Summary: (a) Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)--- ----Ss.31, 32, 33, 53, 54 & 57---National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Functions) Regulations, 2016, Reglns.3 & 4---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Territorial jurisdiction of NIRC---Employment contract---Exclusive jurisdiction clause---Effect---Employment contract containing an exclusive jurisdiction clause conferring jurisdiction on courts at place ‘I’---Enforceability and legal effect---Where the cause of action is asserted to have arisen at place ‘Q’ and the employee institutes a grievance petition before NIRC at place ‘Q’---Maintainability of grievance petition at place ‘Q’---Scope---Brief facts were that the petitioner company challenged the NIRC Full Bench order whereby its appeal against the Single Member, NIRC was dismissed; the respondent employee was hired as ‘safety officer’ under an offer letter containing an exclusive jurisdiction clause for Islamabad; after termination notice, respondent employee filed a grievance petition at NIRC Quetta, and the petitioner’s application under O. VII, R. 10, C.P.C. for return of plaint was rejected---Question requiring determination in the present matter was as to “whether NIRC Quetta had territorial jurisdiction despite the parties having confined themselves to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts at Islamabad?”---Held: It was clear from perusal of standard-form contract furnished by the petitioner company that there existed clear inequality of bargaining power between the petitioner company and the respondent employee---Respondent employee had no meaningful opportunity to negotiate any of its terms---This lack of real choice underscored the inequality of bargaining power between the parties and assumed significance while examining the enforceability of the contractual stipulations contained therein---National Industrial Relations Commission being a federal statutory body designed the sitting of its members at different placed was to be flexible and facilitative in nature to adequately address the disputes of trans-provincial establishments---The seat of member of NIRC at Quetta, therefore, did not constitute a separate or distinct forum; it was merely a bench of NIRC through which the NIRC exercised its federally conferred jurisdiction---Proceedings conducted at Quetta remained proceedings of the NIRC itself, and the territorial jurisdiction of Industrial Relations Act, 2012 extended to whole of Pakistan---Jurisdiction flew from the statute creating the forum, not from the place where the forum happened to sit---So long as the subject matter of the dispute fell within the statutory mandate of the NIRC, the exercise of jurisdiction through any of its duly constituted seats/benches could not be questioned on territorial grounds alone---In the present case, the NIRC acting though its Quetta Bench lawfully exercised jurisdiction in the matter---Proceedings before the NIRC were directed to continue---Present constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Jurisdiction--- ----Jurisdiction is not a mere technicality but the very foundation upon which the legality of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings rests. (c) Jurisdiction--- ----Jurisdiction clause in an employment contract---Effect---Parties agreeing to jurisdiction of courts at a particular place---Circumstances where there is inequality of bargaining power between employer and employee---Scope---Where two or more forums are otherwise competent to entertain a dispute, the parties may, by mutual agreement, restrict themselves to one such forum for the adjudication of their disputes---Such clauses, when they merely regulate the choice amongst available forums and do not oust the jurisdiction of all courts, are respected in order to uphold the sanctity of contract and the autonomy of the parties---A jurisdiction clause is a contractual stipulation, where the parties to the contract choose or select one particular forum out of two or more available forums, and the same is permissible---Choice of parties regarding jurisdiction clause has been upheld by Supreme Court to maintain the sanctity of the contract---General rule of contract in common law is founded upon the principle of freedom of contract that parties are ordinarily the best judges of their own interests and that where they freely and voluntarily enter into a contract the primary function of the courts is to enforce to what has been agreed---However, it has to noted that employment contracts are often marked by unequal bargaining power because the employer generally occupies a dominant position, while employee has little or no real opportunity to negotiate the terms of engagement, and only to sign the dotted line of the contract in order to secure his livelihood---In such circumstances, courts are not confined to formal reading of contractual clauses but are required to examine the fairness and reasonableness of enforcing such clauses---However, it has also to be noted that where enforcement of jurisdiction clause would operate oppressively, unfairly, or inequitably, courts may justifiably decline to give effect to it. State Life Insurance Corporation v. Muhammad Saleem 1987 SCMR 393; Messrs Kadir Motors, (Regd.) Rawalpindi v. Messrs National Motors Ltd. 1992 SCMR 1174 and Eden Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Muhammad Aslam and others 2022 SCMR 2044 and Uber Technologies Inc. and others v. David Heller and others 2020 SCMR 1279 rel. Redtone Telecommunications Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited and 3 others v. Federation of Pakistan and 11 others PLD 2014 Sindh 601, Global Quality Foods (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Hardee’s Food Systems, Inc. PLD 2016 Sindh 169; Tahir Tariq Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others v. National Development Finance Corporation 2003 CLD 1546; Gillespie Brothers and Co. Ltd. v. Roy Bowles Transport Ltd., (1973) 1 QB 400; Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another AIR 1986 SC 1571 and Snehal Kumar Sarabhai v. Economic Transport Organisation and others AIR 1975 Gujarat 72 ref. Makhdoom Ali Khan and Khwaja Aizaz Ahsan for Petitioner. Kamran Mujrtaza and Hassan Kamran for Respondent No.2. Assisted by: Muhammad Fahad, Research Intern and Muhammad Yahya Khan Niazi, Judicial Law Clerk. Date of hearing: 16th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act (XVII of 1996)--- ----Ss.35 & 36---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, R.2(3) [since repealed]---Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2020, R.21---Disciplinary proceedings, challenge to---Constitutional petition, filing of---Maintainability---Non-statutory service rules of transferred employees---Issuance of show cause notice and charge sheet, assailing of---Briefly, matter comprised of multiple constitutional petitions filed by employees of Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL), grouped into two categories: Category “A”, consisting of petitioners who were not employees of the erstwhile Pakistan Telegraph and Telephone Department and joined PTCL after the enactment of the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Act, 1991 and the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996; and Category “B”, consisting of petitioners who were originally employees of the T&T Department and were subsequently transferred first to the Corporation and then to PTCL---The petitions arose out of disciplinary proceedings initiated by PTCL, including the issuance of show-cause notices and charge sheets against the petitioners---All petitions challenged the initiation of disciplinary actions by PTCL and involved questions relating to the nature of employment of the petitioners, the applicable service framework, and the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the petitions---Held: Petitioners of category (A) petitions were neither civil servants nor were they employed as employees of T&T department and were rather appointed by the corporation, therefore, the petitions mentioned in category (A) were not maintainable since the services of these petitioners were never regulated under any statutory rules as they started their employments being employees of corporation and were then transferred to PTCL as transferred employees---After PTCL’s privatization under the Act, 1996 and subsequent amendments thereto, the petitioners’ status in both categories (A & B) seized to be that of civil servants and they were governed by the PTCL’s internal rules and regulations or standing orders---Consequently, the E&D Rules, 1973 were no longer applicable---It was settled by Supreme Court in the case reported as 2021 SCMR 1998 that an employee, who, at no point, had served in T&T department, could not claim that his terms and conditions of service were baptized by any statutory protections---Such employees could not invoke constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution for agitating the grievance pertaining to their service matters---It was the case of the petitioners in category (B) petitions that since the proceedings sought to be initiated against the them were in violations of the E&D Rules 1973, as such proceedings had either not been initiated by mentioning the E&D Rules, 1973 or where even so mentioned, the proceedings were not initiated by the ‘competent authority’, therefore, the proceedings were without jurisdiction---This ground failed for two reasons; firstly, the E&D Rules, 1973 had been repealed by virtue of R. 21 of the Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2020 (E&D Rules, 2020) and the concept or term ‘authorized officer’, as couched in sub-rule (3) of R. 2 of E&D Rules, 1973 had been done away with by the substituted/replaced Rules i.e. E&D Rules, 2020, thus the entire premise of the case sought to be built by the petitioners was without any foundation---Without prejudice to the foregoing, even sub-rule (3) of the R. 2 of E&D Rules, 1973 provided that if no officer was so authorized, the authority could proceed to perform such functions---This was beside the point that the petitioners of category ‘B’ could not insist that they could only and exclusively be proceeded under the E&D Rules, 1973 and the prescribed rules and regulations of Corporation/PTCL, could not be invoked---Mere maintainability of a constitutional petition, owing to statutory protections in terms of Ss. 35 & 36 of the Act, 1996, did not mean that the petitioners could stifle the very essence and purpose of the incorporation of the PTCL and the Act, 1996---It was concluded that the proceedings initiated by the respondent PTCL had lawfully been commenced, therefore, filing of present petitions by way of laying challenges to the mere issuance of the show cause notices and charge sheets were not tenable---All petitions, falling under categories “A” and “B”, were dismissed---Category “A” petitions being held not-maintainable for want of jurisdiction, while category “B” petitions were dismissed on merits. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited v. Muhammad Samiullah 2021 SCMR 1998; Masood Ahmed Bhatti Review judgment 2016 SCMR 1362; Asghar Ali v. PTCL and others PLJ 2025 Lah. 516 = 2025 LHC 922; Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited v. Imran Aziz and others (Civil Appeal No.1509 of 2021); Bilal Hussain v. Present National Bank of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 313 and Lal Khan v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal 1995 SCMR 1758 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Employment---Constitutional petition filed by employee---Terms and conditions of service not being governed by statutory rules---Effect---Maintainability---The alleged violations, if any, quo the terms and conditions of service, if not backed by statutory rules, cannot be redressed while exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited through Chairman v. Iqbal Nasir and others PLD 2011 SC 132; Pakistan Defence Officer’s case 2013 SCMR 1707 and Pakistan Electric Power Company v. Syed Salahuddin and others 2022 SCMR 991 rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Employment---Constitutional petition filed by employee---Maintainability---Statutory rules and non-statutory rules---Distinction--Rules of an organization if not approved by government and having been drafted, approved or adopted for internal arrangement and functioning of such organization are non-statutory. Shafique Ahmed Khan and others v. NESCOM through Chairman, Islamabad and others PLD 2016 SC 377; Ziaullah Khan Niazi v. Chairman, Pakistan Red Crescent Society 2004 SCMR 189; University of the Punjab, Lahore and 2 others v. Ch. Sardar Ali 1992 SCMR 1093; M.H. Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan and 2 others 1994 SCMR 1024 and Muhammad Rafi and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2016 SCMR 2146 rel. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Employment---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Non-statutory rules of service---Adoption of statutory rules of another organization---Effect upon service statues of the employees---Mere adoption of statutory rules does not render the rules statutory for the purpose of organization which adopts such rules. M.H. Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan and 2 others 1994 SCMR 1024 rel. (e) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act (XVII of 1996), Ss.35 & 36---Constitutional petition filed by employees in service of T&T Department---Maintainability---Petitions filed by those employees who were part of the T&T Department would be maintainable for the reason that such employees had statutory rules relating to terms and conditions of their service which were protected by S. 35 read with S. 36 of the Act, 1996---It is not axiomatic that all employees of T&T Department would have ipso facto right to challenge any/all actions, if so initiated against them, by invoking judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited v. Muhammad Samiullah 2021 SCMR 1998 rel. (f) Jurisdiction--- ----Question of jurisdiction has to be decided ahead of all other questions---Jurisdiction lies at the foundation of all legal proceedings and if it is not present, the proceeding is void. [Grahan v. Maingay (1793) RIDG.L&S.20, 72] ref. (g) Master and servant--- ----Principle---Scope---Where conditions of service of an employee of even a statutory body are not regulated by statutory rules and are governed under the terms of a contract or the rules/instructions/regulations for internal use, the relationship of the employee with such instrumentality is governed by the principle of master and servant unless the services are protected in terms of the provisions contained in labour laws. Ishtiaq A. Chaudhary, Hassan Muhammad Rana and Ahmad Fraz Lone for Petitioner. Shahid Anwar Bajwa, Abdul Rahman Bajwa, Rana Nafees, A.D. Shaid, Saad Saleem Rai Ali Shah Marth for PTCL (in W.Ps. Nos.38709, 49394, 53395, 13062, 24612, 12102, 12694 and 64364 of 2024). Barrister Umer Abdullah, Mohammad Ahmad Mughal, Zarak Zaman Khan, Sheikh Waseem Ahmad, Hussain Tahir Zaidi and Miss Zunaira Patrick for Respondents (in W.Ps. Nos.43927 and 28677 of 2023 and 30309 of 2025). Abu Zar Salman Khan Niazi, Zain Sheikh, Umar Bin Khalid Cheema and Wajid Maqsood for Respondents (in W.P. No.6522 of 2025). Syed Faisal Khurshid SM Legal for PTCL and Waqas Mehmood (Manager PTCL). Fawad Haider AM Legal PTCL. Mirza Amir Baig, Abdul Aleem Khan and Saqib Murad for Respondents. Dates of hearing: 24th November, 1st, 3rd, 5th and 9th December, 2025. KHALID ISHAQ, J.--- This judgment will decide the following Constitutional Petitions filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (the "Constitution"), as all these petitions involve common questions of law that require determination by this Court. However, the Constitutional Petitions are divided into two categories, "A" and "B", due to the distinct nature and legal status of the petitioners involved.

Summary: C.P.L.As. Nos. 2199-L and 2211-L of 2024 and 1567 to 1569 of 2025 (Against the judgments dated 29.08.2024 and 05.03.2025, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in W.Ps. Nos. 14891 of 23, 41703 of 2024, 5687 of 2025, 1133 and 5691 of 2025 respectively). and C.M.A. No. 2390 of 2025 in C.P.L.A. No. 1567 of 2025 (Stay application). (a) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)--- ----Ss. 22 (1)(b) & 22A---Old-age benefit regimes---Scope---Two distinct benefit regimes have been provided under Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Monthly old-age pension under S.22(1) of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 payable at the rate specified in the Schedule thereto--- Old-age grant is payable in lump sum at the rate prescribed under S.22A of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Insured person, under the two provisions of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 who has attained the age of sixty years, or fifty-five years in the case of a woman, is entitled to a monthly old-age pension if contributions in respect of him or her have been paid for a period of not less than fifteen (15) years; otherwise, such person is entitled only to an old-age grant. (b) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)--- ----Preamble---Provisions of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 have been enacted to provide economic security, social protection and dignity to employees in their old age, and not to deprive them of pensionary benefits on account of marginal, technical, or inadvertent deficiencies---Where an insured person has substantially fulfilled statutory requirements and has paid contributions for almost the entire qualifying period, denial of a monthly old-age pension for a negligible shortfall would result in grave hardship, arbitrariness, and manifest injustice, thereby undermining the benevolent spirit of the legislation. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Beneficial legislation---Scope---Social welfare and beneficial statutes must be construed liberally so as to advance remedy and suppress mischief sought to be remedied---Courts are, therefore, under a Constitutional and legal duty to adopt a purposive, pragmatic, and equitable interpretation which safeguards rights and legitimate expectations of individuals for whose benefit the statute has been enacted---In appropriate cases, interpretative role of Court becomes essential to prevent irreparable loss, undue hardship, and injustice that may otherwise ensue from a rigid, literal, or technical application of the law. (d) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)--- ----Ss. 22(1)(b), 22A & Schedule, Clause 1---Employees’ Old-age benefits---Duration of service---Rounding off principle---Applicability--- Petitioner of Employees’ old-age benefit institution was aggrieved of judgment passed by High Court allowing claims of respondents of retired employees whose length of service was short of a few months from the duration of 15 years---Validity---Provision of Clause 1 of Schedule to Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 does not merely prescribe a formula for calculation of monthly pension; rather, it also provides pragmatic mechanism for accounting fractional periods of insurable employment---This reflects legislative intent to avoid technical disqualifications on account of insignificant shortfalls and to ensure that substantive rights are not defeated by minor procedural deficiencies---‘Rounding off’ provision contained in Schedule to Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 must be read harmoniously with S.22 of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Any interpretation that excludes its application at the stage of determining eligibility would not only defeat the express legislative scheme but would also result in manifest injustice, thereby frustrating the social-welfare objectives underlying the statute---Acceptance of such interpretation does not create an inconsistency between Ss. 22 & 22A of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Provision of S.22A of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 operates in a distinct and separate field and is intended to cover cases where the insured person falls substantially short of the qualifying period for a pension---Respondents of retired employees did not, in arithmetical terms, complete fifteen full calendar years of employment, as defined under S.2(q) of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Upon application of the principle of ‘rounding off’ expressly provided in Schedule to Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, their period of insurable employment was deemed to have been completed up to fifteen years, as required under proviso to S.22(1)(b) of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Such deeming fiction was not judicially invented but was expressly provided by the Legislature itself through Schedule to Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Once the Schedule to Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 was applied in its proper perspective, respondents of retired employees could not be said to have fallen short of the mandatory requirement---On the contrary respondents of retired employees were to be treated as having satisfied all the conditions prescribed under S.22(1) of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Respondents of retired employees had fulfilled mandatory requirements of Section 22(1) of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 through the statutorily recognized mechanism of ‘rounding off’ and were rightly found entitled to the grant of a monthly old-age pension by High Court---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court which had correctly understood the controversy at hand and made a well-founded decision based on the relevant law on the issue---High Court arrived at a sound and reasoned conclusion that was both legally correct and just and there was no illegality, perversity or misreading or non-reading of evidence in the judgment passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. 2025 PLC 38; Colony Sarhad Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi v. Government of Pakistan and others PLD 1976 SC 227; Abdus Salam Khan v. Salim-Ud-Din Ahmad Siddiqui and 2 others PLD 1979 Lah. 85; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division and another v. Abdul Rasheed Memon 2025 SCMR 532; State of U.P. and others v. Pawan Kumar Tiwari and others AIR 2005 SC 658 and Pakistan, through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Himayatullah Farukhi PLD 1969 SC 407 rel. (e) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)--- ----Ss. 22(1)(b), 22A & Sched., Clause 1---Employees’ old-age benefits---Rounding off, principle of---Fractional periods---Calculation---Where statute itself prescribes a method for dealing with fractional periods of service, such a method necessarily informs and influences determination of eligibility---Any contrary interpretation would render such rounding-off provision redundant and ineffective, which is impermissible. (f) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Schedule to an Act---Object, purpose and scope---Schedule forms an integral part of the Act and falls squarely within the ambit of its provisions---Schedule operates as an extension of the section that introduces or attracts it--- Ordinarily, material is placed in a Schedule because it is too detailed, elaborate, or lengthy, which cannot be conveniently incorporated within the body of a section---Such placement does not diminish its legal force or binding effect, which remains coextensive with the substantive provisions of the Act. Messrs MCB Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue 2014 PTD 1874 and Mars, Incorporated through Authorized Signatory and others v. the Registrar of Trade Marks and others 2019 CLD 27 rel. (g) Maxim--- ----Ut res magis valeat quam pereat---Applicability---Maxim ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’ mandates that a construction be adopted that gives efficacy to the statute rather than having it fail. (h) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art.114---Estoppel---Principle of promissory estoppel---Scope---Principle of promissory estoppel restrains a public authority from resiling from a position that has been consciously adopted and acted upon by affected persons, unless an overriding public interest so demands and such departure is sanctioned by law. Hafeez Saeed Akhtar, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Umar Riaz, Advocate Supreme Court, Abdul Ahad Memon, Director (Law) and Sukhan Ilyas, Deputy Director (Law) for Petitioners. Hassan Lateef Chaudhry, Advocate High Court (with special permission of the Court) along with Shahbaz Hussain, Respondent No. 3 for Respondents. Date of hearing: 9th December, 2025.

Summary: Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976—S. 22(1)(b), S. 22A, Ss. 2(e), 2(g), 2(q), 33, 34, 35 & Schedule, Cl. 1—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Art. 185(3)—Old-age pension—Qualifying period of fifteen years’ insurable employment—Rounding off of fractional service—Beneficial legislation—Administrative circulars vis-à-vis statute—Legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel—The controversy before the Federal Constitutional Court was whether insured employees who had completed more than fourteen years and six months of insurable employment, but less than fifteen full calendar years, were entitled to monthly old-age pension under S. 22(1)(b) of the Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, by applying the rule in Cl. 1 of the Schedule that a period of six months or more of insurable employment shall be treated as one full year. The Court held that the Act created two distinct benefit regimes: monthly old-age pension under S. 22(1) and lump-sum old-age grant under S. 22A; however, the statutory requirement of fifteen years’ insurable employment could not be read in isolation from the Schedule, which formed an integral part of the Act. The Schedule was not merely a computational appendage but a substantive legislative mechanism intended to account for fractional periods of insurable employment and to prevent denial of pension on account of marginal shortfalls. Therefore, where an insured person had completed fourteen years and six months or more of insurable employment, such period had, by legislative deeming fiction, to be treated as fifteen years, thereby satisfying the mandatory threshold under S. 22(1)(b). The Court emphasized that beneficial and social welfare legislation must receive a liberal, purposive and equitable construction to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief, and that a rigidly literal interpretation defeating pensionary entitlement because of negligible deficiency would be unjust and contrary to legislative intent. Administrative law—Executive circulars—Statute overriding administrative instructions—Legitimate expectation—Promissory estoppel—The petitioner Institution relied on Circular No. 1/2022 dated 17.02.2022 to contend that service of 14.5 years or more could not be rounded off for pension eligibility and that rounding off applied only after eligibility had independently been established. Rejecting that contention, the Court held that an executive circular could not override, curtail or dilute the parent statute or the Schedule appended thereto. The Court further noted that the Institution itself had earlier, through Circular dated 03.09.2019, acknowledged that shortfall of six months or less was to be treated as one full year for purposes of old-age pension, and that no material had been produced to show that the decisions forming the basis of that earlier circular had ever been set aside or displaced by a competent forum. In such circumstances, the subsequent executive attempt to undo an accrued and settled legal position was held ineffective. The Court also observed that where a public authority, by representation or consistent practice, creates rights or legitimate expectations in favour of beneficiaries under a social welfare scheme, such expectation cannot be arbitrarily defeated, and promissory estoppel restrains the authority from resiling from a consciously adopted position to the detriment of vested rights, absent overriding public interest sanctioned by law. Statutory interpretation—Schedule as integral part of enactment—Mandatory requirement and deeming fiction—The Court clarified that the High Court’s result was correct, though one aspect of its reasoning required refinement. The condition of fifteen years’ service in proviso (b) to S. 22(1) remained mandatory and had to be adhered to strictly; however, the Schedule did not negate or relax that requirement but supplied the legislatively sanctioned method of determining when that requirement stood fulfilled in cases involving fractional service. Thus, an employee who had not completed fifteen years in strict arithmetical terms could nevertheless be deemed, by force of the Schedule itself, to have completed fifteen years where the shortfall was six months or less. The respondents were therefore to be treated as having fulfilled all statutory conditions for monthly old-age pension. Case references—Colony Sarhad Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi v. Government of Pakistan and others (PLD 1976 SC 227); Abdus Salam Khan v. Salim-Ud-Din Ahmad Siddiqui and two others (PLD 1979 Lah. 85); Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division and another v. Abdul Rasheed Memon (2025 SCMR 532); State of U.P. and others v. Pawan Kumar Tiwari and others (AIR 2005 SC 658); Messrs MCB Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (2014 PTD 1874); Mars, Incorporated through Authorized Signatory and others v. the Registrar of Trade Marks and others (2019 CLD 27); Pakistan, through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Himayatullah Farukhi (PLD 1969 SC 407). Petitions dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the impugned judgments of the Lahore High Court were legally correct, suffered from no illegality, perversity, misreading or non-reading of evidence, and rightly directed grant of monthly old-age pension to the respondents. Consequently, leave was refused and the petitions were dismissed, with all pending applications also disposed of.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Conduct Rules, 1978--- ----R.14(2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Co-operative Societies Act (VII of 1925), Preamble---Cooperative housing society, elections of---A member challenging candidature of employees of an ‘electricity distribution company’ who were also members of the society---Premise---Trial Court and revisional court refusing to grant temporary injunction, challenge to---Brief facts of the matter were that petitioner was a member of a Cooperative Housing Society who filed a civil suit for declaration/cancellation and permanent/mandatory injunction to restrain respondent Nos.9-15,who were employees of an electricity distribution company, from contesting the Society’s Management Committee election; he sought interim suspension of the NOCs granted by the electricity distribution company; the Civil Court and District Court concurrently dismissed his application for temporary injunction, hence, the present constitutional petition was filed---Held: After amendment made in R. 14(2) of the Rules, 1978, an exception had been created with reference to MEPCO (WAPDA) Housing Societies located within the territorial jurisdiction of MEPCO---The Society was located within the territorial jurisdiction of MEPCO---The nexus of the society with MEPCO was required to be determined after recording of evidence in the pending suit of the petitioner---The overall construction and interpretation of the amended R.14(2) of the Rules, 1978 in view of exception created therein would also be determined in the pending suit since respondents Nos. 9 to 15 were admittedly members of the society and in that capacity, they prima facie had a right to participate in the election of the society at par with other members subject to NOCs issued by MEPCO as ordained by Model Election Rules---Even otherwise, any violation of amended R.14(2) of the Rules, 1978 at best attracted disciplinary proceedings under the Rules, 1978 which was the prerogative of MEPCO and the petitioner had no concern with the same---Accordingly, the ingredients of temporary injunction as ordained in O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2 of the CPC in terms of prima facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience or inconvenience did not co-exist in favour of the petitioner, as such, there was no illegality, infirmity or jurisdictional defect in the impugned orders passed by the Courts below---Present petition was devoid of any merit and the same was dismissed. Waqar A. Sheikh for Petitioner. Murid Hussain Makwal and Amir Aziz Qazi for Respondents Nos.3 and 4. Rana Ghulam Hussain, Assistant Attorney General and Bashir Ahmad Buzdar, Assistant Advocate General for Respondent No.5. Mian Nazar Muhammad Arain for Respondent No.6. Muhammad Ali Siddiqui for Respondents Nos.7 and 8. Jamshed Hayat, Abdul Samad Ali and Muhammad Ilyas Jamil for Respondents Nos.9 to 15. Date of hearing: 8th December, 2025.

Summary: (a) Service law ----Transfer and posting---Vested right---Civil servant has no vested right to claim posting at a particular place and transfer is ordinarily within the discretion of the competent authority in public interest---However, discretion must be exercised lawfully, fairly, and in accordance with applicable policy frameworks designed to address hardship and ensure reasoned decision-making---One-dimensional reliance on “transfer as an incident of service” held insufficient where State policy mandates consideration of genuine hardship faced by spouses. (b) Wedlock Policy ----Office Memorandum dated 13.05.1998--- Posting of serving husband and wife at same station---Objective to reduce socio-economic hardship---Request of a spouse to be considered subject to availability of post in same BPS---Temporary deputation/transfer/absorption to be considered subject to availability---Medical problems to be given highest priority---Spouses posted at one station not to be disturbed without compelling reasons of public interest---Extensions may be considered with compassion in cases involving married civil servants---Policy recognized as guiding framework requiring earnest implementation by State departments. (c) Wedlock Policy ----Office Memorandum dated 17.12.1999--- Unmarried female government servants---Posting at place of residence of parents/family---Directive issued to address hardship faced by unmarried female employees in transfer/deputation---Policy treatment held analogous to spousal facilitation framework designed to alleviate family hardship. (d) Wedlock Policy ----Office Memorandum dated 21.04.2006--- at residence/posting of husbands not in government employment---Policy expanded to facilitate married women irrespective of spouse’s employment status (government, private, or unemployed)---Policy objective linked to reducing hardship and supporting family unity and participation of women in public service. (e) Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973--- ----R.20-A(3) proviso inserted by Notification dated 16.04.2012 (S.R.O. No.375(I)/2012) Exemption---Posting of serving husband and wife at same station; unmarried female government servants at residence of parents/family; and married female government servants at residence/posting of husbands not in government employment---Exempted from Rule 20-A---Policy protections affirmed within statutory rules framework to prevent dislocation solely due to deputation-duration limits. (f) Wedlock Policy ----Office Memorandum dated 28.01.2020--- SOPs for deputation under Policy---Standard operating procedures for deputation, rotation, absorption on basis of Wedlock Policy---Policy treated as structured administrative framework to guide decisions rather than ad hoc discretion. (g) Administrative law ----Policy compliance---Legitimate expectation---Fairness Policy does not create absolute right to remain posted at one station, but establishes legitimate expectation that married government employees will be facilitated to serve at same station to preserve family life and the institution of marriage---State, having framed Policy to address hardship, cannot pick and choose when to follow it---Policy must be implemented in letter and spirit; implementation cannot be left to whims of competent authority---Transfer decisions must reflect lawful administrative process balancing administrative requirements with hardship, dignity, and legitimate expectations of employees. (h) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Arts. 34, 35 and Principles of Policy (Ch.2)--- Constitutional orientation---State obligations---Protection of marriage and family and participation of women in national life---Art.35 requires State to protect marriage, family, mother and child; Art.34 requires steps to ensure full participation of women in all spheres of national life---State required to frame and follow family-sensitive policies to reduce hardship, promote family stability and foster participation of women in public service---Convenience, tradition, or rigid administrative practices cannot displace constitutional obligation to facilitate marriage and family life and to promote women’s participation in public service---Wedlock Policy treated as a policy translation of these constitutional directives. Cited Case: • Asad Ali Khan v. Province of Punjab (PLD 2021 SC 770). (i) Transfer on compassionate and medical grounds ----Medical hardship---Routine transfer orders---Public interest--- Where medical issues of both spouses were established and competent authority had no justifiable public interest reason for transfer, routine transfer order held contrary to Policy---Government’s reliance solely on duration of stay at one station (seven years) and prior benefit of Policy held insufficient in absence of compelling reason of public interest---Medical board recommendation regarding wife’s ailment and need for posting near hometown noted; absence of impediment to enforce Policy acknowledged---Failure to provide reasons after representation seeking Policy benefit held improper; transfer order found against Wedlock Policy and unlawful. (j) Governance and public interest ----People-centric administration---Adherence to law and policy--- State governance must be rooted in welfare of people; policies designed for betterment must be adhered to rather than ignored for reasons negating their objective---Administrative action must remain consistent with public interest, fairness, and policy intent to prevent hardship and protect family life. Disposition: Civil Petition for leave to appeal converted into appeal and allowed; judgment dated 21.09.2023 of the Federal Service Tribunal set aside; transfer order dated 08.02.2021, to the extent relating to the petitioner, set aside. (Decided 04.12.2025).

Summary: The underlying principle regarding the grant of back pay to the civil servant upon setting aside his dismissal is “fair go all round” because the culture of authority in administrative law after the coming into force of Article 10-A in the Constitution is now untenable and the culture of justification takes precedence

Summary: (1) It is the prerogative of the competent authority to decide the quantum of punishment which includes the consideration of proportionality in awarding the punishment (2) Doctrine of proportionality is meant to impose punishment commensurate to the gravity of misconduct (3) Taking into consideration the long length of service, the dismissal from service was converted into compulsory retirement.

Summary: (1) Rule 9 (Extra-ordinary leave) of Revised Leave Rules, 1980 (2) If the period of absence was treated as EOL, whether the major penalty of dismissal can be imposed (3) The competent authority treated the period of absence as EOL (4) The adjustment of EOL with retrospective effect is not a punishment but a medium for reconciling two extreme situations.