Summary: (Against judgment dated 18.03.2021 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Sales Tax Reference No. 13-P of 2011). (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 66---Refund of claim---Applicability---Period of limitation set out in Section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 applies when there is a claim for refund based on any one of four grounds: inadvertence, error, misconstruction or refund on account of input adjustment not claimed within the relevant tax period. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 7 & 66---Refund of claim---Relevant tax period---Limitation period---During 13-06-1997 to 05-09-2000 supply of cement was exempted from tax---Respondent / taxpayer claimed refund of tax paid during the period of exemption---Validity---Since the “relevant tax period” did not (and could not) exist in the period of exemption, no date within that period could serve as the starting point of limitation envisaged by section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990---End of the period of exemption did not mark the last day for the start of limitation since up to that point in time there was in law no “time period”---If at all any question of limitation could arise under Section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 the date for its starting would (and could only) lie in the successive “time periods” that had become operative after the end of the exemption---For purposes of computing limitation, time did not begin to run from the end of the period of exemption or any other date prior thereto located within that period---Period of exemption ended on 05-09-2000 and application for refund was made by end August/beginning September 2001, which was well within (or at most towards the end of) a period of one year from the end of the exemption---Limitation did not begin to run from 05-09-2000 (or any date prior thereto) but rather (if at all) from the successive time periods after that date; the claim was well within time and could not be defeated or denied on the ground of being time barred---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the matter as High Court and Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue had correctly concluded that respondent / taxpayer was entitled to refund of remaining amount of Rs. 6,439,608/---Appeal was dismissed. Pakistan Beverage Ltd. v. Large Taxpayer Unit 2010 PTD 2673; CPLA 658-K/2010 and others; CRP 4-K/2011 and others; Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Arco Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and others 2021 SCMR 1308; Waseem Ahmed and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2014 PTD 1733; C.A. No. 600/2016 and others and PLD 2025 SC 633 rel. Qaiser Abbas Bangash, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video-link, Peshawar). Isaac Ali Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (via video-link, Peshawar). Date of hearing: 27th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990) — S. 66 — Refund — Limitation — Application of s. 66 in VAT regime — Determination of “relevant tax period” during period of exemption under s. 13. Question arose whether limitation under s. 66 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 applied to a refund claim relating to input tax paid on goods acquired and utilized during a period when the supply of cement was exempt under s. 13 of the Act. The Court held that the “relevant tax period” under s. 66 refers only to a period in which taxable supplies exist and the output–input adjustment mechanism under s. 7 operates. During an exemption period, the mechanism is substantively suspended because exempt supplies are not “taxable supplies.” Consequently, no “tax period” exists in law during the exemption. Limitation under s. 66 therefore cannot begin to run from any date within such exempt period. The one-year limitation commences only after exemption ceases and taxable supplies resume. Held: Refund claim filed within one year of the end of the exemption period was not time-barred. The taxpayer’s claim was lawfully admissible in full. Cited Cases: • Pakistan Beverage Ltd. v. Large Taxpayer Unit 2010 PTD 2673 (affirmed in 2021 SCMR 1308) • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Arco Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. 2021 SCMR 1308 • Waseem Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan 2014 PTD 1733 (CA 600/2016 etc., decided 21.06.2025 = 2025 SCP 235) • Fleming (t/a Bodycraft) v. HM Revenue and Customs [2008] UKHL 2 • Metcash Trading Ltd. v. Commissioner of South African Revenue Service 2002 (4) SA 317 (Constitutional Court, South Africa) • Benyon & Partners v. HM Commissioners of Customs and Excise [2004] UKHL 53 (b) Sales Tax Act, 1990 — Ss. 7 & 8 — Input tax adjustment — Nature and legal character — Adjustment not a concession but integral to VAT mechanism. Court reaffirmed that Pakistan’s sales tax operates in value-added tax (VAT) mode, following the destination principle. The output–input adjustment under s. 7 is not a concession but a defining feature of the VAT structure. Denying input adjustment without express statutory exclusion would dismantle the entire VAT scheme. Any limitation provision must therefore be interpreted harmoniously with the structural logic of VAT. (c) Sales Tax Act, 1990 — S. 13 — Exemption of supplies — Effect on input tax and tax period. During exemption under s. 13, goods cease to be “taxable goods,” and supplies of such goods are not taxable supplies. Hence, the VAT mechanism, being inoperative, creates no meaningful “tax period” for input–output adjustment. Upon expiry of the exemption, the mechanism revives prospectively. Taxpayer’s claim for input tax carried forward to the first operative tax period after the exemption remains valid and enforceable. (d) Value Added Tax (VAT) — Nature, structure, and principles — Distinction between zero-rated and exempt supplies — Comparative jurisprudence. Court reaffirmed prior jurisprudence (Pakistan Beverage Ltd., Waseem Ahmed) elucidating the structural principles of VAT: (i) Sales tax under the 1990 Act is levied in VAT mode, operating on output–input adjustment. (ii) Pakistan applies the destination principle — imports taxed, exports zero-rated. (iii) “Zero-rated” supplies remain within the tax chain, while “exempt” supplies are removed from it. (iv) For exempt supplies, supplier becomes final consumer, bearing the entire input tax burden. International authorities such as Fleming (UKHL 2008) and Metcash (South Africa 2002) were cited to reinforce Pakistan’s alignment with global VAT structure. (e) Interpretation of fiscal statutes — Harmonious construction — Statutory purpose in VAT context. Section 66 must be interpreted in light of the functional logic of VAT. Limitation provisions cannot be construed to nullify substantive entitlement to input adjustment where statutory operation of “tax period” itself is suspended. Courts must interpret fiscal statutes purposively, maintaining internal consistency between substantive charging and procedural refund provisions. (f) Refund — Limitation — Commencement of limitation period. Time under s. 66 begins to run only when a valid “tax period” arises after cessation of exemption. Refund claim made in August–September 2001 for exemption ending 05.09.2000 was within limitation and lawfully payable. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. High Court judgment affirmed

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss.65A, 120, 122(5A) & 133(1)---Tax credit, disallowing of---Sales to registered persons---Computation of 90% threshold---Whether exports to unregistered foreign buyers are to be included---Threshold condition---Application limited to sales made to registered or (liable to be registered) persons---Present income tax reference under S.133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was filed against respondent company which arose out of an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue---Precisely, for tax year 2011, the taxpayer declared that 85.32% of its sales were made locally to a registered person, while 14.68% of its sales were exports made to a foreign entity not registered or liable to be registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990---The return was initially deemed assessed under S. 120, but was later amended by the tax authorities under S.122(5A), disallowing tax credit claimed under S.65A---The disallowance was upheld by the commissioner (appeals) but set aside by the tribunal, which allowed the tax credit---The issue requiring determination before the High Court was “whether, for purposes of S.65A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, the statutory requirement that ninety percent of sales be made to registered persons was to be calculated with reference to total sales including exports, or only with reference to local sales made to persons registered or liable to be registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990”?---Held: It was an admitted position under the law that ‘foreign entity’ was an entity, which was neither registered in Pakistan nor it was liable to be registered, therefore, the interpretation sought to be placed by the Revenue was clearly misconceived as the entire purpose and essence of the condition/threshold of 90% sales to registered persons was rooted in the rationale of promoting and incentivizing the sales to registered persons---It was for this reason that a tax credit was being inured for those who made 90% of the total sales to registered persons---The threshold requirement of 90% in the present case was not applicable against the entire magnitude of the ‘sales’ made---The term ‘registered persons’ as defined in the Act clearly manifested that persons not even liable to be registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, could not be included for the purpose of calculation of 90% threshold required under S.65A of the Ordinance, 2001---Moreover, while highlighting the principles for interpretation of statues, High Court greatly emphasized that term ‘sales’, as used in S.65A of the Ordinance could not be read in isolation and must be construed in line with the overall scheme of the Ordinance---Impugned order having been passed in accordance with law did not warrant intervention---Proposed questions were answered in negative and resultantly present reference application was dismissed, in circumstances. Combined Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Wali Bhati and others PLD 2016 SC 730 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Imperial Electric Company Pvt. Ltd 2015 PTD 884 rel. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Whole text canon---Principle---A provision not to be read in isolation---Contextual and harmonious construction---Legislative intent to be gathered from the statute as a whole---Scope---In interpreting an enactment, all its parts must be construed together as forming one whole and it is not in accordance with sound principles of construction to consider one section, or group of sections, divorced from the rest of the statute---Further, so far as possible, that construction must be placed upon words used in any part of the statute which makes them consistent with remaining provisions and with the intention of the legislature to be derived from a consideration of the enactment---When the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute, it is not only legitimate but proper to read that provision in its context---It is a rule now firmly established that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole---In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the Court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of statute as a whole---Meaning of a statute is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in all the parts together and in their relation to the end in view---In our jurisprudence, it is also firmly settled that the provisions of a statute have to be read as a whole and all its provisions must be harmoniously construed and reconciled---The intention of the lawmaker is gathered by reading the enactment as a whole and not in isolation and any interpretation of a provision, which is made in isolation of other provisions and overall scheme of the statute, is not in accordance with the canons of construction of statutes. Kamaluddin Qureshi v. Ali International Co. PLD 2009 SC 367; Combined Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Wali Bhati and others PLD 2016 SC 730; Collector of Customs, Customs House, Karachi v. Syed Rehan Ahmed 2017 SCMR 152 and Waqar Zafar Bakhtawari and 6 others v. Haji Mazhar Hussain Shah and others PLD 2018 SC 81 rel. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Any interpretation of a particular provision, which leads to render other provisions of the same statute as redundant or tend to make them anomalous, cannot be resorted to. Judges Pension’s Case PLD 2013 SC 829; Searle IV Solution (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2018 SCMR 1444; Aam Log Ittehad and another v. The Election Commission of Pakistan and others PLD 2022 SC 39 and Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Messrs White Gold Steel Mills and others 2025 SCMR 1521 rel. (d) Interpretation of statutes--- ----No surplusages can be attributed to the legislature---In the field of interpretation of statutes the Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof with a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect---Effect must be given, if possible, to all the words used in the statutory provision, for the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain. Judges Pension’s Case PLD 2013 SC 829; Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Messrs White Gold Steel Mills and others 2025 SCMR 1521; East and West Steamship Co. v. Queensland Insurance Co. PLD 1963 SC 663 and Syed Jalal Mehmood Shah and another v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 1999 SC 395 rel. (e) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal statutes---Two possible interpretations---Doubt about a true import of a provision---Effect---Benefit of doubt to go to the taxpayer---Principle---Even if it may be construed that two interpretations of the provision in question are possible, the one in favour of taxpayer has to be resorted to as it is well recognized canon of construction of fiscal statutes that where a provision is susceptible of two interpretations and there is a doubt about its true import, the benefit will go in favour of the taxpayer and the language used in a tax or financial statute is not to be either stretched in favour of the State or narrowed in favour of the taxpayer. Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Imperial Electric Company Pvt. Ltd 2015 PTD 884; Capital Development Authority, CDA through Chairman, CDA, Islamabad v. Ahmed Murtaza and another 2023 SCMR 61; Government of Sindh through Secretary and Director General, Excise and Taxation and another v. Muhammad Shafi and others PLD 2015 SC 380; Messrs Mehran Associates Limited v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi 1993 SCMR 274 and The Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Mekotex (Pvt.) Limited and others PLD 2024 SC 1168 rel. (f) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal statutes---Two possible interpretations---Out of the two interpretations, that which ends in the furtherance of the object of the statute should be preferred to the one that would frustrate it. Liaquat Ali Chaudhry for Applicant. Umair Ahmad and Haris Irfan for Respondent. Date of hearing: 17th September, 2025.

Summary: ----Ss.65A, 120, 122(5A) & 133(1)---Tax credit, disallowing of---Sales to registered persons---Computation of 90% threshold---Whether exports to unregistered foreign buyers are to be included---Threshold condition---Application limited to sales made to registered or (liable to be registered) persons---Present income tax reference under S.133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was filed against respondent company which arose out of an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue---Precisely, for tax year 2011, the taxpayer declared that 85.32% of its sales were made locally to a registered person, while 14.68% of its sales were exports made to a foreign entity not registered or liable to be registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990---The return was initially deemed assessed under S. 120, but was later amended by the tax authorities under S.122(5A), disallowing tax credit claimed under S.65A---The disallowance was upheld by the commissioner (appeals) but set aside by the tribunal, which allowed the tax credit---The issue requiring determination before the High Court was “whether, for purposes of S.65A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, the statutory requirement that ninety percent of sales be made to registered persons was to be calculated with reference to total sales including exports, or only with reference to local sales made to persons registered or liable to be registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990”?---Held: It was an admitted position under the law that ‘foreign entity’ was an entity, which was neither registered in Pakistan nor it was liable to be registered, therefore, the interpretation sought to be placed by the Revenue was clearly misconceived as the entire purpose and essence of the condition/threshold of 90% sales to registered persons was rooted in the rationale of promoting and incentivizing the sales to registered persons---It was for this reason that a tax credit was being inured for those who made 90% of the total sales to registered persons---The threshold requirement of 90% in the present case was not applicable against the entire magnitude of the ‘sales’ made---The term ‘registered persons’ as defined in the Act clearly manifested that persons not even liable to be registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, could not be included for the purpose of calculation of 90% threshold required under S.65A of the Ordinance, 2001---Moreover, while highlighting the principles for interpretation of statues, High Court greatly emphasized that term ‘sales’, as used in S.65A of the Ordinance could not be read in isolation and must be construed in line with the overall scheme of the Ordinance---Impugned order having been passed in accordance with law did not warrant intervention---Proposed questions were answered in negative and resultantly present reference application was dismissed, in circumstances. Combined Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Wali Bhati and others PLD 2016 SC 730 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Imperial Electric Company Pvt. Ltd 2015 PTD 884 rel. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Whole text canon---Principle---A provision not to be read in isolation---Contextual and harmonious construction---Legislative intent to be gathered from the statute as a whole---Scope---In interpreting an enactment, all its parts must be construed together as forming one whole and it is not in accordance with sound principles of construction to consider one section, or group of sections, divorced from the rest of the statute---Further, so far as possible, that construction must be placed upon words used in any part of the statute which makes them consistent with remaining provisions and with the intention of the legislature to be derived from a consideration of the enactment---When the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute, it is not only legitimate but proper to read that provision in its context---It is a rule now firmly established that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole---In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the Court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of statute as a whole---Meaning of a statute is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in all the parts together and in their relation to the end in view---In our jurisprudence, it is also firmly settled that the provisions of a statute have to be read as a whole and all its provisions must be harmoniously construed and reconciled---The intention of the lawmaker is gathered by reading the enactment as a whole and not in isolation and any interpretation of a provision, which is made in isolation of other provisions and overall scheme of the statute, is not in accordance with the canons of construction of statutes. Kamaluddin Qureshi v. Ali International Co. PLD 2009 SC 367; Combined Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Wali Bhati and others PLD 2016 SC 730; Collector of Customs, Customs House, Karachi v. Syed Rehan Ahmed 2017 SCMR 152 and Waqar Zafar Bakhtawari and 6 others v. Haji Mazhar Hussain Shah and others PLD 2018 SC 81 rel. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Any interpretation of a particular provision, which leads to render other provisions of the same statute as redundant or tend to make them anomalous, cannot be resorted to. Judges Pension’s Case PLD 2013 SC 829; Searle IV Solution (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2018 SCMR 1444; Aam Log Ittehad and another v. The Election Commission of Pakistan and others PLD 2022 SC 39 and Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Messrs White Gold Steel Mills and others 2025 SCMR 1521 rel. (d) Interpretation of statutes--- ----No surplusages can be attributed to the legislature---In the field of interpretation of statutes the Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof with a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect---Effect must be given, if possible, to all the words used in the statutory provision, for the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain. Judges Pension’s Case PLD 2013 SC 829; Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Messrs White Gold Steel Mills and others 2025 SCMR 1521; East and West Steamship Co. v. Queensland Insurance Co. PLD 1963 SC 663 and Syed Jalal Mehmood Shah and another v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 1999 SC 395 rel. (e) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal statutes---Two possible interpretations---Doubt about a true import of a provision---Effect---Benefit of doubt to go to the taxpayer---Principle---Even if it may be construed that two interpretations of the provision in question are possible, the one in favour of taxpayer has to be resorted to as it is well recognized canon of construction of fiscal statutes that where a provision is susceptible of two interpretations and there is a doubt about its true import, the benefit will go in favour of the taxpayer and the language used in a tax or financial statute is not to be either stretched in favour of the State or narrowed in favour of the taxpayer. Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Imperial Electric Company Pvt. Ltd 2015 PTD 884; Capital Development Authority, CDA through Chairman, CDA, Islamabad v. Ahmed Murtaza and another 2023 SCMR 61; Government of Sindh through Secretary and Director General, Excise and Taxation and another v. Muhammad Shafi and others PLD 2015 SC 380; Messrs Mehran Associates Limited v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi 1993 SCMR 274 and The Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Mekotex (Pvt) Limited and others PLD 2024 SC 1168 rel. (f) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal statutes---Two possible interpretations---Out of the two interpretations, that which ends in the furtherance of the object of the statute should be preferred to the one that would frustrate it. Liaquat Ali Chaudhry for Applicant. Umair Ahmad and Haris Irfan for Respondent. Date of hearing: 17th September, 2025.

Summary: The underlying legislative objective of Rule 33 is to prevent the cascading effect of taxation in respect of zero-rated supplies, while simultaneously ensuring that the refund mechanism is not exploited or misused. The rule serves to strike a balance between allowing legitimate refund claims and protecting public revenue, by ensuring that only inputs genuinely used in zero-rated supplies form the basis of any refund claim. Therefore, the application of Rule 33 is strictly dependent upon the factual consumption of inputs in the course of making zero- rated supplies. This approach aligns with the broader statutory scheme of the Act. The framework thereby promotes fiscal discipline, administrative transparency, and accountability within the tax system. 267C.Ref. (Custom Reference) 24552/24 Ms Fatima Fertilizer Company Limited through Asad Murad (CFO) Vs Customs Appellate Tribunal etc. Mr. Justice Malik Javid Iqbal Wains 16- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 6055 2026 PTD 34 (Lahore High Court)

Summary: Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 47(1)---Remand order passed by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, assailing of---Reference Application before the High Court---Maintainability---Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Tribunal) remanded the matter to the Adjudicating Officer for factual verification and to determine whe ther respondent was using imported produced raw material or locally produced in order to determine that which provision of law would be applicable to the respondent/ assesse---No question of law arises from the said remand order as the matter had been remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh appraisal and the Tribunal having not given any conclusive finding against the applicant / department, there was no final order holding the field which could be said to have given rise to any question of law for determination by the High Court---The matter was wide open which would be decided by the Assessing Authority including factual verification after giving applicant /department and respondent /assesse full opportunity to participate in the proceedings and thereafter the matter would be matured for expression of opinion by the High Court if needed---Reference Application is not maintainable in respect of remand order or interlocutory order as under provisions of S. 47(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, only those matters are referable to the High Court in respect of which a question of law arises for determination---In the present case, no substantial question of law arose from the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, whereby the matter had been remanded---Thus, the question raised was declined---Reference application, being not maintainable, was decided against the applicant / department. Haji Muhammad Yousaf v. Commissioner of Income Tax and Wealth Tax Companies Zone, Faisalabad 2006 PTD 72; M/s E.M. Oil Mills and Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2001 PTD 2708; The Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone’B’, Karachi v. Messrs Electronic Industries Ltd. 1988 PTD 111; Islamabad and 3 others v. the Income Tax Officer and others 2000 PTD 306; Dr. Abdul Rauf Hamid v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Faisalabad 65 Tax 207; M/s Bostan International v. Commissioner of Income Tax and Wealth Tax, Sialkot Zone v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Zone C, Karachi 2010 PTD 1275; Commissioner of Income Tax and Wealth Tax, Sialkot Zone v. Messrs Maqsood Ahmad Gill 2007 PTD 1757 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Bihar Alloy Steels Ltd. 1995 PTD 1189 ref. Syed Zain-ul-Abidien Bokhari for Applicant.

Summary: (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss. 179(3) & 179(4)---Mandatory adjudication period, non-observance of---Effect---Grant of extension after expiry of statutory time---Scope and effect---Order-in-Original was passed after over a year of issuance of Show-Cause Notice---Appellate Tribunal validated the Order-in-Original as being within limitation under S. 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969 (‘the Act, 1969’)---Claim of the Collectorate /Respondent was that an extension was granted by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) under Section 179(4) of the Act, 1969---Validity---Record revealed that the said claimed extension was granted after a lapse of 87 days from the expiry of the mandatory adjudication period under S. 179(3) of Act, 1969---Such an extension, made beyond the statutory limit and without lawful authority at that stage, is clearly in violation of the time-bound procedural mandate of Section 179 of the Act, 1969---Statutory timelines for the creation of liability against a taxpayer are mandatory---Though, S. 179(4) of the Act, 1969 empowers the FBR to regulate the system of adjudication, including the transfer of cases and the extension of time in exceptional circumstances (at the relevant time during Tax year 2016), however, for such an exceptional extension to carry legal effect, requisite approval must be obtained within the statutory timeframe prescribed under Section 179(3) of the Act, 1969---Once the mandatory period provided therein lapses, any subsequent extension granted by the Federal Board of Revenue is without legal force---Adherence to statutory timelines in tax adjudication is mandatory, not merely directory; the rationale behind which is rooted in the protection of taxpayer rights against administrative excess, ensuring certainty, fairness, and finality in tax matters---Permitting indefinite extensions would render the express language of the statute redundant, which is impermissible---Thus, the Order-in-Original was passed beyond the statutory period prescribed under S. 179(3) of the Act, 1969 and was, therefore, barred by limitation and the extension granted by the Board after laps of mandatory time frame had no legal value; consequently, the proceedings initiated under the Show-Cause Notice could not have lawfully continued beyond the expiration of the prescribed period---Customs Appellate Tribunal failed to properly consider said crucial legal aspects, rendering its findings, unsustainable in law---Hence, answer to the proposed question was in affirmative i.e. in favour of applicant-taxpayer and against the respondent-department---Special Customs Reference Application was allowed accordingly. Messrs Commander Agro (Private) Limited v. Customs Appellate Tribunal Bench-I, Lahore and others C.P. No.110 of 2023; Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others 2017 SCMR 1427; Wak Limited v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax 2018 SCMR 1474 and Messrs Wak Limited v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore and others 2025 SCMR 1280 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 189---Customs Act (IV of 1969), S. 179---Judicial precedents---Binding nature---"Stare decisis et non quieta movere", principle of---Customs Appellate Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) distinguished the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case referred to by the taxpayer on the ground that the ruling-under consideration pertains to the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and is inapplicable to the time limitation provided under the Customs Act, 1969---Validity---Tribunal fell into error while attempting to distinguish the binding principle enunciated in case referred to by Applicant/Taxpayer on said ground---Such reasoning is misconceived and contrary to the settled law regarding the binding nature of precedents as per Art. 189 of the Constitution---Any declaration of law or enunciation of a legal principle by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts within the country---The maxim "Stare decisis et non quietamovere" (to stand by decision and not to disturb settled matters) underscores the mandatory nature of adherence to judicial precedents--- Therefore, the Tribunal's disregard of the ratio decidendi of the Supreme Court constitutes a grave error in law---Consequently, the findings of the Tribunal not only lack legal sanctity but are also rendered void-ab-initio--- Thus, the impugned judgment, being based on misinterpretation and misapplication of law, is liable to be set aside---Hence, answer to the proposed question was in affirmative i.e. in favour of applicant-taxpayer and against the respondent-department---Special Customs Reference Application was allowed accordingly. Muhammad Shoaib Rashid, Muhammad Hameed Bakhsh, Manahil Khan and Ch. Muhammad Ashfaq for Applicant. Rana Muhammad Mehtab for Respondent-Department. Date of hearing: 16th September, 2025. MALIK JAVID IQBAL WAINS, J.--- This order shall also dispose of connected Customs References Nos. 24553 and 24554 of 2024, as they involve common questions of law and fact.

Summary: When the matter is remanded by the Tribunal and no conclusive finding is holding the field, it does not give rise to any question of law for determination by this Court as the matter is wide open which will be decided by the Assessing Authority including Tribunal and thereafter the matter will be matured for expression of opinion by this Court in Reference Application. In above circumstances Reference Application is not maintainable against the remand order. 273Tax (Writ) 4404/21 Ms Chenab Engineering Works & Foundries Pvt Ltd Vs Federation of Pakistan etc. Mr. Justice Malik Javid Iqbal Wains 15-09- 2025 2025 LHC 5752

Summary: (On appeal from the judgments dated 24.08.2017 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in E.T.R. No. 01 of 2005, S.T.R. No. 33 of 2005 and S.T.R. No. 10 of 2006). Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 36(1), 36(2) & 36(3) ‘second proviso’---Central Excises Act (I of 1944), S.33(3)---Timeframe for passing order-in-original consequent to a show cause notice---Failure in adhering to such mandatory timeframe by the authorities---Effect---Order-in-original would be barred by time---Pivotal question requiring determination before the Supreme Court was “whether the timeframe provided for passing orders, post issuance of show cause notices was followed as required under the relevant statutes”?---Held: Despite two corrigendum issued, the events to invoke either Sections 36(1) and 36(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (‘ST Act’) were not disclosed---It was only in the second corrigendum that Section 36(1) of the Act with disclosing event required under the relevant law, was introduced for the first time---Nonetheless, the record reflected that under second proviso to Section 36(3) of the Act, the order under the relevant subsection was to be made within 120 days of the issuance of the show cause notice or within such extended period as the commissioner might, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, fixed, provided that such extended period in no case could exceed 60 days---The show cause notice was issued on 30.06.2000 and inconsideration thereof the order in original was passed on 02.02.2001, which was much beyond the timeframe required under the law---However, in appeal (Civil Appeal No. 636 of 2018) relating to sales tax there was no extension in timeframe within Section 36(3) of the Act; thus, the order in original should have been passed in 120 days---The orders in original were time barred---Civil Appeal No. 635 of 2018 related to excise duty under Central Excises Act, 1944 (‘the Act’) and related rules---Timeframe provided in the Act and related rules for passing order post show cause notice is 45 days under Section 33(3), which was flouted, hence the order in original in the appeal too was time-barred---The provisions prescribing timeframe for passing order in original, consequent to a show cause notice, were held to be mandatory---The orders-in-original, were barred by time---Impugned judgments were set aside and appeals were allowed, in circumstances. Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore 2025 SCMR 1280 rel. Ali Sibtain Fazli, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Hasham Ahmed Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (through video-link from Lahore). Mrs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate Supreme Court, Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General (Law), FBR for Respondents. Date of hearing: 11th September, 2025.

Summary: (On appeal from the judgments dated 24.08.2017 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in E.T.R. No. 01 of 2005, S.T.R. No. 33 of 2005 and S.T.R. No. 10 of 2006). Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 36(1), 36(2) & 36(3) ‘second proviso’---Central Excises Act (I of 1944), S.33(3)---Timeframe for passing order-in-original consequent to a show cause notice---Failure in adhering to such mandatory timeframe by the authorities---Effect---Order-in-original would be barred by time---Pivotal question requiring determination before the Supreme Court was “whether the timeframe provided for passing orders, post issuance of show cause notices was followed as required under the relevant statutes”?---Held: Despite two corrigendum issued, the events to invoke either Sections 36(1) and 36(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (‘ST Act’) were not disclosed---It was only in the second corrigendum that Section 36(1) of the Act with disclosing event required under the relevant law, was introduced for the first time---Nonetheless, the record reflected that under second proviso to Section 36(3) of the Act, the order under the relevant subsection was to be made within 120 days of the issuance of the show cause notice or within such extended period as the commissioner might, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, fixed, provided that such extended period in no case could exceed 60 days---The show cause notice was issued on 30.06.2000 and inconsideration thereof the order in original was passed on 02.02.2001, which was much beyond the timeframe required under the law---However, in appeal (Civil Appeal No. 636 of 2018) relating to sales tax there was no extension in timeframe within Section 36(3) of the Act; thus, the order in original should have been passed in 120 days---The orders in original were time barred---Civil Appeal No. 635 of 2018 related to excise duty under Central Excises Act, 1944 (‘the Act’) and related rules---Timeframe provided in the Act and related rules for passing order post show cause notice is 45 days under Section 33(3), which was flouted, hence the order in original in the appeal too was time-barred---The provisions prescribing timeframe for passing order in original, consequent to a show cause notice, were held to be mandatory---The orders-in-original, were barred by time---Impugned judgments were set aside and appeals were allowed, in circumstances. Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore 2025 SCMR 1280 rel. Ali Sibtain Fazli, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Hasham Ahmed Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (through video-link from Lahore). Mrs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate Supreme Court, Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General (Law), FBR for Respondents. Date of hearing: 11th September, 2025.