Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 177 & 214-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Audit after expiry of limitation---Condonation of delay---Scope---Petitioner / company was aggrieved of extension in time by authorities to initiate audit proceeds beyond period prescribed for the purpose---Validity---Federal Board of Revenue and its officers are duly authorized under S. 214-A of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to condone delay in performance of any act or thing for which a period has been prescribed under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and audit essentially is an act or thing to be done---Purpose of S. 214-A of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is to give a separate overriding power to the Board to permit any act or thing to be done under the statute within such time period as it may deem appropriate, which is independent of any other provision of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 that provides a time frame and an audit is plainly such an act---Federal Board of Revenue has the power under S.214-A of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to grant condonation---Show cause notice was to be issued within the prescribed five-year period, and such outer limit was absolute and could not be breached---Only five-year limit did not matter and delay after a timely notice had invalidated the proceedings---Additional statutory time limits, such as the time prescribed for issuing the order-in-original after a valid show cause notice were also mandatory and not merely directory but had created multi-layered, mandatory protections for taxpayers---Delays were not caused by any external or unavoidable impediment and Federal Board of Revenue could have proceeded within the statutory period---Benefit of such conduct rebounds entirely to taxpayer, not by operation of law but through the Authority’s own failure to discharge its obligations with diligence and integrity---If the Authority was genuinely committed to proper discharge of its functions, it could have attributed liability when called for---High Court declared condonation of time by authorities as void---High Court restrained the authorities from seeking further information pertaining to Tax Year 2019 in pursuance of such condonation of time limit---High Court declared audit proceedings under S. 177 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 as time barred---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others 2017 SCMR 1427, 2017 PTD 1756; WAK Limited and others v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax 2025 PTD 1179; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Messrs Allah Din Steel and Rolling Mills and others 2018 SCMR 1328; Additional Collector of Customs, Faisalabad v. Messrs Fatima Enterprises, Multan and another (2025 SCMR 1929; Federal Board of Revenue v. Abdul Ghani 2021 SCMR 1154; Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV, Lahore v. Messrs Panther Sports and Rubber Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2022 SCMR 1135; Sabre Travel Network Pakistan Limited v. Pakistan and others (2025) 131 Tax 456 and Dowell Schlumberger (Western) S.A in W.P. No. 1183 of 2018 rel. (b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)--- ----S. 24-A---Recording of reasons---Scope---Requirement to articulate reasons is neither a mere procedural formality nor an empty ritual rather it is a substantive safeguard designed to demonstrate that discretion has been exercised judiciously, objectively, and with due application of mind---Reasoned decision-making ensures that affected persons are apprised of the basis of the action taken, which facilitates meaningful judicial review, and acts as a restraint against arbitrariness or caprice. Additional Collector of Customs, Faisalabad v. Messrs Fatima Enterprises, Multan and another 2025 SCMR 1929 rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Judicial review---Institutional manipulation---Scope---High Court cannot and should not in the exercise of judicial review close its eyes if there is institutionalized manipulation apparent on the face of the record. Sardar Taimoor Aslam and Mudassar Abbas for Petitioner. Muhammad Asif Jadoon, A.A.G. for Respondent No.1. Osama Shahid for Respondent No.2. Assisted by: Muhammad Yahya Khan Niazi, Judicial Law Clerk. Date of hearing: 22nd October, 2025

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII o f 1990)--- ----Ss.38 & 40---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Inspection conducted at petitioner’s business premises, challenge to---Authorities cannot lawfully enter, inspect, or obtain records without first obtaining a magistrate’s warrant under S. 40 of the Act, 1990, plea of---Whether proceedings under S. 38 can be undertaken without first invoking S. 40 of the Act, 1990---‘Routine inspection’---‘Search and seizure’---Distinction---Briefly, the inspection at petitioner’s premises was carried out pursuant to an authorization issued by the Commissioner Inland Revenue, following information received from FBR Headquarters regarding an unusually large carry-forward of input tax declared by the petitioner in its sales tax return, necessitating verification of stock position and related records, and the inspection formed part of a structured desk audit and verification process undertaken by the tax authorities---Held: Section 38 facilitated routine, non-coercive inspections, whereas S. 40 governed intrusive searches justified by the statutory threshold of “reason to believe” and “relevant to any proceedings”---The statutory scheme therefore did not support the view that S. 38 was subordinated to S. 40; both provisions coexisted to serve distinct yet complementary purposes within the broader tax administration regime---In the present case, record did not disclose arbitrariness, mala fides, colorable exercise of authority or any overreach that might warrant interference in constitutional jurisdiction---No coercive action had been taken against the petitioner, nor had it been deprived of property or subjected to any measure beyond a routine inspection---Petitioner had declared an exceptionally high carry-forward adjustment of Rs.185,352,613/- against stock values declared at Rs.1,029,736,739/-, necessitating verification which constituted a reasonable and legally sufficient foundation for initiating inspection proceedings---Verification of such discrepancies was a routine and essential function of the tax administration to ensure accuracy of declarations---Proceedings under S. 38 were neither irregular nor excessive---The Commissioner had a proper factual and statutory basis for issuing the authorization; the officers acted strictly within the scope of S.38; no measure of coercion, seizure, or forced retrieval was adopted; and at no stage were the intrusive mechanisms prescribed under S. 40 invoked---The petitioner, therefore, failed to demonstrate any infringement of legal rights---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss.38 & 40---Access to business premises---Power to inspect stocks, accounts, and records---Permissibility of such exercise even in absence of pending adjudication---Whether proceedings under S. 38 can be undertaken without first invoking S. 40 of the Act, 1990---Routine inspection---Coercive search and seizures---Distinct statutory domains---Obtaining a prior magistrate’s warrant as condition precedent---Requirement---Proceedings under S. 38 can be undertaken without first invoking S. 40 of the Act, 1990---Scope, nature, and purpose of the two provisions are distinct---Section 38 empowers the authorized officer to access business premises, registered offices, stocks, accounts, and records of registered persons or those liable for registration---This power is exercisable even when no adjudicatory or penal proceedings are pending, and is intended to verify declarations, ascertain factual positions, examine stock levels, and review records maintained under federal, provincial, or local laws---In contrast, S.40 contemplates search and seizure, but only where the officer has reason to believe that documents or things relevant to proceedings exist at a place, and then only after obtaining a magistrate’s warrant---The two provisions thus operate independently: Section 38 allows routine inspections for verification and transparency, while S. 40 regulates coercive searches linked to pending or contemplated proceedings---Section 38 expressly authorizes Inland Revenue officers to access any business premises, manufacturing facility, registered office or any other place where stocks, business records or documents relevant under the Act, 1990 are kept---The authority extends not only to registered persons but also to persons liable for registration, and further, to any person whose business activities may be required to be examined for any inquiry or investigation in any tax fraud committed by him, his agent or any other person---This wide yet purpose-linked statutory mandate enables revenue authorities to identify tax evasion, detect fraudulent input adjustments, uncover unreported supplies, and generally ensure that the flow of tax to the exchequer is not impeded through concealment or manipulation---However, under S. 38, the officer may access the premises, inspect records, and obtain material voluntarily produced or found in plain sight, but cannot compel production of concealed documents or seize property byforce. Tanveer Ahmad for Petitioner. Mahmood Ahmad Bhatti for Respondents. Date of hearing: 8th December, 2025.

Summary: Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Conduct Rules, 1978--- ----R.14(2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Co-operative Societies Act (VII of 1925), Preamble---Cooperative housing society, elections of---A member challenging candidature of employees of an ‘electricity distribution company’ who were also members of the society---Premise---Trial Court and revisional court refusing to grant temporary injunction, challenge to---Brief facts of the matter were that petitioner was a member of a Cooperative Housing Society who filed a civil suit for declaration/cancellation and permanent/mandatory injunction to restrain respondent Nos.9-15,who were employees of an electricity distribution company, from contesting the Society’s Management Committee election; he sought interim suspension of the NOCs granted by the electricity distribution company; the Civil Court and District Court concurrently dismissed his application for temporary injunction, hence, the present constitutional petition was filed---Held: After amendment made in R. 14(2) of the Rules, 1978, an exception had been created with reference to MEPCO (WAPDA) Housing Societies located within the territorial jurisdiction of MEPCO---The Society was located within the territorial jurisdiction of MEPCO---The nexus of the society with MEPCO was required to be determined after recording of evidence in the pending suit of the petitioner---The overall construction and interpretation of the amended R.14(2) of the Rules, 1978 in view of exception created therein would also be determined in the pending suit since respondents Nos. 9 to 15 were admittedly members of the society and in that capacity, they prima facie had a right to participate in the election of the society at par with other members subject to NOCs issued by MEPCO as ordained by Model Election Rules---Even otherwise, any violation of amended R.14(2) of the Rules, 1978 at best attracted disciplinary proceedings under the Rules, 1978 which was the prerogative of MEPCO and the petitioner had no concern with the same---Accordingly, the ingredients of temporary injunction as ordained in O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2 of the CPC in terms of prima facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience or inconvenience did not co-exist in favour of the petitioner, as such, there was no illegality, infirmity or jurisdictional defect in the impugned orders passed by the Courts below---Present petition was devoid of any merit and the same was dismissed. Waqar A. Sheikh for Petitioner. Murid Hussain Makwal and Amir Aziz Qazi for Respondents Nos.3 and 4. Rana Ghulam Hussain, Assistant Attorney General and Bashir Ahmad Buzdar, Assistant Advocate General for Respondent No.5. Mian Nazar Muhammad Arain for Respondent No.6. Muhammad Ali Siddiqui for Respondents Nos.7 and 8. Jamshed Hayat, Abdul Samad Ali and Muhammad Ilyas Jamil for Respondents Nos.9 to 15. Date of hearing: 8th December, 2025.

Summary: Application for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was rightly declined by the Courts below since challenge to the power of the Board of Directors of MEPCO to amend Rule 14(2) of the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Conduct Rules, 1978 and the power of Chief Executive Officer, MEPCO to grant NOCs to the private Respondents to contest the election of the Management Committee of WAPDA Employees Cooperative Housing Society Limited Multan shall be decided after recording of evidence. Even otherwise, eligibility of the contesting candidates is required to be scrutinized under the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 read with Cooperative Societies Rules, 1927 and Model Election Rules adopted by the Society. 86Civil Revision 1591622.3000-

Summary: (a) High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders-Muhammad Boota and another v. Moor Begum and 2 others PLD 2002 SC 74 rel. Subedar Muhammad Afzal v. Syed Nafis Ahmad and others PLD 1962 (W.P.) Lah. 45 and Haji Inayat Ali v. Haji Rehmat Ali and 16 others 2010 MLD 894 ref. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- -S.151-Application for re-hearing of civil revision-Maintainability-Scope-Re-hearing of a case cannot be ordered merely because the applicant is dissatisfied with the outcome of the case as every dissatisfied litigant may file an application for re-hearing and there would be no end to litigation rather the same can only be ordered where the applicant substantiates before the Court that he was prevented by sufficient cause beyond control to appear before the Court when the case was called for hearing. Yasrab Traders v. Market Committee 2006 YLR 2280 ref. (c) High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders-Tausif Ahmed v. Muhammad Wakeel and another PLD 2023 Isl. 132; Rana Naveed Ahmad Khan v. Province of Punjab through Secretary LG and CD PLD 2014 Lah. 436; Siraj Ahmad v. Registrar, Lahore High Court, Lahore 2021 MLD 1234 and Tahira Naseem v. Arshad Mehmood and others 2021 PCr.LJ 682 ref.

Summary: (a) Maxim--- ----Nemo pro alterius facto punietur---Meaning---No one should be punished for the deed of another. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 7, 8 (1)(ca) & 73---Input tax adjustment---Conditions---Failure of supplier to deposit sales tax received from purchaser---Dispute pertained to denial of input tax credit to taxpayers in exercise of authority under S. 8(1)(ca) of Sales Tax Act, 1990 when the tax was duly paid but the supplier had been delinquent in depositing such sales tax in the government treasury---Validity---When conditions prescribed by S. 7 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 for purposes of input tax adjustment are satisfied and payment for such supply has been made in compliance with the requirements of S. 73 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 the purchaser is entitled to seek input tax adjustment unless the same is prohibited by S.8 of Sales Tax Act, 1990---System of rule of law is based on individual responsibility and liability and a taxpayer cannot be made to suffer due to delinquency of another, unless the taxpayer is complicit in such wrongdoing---Sales tax is charged in VAT mode and where a purchaser has paid the tax due for the value addition attributable to a supplier, as part of consideration for the supply paid in accordance with requirements of S. 73 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 it cannot be assumed that the Legislature intended to subject such purchaser to double-taxation for the supplier’s failure to deposit the sales tax received from the purchaser in the treasury---Purchaser, in paying input tax to supplier as part of consideration for supply, acts in accordance with requirements imposed by provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990 and where the supplier, who receives such sales tax payment as an agent on behalf of the State, fails to deposit the same with the treasury, it is the supplier that is at fault and ought to be penalized by tax authorities and not the purchaser---Once a purchaser discharges its obligation to pay input tax to a supplier in the manner prescribed by law, there accrues a proprietary entitlement to benefit from such tax payment by seeking its adjustment against output tax due from him, when not otherwise prohibited by S. 8 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 and such entitlement cannot be denied due to any wrongdoing or delinquency on the part of supplier that the purchaser is neither complicit with nor has any control over---High Court declared that any contrary interpretation of Ss. 8(1)(ca) & 8A of Sales Tax Act, 1990 would be in breach of Arts. 4, 10A, 23, 24 & 25 of the Constitution---Reference was disposed of accordingly. D.G. Khan Cement Company Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2013 Lah. 693; Total Parco Pakistan Ltd. v. Pakistan PTCL 2021 CL 576; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs Gadoon Textile Mills, Swabi C.Ps. Nos. 1830 to 1847/2022; Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-IV, Large Taxpayer Unit, Karachi v. Messrs Al-Abid Silk Mills Ltd., Karachi 2023 PTD 1492; The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore v. Messrs Eagle Cables (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore (C.P.L.A 2400-L/2022); The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Legal Zone, Large Taxpayers Office, Lahore and another v. Messrs Mayfair Spinning Mills Ltd. and others 2025 SCMR 01; Pakistan Beverages Ltd. v. Large Taxpayers Unit 2010 PTD 2673 and Waseem Ahmed and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Chairman and 4 others 2014 PTD 1733 ref. Hafiz Muhammad Idris and Syed Farid Bukhari for Applicants (in S.T.R. No.01 of 2015). Osama Shahid for Applicants (in S.T.Rs. Nos. 20/2015, 11/2016 and 28 of 2016). Dr. Farhat Zafar for Applicants (in S.T.Rs. Nos. 11, 12, 13, 15, 16 and 35 of 2015). Hassan Ali Khan for Applicants (in S.T.R. Nos. 45 of 2015). Ali Nawaz Kharal for Applicants (in S.T.R. Nos. 34 of 2015 and 33/2019). Syed Muhammad Abbas for Applicants (in I.C.A. No. 431 of 2016). Makhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Khawaja Aizaz Ahsan and Hashim Khalil for Respondent (in I.C.A. 431 of 2016). Osama Shahid for Respondents (in S.T.R. No.01 of 2015). Wasim Abid for Respondents (in S.T.Rs. Nos. 11, 12 and 13 of 2015). Shaheer Bin Tahir for Respondents (in S.T.R No. 33 of 2019). Syed Ali Murtaza Abbas for Respondent (in S.T.R No. 11 of 2016). Sarmad Munir for Respondent (in S.T.R. No. 35 of 2015). Date of hearing: 24th September, 2025.

Summary: ----Vol. V, Chap. I, Pt. A, R. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.115 & 151---Re-hearing of civil revision, application for---Office objection---Maintainability---Scope---Challenge was laid to the office objection regarding maintainability of an application seeking re-hearing of a civil revision which had already been dismissed on merits by the High Court; petitioner thereafter filed an application under S.151 C.P.C. for re-hearing, which was objected to by the office and an earlier similar application had already been rejected; through the present successive application, he again sought re-hearing of the same civil revision---The issue for determination was “whether a second application for re-hearing of a civil revision already decided on merits was maintainable in law?”---Held: While hearing the revision, not only the merits of the case were discussed but on the basis of same, the case was decided and there was no reason for re-hearing of the matter solely for the reason that applicant was dissatisfied with the decision especially when the stance of the applicant that his counsel had not been granted proper hearing was not emanating from the record of the case---Moreover, the second application again praying for re-hearing of the objection as well as the main civil revision was also not maintainable as subject to certain exceptions which were not available in the present case, filing of successive applications on the same subject matter even though on different grounds was not permissible under the law and the applicant was required to take all the grounds available to him at the time of filing first application and subsequent application after decision of earlier application was barred---Besides by up-holding the office objection, the matter had come to an end and the applicant had the remedy to challenge the order, whereby civil revision was dismissed, before the higher forum, therefore, there was no justification in the present case for re-hearing of the matter---Office objection viz. maintainability raised against the present application for re-hearing, which even otherwise was a subsequent application on the same subject, was sustained, in circumstances. Muhammad Boota and another v. Moor Begum and 2 others PLD 2002 SC 74 rel. Subedar Muhammad Afzal v. Syed Nafis Ahmad and others PLD 1962 (W.P.) Lah. 45 and Haji Inayat Ali v. Haji Rehmat Ali and 16 others 2010 MLD 894 ref. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.151---Application for re-hearing of civil revision---Maintainability---Scope---Re-hearing of a case cannot be ordered merely because the applicant is dissatisfied with the outcome of the case as every dissatisfied litigant may file an application for re-hearing and there would be no end to litigation rather the same can only be ordered where the applicant substantiates before the Court that he was prevented by sufficient cause beyond control to appear before the Court when the case was called for hearing. Yasrab Traders v. Market Committee 2006 YLR 2280 ref. (c) High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders--- ----Vol. V, Chap. I, Pt. A, R. 9---Office objection, upholding of---Requirement to provide reasons---Exception---The Court is not required to give detailed reasons for up-holding the office objection for the reason that office objections are decided on administrative side by the Court and not on judicial side unless of course subject to the exception that the Courts deem it appropriate to decide the same on judicial side. Tausif Ahmed v. Muhammad Wakeel and another PLD 2023 Isl. 132; Rana Naveed Ahmad Khan v. Province of Punjab through Secretary LG and CD PLD 2014 Lah. 436; Siraj Ahmad v. Registrar, Lahore High Court, Lahore 2021 MLD 1234 and Tahira Naseem v. Arshad Mehmood and others 2021 PCr.LJ 682 ref. Muhammad Abbas Chohan for Applicant.

Summary: 87 160539/25 Muhammad Nawaz Vs Maqbool Ahmad etc Mr. Justice Muzamil Akhtar Shabir 05- 12- 2025 2025 LHC 7201

Summary: Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 133---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5---Reference Application before the High Court, filing of---Limitation---Suf ficient cause, absence of---Scope and effect---Applicant-Department filed the reference application and the office raised objection that file was ‘totally incomplete’, and directed to resubmit after removal of objections within three days, however, the Applicant-Department, after removing the objections, re-filed the reference application after 347 days beyond the period granted for removal of the office objections---Held: Inordinate delay was fatal in absence of any explanation demonstrating “sufficient cause” as required under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908---In the present matter, the Applicant-Department had failed to furnish any justification, much less a satisfactory or legally sufficient cause, for the delay in re-filing the reference application---The prescribed period of limitation is not merely a procedural formality but a matter of substantive right---Once the limitation period commences, it runs inexorably and cannot be arrested or extended by administrative lapses or clerical omissions---The Court is duty bound to enforce limitation statutes with judicial rigour and restraint, regardless of whether limitation is raised as a defense---Further, the law aids the vigilant, not the indolent (leges vigilantibus non dormientibus subserviunt)---Ignorance of law, inadvertence, does not constitute valid grounds for condonation, which is not to be granted as a matter of right, but only upon establishing sufficient cause with due diligence---Reference application filed by the Department, being non-maintainable on the ground of limitation, was dismissed, in circumstances. Asad Ali and 9 others v. The Bank of Punjab and others PLD 2020 SC 736; Muhammad Faisal Prop., F.A. Traders. Lahore v. Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-II RTO-II, Lahore 2025 SCMR 930 and Commissioner Inland Revenue, Faisalabad v. Messrs Al-Hamd Cotton Ginning Pressing Factory, Jhang (ITR No.256746 of 2018) ref. Khalil Ahmad Ali for Applicant-Department. Khubaib Ahmad for Respondent.

Summary: The following points are determined in this judgment: - 1. In case the defendant is proceeded against ex-parte in a suit under Order XXXVII of CPC, whether it is obligatory for the defendant to move an application for leave to contest alongwith application for setting aside ex-parte proceedings? 2. In case a suit under Order XXXVII of CPC is decreed ex-parte, whether it is obligatory for the defendant to move an application for leave to contest alongwith application for setting aside ex-parte decree? 95Jail Appeal 85571/23 Sufiyan Riaz Vs The State Mr. Justice Farooq Haider 03-12- 2025 2025 LHC 7029