Summary: ----S.5(5)---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24-A---Debit-blocking/ freezing of bank accounts by FIA---Directions to debit-block bank accounts issued on the same day as receipt of the complaint---No investigation/inquiry initiated prior to freezing the bank accounts---Legality---Powers of authority to freeze bank accounts---Scope---Procedure enunciated---Brief facts were that the petitioner company entered into a Robotic Process Automation Agreement with Habib Bank Limited (HBL) in July 2024, which was effective until 30.06.2025 with automatic renewal for two years---On 05.06.2025, when the agreement was nearing expiry, HBL lodged a complaint before the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) against the petitioner company, and on the same day, FIA issued a notice under S. 5 of the FIA Act, 1974, directing various banks to block the petitioner company’s bank accounts---The petitioner company challenged the said notice before the High Court under Constitutional jurisdiction asserting that the FIA’s action lacked lawful authority as it was issued without forming a written opinion or obtaining an order from the competent authority, as required under S. 5(5) of the FIA Act, 1974---Held: Firstly, from perusal of the complaint, no allegation of Rs.1.324 Billion was spelled out therein---Secondly, the last page of the complaint reflected that the complaint was marked to “S.I. Zohra” for verification on the same day i.e. 05.06.2025, whereas on the same day, the impugned letter for debit-block of the bank accounts of the petitioner company was issued-- -No record had been filed in court to establish that based upon which material and opinion or as to when, the said complaint was converted into inquiry on 05.06.2025---While issuing directions to debit-block the bank accounts of the petitioner on the same day of receipt of the complaint dated 05.06.2025, the power under S. 5 of the Act had been used in haste, without any caution or restrain, and without forming an opinion in writing---Moreover, while taking such action, the respondent No.1 also did not establish that sufficient time was not available to approach appropriate authority for obtaining order for seizure, which was a mandatory requirement---Respondents could not be allowed to exercise their power under S. 5 in an unfettered manner, without reasonable care and caution, without giving reasons for making the order and without application of mind, as mandatorily required under S. 24-A of the Act, 1897---None of these requirements were fulfilled in the present case---Impugned notice issued under S. 5 of the Act was set aside---Constitutional petition was accepted, in circumstances. (b) Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 (VIII of 1975)--- ----S.5(5)---Powers to seize a property by member of agency, exercise of---Scope---Before seizure of property by a member of FIA it must be established that sufficient time was not available with concerned member to approach appropriate authority for obtaining order for seizure and it is only in these circumstances that power under S. 5(5) of the Act, 1974 could be exercised by such member. Muhammad Muslim v. Federal Investigation Agency PLD 1984 Kar, 71; Fazal Mahmood v. Sardar Khan and 3 others PLD 1996 Kar. 475; Uzma Adil Khan and others v. Federal Investigation Authority 2023 CLD 599; Muhammad Sohail Shaikh v. The State and 2 others PLD 2021 Lah. 612 and Muhammad Bilal Nawaz v. Director General FIA Punjab and 5 others PLD 2024 Lah. 584 ref. Mirza Moiz Baig for Petitioner. Ms. Alizeh Bashir, Deputy Attorney General Federation of Pakistan. Mukesh Kumar Talreja for Respondent No.4. Umair Nabi and Furqan Ansari for Respondent No. 5. Faiz Durrani for Respondent No.7. Umair Shah, Inspector FIA, CBC, Karachi. Date of hearing: 28th July, 2025.

Summary: (a) Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance (IV of 2001)--- ----Ss.17 & 19---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Ejectment petition---Change/transfer of ownership---Effect---Subsequent / new owner instituting ejectment proceedings---Relationship of landlord and tenant, denial of---Once a tenant, always a tenant---Principle---Mere transfer of ownership does not alter the status of the tenancy nor creates a fresh tenancy---'Undertaking' given by petitioner's (tenant's) counsel to vacate the premises---Significance---Consequence of non-compliance stated---The issue in the present case centered on the legality of an eviction order passed against the petitioner (tenant) after a long-standing tenancy---The petitioner had entered into lease agreements with the original landlady, regularly paid rent without default, and even verbally extended tenancy beyond the written lease period---Later, Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 (new owners) claimed ownership of the premises after a transfer of title and filed an ejectment petition---The petitioner challenged the same, arguing that no mandatory notice of change of ownership under S.19 of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 (the Ordinance 2001) was served; that the relationship of landlord and tenant with Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 (new owners) never legally existed, and that eviction was ordered without proper recording of evidence---The dispute thus revolved around "whether the eviction order was lawful in light of the alleged ownership transfer and absence of statutory notice"?---Held: Admittedly petitioner (tenant) originally entered the demised premises as tenant under the previous landlord---Upon the transfer of title, the private respondents (new landlord), being successors-in-interest, stepped into the shoes of the original landlord---Principle "once a tenant, always a tenant," was attracted in the present case and the mere transfer of ownership, did not alter the status of the tenancy nor created a fresh tenancy in favour of the new landlord---Furthermore, it had been the consistent view of the superior courts that a tenant was not entitled to challenge the title of the landlord unless and until he first surrendered possession of the tenanted premises---Moreover, petitioner's counsel gave an undertaking before the High Court that demises premises would be handed over to the new owners within four months which undertaking was not complied with---Undertaking recorded by the court carried the force of an order and breach thereof could entail penal consequences, including proceedings for contempt of court---With regards to the requirement of issuing statutory notice under S.19 of the Ordinance 2001, mere filing of the ejectment petition itself constituted sufficient notice to the tenant, therefore, there was no formal requirement to issue notice---Invocation of Art. 199 of the Constitution in the present case was wholly misconceived and not maintainable---Present petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance (IV of 2001)--- ----S.19---Ejectment petition---Transfer/change of ownership---Issuance of intimation notice by new owner---Requirement---Exception stated---Filing of an eviction petition itself constitutes sufficient notice to the tenant of the landlord's intention to terminate the tenancy---The institution of eviction proceedings, by necessary implication, serves as an express manifestation of the landlord's desire not to continue the tenancy any further. Sher Jang v. District Judge Islamabad and 4 others 2004 SCMR 1852 rel. (c) Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance (IV of 2001)--- ----S.17---Ejectment petition---Undertaking given by tenant's counsel---Significance and scope---Consequences for non-compliance---Undertaking is defined as promise, pledge and engagement---Definition of 'undertaking' is of significant legal consequence as it aligns with the judicial interpretation that such a commitment made before a court is not a mere procedural formality but a binding assurance carrying the force of a court order---Once a party, through counsel, gives an unequivocal undertaking to the court such as to vacate rented premises within a specified period the undertaking transforms into an enforceable obligation---Any breach of such a solemn pledge not only offends the dignity of the court but also has coercive consequences. Riasat Ali Azad and Muzammil Hussain Shahad for Petitioner. Ahmed Murtaza Langrial for Respondents Nos. 3 to 5. Date of hearing: 19th June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 212(3)-Civil service-Promotion-Entitlement-Departmental Promotion Committee-Meeting deferred by department-Revision of promotion rules during deferred period of meeting-Effect upon pending promotion cases-Department relying upon revised promotion rules-Legality-Entitlement determined under earlier rules-Briefly, the respondents were appointed as ‘sub engineers’ in the year 1986 and were later upgraded to BPS-16 from BPS-12-Upon becoming eligible under the then-applicable service rules, their working papers for promotion to the post of ‘assistant engineer’ in BPS-17 were prepared, but the meeting of the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) was deferred by the department on the ground that new promotion rules were under consideration, subsequently, revised rules were notified, under which the respondents were declared ineligible for promotion, while their departmental appeals remained undecided, leading them to file service appeals before the service tribunal, which were allowed, holding them entitled to promotion in accordance with the rules applicable at the time they became eligible-The said judgment of service tribunal was challenged by the department before the Supreme Court through present civil petitions for leave to appeal-Held: Respondents had satisfied the eligibility criteria for promotion pursuant to the rules enforced at the time of their initial appointment-Consequently, their cases were fully ripe for consideration by DPC-The subsequent delay in convening meeting of the DPC was an administrative failure attributable solely to the department and could not be imputed to the respondents-The subsequently amended rules were to operate prospectively unless a contrary intimation was manifestly evident from the statute-Question of whether the amended rules were to be applied retrospectively or prospectively was beyond the scope of DPC’s mandate-The DPC also did not have the authority to delay the meeting while waiting for amendment of the rules-Leave was declined and present petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Civil service- - Departmental promotion committee-Deferment of meeting by department-Subsequent revision of promotion rules during deferred period of meeting-Effect on pending promotion cases - Department’s reliance on revised rules - Legality and permissibility-Whoever fulfills the prescribed eligibility conditions acquires a legitimate expectation to be considered for promotion in accordance with the prevailing rules. (c) Civil service- -Seniority or eligibility for promotion, matter of-Department giving prospective effect to the subsequently introduced amendment in promotion rules-Effect upon employees appointed prior to amendment-Legality-Correct interpretation of statute in such circumstances-Where an amendment adversely effects the accrued substantive rights, such as those pertaining to seniority or eligibility for promotion, it cannot be applied retrospectively to the employees appointed prior to amendment. (d) Interpretation of statutes- -Retrospective application of a statue-Scope-Circumstances-Retrospective application is permissible only if the parent statute, which confers the rule making power, contains an express provision to the effect-In absence of such explicit legislative sanction, applying amended provision of law retrospectively is legally untenable.

Summary: (Against the judgment / order dated 25.07.2024 passed by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal, Peshawar in Appeals Nos. 1183 and 1184 of 2023). (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 212(3)---Civil service---Promotion---Entitlement---Departmental Promotion Committee---Meeting deferred by department---Revision of promotion rules during deferred period of meeting---Effect upon pending promotion cases---Department relying upon revised promotion rules---Legality---Entitlement determined under earlier rules---Briefly, the respondents were appointed as ‘sub engineers’ in the year 1986 and were later upgraded to BPS-16 from BPS-12---Upon becoming eligible under the then-applicable service rules, their working papers for promotion to the post of ‘assistant engineer’ in BPS-17 were prepared, but the meeting of the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) was deferred by the department on the ground that new promotion rules were under consideration, subsequently, revised rules were notified, under which the respondents were declared ineligible for promotion, while their departmental appeals remained undecided, leading them to file service appeals before the service tribunal, which were allowed, holding them entitled to promotion in accordance with the rules applicable at the time they became eligible---The said judgment of service tribunal was challenged by the department before the Supreme Court through present civil petitions for leave to appeal---Held: Respondents had satisfied the eligibility criteria for promotion pursuant to the rules enforced at the time of their initial appointment---Consequently, their cases were fully ripe for consideration by DPC---The subsequent delay in convening meeting of the DPC was an administrative failure attributable solely to the department and could not be imputed to the respondents---The subsequently amended rules were to operate prospectively unless a contrary intimation was manifestly evident from the statute---Question of whether the amended rules were to be applied retrospectively or prospectively was beyond the scope of DPC’s mandate---The DPC also did not have the authority to delay the meeting while waiting for amendment of the rules---Leave was declined and present petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Civil service--- ---- Departmental promotion committee ---Deferment of meeting by department---Subsequent revision of promotion rules during deferred period of meeting--- Effect on pending promotion cases --- Department’s reliance on revised rules --- Legality and permissibility ---Whoever fulfills the prescribed eligibility conditions acquires a legitimate expectation to be considered for promotion in accordance with the prevailing rules. (c) Civil service--- ----Seniority or eligibility for promotion, matter of---Department giving prospective effect to the subsequently introduced amendment in promotion rules---Effect upon employees appointed prior to amendment---Legality---Correct interpretation of statute in such circumstances---Where an amendment adversely effects the accrued substantive rights, such as those pertaining to seniority or eligibility for promotion, it cannot be applied retrospectively to the employees appointed prior to amendment. (d) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Retrospective application of a statue---Scope---Circumstances---Retrospective application is permissible only if the parent statute, which confers the rule making power, contains an express provision to the effect---In absence of such explicit legislative sanction, applying amended provision of law retrospectively is legally untenable. Bashar Naveed, Additional Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 30th July, 2025.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan- -Arts. 199(1)(b)(ii), 213, 215 & 218-Gilgit Baltistan Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) Order, 2014, S. 3-Government of Gilgit Baltistan Order, 2018, Art. 97(1)-Territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction of Islamabad High Court-Scope-Writ of quo warranto-Maintainability-Petitioner assailed continuous holding the office of Chief Election Commissioner of Gilgit Baltistan after expiry of previous term and re-appointment without consultation with the Chief Minister and Leader of Opposition of Gilgit Baltistan Assembly-Validity-When actions are undertaken by federal authorities operating across Pakistan, territorial jurisdiction lies with the High Court of the province or territory where the operative acts occur and where the consequential effect of such acts is felt-Primary and direct effect of the appointment fell within the electoral and governance affairs of Gilgit-Baltistan-Islamabad High Court, being a territorial court of limited jurisdiction, cannot assume advisory or supervisory authority over functionaries and legal frameworks established exclusively for Gilgit-Baltistan-No part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial limits of Islamabad, nor did the office or the functions of respondent bear any connection to this territory-Dominant object of the petition pertained exclusively to executive and quasi judicial acts performed within Gilgit-Baltistan under its unique constitutional framework, thus, Islamabad High Court was divested of jurisdiction to entertain constitutional petition either on territorial or subject-matter grounds-Cause of action, the subject matter of the petition and the appointment were all inextricably linked to the territory of Gilgit-Baltistan, thus, Islamabad High Court lacked both territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the constitutional petition-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Khawaja Muhammad Asif v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2013 SCMR 1205; Rasheed Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2017 SC 121; Officer incharge, Army Housing Directorate, Karachi v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2024 SC 576; Al-Jehad Trust and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1990 SCMR 1379; Civil Aviation Authority v. Supreme Appellate Court Gilgit Baltistan and others CMA No. 2415/2020 in 2944/2019 and C.M.A. 2944/2019 in Constitution Petition No. 50/2018; Khalid Khursheed Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others C.M.As Nos. 3985 of 2024 and 1564 of 2025 in Constitution Petition No. 35 of 2022; 2022 SCMR 2058 and PLD 2025 Lah. 200 ref. Taufiq Asif v. General (R) Pervez Musharraf PLD 2024 SC 610; Messrs The Communicators (Pvt) Ltd. v. PEMRA W.P. No. 2172 of 2025 and PLD 2019 SC 357 rel. Petitioner in person.

Summary: (Against the order dated 16.09.2021 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Writ Petition No. 59849 of 2017). (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 115---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5---Suit dismissed for non-prosecution---Inability to pursue the case proceedings due to being behind bars/in jail---Belated filing of restoration application along with condonation of delay application---Sufficient cause---Revisional court, jurisdiction of---Scope---Suit was restored by Trial Court exercising its discretion---Revisional court as well as High Court held the restoration application to be time-barred---Question requiring determination before the Supreme Court was as to "Whether the revisional court exercising jurisdiction under section 115 C.P.C. could reverse the discretionary findings reached by the Trial Court in exercise of its lawful jurisdiction while condoning the delay in filing of application for restoration of suit?"---Held: In the impugned orders it was found that the restoration application was barred by time, whereas, it was revealed from perusal of the paper-book that the application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was available which escaped the attention of the revisional court---Supreme Court did not agree with the reasoning assigned by the revisional court which was appreciated by the High Court through the impugned order that such grounds as disclosed in the restoration application could have been considered had it been filed within thirty days of order---Had the application been filed within thirty days, the condonation application was not required---Condonation application was filed when statutory period for filing restoration application had lapsed---Such delay was then required to be explained in the condonation application which the petitioner did and the Trial Court was in consonance with the grounds mentioned therein when it accepted the applications both for restoration and condonation---The impugned orders of the High Court and that of the revisional court were set aside and the order of the Trial Court was restored---Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 115---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Revisional court---Jurisdiction---Scope---Interreference of revisional court and subsequently the High Court against exercise of lawful jurisdiction by the Trial Court---Limits and extent---Indisputably the revisional court has limited jurisdiction under section 115 C.P.C. which includes, (i) when Trial Court was found to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law; (ii) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (iii) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity---However, when a lawful jurisdiction was exercised by the Trial Court then the revisional court followed by High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot reverse it by expressing their own views over and above the lawful discretion exercised by the trial court unless found within frame of section 115 of C.P.C. Petitioner in person. Respondents Nos. 1 and 3 in person. Respondents Nos. 2 and 6 (died). Nemo for Respondents Nos. 4 and 5. Date of hearing: 29th July, 2025.

Summary: (Against the order dated 18.09.2023 passed in Writ Petition No. 2874 of 2022 by Islamabad High Court, Islamabad and stay application). (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 12(2), O.IX, R.13 & O.V, Rr.19 & 20---Non-service of summons upon defendant---Substituted service, procedure and invocation of---Pre-requisites---Trial Court resorting to substituted service without adopting requirements for ordinary service---Legality---Affixation of court summons on conspicuous place of business and recording of statement of process server as to the affixation---Requirement---Setting aside ex parte decree, seeking of---Proper remedy, invocation of---Whether application under section 12(2) C.P.C. was maintainable or recourse lay under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C.?---Primary issue in the present case revolved around whether the ex parte judgment and decree dated 18.09.2013 passed against the petitioner was validly obtained on the premise that Trial Court had resorted to substituted service through newspaper publication without first ensuring compliance with mandatory legal requirements for ordinary service of summons---The petitioner's subsequent application under section 12(2) C.P.C. to set aside the ex parte decree was dismissed by the Trial Court and later upheld by the High Court---The Supreme Court was thus called upon to decide "whether the ex parte proceedings stood vitiated for lack of proper service, and whether the proper remedy lay under section 12(2) C.P.C. or Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. for setting aside the decree"?---Held: No order for affixation of court summons on the conspicuous place of the business of the petitioner was passed by the Trial Court rather it was ordered that 'defendant be summoned through registered post AD/TCS for 28.02.2013'; however, on 28.02.2013, the Trial Court without taking into account the preceding order and without recording statement of the process server as to purported affixation of the court summons as required under Rule 19, Order V of C.P.C. as to its satisfaction for reasons to believe that the petitioner/defendant was keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service or for any other reason the summons could not be served in the ordinary way, especially when no order for affixation was passed by it on the preceding date and without adhering to the provided procedure as per mandate of law, resorted to substituted service of the petitioner through publication of court notice in the newspaper---Substituted service could only be effected when ordinary summons could not be served or defendant deliberately avoided to receive summons of the Court and the Court was satisfied that service could not be effected through ordinary modes of service and that satisfaction could be achieved by recording statement of the process server but nothing as such was done by the Trial Court---Process of issuance of proclamation for the service of the petitioner without fulfilling the mandatory requirement was nothing but nullity in the eye of law; therefore, the superstructure built thereon automatically collapsed---In the present case, when it was established from the record that the Trial Court while dealing with the suit did not resort to the mandated procedure of law for procuring the service of the petitioner, the application seeking setting aside ex parte judgment and decree ought to have been accepted---With regards to the question as to the applicability of either section 12(2) of Order IX, Rule 13 of C.P.C., an application under Order IX of Rule 13, C.P.C. was competent when an ex parte decree was passed due to non-service of summons---However, the court must assess the facts and evidence to determine the appropriate remedy under each provision---Impugned order passed by High Court and order delivered by Trial Court, were set aside, consequent whereof the application filed by the petitioner, treating the same as filed under Order IX, Rule 13 of C.P.C. was accepted and the ex parte judgment and decree in question was set aside and case was remanded to the Trial Court for decision afresh, obviously after obtaining written statement of the petitioner, framing issues and recording evidence of the parties---Present petition was converted into appeal while granting leave and same was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 12(2) & O.V, Rr.10, 17, 20---Non-service of summons to defendant---Ex parte judgment and decree passed against defendant---Trial Court adopting substituted service without adhering to the procedure provided for ordinary service---Defendant seeking setting aside of ex-parte judgment and decree---'Audi alteram partem'---Principle---Applicability---It is a settled principle of law as well as demand and mandate of law that one should not be condemned unheard and every litigant should be provided with fair opportunity to plead and defend his/her case by adhering to the principle of audi alteram partem and technicalities should and ought to be avoided. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 12(2), O.IX, R.13 & O.VI, R.4---Defendant seeking setting aside of ex parte judgment and decree by filing application under section 12(2) C.P.C.---Competency and legality---Legal question before the Court was as to "whether application under section 12(2) C.P.C. or under Order IX, Rule 13 C.P.C. would be competent?---Key distinction between applicability and competency of both applications stated---Section 12(2) of C.P.C. provides a remedy to challenge a judgment, decree, or order obtained by: (i) fraud (ii) misrepresentation, or (iii) want of jurisdiction---However, mere use of these terms is not sufficient, rather specific particulars must be provided as required by Rule 4 of Order VI, C.P.C.---It allows any person affected by such a decree or order to apply to the court that passed it, seeking to set it aside---This provision is not limited to parties to the suit but extends to any person aggrieved by the decree or order---It means an application under section 12(2) C.P.C. is maintainable when the decree or order was obtained by deliberate deception or suppression of material facts from the Court---However, the judgment supports a broader reading that includes fraud between the parties affecting the decree---For instance, if a plaintiff fabricates documents or misleads the court to secure a favorable judgment, the affected party can invoke Section 12(2) of C.P.C.; when the decree results from unintentional but material misstatement of facts by a party, leading the court to pass an erroneous order---For example, if a party misrepresents the ownership of property in a suit, the aggrieved party may apply under this section; and when the court lacked inherent jurisdiction to pass the decree or order---For instance, if a court passes a decree in a matter outside its territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction, an application under Section 12(2) of C.P.C. can be filed---Additionally, a person not a party to the suit but affected by the decree e.g., a third party whose property is wrongly included in a decree, may apply under this section---The application must be filed in the same court that passed the decree or order---The applicant must prove fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of jurisdiction with cogent evidence---The scope of application under Section 12(2) of C.P.C. is broader than Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C., as it is not limited to ex-parte decrees and can be invoked by non-parties---Whereas, Order IX, Rule 13 of C.P.C. provides a remedy to set aside an ex parte decree passed against a defendant who was unable to appear when the suit was called for hearing---It applies only to defendants and is limited to ex-parte decrees---An application under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. is maintainable when: the defendant was not duly served with the summons, or the service was defective, preventing their appearance; the defendant(s) was prevented from appearing due to sufficient cause, such as illness, accident, or other unavoidable circumstances; the decree was passed ex- parte, i.e., in the absence of the defendant, without hearing their defense---The application must be filed by the defendant in the court that passed the ex-parte decree---The defendant must demonstrate that they were not served or had sufficient cause for non-appearance---The court may set aside the decree in terms (e.g., costs) and allow the defendant to contest the suit---Unlike Section 12(2) C.P.C., this provision Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C. is limited to ex-parte decrees and does not cover fraud or jurisdiction issues unless they relate to service or non-appearance---Key distinctions between the applications under section 12(2) and IX(13), C.P.C. are that Section 12(2) C.P.C. addresses fraud, misrepresentation or lack of jurisdiction and applies to any decree or order, while Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. is restricted to ex-parte decrees; Section 12(2) C.P.C. can be invoked by any aggrieved person, including non-parties, while Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. is available only to defendants; Section 12(2) C.P.C. focuses on substantive defects (fraud, misrepresentation, jurisdiction), while Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. addresses procedural issues (non-service, sufficient cause); Section 12(2) C.P.C. seek to set aside the decree or order entirely, while Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. seeks to restore the suit for hearing on merits---In light of the above, an application under Section 12(2) C.P.C. lies when a decree or order is tainted by fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of jurisdiction, as seen in cases like fabrication of documents or jurisdictional overreach---Conversely, an application under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. lies when an ex-parte decree is passed due to non-service of summons or sufficient cause for the defendant's non-appearance, such as illness or defective service---The court must assess the facts and evidence to determine the appropriate remedy under each provision. Pakistan Railways through Chairman Pakistan Railways, Islamabad and another v. Muhammad Amin 2025 PLC (C.S.) 699; Sheikh Muhammad Iftikhar Ahmad and others v. Faiz Ahmad and others 2023 SCMR 2158; Muhammad Aslam and others v. Mst. Kundan Mai and others 2004 SCMR 843 and Hafiz Malik Kamran Akbar and others v. Muhammad Shafi (deceased) through L.Rs. and others PLD 2024 SC 262 rel. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----Ss. 9, 12(2), 47 & 151---Ancillary provisions for application under section 12(2) C.P.C.---Applicability and significance---Addressing issues related to execution of decree obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, lack of jurisdiction or defected service---Multiple remedies for aggrieved person stated---Prevention of decrees obtained unfairly from attaining finality---Filing of objections under section 47 C.P.C. or separate application under section 12(2) C.P.C.---Scope---Ancillary provisions for Section 12(2) C.P.C. can be summarized such that Section 47 C.P.C. deals with questions arising between parties to a suit (or their representatives) regarding the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree---Meaning thereby, if a decree is challenged under Section 12(2) C.P.C. on the basis of fraud or lack of jurisdiction, issues related to its execution (e.g., whether the decree is enforceable) may be addressed under Section 47 of C.P.C. during execution proceedings---For instance, if a decree obtained by fraud is sought to be executed, the aggrieved party may raise objections under Section 47 of C.P.C., alongside or instead of a separate application under Section 12(2) C.P.C., depending on the stage of proceedings---Section 151 of C.P.C. empowers courts to pass orders necessary to meet the ends of justice or prevent abuse of the process of the court---It is notable fact that if an application under section 12(2) C.P.C. does not fully address procedural gaps (e.g. interim relief to stay execution of a fraudulent decree), the court may invoke its inherent powers under Section 151 C.P.C.---For example, if a decree is challenged for fraud under Section 12(2) C.P.C., the Court may use Section 151 C.P.C. to stay execution proceedings pending the adjudication of the application---Further, provisions under Order XXI (e.g. Rules 26, 29, 90, 99-101) govern the execution of decrees---If a decree is challenged under Section 12(2) C.P.C. for fraud or lack of jurisdiction, ancillary issues like staying execution (Order XXI Rule 26, C.P.C.) or setting aside a sale in execution due to fraud (Order XXI Rule 90, C.P.C.) may arise; if a property is sold in execution of a decree obtained by misrepresentation, the affected party may seek to set aside the sale under Order XXI Rule 90, C.P.C., in conjunction with an application under Section 12(2) C.P.C.; Section 9 C.P.C. establishes that civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature unless barred---When an application under Section 12(2) C.P.C. is filed alleging want of jurisdiction, Section 9 C.P.C. provides the foundational principle for determining whether the court had the authority to pass the decree---For instance, if a decree is challenged under Section 12(2) C.P.C. for being passed by a court lacking territorial jurisdiction, Section 9 C.P.C. guides the inquiry into the court's competence---However, ancillary provisions for Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. can be summarized as: Order V (Rules 1-30) C.P.C. governs the issuance and service of summons---Since an application under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. often hinges on non-service or defective service of summons, Order V C.P.C. provisions are critical to determining whether the service was proper---For example, if a defendant claims non-service under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. because the summons were not served as per Order V Rule 15, C.P.C. (service on an adult member of the family), the court will examine compliance with Order V of C.P.C.; Order IX Rule 6, C.P.C. outlines the procedure when the defendant does not appear, leading to an ex-parte decree---This provision sets the stage for an application under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C., as it defines the circumstances under which an ex-parte decree is passed; if a court proceeds ex-parte under Order IX Rule 6, C.P.C. due to the defendant's absence, the defendant may apply under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. to set aside the decree, citing non-service or sufficient cause; if the suit is at the hearing stage and has not yet resulted in a decree, Order IX Rule 7, C.P.C. allows the defendant to apply to set aside the ex-parte proceedings and join the hearing---This is a precursor to Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C., applicable when the case is still ongoing---For instance, if defendant learns of the ex-parte proceedings before the decree is passed, he may apply under Order IX Rule 7 instead of waiting to file under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C.; Order IX Rule 14, C.P.C. mandates that no ex-parte decree shall be set aside under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. without giving notice to the opposite party (plaintiff)---This ensures procedural fairness in applications under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C.---When a defendant files an application under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C., the court must issue notice to the plaintiff under Order IX Rule 14, C.P.C. before deciding the application---In addition to the above, if an ex-parte decree is set aside under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C., Section 144 C.P.C. allows the court to order restitution to restore the parties to their original position (e.g. refund of money paid under the decree or restoration of property)---Moreover, if defendant's property was sold in execution of an ex-parte decree that is later on set aside, Section 144 C.P.C. may be invoked to restore the property to the defendant---Similar to its role in Section 12(2) C.P.C., Section 151 C.P.C. can be used to address procedural gaps in Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. applications, such as granting interim relief to stay execution of an ex-parte decree pending the application's adjudication---Furthermore, provisions like Order XXI Rule 26 (stay of execution) and Rule 29, C.P.C. (stay of suit when execution is pending), are ancillary to Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C., as they allow the court to manage execution proceedings while the application to set aside the ex-parte decree is pending---If a defendant files an application under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. and the decree is being executed, they may seek a stay under Order XXI Rule 26, C.P.C.---The ancillary provisions ensure procedural fairness, provide mechanisms for execution or stay, and allow appeals or restitution, complementing the primary remedies under Section 12(2) and Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C.---Provisions like Section 151 and Order XXI, C.P.C. grant courts flexibility to address case-specific issues, ensuring justice is not defeated by procedural technicalities---Both Section 12(2) and Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. applications require compliance with procedural rules [e.g., notice under Order IX Rule 14, C.P.C. or evidence of fraud under Section 12(2) C.P.C.], and ancillary provisions like Order V or Section 47, C.P.C. guide these requirements. Imran Muhammad Sarwar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video-link from Lahore). Hasan Rashid Qamar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing: 29th July, 2025.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- O. V, Rr. 17, 19 & O. IX, Rr. 6, 13 ---- Ex parte decree ---- Substituted service without satisfaction of prerequisites ---- Nullity in law In a suit for recovery, the petitioner was proceeded against ex parte and decree passed on 18.09.2013. The petitioner’s application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., was dismissed, followed by constitutional petition also being dismissed by the High Court. Supreme Court held that no order for substituted service was passed on the relevant date and substituted service via publication was effected without satisfying the mandatory prerequisites of O.V, R.20, C.P.C. No statement of process server was recorded to support the claim of avoidance of service or impossibility of service through ordinary means. Held, substituted service without judicial satisfaction of prior service failure is invalid; entire proceedings stand vitiated. Cited Case: • Sana Jamali v. Mujeeb Qamar 2023 SCMR 316 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- O. IX, R.13 ---- Right to fair hearing ---- Audi alteram partem ---- Ex parte decree liable to be set aside where service is defective Supreme Court held that when ex parte decree is passed without due and legal service of summons, it violates the fundamental principle of natural justice—audi alteram partem. Service through publication, not preceded by effective service attempts and judicial satisfaction, renders the proceedings void. Defendant cannot be condemned unheard. Held, technicalities should be avoided where they obstruct justice. Petitioner's absence from proceedings was not deliberate; denial of fair opportunity necessitates restoration of case on merits. Cited Case: • Syed Muhammad Anwar Advocate v. Sheikh Abdul Haq 1985 SCMR 1228 • Muhammad Sharif v. MCB Bank Ltd. 2021 SCMR 1158 • Faqir Muhammad v. Khursheed Bibi 2024 SCMR 107 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- S. 12(2) vs. O. IX, R. 13 ---- Comparative scope and applicability ---- Principles restated with illustrative examples Court elaborated the distinctions: Section 12(2), C.P.C. applies when a decree is challenged on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or want of jurisdiction. It is available to any aggrieved person, including non-parties. Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C. applies only to ex parte decrees, is available only to defendants, and hinges on non-service or sufficient cause for non-appearance. If summons were not properly served, O. IX, R. 13 is applicable; if judgment was procured by deceit or concealment of facts, S. 12(2) is invoked. Court emphasized that mere labeling under S. 12(2) is insufficient without pleadings disclosing specific fraud particulars per O. VI, R.4, C.P.C. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- Ss. 47, 151, 144 & O. XXI, Rr. 26, 90 ---- Ancillary provisions to S. 12(2) and O. IX, R. 13 C.P.C. ---- Execution and restitution frameworks explained Court clarified that: S. 47 governs questions during execution including objections arising from invalid or fraudulent decrees. S. 151 provides inherent power to prevent abuse and ensure justice, especially when S. 12(2) or O. IX, R.13 do not provide complete procedural relief. S. 144 allows restitution when an ex parte decree is later set aside. O. XXI R. 26 permits stay of execution during pendency of challenge to decree. These provisions collectively ensure that procedural rules do not defeat substantive justice. (e) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 10A ---- Fair trial and due process ---- Defendant deprived of opportunity to contest ---- Ex parte decree set aside to prevent miscarriage of justice Held, fair trial under Article 10A of the Constitution guarantees the right to contest claims. Petitioner was denied this right due to flawed substituted service and non-adherence to due process. Decree passed without giving a party a chance to be heard contravenes constitutional protection. Trial court’s non-compliance with mandatory provisions rendered the decree unsustainable. Disposition: Leave to appeal granted; petition converted into appeal and allowed. Orders of the High Court dated 18.09.2023 and trial court dated 14.07.2022 set aside. Ex parte judgment and decree dated 18.09.2013 also set aside. Matter remanded to trial court for de novo hearing after obtaining written statement, framing issues, and recording evidence.

Summary: Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----Ss.30 & 39---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115---Contractual dispute between two contractors---Referral of a dispute to arbitration---Filing of revision petition against appellate judgment upholding the award issued by umpire---Maintainability---Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court---Concurrent findings---Interference, scope of---Brief facts were that the applicant company along with another entered into a contract with the respondent company for a project of Balancing, Modernization and Rehabilitation at the applicants’ factory---Disputes arose between the parties and were referred to two arbitrators who gave conflicting awards, leading to the appointment of an umpire, who issued his award and same was made rule of the court---Subsequent civil appeals and applications by the applicants were dismissed at various stages, with the final appellate judgment and decree dated 13.05.2009 upholding the umpire’s award---The applicants then filed the present civil revision under S. 115, C.P.C., challenging the concurrent findings of the courts below---Legal issue requiring determination was as to “Whether a revision application under S.115, C.P.C. lay against an appellate judgment rendered under S. 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and whether the High Court could interfere with the concurrent findings and the umpire’s award within the limited supervisory jurisdiction”?---Held: a second appeal was not available against an order setting aside or refusing to set aside the award, however, the aggrieved party was entitled to file a revision application---The scope of revision application was limited and the court could only interfere if the subordinate court had exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or had failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or had acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity---Therefore, at the outset, it was observed that the present revision application was maintainable as under S. 39 of the Arbitration Act no second appeal lay under the scheme of the Act---The primary dispute between the parties was whether certain works undertaken by the respondent were beyond the scope of the contract---It was contended by the applicant, as articulated in the impugned judgement and not during the course of arguments before the High Court, that the extra work undertaken by the respondent was beyond the scope of the contract and the agreement ought to be void for “uncertainty”---Whereas, the award as well as the impugned judgment, placing reliance on clause 51.1 of the general conditions of contract had rendered a finding that the agreement between the parties stipulated additional work---There was no error, factual or legal, floating on the face of the record and the High Court was not inclined to interfere in the impugned judgment---Further, the appellate court had correctly curtailed its jurisdiction by holding that the said court was not a court of appeal and the jurisdiction, even if liberally interpreted at the appellate stage, was of a supervisory nature---The scope of interference, in the jurisdiction of the High Court under S.115, C.P.C., against concurrent findings of the court below, was further circumscribed---Applicants failed to bring the present case within the constricted scope and therefore the present revision application was dismissed. Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Aeroflot Russian International Airlines 2018 SCMR 662 and Injam Aqeel v. Latif Muhammad Chaudhry 2023 SCMR 1361 rel. Abdul Razzak v. Mst. Qaiser Sultan and 2 others 1984 MLD 147 ref. Zahid Hamid for Applicants. Umar Sikandar for Respondent. Dates of hearing: 18th, April, 2nd and 16th May, 2025. (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Section 35.

Summary: Punjab Price Control of Essential Commodities Act (VII of 2024)--- ----Ss. 4 & 6---Price control---Petitioner assailed wheat price fixed by authorities---Validity---To have price control of essential commodities, Punjab Price Control of Essential Commodities Act, 2024 has been promulgated with the clear object to make provisions for providing effective mechanism for fixing of prices of essential commodities; to control artificial price hike and profiteering of essential commodities in Punjab; and for matters ancillary thereto---Price Control Council is empowered under S.4 of Punjab Price Control of Essential Commodities Act, 2024directly or through Provincial Controller General or authorized officer to make orders for regulating prices, production and sale of essential commodities and for the price to be charged or paid for it at any stage of transaction therein---Price Control Council, under S.6 of Punjab Price Control of Essential Commodities Act, 2024 is further authorized to give directions for fixing specific maximum prices of the essential commodities---Functionaries can also review the prices so fixed or extend the period if the circumstances so demand---High Court directed the authorities to take necessary measures to ensure implementation of Punjab Price Control of Essential Commodities Act, 2024 and its object---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly. Regarding enormous increase in the price of Flour 2014 SCMR 329; Ikram Bari and 524 others v. National Bank of Pakistan through President and another 2005 SCMR 100; Executive District Officer (Revenue), District Khushab at Jauharabad and others v. Ijaz Hussain and another 2011 SCMR 1864; Senior General Manager, Pakistan Railways and others v. Muhammad Pervaiz 2024 SCMR 581 and Shehri and others v. Province of Sindh and others 2001 YLR 1139 rel. Zubair Afzal Rana for Petitioner. Muhammad Waseem, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Salman Asif Warraich, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab along with Muhammad Iltaf, Deputy Director (State) Agriculture Department for Respondent No. 3. Faisal Hayat, Senior Law Officer for Respondent No. 4. Amicus Curiae: Barrister Khurram Raza and Abdullah Jehangir. Date of hearing: 2nd July, 2025.