changes rendering its business unviable---Employees alleged the closure was in retaliation to trade union activities and filed grievance petitions, which were dismissed by the Labour Court---On appeal, the Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside the dismissal and ordered compensation for the employees in lieu of reinstatement---The High Court upheld this order, holding that the closure was not in accordance with law as no application had been made to the government through the proper channel---Pivotal question for determination before the Supreme Court was as to “Whether the petitioner company’s application for closure of its establishment fulfilled the legal requirement of seeking closure approval under Standing Order 15 of the 2015 Act, and if compensation in lieu of reinstatement granted to the employees was justified?”---Held: The petitioner filed the application for seeking permission to close down the factory before a wrong forum, and after lapse of fifteen days, presumed that their application, by fiction of law was allowed, which was a completely wrong understanding of the law by the petitioner---Had the (petitioner) approached and filed an application through the proper channel, which could be the office of the Chief Secretary, with the request to place it before the provincial cabinet for approval, and if such application was then moved to the Government through the Chief Secretary, there was a possibility that the Chief Minister could have placed such application before the Cabinet for consideration---Labour Appellate Tribunal correctly held that the application for closing down the factory was not submitted to the government, therefore it could not be deemed to have been granted upon the expiry of fifteen days---High Court had also expressed distinctly that the petitioner company had not legally closed down the establishment, hence the Labour Appellate Tribunal rightly directed the petitioner’s company to deposit the amount due as payment to the workers within one month, in view of the length of their service, instead of reinstating them in service, which was not possible---Since, in the present case, due to certain reasons, the petitioner had already closed down the whole establishment unlawfully, therefore, the reinstatement of employees in a closed down establishment was otherwise not possible, and had reinstatement been ordered, it could have no positive effect except being an academic exercise without any implementation or execution---Therefore, in order to secure the lawful service dues in such peculiar set of circumstances, the best devise was to grant reasonable compensation to the workmen for their wrongful removal from service---Had the application for closure of the factory been moved through the Chief Secretary for consideration by the Government/Cabinet, the situation would have been much different, with the rider that if the application for permission to close down was not decided within fifteen days of its submission, the said application could be deemed to have been granted/allowed and appeal against such decision could have been filed within thirty days of the order---Moreover, the violation of Standing Orders had been made punishable under Section 7 of the 2015 Act---No illegality or perversity in the concurrent findings recorded by Labour Appellate Tribunal as well as the High Court were found---Leave was refused and petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Mustafa Impex’s case PLD 2016 SC 808 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.91---Rules of Business, 1973, Rr.16, 17, 18 & 20---Supremacy and role of the Cabinet in Executive decision-making---Scope---The Cabinet, being the supreme body of the Executive, with a high constitutional status, cannot and ought not to be treated as a mere rubber stamp for decision making by the Prime Minister---Constitution envisaged a Parliamentary form of Government which was based on decision making by the Cabinet---To turn the Cabinet into a rubber stamp in pursuit of decision making by the Prime Minister to the exclusion of his Cabinet would violate the letter and spirit of the Constitution, as it would reduce a cabinet form of government into a prime ministerial one which is a concept alien to the Constitution. Mustafa Impex’s case PLD 2016 SC 808 rel. (c) Maxim--- ----“Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria” (No man can take benefit of his own wrong)---“Ignorantia juris non excusat” (Ignorance of law is not excuse)---Scope and applicability---The legal maxim “nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria” delineates that no man can take advantage of his own wrong---If a person sets up a strategy to thwart the legal rights of others, he cannot be allowed to take benefit of his wrong---At the same time, another legal maxim “ignorantia juris non excusat” cannot be ignored, which describes that ignorance of the law is no excuse and nobody can get away from being held accountable for being in violation of the law by merely pleading that he was unaware of the consequences. (d) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Intent of legislature to be given full effect---Statutes should be interpreted in a way that they are made practicable and courts should avoid such construction of law that may defeat the explicit intention of the lawmakers or may lessen the impact of a statute or its provision to vainness---The legislature's intention can be deduced from the language of the statute or its provision which cannot be diverged while interpreting it, for the simple reason that the main object before a court is to get to the bottom of the legislature’s intention for enacting the law. (e) Sindh Terms of Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 2015 (XI of 2016)--- ----Ss.2(g), 2(k), 3, S.O. 15 & Sched.---Closing down of an establishment by the employer---Absence of procedural legal framework---Legislative and regulatory reforms, requirement of---Necessity for structured process, employee dues protection, and speaking orders---Scope---There must be some well-structured procedure and mechanism to deal with and decide the applications submitted to the Government for closing down the establishment in terms of Standing Order 15 of the Sindh Terms of Employment (Standing Orders) Act 2015---No doubt, the powers are given to the Government, but there is no procedure to decide such application except providing the outer limit of 15 days; that, too, is in favour of the employer, to presume that his application is allowed if it was not decided or responded to within fifteen days---Therefore, a clean slate is accorded to the employer to immediately shut down the whole business/establishment without checking whether the action is bona fide or mala fide or, while doing so, if the full and final accrued dues of employees have been settled or not---On the contrary, while assuming jurisdiction to accord permission, it is the responsibility of the Government to ensure that the close down is bona fide and permission is granted after ensuring the payment of dues to the employees---Apparently, this cumbersome exercise cannot be done by the Government itself as it involves microscopic details, therefore, there is a need to enact a fool-proof procedure to deal with, examine, and decide such applications after hearing the employer and employees/their representative/Trade Union/CBA, and then render a speaking order so that an aggrieved person may file an appeal in the Labour Court in terms of Standing Order 15 of the 2015 Act---Therefore, some necessary amendments in the 2015 Act or some rules or Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are required to be enacted in the best interest of workers, to save them from unlawful removal from service in case of mala fide attempts/schemes, and also from deprivation of their lawful dues in case bona fide of employer is proved---Necessary attention of the Government was invited to take necessary action regarding the above aspect of the matter. Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry, Advocate Supreme Court / Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Fazal Mannan Bacha, Advocate High Court with R-1 (Babu Sher) for Respondents. Sibtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General Sindh for Respondents (on Court’s call). Date of hearing: 2nd June, 2025.

Summary: (On appeal against the judgment, dated 31.01.2023 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Constitutional Petition No. D-1134 of 2022). (a) Sindh Terms of Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 2015 (XI of 2016)--- ----Ss.2(g), 3, 14, S.O. 15 & Sched.---Sindh Industrial Relations Act (XXIX of 2013), Ss.34(7), 47(3) & 48(3)---Closing down of an establishment by the employer---Grievance petition by the employees---Payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement in service, grant of---Due process and mandatory procedure to be followed for seeking approval before closing of establishment by employer, requirement of---Scope---Facts in brevity were that the petitioner being engaged in printing ceramic tiles for other manufacturers applied under Standing Order 15 of the Sindh Terms of Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 2015 to close its factory due to technological changes rendering its business unviable---Employees alleged the closure was in retaliation to trade union activities and filed grievance petitions, which were dismissed by the Labour Court---On appeal, the Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside the dismissal and ordered compensation for the employees in lieu of reinstatement---The High Court upheld this order, holding that the closure was not in accordance with law as no application had been made to the government through the proper channel---Pivotal question for determination before the Supreme Court was as to “Whether the petitioner company’s application for closure of its establishment fulfilled the legal requirement of seeking closure approval under Standing Order 15 of the 2015 Act, and if compensation in lieu of reinstatement granted to the employees was justified?”---Held: The petitioner filed the application for seeking permission to close down the factory before a wrong forum, and after lapse of fifteen days, presumed that their application, by fiction of law was allowed, which was a completely wrong understanding of the law by the petitioner---Had the (petitioner) approached and filed an application through the proper channel, which could be the office of the Chief Secretary, with the request to place it before the provincial cabinet for approval, and if such application was then moved to the Government through the Chief Secretary, there was a possibility that the Chief Minister could have placed such application before the Cabinet for consideration---Labour Appellate Tribunal correctly held that the application for closing down the factory was not submitted to the government, therefore it could not be deemed to have been granted upon the expiry of fifteen days---High Court had also expressed distinctly that the petitioner company had not legally closed down the establishment, hence the Labour Appellate Tribunal rightly directed the petitioner’s company to deposit the amount due as payment to the workers within one month, in view of the length of their service, instead of reinstating them in service, which was not possible---Since, in the present case, due to certain reasons, the petitioner had already closed down the whole establishment unlawfully, therefore, the reinstatement of employees in a closed down establishment was otherwise not possible, and had reinstatement been ordered, it could have no positive effect except being an academic exercise without any implementation or execution---Therefore, in order to secure the lawful service dues in such peculiar set of circumstances, the best devise was to grant reasonable compensation to the workmen for their wrongful removal from service---Had the application for closure of the factory been moved through the Chief Secretary for consideration by the Government/Cabinet, the situation would have been much different, with the rider that if the application for permission to close down was not decided within fifteen days of its submission, the said application could be deemed to have been granted/allowed and appeal against such decision could have been filed within thirty days of the order---Moreover, the violation of Standing Orders had been made punishable under Section 7 of the 2015 Act---No illegality or perversity in the concurrent findings recorded by Labour Appellate Tribunal as well as the High Court were found---Leave was refused and petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Mustafa Impex’s case PLD 2016 SC 808 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.91---Rules of Business, 1973, Rr.16, 17, 18 & 20---Supremacy and role of the Cabinet in Executive decision-making---Scope---The Cabinet, being the supreme body of the Executive, with a high constitutional status, cannot and ought not to be treated as a mere rubber stamp for decision making by the Prime Minister---Constitution envisaged a Parliamentary form of Government which was based on decision making by the Cabinet---To turn the Cabinet into a rubber stamp in pursuit of decision making by the Prime Minister to the exclusion of his Cabinet would violate the letter and spirit of the Constitution, as it would reduce a cabinet form of government into a prime ministerial one which is a concept alien to the Constitution. Mustafa Impex’s case PLD 2016 SC 808 rel. (c) Maxim--- ----“Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria” (No man can take benefit of his own wrong)---“Ignorantia juris non excusat” (Ignorance of law is not excuse)---Scope and applicability---The legal maxim “nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria” delineates that no man can take advantage of his own wrong---If a person sets up a strategy to thwart the legal rights of others, he cannot be allowed to take benefit of his wrong---At the same time, another legal maxim “ignorantia juris non excusat” cannot be ignored, which describes that ignorance of the law is no excuse and nobody can get away from being held accountable for being in violation of the law by merely pleading that he was unaware of the consequences. (d) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Intent of legislature to be given full effect---Statutes should be interpreted in a way that they are made practicable and courts should avoid such construction of law that may defeat the explicit intention of the lawmakers or may lessen the impact of a statute or its provision to vainness---The legislature's intention can be deduced from the language of the statute or its provision which cannot be diverged while interpreting it, for the simple reason that the main object before a court is to get to the bottom of the legislature’s intention for enacting the law. (e) Sindh Terms of Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 2015 (XI of 2016)--- ----Ss.2(g), 2(k), 3, S.O. 15 & Sched.---Closing down of an establishment by the employer---Absence of procedural legal framework---Legislative and regulatory reforms, requirement of---Necessity for structured process, employee dues protection, and speaking orders---Scope---There must be some well-structured procedure and mechanism to deal with and decide the applications submitted to the Government for closing down the establishment in terms of Standing Order 15 of the Sindh Terms of Employment (Standing Orders) Act 2015---No doubt, the powers are given to the Government, but there is no procedure to decide such application except providing the outer limit of 15 days; that, too, is in favour of the employer, to presume that his application is allowed if it was not decided or responded to within fifteen days---Therefore, a clean slate is accorded to the employer to immediately shut down the whole business/establishment without checking whether the action is bona fide or mala fide or, while doing so, if the full and final accrued dues of employees have been settled or not---On the contrary, while assuming jurisdiction to accord permission, it is the responsibility of the Government to ensure that the close down is bona fide and permission is granted after ensuring the payment of dues to the employees---Apparently, this cumbersome exercise cannot be done by the Government itself as it involves microscopic details, therefore, there is a need to enact a fool-proof procedure to deal with, examine, and decide such applications after hearing the employer and employees/their representative/Trade Union/CBA, and then render a speaking order so that an aggrieved person may file an appeal in the Labour Court in terms of Standing Order 15 of the 2015 Act---Therefore, some necessary amendments in the 2015 Act or some rules or Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are required to be enacted in the best interest of workers, to save them from unlawful removal from service in case of mala fide attempts/schemes, and also from deprivation of their lawful dues in case bona fide of employer is proved---Necessary attention of the Government was invited to take necessary action regarding the above aspect of the matter. Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry, Advocate Supreme Court / Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Fazal Mannan Bacha, Advocate High Court with R-1 (Babu Sher) for Respondents. Sibtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General Sindh for Respondents (on Court’s call). Date of hearing: 2nd June, 2025.

Summary: Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977--- ----R. 4(5)---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), Art. 44---Civil service---Recruitment process---Illegal appointments of Moallim-ul-Quran---Appointing authority acting as Chairman instead of ex officio Member of Selection Board and making recommendation in violation of Rules---Issuance of advertisement by incompetent authority---Effect---Administrative misconduct and procedural irregularities in execution of selection process---Advertisement was issued by DEO (Male) for the posts of Moallim-ul-Quran and no such post was advertised by DEO (Female)/appointing authority---DEO (Male) of the concerned district, who was the appointing authority for Moallim-ul-Quran B-1 under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Elementary and Secondary Education Department Teaching Cadre Services Rules (Male), 2022, acted as Chairman Selection Committee for Moallim-ul-Quran and no one was associated being the representative of appointing authority as an ex officio Member of Section Committee as was required by R. 4(5) of the Rules, 1977---Summary to this effect forwarded by Chief Secretary of Azad Jammu and Kashmir to the Prime Minister of the State of Jammu and Kashmir also portrayed that an inquiry was conducted by the Chief Secretary in which it was found that selection process was liable to be scrutinized---Some disabled persons had been appointed without reserving/calculating any quota in the advertisement for the disabled persons---High Court found serious administrative misconduct in execution of statutory process, despite clear provisions of law and regulations---Responsible officers were found to have failed to discharge their duties in lawful and efficient manner---Whole selection process was declared to be anomalous, ab initio void and coram non judice, hence, stood extinguished---Respondents were directed to re-initiate the selection process from inception---Writ petition was accepted, in circumstances. Civil Appeal No.33 of 2025 Waseem Khan and others v. Azad Government and others rel. Counsel for Petitioners. Faheem Ahmed Awan, Legal Advisor Education Department. VERDICT: The above titled writ petitions are hereby accepted. Date of hearing: 27th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan—Art. 188—Review jurisdiction of Supreme Court—Error apparent on face of record—Per incuriam judgment—Principles—Scope—Supreme Court allowed review petition where statutory service rules providing right of appeal were not considered either by the High Court or by the Supreme Court in earlier proceedings—Such omission constituted an error apparent on the face of record resulting in miscarriage of justice—Judgment dated 16.03.2020 passed in Civil Appeal No. 353 of 2010, and judgment of Peshawar High Court dated 06.03.2009, were set aside to the extent of petitioner and matter remanded to Chief Justice of Peshawar High Court for re-decision of petitioner’s appeal by a Bench to be nominated. The Court reaffirmed that a reviewable error includes failure to consider applicable statutory provisions which have a material bearing on the outcome—In the present case, Rule 12 of the Peshawar High Court Ministerial Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1989, read with Rule 3 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1986, conferred a right of appeal to a civil servant aggrieved by an order of removal, even when passed by the Chief Justice—Said Rules, though repealed by the 2020 Rules, were applicable at the time of removal and their repeal did not affect accrued rights—Failure of both the Peshawar High Court and Supreme Court to consider these rules constituted a legal error justifying review. Cited Cases: Government of Punjab v. Aamir Zahoor ul Haq (PLD 2016 SC 421) Nadia Naz v. The President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan (PLD 2023 SC 588) (b) Service matters—Departmental appeal—Right of appeal against order passed by Chief Justice of High Court—Applicability of statutory rules—Peshawar High Court Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1989, read with Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1986—Scope—Where removal order is passed by Chief Justice, appellate authority is Bench of two judges nominated by Chief Justice—Such right of appeal held to be available to the petitioner—Subsequent repeal by 2020 Rules does not extinguish rights already accrued under repealed rules—Supreme Court directed Chief Justice, Peshawar High Court to place matter before appropriate Bench for decision afresh. The Court interpreted the Rules of 1989 in conjunction with the 1986 Rules and Appendix to the High Court of West Pakistan (Civil Services) Delegation of Powers Rules, 1960, to conclude that petitioner had a statutory right of appeal—Despite Rule 22 of the 2020 Rules repealing the 1989 Rules, the repeal could not retrospectively extinguish rights already accrued—Proper forum for appeal in cases of removal by Chief Justice is a Bench of judges nominated by him. (c) Constitution of Pakistan—Art. 208—Power of High Court to make rules for its establishment—Effect—Rules framed under Art. 208 and approved by provincial Governor are binding in administrative and disciplinary matters of court employees—Failure to adhere to such rules while deciding constitutional petition and civil appeal constitutes miscarriage of justice—Petitioner’s removal from service without availing appeal process under said rules held unlawful—Matter remanded. (d) Limitation—Delay of one day in filing review petition—Condonation—Supreme Court condoned delay on account of genuine grounds supported by affidavit—Petition not dismissed on technical ground where merits justified consideration—Petition allowed. Disposition: Review petition allowed; judgments of Supreme Court dated 16.03.2020 and Peshawar High Court dated 06.03.2009 set aside to petitioner’s extent; matter remanded to Chief Justice, Peshawar High Court for placing appeal before nominated Bench for decision in accordance with law; delay in filing review petition condoned.

Summary: (a) State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act (VII of 2023)--- ----S.3---State owned enterprises---Terms and conditions of employees---Board of directors---Duties---Provision of State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023 has been enforced for the smooth working of state-owned companies with specific reference to appointment of its Chief Executive and the Directors of the Board---Not a single reference has been made anywhere in State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023 to terms and conditions of employees of state-owned companies---Provision of State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023, cannot unnecessarily be stretched to that extent at the whims of any state-owned company. (b) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)--- ----S. 2(bb)---Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012), S. 33---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 175---Industrial dispute---Grievance notice---Termination of service---Petitioner / Gujranwala Electric Supply Company was aggrieved of acceptance of grievance notice of respondents / employees whose services were terminated---Plea raised by petitioner / Company was that it was not an industry---Validity---Any entity which is involved in electrical undertakings falls within the definition of an industry---Main role of petitioner / Company is distribution, service and sale of electric power; the same falls within the definition of an industry and provisions of Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 are applicable to its employees---According to Art. 175 of the Constitution, Government has jurisdiction to establish Courts for various subjects---Labour Courts have been established under the provisions of Labour Laws enacted by the relevant government, the same cannot be denuded of their powers to deal with a matter covered under the provisions of Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968---High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by the Courts below as their findings were unexceptionable---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances. Messrs Rajby Industries Karachi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2023 SCMR 1407; PESCO, WAPDA House through Chief Executive v. Ishaq Khan and others 2021 PLC 148; LESCO v. Muhammad Shoaib and others 2020 PLC (C.S.) 654; Kamran Ahmad v. Chief Executive GEPCO and others 2017 PLC (C.S.) 900; Manzoor Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Water and Power, Government of Pakistan and 4 others 2018 PLC (C.S.) 1224; Water and Sanitation Agency (WASA) v. Hussain Shoukat and others (W.P. No.61325 of 2022); Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and another v. WAPDA and another PLD 2014 SC 766; Town Administration and another v. Mohammad Khalid and others 2024 SCMR 1852; Lahore Development Authority through D.G., Lahore and another v. Abdul Shafique and others PLD 2000 SC 207; Agriculture Works’ Union, Balochistan v. The Registrar of Trade Unions, Balochistan, Quetta and others 1997 SCMR 66; WAPDA v. Muhammad Ashraf Naeem 1997 SCMR 1128; National Electric Power Regulatory Authority v. Registrar of Trade Unions, NIRC and others 2015 PLC 148; Shaheen Airport Services v. National Industrial Relations Commission through Deputy Registrar and 2 others 2011 PLC 105; Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa and others AIR 1978 SC 548; Messrs Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2018 SCMR 802 and Dr. Mutaher Gul v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Health and others 2025 MLD 36 ref. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Statutory rules---Principle---Mere adoption of rules from another entity does not render them statutory in nature. Pakistan Electric Power Company v. Syed Salahuddin and others 2022 SCMR 991 rel. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Fourth Schedule---Legislative list---Scope---Mere mentioning of a subject in Legislative List in the Constitution does not determine power of legislation rather the same shows that which Government would deal with such matter. (e) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 25---Equality of citizens---Discrimination---Provision of Art. 25 of the Constitution provides shield against any kind of discrimination---If any act of Executives is found tainted with mala fide or discrimination, same cannot be allowed to continue. Secretary to the Government of Pakistan Establishment Division Islamabad and another v Muhammad Ahmed Khan and others 2025 SCMR 434 rel. (f) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)--- ----S. 2 (bb)---Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012), S. 33---Industrial dispute---Termination of service---Higher qualification---Violation of eligibility criteria---Petitioner / Gujranwala Electric Supply Company was aggrieved of acceptance of grievance notice of respondents / employees whose services were terminated---Plea raised by petitioner / Company was that the respondents / employees did not fulfil eligibility criteria---Validity---Eligibility criteria for appointment against a particular post was to be determined on the basis of public advertisement---Respondents / employees were possessing higher qualification than Matriculation and they were ineligible to apply against the posts of Assistant Linemen---Respondents / employees did not fulfill eligibility criteria, therefore, appointment orders issued in their favour could not be allowed to remain in field---High Court set aside the orders passed by fora below, which had misdirected themselves while dealing with the matter, resultantly their grievance petitions were dismissed---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Syed Mujib-ul-Hassan along with Muhammad Azhar Toor, Deputy Manager (HR), GEPCO for Petitioners. Mirza Aamer Baig and Abdul Aleem Khan for Respondent No.1. (in Writ Petitions Nos. 22374/2020, 22376/2020, 22379/2020, 22383/2020 and 22387 of 2020). Azfar Hakeem Awan for Respondent No.1. (in Writ Petitions Nos.2282/2020, 2283/2020, 2292/2020, 2294/2020, 2308/2020, 2311/2020, 2312/2020, 2315/2020, 2317/2020, 2318/2020, 2323/2020, 2327/2020, 2328/2020, 2333/2020, 2334/2020, 2335/2020 and 2336 of 2020). Rana Saqib Mumtaz for Respondent No.1. (in W.P. No.22386 of 2020). Salman Riaz Ch., for Respondent No.1. (in Writ Petitions Nos. 2293/2020, 2314/2020 and 2338 of 2020). Khalid Ismail for Respondent No.1. (in Writ Petitions Nos. 2284/2020, 2309/2020 and 2324 of 2020). Usama Zubair for Respondent No.1 (in WP No.2332 of 2020). Qazi Waqar Majeed for Respondent No.1. (in Writ Petition Nos. 2291/2020, 2296/2020, 2325/2020, 2326/2020, 2329/2020, 2331/2020, 2339/2020 and 2340 of 2020). Dates of hearing: 4th December, 2024 and 22nd May, 2025. SHUJAAT ALI KHAN, J--- Through this single judgment I intend to decide the petitions mentioned in the following Schedules having commonality of law and facts:-

Summary: The point for determination before this Court is whether the High Court has jurisdiction and/or is obligated to decide the matter after having assumed jurisdiction as a stopgap arrangement due to non- functionality of the Punjab Service Tribunal ("the Tribunal"), upon the Tribunal becoming functional, keeping in view Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 ("the Constitution"). Held: Article 212(2) of the Constitution read with Section 8 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 clearly envisaged that once the Tribunals are established, all proceedings pending before any Court will abate. The temporary non- functionality of the Tribunal indicates that it is not established and once the Tribunal assumes functioning, the proceedings before this Court will abate. The entertainment of a constitutional petition on account of non- functionality of the Tribunal is an exceptional remedy carved-out to ensure that a civil servant is not left remediless on account of non-appointment of its Chairman and/or members by the Government, however, this does not and should not so operate as to divest the Tribunal of its constitutionally vested jurisdiction and/or, conversely speaking, vest this Court with constitutionally divested jurisdiction. It is a stop-gap arrangement and such arrangement ought to dissipate upon the Tribunal becoming functional. 425Crl. Appeal- Against Conviction- PPC 32-24 HARIS ALI VS MUHAMMAD SHABIR ETC Mr. Justice Sardar Akbar Ali 29- 05- 2025 2025 LHC 3628

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.96---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts.117 & 120---Suit for damages---Illegal termination of service, grievance of---Loss of reputation and mental anguish, plea of---Proof---Personal liability of the employees---Vicarious liability of the company---Effect---Scope---Brief facts of the matter were that the appellant instituted a civil suit for recovery of damages against the respondent (appellant's employer), alleging unlawful termination of service and consequential harm; the Trial Court, after framing issues and recording evidence, dismissed the suit, against which the present 'regular first appeal' was filed before the High Court---Held: Appellant himself admitted that the company never published any advertisement nor issued any letter to dealers or third parties containing adverse or defamatory remarks about him---Additionally, he admitted that the respondents/defendants did not express any negative or damaging comments concerning his character or conduct---Respondents/defendants could not be held personally liable for any damages allegedly arising from their actions---If any liability were to arise, it could be the company that could potentially be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees or agents, provided that such damages were properly pleaded and substantiated by the appellant/plaintiff---In the present case, the appellant/plaintiff had no valid cause of action against the individual respondents---The appellant failed to bring a claim against the company, therefore, no claim for damages could be sustained against the respondents in their personal capacities---In view of the foregoing and in the absence of any cogent or corroborative evidence to demonstrate actual loss of reputation or mental suffering, the claim for such damages remained unproven and was therefore legally untenable---Present appeal being devoid of merit was dismissed, in circumstances. Pakistan Television Corporation v. Noor Sanat Shah 2023 SCMR 616 rel. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Arts.117 & 120---Damages, claim of---Burden of proof---Scope---In claims for damages, the burden of proof lies squarely on the claimant---The party seeking damages is legally required to establish not only the incidence of the alleged harm (factum) but also the extent or value of that harm (quantum), through the production of clear, credible, and convincing evidence---Courts are not empowered to decree damages based on mere allegations; each assertion made in the plaint must be substantiated by independent and specific evidence addressing every material point. (c) Damages--- ----General damages and special damages---Concept, distinction and scope---The term general damages refer to losses that arise as the immediate, direct, and proximate result of the wrongful act complained of---These damages are presumed by law and typically encompass non-pecuniary harms such as pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life, and, in certain cases, loss of future earning capacity due to lasting or permanent injury---General damages are not capable of exact calculation and are usually assessed by the court based on the overall circumstances of the case, applying a broad rule of thumb---Whereas, in contrast, special damages refer to actual, quantifiable monetary losses that, although not necessarily a direct or inevitable result of the wrongful act, arise due to particular circumstances or conditions specific to the case---These may include out-of-pocket expenses, medical treatment costs, loss of income, and other financial losses sustained up to the date of the trial---Unlike general damages, special damages must be specifically pleaded in the plaint and strictly proved through credible evidence, such as receipts, medical bills, salary records, or expert testimony. (d) Damages--- ----General damages and special damages, awarding of---Criterion---Distinct standards of proof---Scope---General damages are awarded on a discretionary basis, guided by judicial experience and precedent, whereas special damages require a detailed evidentiary foundation and must be clearly substantiated by the claimant---The overarching objective in awarding such damages is to restore the injured party, as far as possible, to the position they would have been in had the wrongful act not occurred. Abdul Majeed Khan v. Tawseen Abdul Haleem and others PLD 2012 SC 80 rel. Muhammad Asif Qazi for Appellant. Raja Akbar Ali Mehboob for Respondents. Date of hearing: 27th May, 2025.