Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss. 302(b), 324 & 306---Mental illness as mitigating circumstance---Death sentence---Remand under S. 465 Cr.P.C.---Held, remanding for S. 465 compliance would not advance justice after long lapse; Medical Board report of mental illness is significant mitigating factor; peculiar facts including deceased being petitioner’s own mother and spirit of S. 306 PPC favour lesser punishment---Conviction under S. 302(b) maintained; death on two counts commuted to rigorous imprisonment for life on two counts as Ta’zir; S. 324 conviction maintained; sentences concurrent with S. 382-B benefit---Directions for referral to Punjab Institute of Mental Health and periodic medical management/reporting. Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and partly allowed in above terms. Dated 14.05.2026. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code----O. VII, R. 7---Moulding of relief---Scope and limits---Declaratory suit challenging cancellation of forest-tree auction---High Court in revisional jurisdiction directing deposit of remaining bid amount, execution of contract and harvesting of trees---Conversion of declaratory suit into suit for specific performance---Respondents had instituted a suit for declaration and permanent injunction challenging letters dated 06.05.2010 and 10.05.2010 directing cancellation of lots of dead/dry trees auctioned on 15.01.2008 and 15.04.2008---Trial Court dismissed the suit; Additional District Judge decreed it; High Court partially accepted the revision and modified the decree by directing the respondents to deposit the remaining bid amount along with the required fine and the department to execute the contract and permit harvesting---Held, that O. VII, R. 7 required every plaint to state the relief claimed but empowered the Court to grant such general or other relief as the plaintiff might be found entitled to---Doctrine of moulding of relief enabled a Court, in appropriate cases, to tailor relief in light of the pleadings, evidence and facts established, so that substantial justice was not defeated by technical deficiencies in prayers---Power was neither unbridled nor exercisable as a matter of course; it was an exception to the rule that parties are bound by their pleadings---Moulded relief must flow from the pleadings and proved facts, remain consistent with the nature of the proceedings, and must not take the opposite party by surprise---Doctrine did not permit the Court to introduce an entirely new cause of action or to substitute one category of suit for another---It did not extend to converting a declaratory suit into one for specific performance, enforcing a contract where such relief was never claimed, or granting relief wholly inconsistent with the pleadings---Relief not founded on the pleadings cannot be granted; evidence beyond the pleadings is irrelevant; the Court cannot travel beyond the pleadings to construct a new case---Present suit was purely declaratory, challenging legality of cancellation, and specific performance was neither sought nor implied---Grant of such relief outside the pleadings resulted in manifest prejudice and denial of a fair opportunity to contest the real controversy. Cited Cases: • Syed Phool Badshah v. ADBP through Manager, Peshawar Branch 2012 SCMR 1688 (b) Civil Procedure Code----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Scope---Grant of substantive equitable relief not pleaded---Held, that the High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, might interfere where subordinate Courts had misread evidence or acted in disregard of settled principles, but could not travel beyond the pleadings so as to grant an entirely new or inconsistent relief neither claimed nor founded in the plaint---Revisional jurisdiction was confined to correcting jurisdictional errors, material irregularities or illegalities and could not assume the role of a trial Court or appellate Court so as to grant substantive equitable relief in the absence of pleadings and framed issues---High Court, while setting aside the appellate decree, proceeded to decree specific performance though such relief was neither pleaded nor prayed for, which exercise was beyond the permissible scope of S. 115 and suffered from jurisdictional infirmity. (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)----Specific performance---Equitable and discretionary relief---Readiness and willingness---Declaratory suit and suit for enforcement of contract---Distinction---Held, that a plaintiff seeking specific performance must specifically plead and prove readiness and willingness, existence of a valid and enforceable contract, compliance with essential terms and, where relevant, proper court-fee valuation---Where a party failed to deposit the remaining bid amount within the stipulated period and confined relief to declaration and injunction on the plea that cancellation was illegal, the Court could not, in the absence of proper pleadings, convert the suit into one for specific performance---Such conversion would defeat the equitable character of the remedy unless foundational pleas such as waiver, extension of time or prevention by the opposite party were specifically pleaded and proved---A declaratory suit challenging cancellation of a contract and a suit seeking enforcement of the contract were legally distinct; one could not ordinarily be substituted for the other through judicial improvisation under O. VII, R. 7---Reliance on Syed Phool Badshah's case was misconceived, that controversy having arisen in recovery proceedings under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and the precedent in fact reaffirming that no relief could be granted on matters outside the pleadings. (d) Auction---Forest lots of dead/dry trees---Default in depositing remaining bid amount within stipulated period of seven days---Effect---Held, that even on merits the respondents had no case, having failed to deposit the balance sale consideration in accordance with the agreed terms of the auction pertaining to specified lots within seven days and thereby committed wilful default---Alleged agreement neither attained enforceability nor could it be lawfully concluded or acted upon---In view of that default, respondents were not entitled to a decree of declaration and permanent injunction against the appellants. Disposition: Appeal allowed; judgments and decrees of the Peshawar High Court dated 27.09.2017 in C.R. No.248-P of 2014 and of the appellate Court set aside; judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 02.03.2013 dismissing the suit restored; no order as to costs; listed CMA disposed of. (C.A. No.328 of 2018 with CMA No.979-P of 2017, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided 14.05.2026 at Islamabad; approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act----S. 22---Agreement to sell immovable property---Time of the essence---Forfeiture clause---Respondents agreed on 11.03.2014 to sell 5 kanals and 4 marlas of land in khasra No.6012/1, khewat No.294, khatooni No.365, Revenue Estate Urban Chowinda, Tehsil Pasrur, District Sialkot, to the appellant for Rs.7,280,000, of which Rs.800,000 was paid as earnest money and the balance of Rs.6,480,000 was to be paid by 27.07.2014 at registration of the sale deed---Agreement expressly provided that if the appellant failed to pay the balance by that date the respondents would be entitled to forfeit the earnest money and have the agreement enforced through a court of law---Held, that on account of such a stipulation, the time fixed for payment of the balance sale consideration was of the essence---A stipulation for payment of the balance with a consequential penalty of forfeiture of earnest money and vitiation of the agreement was sufficient to hold that the parties had agreed that time was of the essence---Where non-performance within the stipulated period entailed consequences given in the contract, time became of the essence---Courts must interpret such agreements in light of current economic realities; given the rapid increase in real estate values, delay in payment undermined contractual efficacy, and the archaic principle that in contracts involving immovable property time is generally not of the essence could not indiscriminately be applied. Cited Cases: • Liaqat Ali v. Falak Sher PLD 2014 SC 506 • Mst. Gulshan Hamid v. Kh. Abdul Rehman 2010 SCMR 334 • Muhammad Abdur Rehman Qureshi v. Sagheer Ahmad 2017 SCMR 1696 (b) Specific Relief Act----S. 22---Specific performance---Equitable and discretionary relief---Continuous readiness and willingness---Plaintiff's failure to deposit balance sale consideration---Cause of action---Held, that the remedy of specific performance was purely equitable and it was not obligatory on the Court to grant such relief merely because it was lawful to do so---Continuous readiness and willingness on the part of a plaintiff to pay the agreed consideration was a condition precedent---Court was to consider the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to filing of the suit---A plaintiff/purchaser could not be said to have a cause of action where he had not demonstrated readiness and willingness to pay the balance---Although the appellant had pleaded readiness, his failure to comply with the trial Court's directions dated 18.12.2014 and 05.01.2015 to deposit Rs.6,480,000 ipso facto rendered such pleading untrue---Deposit of the balance on 24.01.2018, almost three and a half years after the contractual deadline, did not improve his case---He who seeks equity must do equity; by failing to pay in accordance with the agreement or the Court's directions the appellant was stripped of bona fides and disentitled from equitable relief---Appellant's conduct suggested speculative litigation and abuse of equitable jurisdiction. Cited Cases: • Adil Tiwana and others v. Shaukat Ullah Khan Bangash 2015 SCMR 828 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. XVII, R. 3---Dismissal of suit for default in performing an act necessary to further progress of the suit---Deposit of balance sale consideration---Trial Court, after recording statements of the respondents that they would have no objection to the suit being decreed if the appellant deposited the balance, directed deposit first by 05.01.2015 and, on extension, by 20.01.2015---Appellant failed to deposit despite two opportunities---Held, that O. XVII, R. 3 empowered the Court, where a party to whom time had been granted failed to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit, to proceed to decide the suit forthwith---Deposit of the balance was of utmost importance for further progress of the suit for specific performance as it would have prima facie shown readiness, willingness and ability to pay---If a plaintiff did not deposit the balance within the time stipulated by the trial Court, the presumption was that he was not serious in prosecuting the remedy---Trial Court did not commit any illegality in dismissing the suit. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----First Schedule, Appendix A, Forms 47 & 48---Suit for specific performance---Pleading of readiness and willingness---Held, that a suit for specific performance had to conform to Forms 47 and 48; Form 48 required the plaintiff/purchaser to plead that he was still ready and willing to pay the purchase-money---Failure to comply with the direction for deposit left the plaintiff without a cause of action to seek specific performance. (e) Contract---Earnest money---Direction to return double the earnest money---Concession before High Court---Presumption of correctness of recitals in judgment---Respondents, through Civil Appeal No.284-L of 2020, challenged the High Court's direction to return Rs.1,600,000 (double the earnest money of Rs.800,000) to the appellant---Held, that the Court was not inclined to interfere with that direction because the respondents' counsel before the High Court had submitted that the respondents were ready to return such amount---There was a presumption of correctness as to facts expressly mentioned in the judgment and decree of the High Court, which could not be dislodged simply because the respondents said, without swearing an affidavit, that their counsel had not made such submission. Disposition: Both appeals dismissed; appellant to bear the respondents' costs in Civil Appeal No.173-L of 2020; High Court's judgment dated 04.03.2020 in Civil Revision No.180498 of 2018, restoring dismissal of the suit with direction to return double the earnest money, maintained. (C.A. Nos.173-L and 284-L of 2020, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided 14.05.2026 at Islamabad; approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. VI, R. 17---Amendment of pleadings in review petition pending before Federal Constitutional Court---Review petition (C.R.P. 173 of 2024, filed in Supreme Court and transferred after Constitution (Twenty-seventh Amendment) Act, 2025) against judgment dated 14.12.2023 which had dismissed challenge to judgment dated 10.06.2021 of Peshawar High Court setting aside de-notification dated 07.10.2019 of land acquired for AFV Range, Nowshera---Petitioners sought to add, by C.M.A. 84 of 2025, questions of law and grounds (including inapplicability of Ss. 36 and 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 because Federation had remained in possession as lessee since 1955, financial incapacity to pay compensation of approximately Rs.75 billion, locus standi of private respondents, and expunction of adverse observations of mala fides) said to have been omitted inadvertently; respondents objected that amendment introduced new questions of law and fresh factual pleas and sought to convert review into rehearing or substantive final relief---Held, that proposed amendments neither introduced a new cause of action nor altered the fundamental nature of review petition; they were primarily clarificatory, elaborating questions of law and factual aspects already implicit in original pleadings and arising from the impugned judgment, stemmed from existing record and required no fresh evidence---Procedural rules are meant to advance the cause of justice and not to thwart adjudication on merits---O. VI, R. 17 vests wide discretion to allow amendment at any stage, provided it is necessary for determining the real questions in controversy and is just; power is of wide amplitude and may be exercised even at appellate or revisional stage before superior courts if ends of justice so require---Procedural law is handmaid of justice and amendments necessary for proper adjudication ought to be allowed, subject to condition that no irreparable prejudice is caused to opposite party and the nature of lis or fundamental complexion of case is not altered---Where amendment is merely clarificatory, necessary for proper elucidation of existing pleadings, introduces no new case and alters no core controversy, it may be allowed even at advanced stage---Respondents had full opportunity to controvert amended pleas and no irreparable prejudice was shown---Objection that review was being converted into appeal in disguise not accepted at this stage; whether grounds fall within narrow scope of review jurisdiction is to be examined at hearing of review petition itself, the Court being now concerned only with whether amendments are necessary and germane to existing lis. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Nabi v. Sardar Nazir Ahmed 1985 SCMR 824 Disposition: C.M.A. 84 of 2025 allowed; review petition (C.R.P. 173 of 2024) deemed amended in terms of the proposed amendments, subject to all just exceptions to be considered at the time of final hearing of the review petition. Order dated 14.05.2026. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Representation of statutory entity before High Court---Consent of Attorney General Office---Gujranwala Electric Power Company (GEPCO) objected that consent to disposal of writ petition pending before the Islamabad High Court had been given on its behalf by the Attorney General Office, which was not competent to do so as GEPCO was an independent entity entitled to be represented by counsel of its own choice---Held, that the Assistant Attorney General, in the facts and circumstances, was not competent to give consent on behalf of the petitioner regarding disposal of the writ petition pending before the Islamabad High Court. (b) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 203 & Part VII, Chapter 3---High Courts---Independence---Directions by Supreme Court/Federal Constitutional Court to High Courts for expeditious disposal of cases---Scope and propriety---Request by respondent for direction to High Court to decide matter expeditiously on remission---Held, that under the scheme of judicature in the Constitution there are five independent High Courts created under Part VII, Chapter 3, each an independent Constitutional Court not subordinate to either the Supreme Court or the Federal Constitutional Court; the district judiciary and other courts are subordinate to the respective High Court under Art. 203---All decisions of High Court are challengeable before the Supreme Court and/or Federal Constitutional Court, which does not make the High Court subordinate in any manner---Orders issuing directions to High Courts should be made sparingly and couched in appropriate words, as High Courts have their own independent roster, case management schemes and policy for fixation of cases---Any order or direction which superimposes such policy or case fixation amounts to intrusion in the judicial and administrative independence of such courts---Where exigency or emergency of the lis demands, early hearing on remission may be observed, but in appropriate words and not so as to affect the independence of the High Court---Directions generally issued for early decision are administrative rather than judicial in nature and are recommendatory, asking courts to take up the matter in priority in view of its urgency; same holds where a High Court directs trial courts/subordinate courts. Cited Cases: • Talat Ishaq v. National Accountability Bureau PLD 2019 SC 112 Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed; impugned order dated 10.07.2025 of the Islamabad High Court in Writ Petition No.2749/2025 set aside; writ petition filed by respondent No.1 (Master Tiles & Ceramics Industries Ltd.) deemed pending before the Islamabad High Court, which is expected to take it up at the earliest in view of the urgency involved. C.P.L.A. No.4085 of 2025, decided 14.05.2026. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 141 & 142---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Removal from Service) Act, 2025, S. 3---Legislative competence of Provincial Assembly---Validity of statute declaring appointments made during Caretaker Government tenure (22.01.2023 to 29.02.2024) void ab initio---Petitioners, appointed against vacant Class-IV posts in colleges in District Peshawar vide appointment orders dated 14.06.2023, were removed from service after enactment of the 2025 Act, S. 3 of which declared appointments made in contravention of S. 230 of the Elections Act, 2017 and Election Commission's Notification No. F.No. 2(1)/2023-Cord dated 22.01.2023 to be void ab initio---Challenge to the Act as void ab initio and violative of fundamental rights---Held, such challenge was misconceived and devoid of legal substance---Act had been duly enacted by competent Provincial Legislature within the four corners of its constitutional authority and neither infringed nor curtailed any fundamental right guaranteed under Chapter I of Part II of the Constitution---Legislative competence of Provincial Assembly was firmly entrenched in the constitutional framework and Act enjoyed presumption of constitutionality unless declared otherwise by a competent forum---Mere fact that certain individuals felt aggrieved by consequences of legislation did not render it unconstitutional or ultra vires. Cited Cases: • Ms. Imrana Tiwana's case (principles governing striking down of legislation, para. 65) • Pakistan through Secretary Finance and others v. Shahta Sugar Mills Ltd. and others 2024 SCMR 1656 (b) Constitutional law---Judicial review of legislation---Principles governing declaration of statute as unconstitutional---Court reproduced principles summarised in Ms. Imrana Tiwana's case: presumption in favour of constitutionality; interpretation favouring validity to be preferred where more than one is possible; statute not to be declared unconstitutional unless invalidity is beyond reasonable doubt, any reasonable doubt being resolved in favour of validity; Court to abstain from deciding constitutional question if case can be decided on other or narrower grounds and not to decide larger constitutional question than necessary; statute not to be struck down for violating spirit of Constitution unless it also violates its letter; Court not concerned with wisdom or prudence of legislation but only with its constitutionality; statutes not to be struck down on principles of republican or democratic government unless placed beyond legislative encroachment by Constitution; mala fides not to be attributed to Legislature---Shahta Sugar Mills case, as noted by the Court, rests on trichotomy of powers, burden on person challenging vires of law to demonstrate its invalidity, courts to lean towards sustaining legislation, and judicial review to be exercised within narrow and stringent limits. Cited Cases: • Ms. Imrana Tiwana's case • Pakistan through Secretary Finance and others v. Shahta Sugar Mills Ltd. and others 2024 SCMR 1656 (c) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)----S. 230 & Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 52, 218(3), 224 & 224-A---Caretaker Government---Scope of mandate---Appointments during caretaker tenure---Held, Caretaker Government derives its constitutional basis from the Constitution and is a temporary, transitional and non-political setup constituted for administrative continuity during interregnum between dissolution of Assemblies and formation of new Government---Its mandate under S. 230 is narrowly confined to attending day-to-day affairs, assisting the Election Commission in holding elections and ensuring smooth, orderly and transparent transition of power---Authority of Caretaker Government does not extend to framing or implementing new policies, long-term development initiatives, making permanent appointments, whether in civil service, public sector institutions, autonomous bodies or corporations, or entering into binding financial or contractual obligations outliving its tenure or prejudicing discretion of incoming government---Any administrative or developmental measure by caretaker setup must be justified by compelling public interest and is permissible only with prior approval of Election Commission of Pakistan---Acts beyond limited mandate, including permanent appointments, policy decisions or financial commitments with long-term consequences, are in excess of jurisdiction, amenable to judicial scrutiny and, if in violation of constitutional or legal framework, liable to be declared ultra vires, void and of no legal effect---Appointments made during caretaker tenure from 22.01.2023 to 29.02.2024, if entailing permanence or long-term consequences, would prima facie travel beyond lawful scope of caretaker authority and warranted scrutiny in context of S. 230 and the impugned provincial legislation. Cited Cases: • Khawaja Muhammad Asif v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2013 SCMR 1205 (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 4, 9 & 25---Service matter---Removal of employees appointed by Caretaker Government under provincial statute---Fundamental rights---Whether petitioners' constitutional and vested rights were violated---Held, impugned termination orders passed under authority of the legislation were lawful, intra vires and issued in accordance with principles of natural justice and due process of law---Petitioners failed to demonstrate any violation or infringement of their fundamental rights under Arts. 4, 9 and 25 of the Constitution, nor was any such infringement established from the record---Petitions, involving identical legal and factual questions, found to be without merit. Disposition: Petitions dismissed. C.P.L.A. Nos. 3992, 3993, 3994, 3995 and 3996 of 2025, order dated 14.05.2026 of the Federal Constitutional Court of Pakistan (Rozi Khan Barrech, J.), against judgment dated 03.07.2025 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in W.P. Nos. 1830-P, 1831-P, 1832-P, 1833-P, 1834-P and 2629-P of 2025, which had dismissed the petitions as not maintainable and devoid of merit. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 141 & 142---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Removal from Service) Act, 2025, S. 3---Legislative competence of Provincial Assembly---Validity of statute declaring appointments made during Caretaker Government tenure (22.01.2023 to 29.02.2024) void ab initio---Petitioners, appointed against vacant Class-IV posts in colleges in District Peshawar vide appointment orders dated 14.06.2023, were removed from service after enactment of the 2025 Act, S. 3 of which declared appointments made in contravention of S. 230 of the Elections Act, 2017 and Election Commission's Notification No. F.No. 2(1)/2023-Cord dated 22.01.2023 to be void ab initio---Challenge to the Act as void ab initio and violative of fundamental rights---Held, such challenge was misconceived and devoid of legal substance---Act had been duly enacted by competent Provincial Legislature within the four corners of its constitutional authority and neither infringed nor curtailed any fundamental right guaranteed under Chapter I of Part II of the Constitution---Legislative competence of Provincial Assembly was firmly entrenched in the constitutional framework and Act enjoyed presumption of constitutionality unless declared otherwise by a competent forum---Mere fact that certain individuals felt aggrieved by consequences of legislation did not render it unconstitutional or ultra vires. Cited Cases: • Ms. Imrana Tiwana's case (principles governing striking down of legislation, para. 65) • Pakistan through Secretary Finance and others v. Shahta Sugar Mills Ltd. and others 2024 SCMR 1656 (b) Constitutional law---Judicial review of legislation---Principles governing declaration of statute as unconstitutional---Court reproduced principles summarised in Ms. Imrana Tiwana's case: presumption in favour of constitutionality; interpretation favouring validity to be preferred where more than one is possible; statute not to be declared unconstitutional unless invalidity is beyond reasonable doubt, any reasonable doubt being resolved in favour of validity; Court to abstain from deciding constitutional question if case can be decided on other or narrower grounds and not to decide larger constitutional question than necessary; statute not to be struck down for violating spirit of Constitution unless it also violates its letter; Court not concerned with wisdom or prudence of legislation but only with its constitutionality; statutes not to be struck down on principles of republican or democratic government unless placed beyond legislative encroachment by Constitution; mala fides not to be attributed to Legislature---Shahta Sugar Mills case, as noted by the Court, rests on trichotomy of powers, burden on person challenging vires of law to demonstrate its invalidity, courts to lean towards sustaining legislation, and judicial review to be exercised within narrow and stringent limits. Cited Cases: • Ms. Imrana Tiwana's case • Pakistan through Secretary Finance and others v. Shahta Sugar Mills Ltd. and others 2024 SCMR 1656 (c) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)----S. 230 & Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 52, 218(3), 224 & 224-A---Caretaker Government---Scope of mandate---Appointments during caretaker tenure---Held, Caretaker Government derives its constitutional basis from the Constitution and is a temporary, transitional and non-political setup constituted for administrative continuity during interregnum between dissolution of Assemblies and formation of new Government---Its mandate under S. 230 is narrowly confined to attending day-to-day affairs, assisting the Election Commission in holding elections and ensuring smooth, orderly and transparent transition of power---Authority of Caretaker Government does not extend to framing or implementing new policies, long-term development initiatives, making permanent appointments, whether in civil service, public sector institutions, autonomous bodies or corporations, or entering into binding financial or contractual obligations outliving its tenure or prejudicing discretion of incoming government---Any administrative or developmental measure by caretaker setup must be justified by compelling public interest and is permissible only with prior approval of Election Commission of Pakistan---Acts beyond limited mandate, including permanent appointments, policy decisions or financial commitments with long-term consequences, are in excess of jurisdiction, amenable to judicial scrutiny and, if in violation of constitutional or legal framework, liable to be declared ultra vires, void and of no legal effect---Appointments made during caretaker tenure from 22.01.2023 to 29.02.2024, if entailing permanence or long-term consequences, would prima facie travel beyond lawful scope of caretaker authority and warranted scrutiny in context of S. 230 and the impugned provincial legislation. Cited Cases: • Khawaja Muhammad Asif v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2013 SCMR 1205 (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 4, 9 & 25---Service matter---Removal of employees appointed by Caretaker Government under provincial statute---Fundamental rights---Whether petitioners' constitutional and vested rights were violated---Held, impugned termination orders passed under authority of the legislation were lawful, intra vires and issued in accordance with principles of natural justice and due process of law---Petitioners failed to demonstrate any violation or infringement of their fundamental rights under Arts. 4, 9 and 25 of the Constitution, nor was any such infringement established from the record---Petitions, involving identical legal and factual questions, found to be without merit. Disposition: Petitions dismissed. C.P.L.A. Nos. 3992, 3993, 3994, 3995 and 3996 of 2025, order dated 14.05.2026 of the Federal Constitutional Court of Pakistan (Rozi Khan Barrech, J.), against judgment dated 03.07.2025 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in W.P. Nos. 1830-P, 1831-P, 1832-P, 1833-P, 1834-P and 2629-P of 2025, which had dismissed the petitions as not maintainable and devoid of merit. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending