Summary: Dismissed--- It is prima facieevident from the record of the Suit that the Arbitration Application wasfiled immediately after issuance of notice in the Suit and this factum isalso apparent from the order sheet, on the second date of hearing in theSuit, which shows that the said application was listedfor orders. Whether or not the application could be granted on the basisof its merits was a question for the learned Single judge to decide uponconsideration of the facts and in application of the law, however,predicating the dismissal of the said application upon the premise thatthe applicant had stepped into the proceedings cannot be sustained inthe present facts and circumstances.

Summary: The petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Council to fix maintenance after the promulgation of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. The petitioner argued that under Rule 5(6) of the West Pakistan Rules 1961, all decisions of the Arbitration Council should be by majority vote, and as there was no majority decision, the chairman's decision couldn't be the council's decision. The court rejected the jurisdiction argument, stating that both the Arbitration Council and Family Courts under the Act have concurrent jurisdiction in family matters. It referred to previous judgments, to highlight the need to avoid contradictory decisions from both forums. On the merits, the court noted the petitioner's employment abroad and foreign earnings. It held that the reduction of maintenance to Rs.20,000 per month was reasonable and not arbitrary. The petitioner failed to provide evidence of his exact income abroad. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition as meritless.

Summary: Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------Ss. 20, 29, 30 & 33---Arbitration agreement---Award---Objection---Arbitrator wasappointed who submitted his award in the Court wherein principal amount with markup onthe same was granted till payment---Objections raised against the award were rejected and itwas made Rule of the Court---Validity---Court while examining the validity of award couldnot act as a Court of Appeal and make reappraisal of evidence recorded by the arbitrator inorder to discover the error or infirmity in the award unless such error or infirmity was on therecord---Award, in the present case, was based on documentary evidence which did notrequire reappraisal of evidence---No infirmity had been pointed out in the impugned award---Nothing was on record with regard to misconduct of arbitrator---Arbitrator had no authorityto grant any markup on the principal amount from the date of award till payment---Markupwith effect from the date of award till realization of principal amount awarded by thearbitrator was without competence---Appeal was dismissed, accordingly.PLD 2011 SC 506; PLD 2003 SC 301; 2002 SCMR 366; 1983 SCMR 718 and 1981CLC 311 ref.PLD 1996 SC 108 and Ghulam Abbas v. Trustees of the Port of Karachi PLD 1987SC 393 rel.

Summary: The petitioner, a government contractor, claimed to be registered with respondent No.1 and had been granted a contract/work through a letter issued by respondent No.3. The petitioner asserted that respondent No.4 declined to commence arbitration proceedings, and the rescission of the contract was illegal. The petitioner sought a declaration that the impugned letters be declared without authority and set aside. The court, after considering the arguments and documents, emphasized that contractual matters involving claims and counter-claims requiring factual inquiry should be resolved through arbitration if the contract provides for such a mechanism. The court cited previous orders and rulings stating that in the presence of an arbitration clause, parties should follow the agreed mechanism for dispute resolution. As the petitioner had an alternative remedy through arbitration, the court held that the constitutional petition was not maintainable. The court dismissed the petition, noting that the petitioner could approach the competent forum for reference to arbitration and resolution of the dispute through the agreed mechanism.

Summary: The background of the case involves an application under section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, filed by Ajaeb Khan (predecessor of the petitioners), seeking to make an arbitration award of 23.12.1989 a rule of the court. The application was granted by the Civil Judge on 14.3.1990. Subsequently, an application under section 12(2), C.P.C. was filed by Mehr Muhammad Murad and others, claiming fraud, collusion, and misrepresentation in obtaining the decree.The Civil Judge, on 28.5.2011, allowed the application under section 12(2), C.P.C., setting aside the order and decree of 14.3.1990. The petitioner's revision petition against this decision was also dismissed on 02.7.2016.The petitioner argues that the lower courts' orders are unsustainable, claiming that the respondents based their rights on an agreement to sell, which was assigned to Karim Bakhsh, the petitioner's ascendant. The petitioner contends that the agreement did not confer the right to sue.The courts, after examining the evidence, found that the decree was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. The alleged agreement for arbitration lacked authority, and the award, which declared ownership of property, was unregistered, making it legally ineffective.Consequently, the High Court, after considering the arguments and reviewing the evidence, concluded that the writ petition lacked merit and dismissed it.

Summary: The petitioner filed a suit for the recovery of Rs. 20,00,000/- against the respondents, alleging that they were awarded a contract for the construction of a building, but the payment was not released without any lawful excuse. The respondents moved an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit had been filed without resorting to arbitration as per the contract agreement. The judgment criticized the trial court's procedure, stating that the respondents' application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was wrongly treated as an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. It emphasized that the two provisions have different procedures and mechanisms. The court also noted that an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC can be filed at any stage, while an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act must be filed before filing a written statement or taking any other steps in the proceedings. The court concluded that the respondents' application could not be treated as an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, and therefore, the stay of proceedings is unwarranted. As a result, the petition was allowed, and the impugned judgment, decree, and order are set aside.

Summary: Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---Contract Act ----S. 20---Notification SRO No. 932(I)/2012 dated 01-08-2012---Recovery of money---Transit Trade---Arbitration, agreement---Court, jurisdiction of---Effect---Plaintiff sought recovery of amount from defendant company which was operating from Tajikistan on basis of agreement between parties---Plaintiff also impleaded another person who was carrying on business in Afghanistan---Validity---Agreement, on basis of which suit was filed, stipulated an arbitration clause which fact was suppressed by plaintiff while obtaining ex-parte interim orders---Property in transit was perishable item and in terms of Notification SRO No. 932(I)/2012 dated 01-08-2012 jurisdiction of transit trade authorities was not extended to Tajikistan since no agreement existed between Pakistan and Tajikistan---High Court recalled interim order as court had no jurisdiction in terms of arbitration clause and prima facie it was a case of hardship to defendant with whom plaintiff had no direct privity of contract---Suit was dismissed in circumstances. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. ACT Airlines INC 2011 CLC 714 ref.

Summary: (a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------Ss. 14, 17, 21, 23 & 47---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 100 & 101---BalochistanLand Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S.52---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.144 (sinceomitted)---Suit for declaration and possession---Limitation---Compromise by the attorney onbehalf of his principal---Reference to arbitration without intervention of the Court---Possession on the suit property---Document more than thirty years old---Effect---Revenueentries---Presumption of truth---Contention of plaintiffs was that they were owner of suitproperty---Suit was dismissed by the Trial Court but Appellate Court decreed the same---Validity---Principal of attorney had not authorized him to refer the matter to the arbitrator orenter into compromise with the defendants---Attorney should have sought permission fromthe principal for such act, in circumstances---Act of attorney in absence of any suchpermission was misrepresentation and it had element of fraud---Purported award was notonly undated but it also did not contain the names and signatures of arbitrators---Terms ofsaid award could not be enforced, in circumstances---When parties to the suit had agreed thatmatter in question should be referred to arbitration then they might, before announcement ofjudgment, apply to the Court in writing for an order of reference---Where parties to the suithad agreed or consented to refer the matter to arbitration, Court could refer the same toarbitrator and specify the time for making the award---Parties who had agreed to refer matterto arbitrator would be bound by such award---Reference to arbitration and an award in thepending suit without intervention of the Court would be nullity and such award could not bemade rule of the Court---Presumption could not be attached to the document more than thirtyyears old when defendant had denied the same---Parties should prove said document inaccordance with law---Presumption of truth was attached to the revenue entries unlessrebutted through cogent evidence---Longstanding impugned mutation in favour of a partycould not be disturbed due to presumption of truth attached to such entries---Impugnedmutation was not challenged by the vendor in his lifetime and defendants had no locus standito assail the same---Possession was an incident of ownership and it could be transferred by the owner of an immovable property to another---Possession would be important when therewas no title document and other relevant record---Once a document and record of title camebefore the Court then it was the title which had to be taken into consideration---Possessionon suit property could not be considered in vacuum---Mere longstanding possession wouldnot be good against the rightful owner and the assumption that he was in peaceful possessionwould not work and could not operate against the true lawful owner---Plaintiffs were ownersof suit property and they had sought relief of possession---Evidence produced by defendantsspoke about possession which could not work against the plaintiffs---Plaintiffs had adopteddue course of law by filing suit for possession---Defendants while filing written statementhad denied the title of plaintiffs and raised question of limitation---Limitation would runfrom the date when written statement was filed by the defendants, in circumstances---Defendants had no title document to continue their possession---Revision was dismissed, incircumstances.Fida Muhammad v. Pir Muhammad Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 341; Messer S.M.Qasim and Co. v. Messer Shah Azimuddin PLD 1962 (WP) Lah. 95; Allah Bakhsh v. Mst.Shamshad Begum and 2 others 1991 MLD 1937; Mst. Hashmat Bibi v. Muhammad Rafi andanother 1980 CLC 967; Abdul Karim and 3 others v. Mst. Zar Bibi PLD 1996 Quetta 1;Nazir Ahmed deceased through LRs v. Karim Bakhsh (Late) through LRs, 2017 SCMR1934; Ghulam Abbas and others v. Mohammad Shafi through LRs and others 2016 SCMR1403; 1996 SCMR 1539 and 2010 SCMR 1630 rel.(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. VI, R. 7---Departure from pleadings---Effect---Anything stated outside the scope ofsuit, averments cannot be looked into---Order VI R. 7, C.P.C. not only excludes the elementof surprise, but also precludes the party from proving what has not alleged or pleaded.PLD 1976 SC 469; 1968 SCMR 804; 1996 SCMR 336 and 2006 SCMR 562 rel.(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XIII, R. 4---Endorsement on documents admitted in evidence---Scope---Document notto be exhibited unless proved---Marked document could not be taken into consideration.2011 SCMR 1013 and 2005 SCMR 152 rel.(d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-------Art. 100---Document more than thirty years' old---Presumption---Condition---Presumption could not be attached to the document more than thirty years old whendefendant had denied the same---Parties should prove said document in accordance with law---Presumption of truth was attached to the revenue entries unless rebutted through cogentevidence---Longstanding impugned mutation in favour of a party could not be disturbed dueto presumption of truth attached to such entries---Impugned mutation was not challenged bythe vendor in his lifetime and defendants had no locus standi to assail the same.

Summary: Background:In the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Civil Appeal No. 1178 of 2008 arose from a dispute regarding the sale of a shop in Liaqat Bazar, Quetta. Respondent No. 1, a tenant, entered into an oral agreement with Respondent No. 2 to purchase the shop. However, Respondent No. 1 failed to complete the payment within the stipulated time. The matter was referred to arbitrators who issued an award, unchallenged by either party, requiring Respondent No. 1 to vacate the shop and receive compensation from Respondent No. 2. Subsequently, the shop was sold to the Appellants, who initiated eviction proceedings against Respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 filed a suit for specific performance of the oral agreement, which was decreed in his favor by the trial court and upheld by the High Court.---Issues:Whether the arbitrators' decision, unchallenged by the parties, had the effect of novating the oral agreement.Whether the suit for specific performance of the oral agreement was maintainable in light of the arbitrators' award.---Holding/Reasoning:The Court held that the arbitrators' decision, unchallenged by either party, had the legal effect of novating the oral agreement. Novation extinguished the original contract and replaced it with new terms, as acknowledged by both parties. Therefore, Respondent No. 1's right to seek specific performance under the original oral agreement ceased to exist. Citing Section 62 of the Contract Act and the principle established in the case of Habib Ahmad v. Meezan Bank Ltd., the Court emphasized that unless rights under the old contract are explicitly relinquished, no new contract emerges. As Respondent No. 1 had agreed to the terms of the arbitrators' award, the suit for specific performance was not maintainable.---Disposition:The Court directed Respondent No. 2 to deposit the awarded amount within sixty days, failing which the appeal would be dismissed, and Respondent No. 1 would retain possession of the shop. Respondent No. 1 was ordered to vacate the shop within fifteen days of the deposit, and failure to do so would result in the appellants obtaining possession through an Executing Court.---Quote:Once a party novates a contract then enforcement of the earlier agreement cannot be sought in terms of Section 62 of the Contract Act unless it is expressly stipulated in the fresh agreement that his rights in the original agreement will not be prejudiced.

Summary: Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------Ss. 8, 20, 25, 32 & 34---Suit for recovery of money---Arbitration clause---Referring matter to Arbitrator---After filing of suit, proceedings were stayed and matter was referred to Arbitrator---Subsequently plaintiff filed application for restoration of suit and sought appointment of Arbitrator under Ss. 8 & 20 of Arbitration Act, 1940---Validity---Once parties were referred to Arbitrator, the purpose / object of Arbitration Act, 1940, was effectively achieved and parties were prevented to obtain a decree from Court contrary to their own agreement that their disputes were to be adjudicated by a private party as provided in arbitration agreement---Order on application under S. 34 of Arbitration Act, 1940, and / or on application under S. 20 of the Act, was one and the same---Purpose of both the provisions was to seek enforcement of an 'arbitration clause/agreement' against the party guilty of avoiding / refusing arbitration for resolution of their dispute---High Court declined exercise of discretion under S. 25 of Arbitration Act, 1940---Plaintiff had repeatedly approached the High Court by suppressing arbitration agreement and attempted to obtain a decree from a civil Court despite the fact that the suit was barred under S. 32 of Arbitration Act, 1940---Suit was dismissed in circumstances.