Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.107, O.XLI, Rr. 23, 24 & O.I, R.10---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42---Claim of share in grandfather’s property---Failure to implead all legal heirs of grandfather---After impleadment of all legal heirs appellate court remanded the matter to Trial Court to allow newly added parties to submit their pleadings---Legality---Remand order, challenge to---Appellate court should have decided the lis itself, plea of---Scope---Brief facts of the matter were that the appellants (plaintiffs) filed a suit for declaration claiming entitlement to inherit shares in the estate of their grandfather, “DM”, and sought correction of revenue entries and mutations relating to the suit property--- Trial Court dismissed the suit partly on the ground that all legal heirs of “DM” had not been impleaded as necessary parties---The appellants then filed an appeal and also moved an application before the appellate court for impleadment of additional legal heirs, which the appellate court allowed and consequently remanded the case to the Trial Court for a fresh decision---The appellants challenged the remand order through the present appeal wherein a pivotal question was raised for determination as to “whether the appellate court acted lawfully in remanding the matter for a fresh decision after allowing impleadment of new parties, or whether it was required to decided the appeal itself under S.107 and O. XLI R. 24 C.P.C.”?---Held: It was an admitted position that certain parties were impleaded at the appellate stage, yet they neither filed their written statements nor adduced any evidence, thereby depriving them of a fair opportunity to contest the case---Under S.107 & O. XLI R. 24 of C.P.C., the appellate court could decide the case itself if sufficient material was available on record---Furthermore, the court could add or remove parties under O. I, R. 10 C.P.C., either suo motu or on a party’s application, however, the court had to ensure that the rights of all parties, especially those added at the appellate stage, were protected and afforded a fair opportunity to present their case---In case new parties were added at the appellate stage, they had to be given a fair opportunity to present their case---Given the importance of pleadings in civil disputes, and to ensure justice was served, the case was rightly remanded to the Trial Court under O. XLI, R. 23 C.P.C., allowing the new parties to file their pleadings and participate in the proceedings---No legal infirmity or jurisdictional error in the impugned remand order passed by the appellate court was found and the same was based on sound legal reasoning, ensures adherence to due process, and upholds the principles of fair trial---Present appeal being devoid of merit was dismissed in limine. (b) Administration of justice--- ----Courts should provide parties a full and fair opportunity to prove their case---These procedural safeguards govern the proceedings to ensure fairness and strict adherence to procedures in mandatory---Non-compliance can attract legal consequences---No one should be condemned unheard---This fundamental principle of law guides Court to protect the rights of all parties involved---The process must uphold the principles of natural justice and fair trial, ensuring that no party suffers prejudice during adjudication. Malik Arab Hassan Asif for Appellants.

Summary: (a) Civil service--- ----Back benefits, concept of---Meaning---“Back benefits”, as discussed in present case, were confined to arrears of pay and other emoluments denied due to wrongful dismissal or removal. Bryan A Garner (ed), Black's Law Dictionary (10th edn, Thomson Reuters 2014) 166; Ibid and Aguinaga v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union 993 F.2d 1463, 1473; Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962 and Smith v. West 1999 US App Vet Claims LOXIS 475, 6 rel. (b) Civil service--- ----Reinstatement---Meaning and Scope. Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962; Chairman State Life v. Siddiq Akbar 2013 SCMR 752; Umer Said v. District Education Officer (Female) 2007 SCMR 296; Inspector General of Police, Punjab v. Tariq Mahmood 2015 SCMR 77; Muhammad Bashir v. Government of the Punjab 1994 SCMR 1801 and Pakistan v. Mrs. A.V. Issacs PLD 1970 SC 415 rel. (c) Civil service--- ----Period spent by the civil servant due to wrongful removal or dismissal from service---Regularization of intervening period by “leave without pay” or “leave of kind due”---Purpose and meaning. National Bank of Pakistan v. Zahoor Ahmed Mengal 2021 SCMR 144; NAB v. Muhammad Shafique 2020 SCMR 425; Federation of Pakistan v. Mamoon Ahmed Malik 2020 SCMR 1154 and Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962 rel. ( d) Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974)--- ----S. 16, second proviso---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 10A, 14 & 25---Fundamental Rules, R. 54---Civil Service Rules (Punjab), R. 7.3-- -Reinstatement in service after setting aside order of compulsory retirement, removal or dismissal from service---Back benefits, entitlement to---Scope and principles---“Doctrine of Constructive Continuity” and “Vanishing Dismissal”---Introduction and applicability in service jurisprudence--- This is the first time such a doctrine is being formally articulated in service jurisprudence---Adopting the language and structure of constructive continuity provides coherence, consistency, and clarity to future cases where civil servants are reinstated following wrongful termination---In the absence of a codified rule or settled precedent using this terminology, this formulation will serve as a valuable guidepost for courts, tribunals and administrative authorities and will enhance the transparency and reasoning behind reliefs granted in reinstatement cases---When the foundational order is without lawful authority, superstructure built upon it collapses---Civil servant must be placed in the position they would have occupied had the unlawful action not occurred---Concept of constructive continuity, as articulated here, reinforces this consequence and gives expression to the broader principles of legal restoration and administrative fairness that underpin service jurisprudence---Such doctrine, while coined for the first time, is rooted in the constitutional promise of fairness, restitution and institutional integrity---It ensures that a wrongfully removed public servant is treated, for all legal and financial purposes, as having continued in service, thereby entitling them to the salary, benefits, and emoluments that would have accrued but for the wrongful termination-- -Constructive continuity is, therefore, not only an administrative doctrine; it draws strength from constitutional protections---Denying back benefits to a reinstated civil servant who has suffered procedural or substantive injustice infringes upon these constitutional guarantees---It amounts to continued punishment despite legal vindication---Such imaginative reconstruction, grounded in equity and justice, constitutes a legitimate and necessary doctrinal development in service jurisprudence---Constructive continuity functions as a constitutional bridge---It ensures that reinstatement is not an empty gesture but a restorative act, fully aligned with Articles 9, 10A, 14, and 25 of the Constitution---It prevents wrongful state action from leaving lasting scars on an individual’s career and livelihood---To reinstate a civil servant without restoring their status, entitlements and dignity is to offer a remedy that fails to remedy and justice that falls short of being just---Petitioners were held entitled to back benefits subject to the effect of the modified penalties, effective from the date of the original punishments---Denial of back benefits by the Punjab Service Tribunal was held to be unsustainable and judgments were modified accordingly---Civil petitions were converted into appeals and were partially allowed, in circumstances. Marangakis v. Icelands Food Limited [2022] EAT 161; Folkestone Nursing Home v. Patel [2018] EWCA Civ 1843; Roberts v. West Coast Trains Ltd. [2004] IRLR 789; Superintendent of Police v. Ijaz Aslam 2024 SCMR 1831; Vice Chancellor Agriculture University v. Muhammad Shafiq 2024 SCMR 527; Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 574; Aatika Hina Mushtaq v. Secretary Special Education, Government of Punjab 2025 SCP 158; Divisional Superintendent v. Umar Daraz 2023 SCMR 761; Province of Punjab v. Kanwal Rashid 2021 SCMR 730; Pir Imran Sajid v. Managing Director 2015 SCMR 1257; Abdul Wahab v. HBL 2013 SCMR 1383; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180; Naveed Asghar v. The State PLD 2021 SC 600; Altaf Ibrahim Qureshi v. Aam Logue Ittehad PLD 2019 SC 745; Mubarik Ali Babar v. Punjab Public Service Commission 2023 SCMR 518; Uzma Naveed Chaudhary v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 783; Malik Ubaidullah v. Government of Punjab 2021 PLC (C. S.) 65; Muhammad Yasin v. D.G. Pakistan Post Office 2023 SCMR 394; National Commission on Status of Women v. Government of Punjab PLD 2019 SC 218; Inspector General of Police, Punjab v. Tariq Mahmood 2015 SCMR 77; Sohail Ahmed Usmani v. DG CAA 2014 SCMR 1843; Chairman State Life v. Siddiq Akbar 2013 SCMR 752; Muhammad Hussain v. E.D.O. (Education) 2007 SCMR 855; Umer Said v. District Education Officer (Female) 2007 SCMR 296; General Manager v. Mehmood Ahmed Butt 2002 SCMR 1064; Secretary, Government of Punjab v. Khalid Hussain Hamdani 2013 SCMR 817; Brean v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971) 2 QB 175 and Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962 rel. (e) Civil service--- ----Reinstatement after passing of substituted/modified/reduced penalties on the ground of disproportionality---Effect and scope stated. Muhammad Usman Arif, Advocate Supreme Court along with Rana Iqbal, Advocate High Court for Petitioners (in C.P.L.A. No. 3453-L of 2019). Malik Saleem Iqbal Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in C.P.L.A. No. 23-L of 2022). Khalid Masood Ghani, A.A.G., Punjab and Kashif Murtaza, Inspector (Legal) for Respondents. Assisted by: Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 14th May, 2025.

Summary: (Against the order dated 24.11.2021 and 13.09.2019 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeals Nos. 5717/2015 and 863 of 2019). (a) Civil service--- ----Back benefits, concept of---Meaning---“Back benefits”, as discussed in present case, were confined to arrears of pay and other emoluments denied due to wrongful dismissal or removal. Bryan A Garner (ed), Black's Law Dictionary (10th edn, Thomson Reuters 2014) 166; Ibid and Aguinaga v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union 993 F.2d 1463, 1473; Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962 and Smith v. West 1999 US App Vet Claims LOXIS 475, 6 rel. (b) Civil service--- ----Reinstatement---Meaning and Scope. Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962; Chairman State Life v. Siddiq Akbar 2013 SCMR 752; Umer Said v. District Education Officer (Female) 2007 SCMR 296; Inspector General of Police, Punjab v. Tariq Mahmood 2015 SCMR 77; Muhammad Bashir v. Government of the Punjab 1994 SCMR 1801 and Pakistan v. Mrs. A.V. Issacs PLD 1970 SC 415 rel. (c) Civil service--- ----Period spent by the civil servant due to wrongful removal or dismissal from service---Regularization of intervening period by “leave without pay” or “leave of kind due”---Purpose and meaning. National Bank of Pakistan v. Zahoor Ahmed Mengal 2021 SCMR 144; NAB v. Muhammad Shafique 2020 SCMR 425; Federation of Pakistan v. Mamoon Ahmed Malik 2020 SCMR 1154 and Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962 rel. ( d) Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974)--- ----S. 16, second proviso---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 10A, 14 & 25---Fundamental Rules, R. 54---Civil Service Rules (Punjab), R. 7.3-- -Reinstatement in service after setting aside order of compulsory retirement, removal or dismissal from service---Back benefits, entitlement to---Scope and principles---“Doctrine of Constructive Continuity” and “Vanishing Dismissal”---Introduction and applicability in service jurisprudence--- This is the first time such a doctrine is being formally articulated in service jurisprudence---Adopting the language and structure of constructive continuity provides coherence, consistency, and clarity to future cases where civil servants are reinstated following wrongful termination---In the absence of a codified rule or settled precedent using this terminology, this formulation will serve as a valuable guidepost for courts, tribunals and administrative authorities and will enhance the transparency and reasoning behind reliefs granted in reinstatement cases---When the foundational order is without lawful authority, superstructure built upon it collapses---Civil servant must be placed in the position they would have occupied had the unlawful action not occurred---Concept of constructive continuity, as articulated here, reinforces this consequence and gives expression to the broader principles of legal restoration and administrative fairness that underpin service jurisprudence---Such doctrine, while coined for the first time, is rooted in the constitutional promise of fairness, restitution and institutional integrity---It ensures that a wrongfully removed public servant is treated, for all legal and financial purposes, as having continued in service, thereby entitling them to the salary, benefits, and emoluments that would have accrued but for the wrongful termination-- -Constructive continuity is, therefore, not only an administrative doctrine; it draws strength from constitutional protections---Denying back benefits to a reinstated civil servant who has suffered procedural or substantive injustice infringes upon these constitutional guarantees---It amounts to continued punishment despite legal vindication---Such imaginative reconstruction, grounded in equity and justice, constitutes a legitimate and necessary doctrinal development in service jurisprudence---Constructive continuity functions as a constitutional bridge---It ensures that reinstatement is not an empty gesture but a restorative act, fully aligned with Articles 9, 10A, 14, and 25 of the Constitution---It prevents wrongful state action from leaving lasting scars on an individual’s career and livelihood---To reinstate a civil servant without restoring their status, entitlements and dignity is to offer a remedy that fails to remedy and justice that falls short of being just---Petitioners were held entitled to back benefits subject to the effect of the modified penalties, effective from the date of the original punishments---Denial of back benefits by the Punjab Service Tribunal was held to be unsustainable and judgments were modified accordingly---Civil petitions were converted into appeals and were partially allowed, in circumstances. Marangakis v. Icelands Food Limited [2022] EAT 161; Folkestone Nursing Home v. Patel [2018] EWCA Civ 1843; Roberts v. West Coast Trains Ltd. [2004] IRLR 789; Superintendent of Police v. Ijaz Aslam 2024 SCMR 1831; Vice Chancellor Agriculture University v. Muhammad Shafiq 2024 SCMR 527; Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 574; Aatika Hina Mushtaq v. Secretary Special Education, Government of Punjab 2025 SCP 158; Divisional Superintendent v. Umar Daraz 2023 SCMR 761; Province of Punjab v. Kanwal Rashid 2021 SCMR 730; Pir Imran Sajid v. Managing Director 2015 SCMR 1257; Abdul Wahab v. HBL 2013 SCMR 1383; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180; Naveed Asghar v. The State PLD 2021 SC 600; Altaf Ibrahim Qureshi v. Aam Logue Ittehad PLD 2019 SC 745; Mubarik Ali Babar v. Punjab Public Service Commission 2023 SCMR 518; Uzma Naveed Chaudhary v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 783; Malik Ubaidullah v. Government of Punjab 2021 PLC (C. S.) 65; Muhammad Yasin v. D.G. Pakistan Post Office 2023 SCMR 394; National Commission on Status of Women v. Government of Punjab PLD 2019 SC 218; Inspector General of Police, Punjab v. Tariq Mahmood 2015 SCMR 77; Sohail Ahmed Usmani v. DG CAA 2014 SCMR 1843; Chairman State Life v. Siddiq Akbar 2013 SCMR 752; Muhammad Hussain v. E.D.O. (Education) 2007 SCMR 855; Umer Said v. District Education Officer (Female) 2007 SCMR 296; General Manager v. Mehmood Ahmed Butt 2002 SCMR 1064; Secretary, Government of Punjab v. Khalid Hussain Hamdani 2013 SCMR 817; Brean v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971) 2 QB 175 and Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962 rel. (e) Civil service--- ----Reinstatement after passing of substituted/modified/reduced penalties on the ground of disproportionality---Effect and scope stated. Muhammad Usman Arif, Advocate Supreme Court along with Rana Iqbal, Advocate High Court for Petitioners (in C.P.L.A. No. 3453-L of 2019). Malik Saleem Iqbal Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in C.P.L.A. No. 23-L of 2022). Khalid Masood Ghani, A.A.G., Punjab and Kashif Murtaza, Inspector (Legal) for Respondents. Assisted by: Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 14th May, 2025.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan --- ----Art.199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Contractual dispute---Factual controversy---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, invocation of---Permissibility---Scope---Petitioner was awarded a two-year vending contract through an open auction conducted by Pakistan Railways pursuant to a public notice---Petitioner deposited 30% of the bid amount, i.e., Rs.1,683,000, with the respondents---Allotment pertained to vending services, and subsequent to commencement of the contract, the petitioner’s vending operations were regulated in terms of items permitted for sale and the number of salespersons authorized under the allotment order and applicable railway policy, during which period the petitioner’s vending activity ultimately ceased ---Held: Matter at hand emanated solely from a contractual dispute between the parties---The document annexed by the petitioner himself demonstrated that the petitioner was authorized to vend only twelve items and to operate through no more than four salespersons, in accordance with the terms explicitly set forth in the contractual letter, hence, the very basis of his claim stood contradicted by his own annexures---Furthermore, the petitioner had concealed a material fact viz. institution of a civil suit, wherein, plaint was rejected---Such concealment, coupled with the petitioner’s contradictory pleadings, rendered it evident that the petitioner had not approached the High Court with clean hands, and, therefore, was not entitled to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the High Court---Contractual disputes, laden with factual controversies, did not fall within the purview of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution---In the absence of any demonstrable violation of fundamental rights or statutory obligations, High Court could not be called upon to adjudicate such dispute---Present petition was misconceived and same was devoid of any merit, as such, same was dismissed. Pakcom Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2011 Sc 44 rel. Syed Muhammad Ali Shah Rizvi for Petitioner. Ghulam Abbas Akhtar and Syed Naveed Ahmed Shah, Deputy Attorney General for the State. Date of hearing: 14th May, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: the Tribunal is vested with the powers to remand the case to the Commissioner for making such enquiry or taking such action as the Tribunal may direct or make such order as it deems fit.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: In a complaint filed under Section 25 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2025 ("the Act"), objection of limitation was taken in terms of Section 28(4) of the Act and application under Section 35 of the Act was filed for summary dismissal of the complaint, which was dismissed by the Trial Court through impugned order. Held that there is no cavil to the legal position that the limitation period provided under Section 28 (4) of the Act, for filing a claim, is 30 days from the date of accrual of cause of action. However, the said period of limitation is not so absolute as to leaving no room for filing claim beyond the stipulated period of 30 days as evident from the first proviso to Section 28(4) of the Act, which vests discretion within the Court to allow a claim to be filed within such time as the Court may allow if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within the specified period. Similarly, the second proviso lays down an upper ceiling of 60 days from the expiry of warranty or guaranty and if no period is specified one year from the date of purchase of the product or providing of services. Thus, the legislature in its wisdom has conferred discretion for extending the limitation for filing of a claim beyond the stipulated period of 30 days. Suffice to observe that such discretion is to be exercised in judicial manner. In the present case, it is not denied that a contractual warranty clause existed. The case of Pak Suzuki Motors Company Limited through Manager v. Faisal Jameel Butt and another (PLD 2023 SC 482) relied upon by the petitioner is hardly of any help to the case of the petitioner as the August Supreme Court while upholding the view of this Court rendered in case reported as Muhammad Ashraf v. Sheikh Muhammad Akram etc. (2022 CLD 638) enunciated that the statutory period of 30 days is to run from the date of accrual of cause of action. However, the said case, by no means denuded the Trial Court from its discretionary power of extension of limitation period vested under the law. Further held that Section 35 of the Act pertains to summary dismissal of the frivolous and vexatious claims and a complaint that is barred by time may ultimately fail on legal grounds, but it does not, on that count becomes frivolous or vexatious when relationship of customer-service provider is admitted.