Summary: (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----S.194-C(5)---Difference of opinion between the Members of a Customs Appellate Tribunal / Bench---Mandatory procedure of adjudication---Scope---From reading of S. 194-C(5) of the Customs Act, 1969 (‘the Act’), it is evident that the statutory provision contemplates a specific procedure to be followed in the event of a difference of opinion between the Members of a Bench of Customs Appellate Tribunal (‘Tribunal’)---The legislative intent is unambiguous, the Members shall first formulate the precise point or points of difference, which shall then be referred by the Chairman of the Tribunal to one or more other Members for resolution---The final decision must reflect the opinion of the majority of the Members who have heard the case, including those who originally constituted the Bench---Said framework ensures adjudication in accordance with law and upholds the principle of collective decision-making---However , in the present matter, the Tribunal had failed to adhere to the mandatory procedural requirements set forth under the said provision---The Members of the original Bench did not record or frame the specific point or points on which they differed, as required under S. 194-C(5) of the Act---In absence of duly formulated points of difference, the matter was nonetheless referred by the Chairman to a Referee Member, contrary to the statutory mandate; the Referee Member proceeded to dispose of the matter without identifying or addressing any specific point or points of divergence and without assigning independent or reasoned justification for concurring with either Member of the original Bench---Said lapses amounted to a clear violation of the mandatory procedures prescribed by law---Thus, the impugned judgment was vitiated by procedural illegality and could not be sustained in law---High Court set-a side the impugned judgment passed by the Member (Technical) of the Tribunal, including the orders rendered by the dissenting Member and the Referee Member ; and the matter was remanded to the Chairman of the Appellate Tribunal for a fresh hearing and decision in accordance with law---Special Reference Application was disposed of accordingly. Messrs Vintak Pipe Industries through Proprietor v. Customs Appellate Tribunal and 3 others 2018 PTD 1823 and Deputy Collector Sales Tax v. Collector, Excise and Sales Tax and others 2002 PTD 2570 ref. (b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----S. 194-C(5)---Difference of opinion between the Members of a Customs Appellate Tribunal / Bench---Mandatory procedure of adjudication---Scope---“Majority opinion”---Scope---Record disclosed three distinct and mutually inconsistent opinions: (i) the original judgment authored by the Member (Technical), (ii) the dissenting note of the Member (Judicial), and (ii) the brief, unreasoned orders of the Referee Member; which, could not collectively constitute a “majority opinion” as contemplated under S. 194-C(5) of the Customs Act (‘the Act’), as the majority must emerge from a procedurally valid formulation of points of difference and their resolution, which was absent in this case---Such a course of action undermined the statutory structure, defeated the legislative intent behind collective adjudication, and constituted a material irregularity going to the root of the proceedings---High Court set-aside the impugned judgment passed by the Member (Technical) of the Tribunal, including the orders rendered by the dissenting Member and the Referee Member ; and the matter was remanded to the Chairman of the Appellate Tribunal for a fresh hearing and decision in accordance with law--- Special Reference Application was disposed of accordingly. Rana Muhammad Mehtab for Applicant-Department. Umar Ilyas Khan for Respondent. Date of hearing: 24th September, 2025. MALIK JAVID IQBAL WAINS, J.--- This judgment shall decide the instant Custom Reference Application along with connected Reference Applications bearing Nos.28738 of 2024, 28739 of 2024, 28741 of 2024, 29457 of 2024, 29458 of 2024, 29459 of 2024, and 29460 of 2024, filed by applicant-department and respondent-taxpayer, as all these matters involve common question of law, though arising from the separate judgments.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)- -S. 66-Refund of claim-Applicability-Period of limitation set out in Section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 applies when there is a claim for refund based on any one of four grounds: inadvertence, error, misconstruction or refund on account of input adjustment not claimed within the relevant tax period. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)- -Ss. 7 & 66-Refund of claim-Relevant tax period-Limitation period-During 13-06-1997 to 05-09-2000 supply of cement was exempted from tax-Respondent / taxpayer claimed refund of tax paid during the period of exemption-Validity-Since the-relevant tax period-did not (and could not) exist in the period of exemption, no date within that period could serve as the starting point of limitation envisaged by section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990-End of the period of exemption did not mark the last day for the start of limitation since up to that point in time there was in law no-time period-If at all any question of limitation could arise under Section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 the date for its starting would (and could only) lie in the successive-time periods-that had become operative after the end of the exemption-For purposes of computing limitation, time did not begin to run from the end of the period of exemption or any other date prior thereto located within that period-Period of exemption ended on 05-09-2000 and application for refund was made by end August/beginning September 2001, which was well within (or at most towards the end of) a period of one year from the end of the exemption-Limitation did not begin to run from 05-09-2000 (or any date prior thereto) but rather (if at all) from the successive time periods after that date; the claim was well within time and could not be defeated or denied on the ground of being time barred-Supreme Court declined to interfere in the matter as High Court and Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue had correctly concluded that respondent / taxpayer was entitled to refund of remaining amount of Rs. 6,439,608/-Appeal was dismissed. Pakistan Beverage Ltd. v. Large Taxpayer Unit 2010 PTD 2673; CPLA 658-K/2010 and others; CRP 4-K/2011 and others; Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Arco Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and others 2021 SCMR 1308; Waseem Ahmed and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2014 PTD 1733; C.A. No. 600/2016 and others and PLD 2025 SC 633 rel.

Summary: (Against judgment dated 18.03.2021 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Sales Tax Reference No. 13-P of 2011). (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 66---Refund of claim---Applicability---Period of limitation set out in Section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 applies when there is a claim for refund based on any one of four grounds: inadvertence, error, misconstruction or refund on account of input adjustment not claimed within the relevant tax period. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 7 & 66---Refund of claim---Relevant tax period---Limitation period---During 13-06-1997 to 05-09-2000 supply of cement was exempted from tax---Respondent / taxpayer claimed refund of tax paid during the period of exemption---Validity---Since the “relevant tax period” did not (and could not) exist in the period of exemption, no date within that period could serve as the starting point of limitation envisaged by section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990---End of the period of exemption did not mark the last day for the start of limitation since up to that point in time there was in law no “time period”---If at all any question of limitation could arise under Section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 the date for its starting would (and could only) lie in the successive “time periods” that had become operative after the end of the exemption---For purposes of computing limitation, time did not begin to run from the end of the period of exemption or any other date prior thereto located within that period---Period of exemption ended on 05-09-2000 and application for refund was made by end August/beginning September 2001, which was well within (or at most towards the end of) a period of one year from the end of the exemption---Limitation did not begin to run from 05-09-2000 (or any date prior thereto) but rather (if at all) from the successive time periods after that date; the claim was well within time and could not be defeated or denied on the ground of being time barred---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the matter as High Court and Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue had correctly concluded that respondent / taxpayer was entitled to refund of remaining amount of Rs. 6,439,608/---Appeal was dismissed. Pakistan Beverage Ltd. v. Large Taxpayer Unit 2010 PTD 2673; CPLA 658-K/2010 and others; CRP 4-K/2011 and others; Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Arco Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and others 2021 SCMR 1308; Waseem Ahmed and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2014 PTD 1733; C.A. No. 600/2016 and others and PLD 2025 SC 633 rel. Qaiser Abbas Bangash, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video-link, Peshawar). Isaac Ali Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (via video-link, Peshawar). Date of hearing: 27th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Customs Act (IV of 1969), Ss. 30, 31A & 79---Assessment of duty of imported goods, matter of---Constitutional petition, filing of---Territorial jurisdiction---Scope---Petitioner / Importer sought issuance of a direction to Respondents / Department for assessment of duty of its imported goods on the basis of the Valuation Ruling in vogue---Held: High Court had the territorial jurisdiction since the consignment was not claimed to be cleared for home consumption under S. 79 of the Customs Act , 1969 (‘the Act 1969’) and was subject to release/ex-bonded from the bonded warehouse of the petitioner and thus in terms of S. 30 read with 31A of the Act 1969, the relevant port for the purpose of determining the territorial jurisdiction shall be the place from where the goods were being ex-bonded, therefore, the objection of territorial jurisdiction had no basis---Constitutional petition was allowed. (b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss. 30, 31A, 79 & 193---Assessment of duty of imported goods, determination of---Whether ruling as existing on the date of filing of the GDs, or prevalent on the date of ex-bonding of consignment from bonded warehouse applicable---Held: Objection that the remedy under S.193 of the Customs Act, 1969 (‘the Act, 1969’) had not been availed, was not tenable, since the only question which required determination in the present case was whether the Initial Valuation would be attracted as agitated by the Department, or the Valuation Ruling would be applicable---There was no dispute as to the quantum of valuation nor there were any other disputed questions of fact and the only question which required determination was whether the Initial Ruling would apply, as it existed on the date of filing of the GDs, or the customs duty was payable at the rate prevailing on the date of ex-bonding of consignment from bonded warehouse of the petitioner---Applicable customs duty would be the one which was in vogue on the date of ex-bonding of the consignment from the bonded warehouse, licensed under S.13 of the Act, 1969---High Court directed the respondents / Department to release the consignment in accordance with the customs duty per the Valuation Ruling prevalent at the time of import---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Collector of Customs and others v. Ravi Spinning Ltd. and others 1999 SCMR 412 and National Construction Co. v. Government of Pakistan and 2 others PLD 1989 Kar. 174 ref. Barrister Muhammad Abdullah for Petitioner. Mirza Nasar Ahmed, Addl. Attorney General assisted by Asad Ali Bajwa, Deputy Attorney General for Respondent No.1. Rana Muhammad Mehtab and Syed Majid Ali Bukhari for Respondent No.5. Shahzad Ahmad Cheema for Respondents Nos.3 and 7. Date of hearing: 23rd September, 2025.

Summary: (Against judgment dated 18.03.2021 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Sales Tax Reference No. 13-P of 2011). (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 66---Refund of claim---Applicability---Period of limitation set out in Section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 applies when there is a claim for refund based on any one of four grounds: inadvertence, error, misconstruction or refund on account of input adjustment not claimed within the relevant tax period. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 7 & 66---Refund of claim---Relevant tax period---Limitation period---During 13-06-1997 to 05-09-2000 supply of cement was exempted from tax---Respondent / taxpayer claimed refund of tax paid during the period of exemption---Validity---Since the “relevant tax period” did not (and could not) exist in the period of exemption, no date within that period could serve as the starting point of limitation envisaged by section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990---End of the period of exemption did not mark the last day for the start of limitation since up to that point in time there was in law no “time period”---If at all any question of limitation could arise under Section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 the date for its starting would (and could only) lie in the successive “time periods” that had become operative after the end of the exemption---For purposes of computing limitation, time did not begin to run from the end of the period of exemption or any other date prior thereto located within that period---Period of exemption ended on 05-09-2000 and application for refund was made by end August/beginning September 2001, which was well within (or at most towards the end of) a period of one year from the end of the exemption---Limitation did not begin to run from 05-09-2000 (or any date prior thereto) but rather (if at all) from the successive time periods after that date; the claim was well within time and could not be defeated or denied on the ground of being time barred---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the matter as High Court and Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue had correctly concluded that respondent / taxpayer was entitled to refund of remaining amount of Rs. 6,439,608/---Appeal was dismissed. Pakistan Beverage Ltd. v. Large Taxpayer Unit 2010 PTD 2673; CPLA 658-K/2010 and others; CRP 4-K/2011 and others; Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Arco Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and others 2021 SCMR 1308; Waseem Ahmed and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2014 PTD 1733; C.A. No. 600/2016 and others and PLD 2025 SC 633 rel. Qaiser Abbas Bangash, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video-link, Peshawar). Isaac Ali Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (via video-link, Peshawar). Date of hearing: 27th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss.157, 181 & 196---Vehicle carrying smuggled goods, seizure of---Release of seized vehicle in lieu of redemption fine---Legality---Outright confiscation---Scope---Briefly, customs officials intercepted a vehicle and recovered non-duty-paid foreign origin goods, including assorted cigarettes and skimmed milk, along with the vehicle itself, having an aggregate value of Rs. 8,918,450---The goods and vehicle were seized, adjudication proceedings were initiated, and an order-in-original ordered confiscation, whereafter the respondent, claiming to be the driver/owner of the vehicle, filed an appeal before the customs appellate tribunal, which modified the order by directing release of the vehicle on payment of 40% redemption fine, leading the collector of customs to file the present reference before the High Court---The issues of law requiring determination before the High Court were as to “whether the vehicle found carrying smuggled goods could be released on redemption fine in view of Ss. 157 and 181 of the Customs Act, 1969?”; and, “whether the appeal involving determination of fine exceeding the statutory threshold could validly be decided by a single member bench of the customs appellate tribunal?”---Held: The tribunal was bereft of the jurisdiction of giving the option and ordering the release of the vehicle against a fine as the vehicle was found carrying the smuggled goods---Tribunal had erred in law while relying upon subsection (2) of S. 157 of the Customs Act, 1969 and had also failed to take into consideration the true import of S. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969 read with SRO 499(I)/2009, as amended vide SRO 1619(I)/2024---Resultantly, question No.1 mentioned above was answered in affirmative---Whereas, the second question proposed for determination viz the jurisdiction of single member of the tribunal was not necessary to be adjudicated in light of the principle that "if it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then it is necessary not to decide more”---Impugned judgment was set aside and present customs reference application was allowed, in circumstances. Fozia Mazhar v. Additional District Judge, Jhang and others PLD 2024 SC 771 rel. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org. 597 U.S. 215 (2022) and Meera Shafi v. Office of the Governor Punjab and others 2019 LHC 3402 = PLD 2020 Lah. 54 ref. (b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss.157 & 181---Vehicle carrying smuggled goods---Release of seized vehicle in lieu of redemption fine---Permissibility---Exemption---Outright confiscation of a vehicle---Scope---Section 181 of the Customs Act is to the effect that once an order for confiscation of goods is passed under the Customs Act, the adjudicating officer may pass an order giving an option to the owner of the goods to pay such fine in lieu of the confiscated goods, as he thinks fit, however, the proviso to the said section envisages that the Federal Board of Revenue is empowered to circumscribe the discretion of the officer for passing an order for payment of fine in lieu of confiscated goods---While exercising the powers conferred under S. 181 of the Customs Act, the Federal Board of Revenue has indeed issued a notification bearing SRO 499(I)/2009 dated 13.06.2009, the preamble of the said SRO describes the goods or classes of goods from clauses (a) to (g)regarding which the officer concerned cannot exercise his discretion in terms of S.181 of the Customs Act---There are two significant recent amendments/insertions/substitutions brought about in the SRO 499(I)/2009---Initially clause (ba) was inserted vide SRO 1280(I)/2024 dated 20.08.2024---Thereafter, the said clause was substituted vide SRO 1619(I)/2024 dated 03.10.2024---Perusal of newly substituted clause (ba) of SRO 499(I)/2009 clearly concludes that a ‘lawfully registered conveyance’, ‘if seized and found carrying smuggled goods’ will fall within the exceptions of Section 181 of the Customs Act and shall not be amenable to avail the option of payment of fine in lieu of confiscation---This substitution is definite in terms and unequivocal in application---If a vehicle was found carrying smuggled goods and was being used exclusively for the transportation thereof, thus, the same will be squarely covered under clause (ba) of SRO 499(I)/2009 and the option contemplated under Section 181 of the Customs Act cannot be resorted to for its release. Bashir Ahmad v. Director, Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation Customs and another 2025 SCMR 684 = 2025 PTD 608 rel. (c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----S.157(2)---Power to release seized vehicle---Whether such power can be exercised only by the ‘appropriate officer’ during adjudication proceedings---Scope---It is clear that the recourse to subsection (2) of S. 157 of the Customs Act can only be made as an interim arrangement during the pendency of the process of adjudication for the purpose of determination that as to whether the goods, which are seized as ‘liable to confiscation’, are to be confiscated or not---This authority to invoke subsection (2) vests in an ‘appropriate officer’---For the purpose of exercise of authority under S. 157 of the Customs Act, the ‘appropriate officer’ shall be the ‘Officer of Customs competent to adjudicate the case under S. 179 of the Customs Act, 1969’---This selection of officer further lends support to the effect that subsection (2) is only meant for an interim arrangement during the course of adjudication as the said power has been exclusively conferred upon the same officer, who is seized with the jurisdiction to finally adjudicate upon the matter of confiscation or otherwise---The rationale is unequivocal and logical; the words being employed in S. 157 ineluctably conclude that subsection (2) is an enabling provision which can only be invoked during the pendency of the process of adjudication of the goods, which goods are seized as being liable to be confiscated. Shahzad v. The Collector of Customs, Model Collectorate of Customs (Preventive), Karachi and another 2025 SCMR 1912 rel. Rana Muhammad Mehtab and Syed Majid Ali Bukhari for Petitioner. Malik Saif Bhutta for Respondent No.1. Date of hearing: 23rd September, 2025.

Summary: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Preamble---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.51, 141, 151 & O.XXIX, R.1 & 2---National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance (VIII of 2000), S.18---Execution proceedings---Order blocking CNIC of a judgment debtor in satisfaction of a decree, recalling of---Blocking of CNIC in such circumstances---Permissibility---Decree holder providing wrong address of the judgment debtor---Effect---Brief facts of the matter were that the Bank sought execution of a consent decree arising from a settlement agreement under which two sets of agreed amounts were to be satisfied through acquisition and sale of specified properties---The first portion of Rs.426,171,375/- was satisfied through acquisition of four properties, whereas the second portion of approximately Rs.120 million remained partly unsatisfied due to other executions and pending proceedings regarding one property---During execution, the Court issued a direction for blocking the CNICs of judgment debtors Nos.3 and 4---Judgment debtor No.4 later filed applications seeking recalling of that order---Held: A clear discrepancy appeared in the address of the judgment debtor and such position clearly supported his contention that due to his wrong address in the execution application he was never served in the present proceedings and therefore he did not have any knowledge about the instant execution application---The maxim ‘Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria’ provided that, ‘no one can benefit from their own wrong’---Such address was provided by the decree holder, for which the judgment debtor No.4 should not be punished---Attending to the next aspect of the matter and in order to justify the blocking of CNIC of judgement debtors, decree holder relied upon O. XXI, R. 77 of the Civil Procedure Code [C.P.C.] [KPK Amendment], which provided for blocking of National Identity Card of judgment debtors---It was to be noted after the 18th Constitutional Amendment, C.P.C. had become a Provincial subject, whereas no such provision was available in the C.P.C. as enforceable in the Province of Sindh---Hence, reliance on such a provision, which was neither available nor enforceable in the present jurisdiction, was completely misplaced---Secondly, it was also to be noted that for execution of a decree under the banking jurisdiction, a complete mechanism was provided under the C.P.C., being the general law and under the Financial Institutions Ordinance 2001 [Ordinance 2001] being special law applicable to the present case, which provisions and mechanisms were required to be followed strictly in letter and spirit---Conspicuously, none of these two laws, as applicable in the Province of Sindh, contained any specific provision for blocking of CNIC of a judgment debtor in satisfaction of a decree---Further decree holder sought to rely on S.51 of C.P.C. seeking arrest and detention of the judgment debtor---Before issuance of a warrant under S.51 of C.P.C. certain mandatory pre-requisites had to be fulfilled---In the present case, neither any of pre-conditions was pleaded, nor was issuance of warrant ordered---Reliance on S.51 C.P.C. was therefore, completely misplaced---Lastly, an objection was raised that under O. XXI, R. 23A the judgement debtor No.4 was first required to deposit the decretal amount before his objections could be heard---In this regard, the decree holder was first required to correct the address of judgment debtor No.4 on the title of the present execution application; and thereafter was also required to bring on record the exact outstanding amount which was to be recovered in final satisfaction of the decree, after deduction of the amounts received in partial satisfaction of Rs.120 million---After completion of such activity if the judgment debtor No.4 chose to file objections to this execution, that would be appropriate time when such an objection would be considered---Although the order impugned was passed under S.18 of the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 yet even under such Ordinance, Courts had repeatedly discouraged blocking of CNICs---Order impugned was recalled and consequently, National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) was directed to immediately unblock the CNIC of the judgement debtors---Both applications were allowed, in circumstances. Agha Abid Majeed v. Idrees Ahmad and others (Civil Petition No. 3744/2023) rel. Zafar Hasan Khan and 2 others v. Messrs Habib Bank Limited 2024 CLC 1068; Abdul Basit Zahid and another v. Modaraba Al-Tijarah and another 2002 CLD 46; Precision Engineering Ltd. and others v. The Grays Leasing Limited PLD 2000 Lah. 290; Hafiz Hamdullah Saboor v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 2021 Isl. 305; Abbu Hashim and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and 2 others PLD 2021 Sindh 492; Muhammad Umar v. Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 2017 Sindh 585 and Syed Hasamuddin v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 MLD 1748 ref. Irfanullah Khan and Lubna Aman for Applicant. Farjad Ali Khan and Muhammad Umar Farooq for Malik Ali Zain through Judgment Debtor No.4. Date of hearing: 9th September, 2025.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----Ss.51, 141, 151 & O.XXIX, Rr.1 & 2---National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance (VIII of 2000), S.18---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Preamble---Execution proceedings---Order blocking CNIC of a judgment debtor in satisfaction of a decree, recalling of---Blocking of CNIC in such circumstances---Permissibility---Decree holder providing wrong address of the judgment debtor---Effect---Brief facts of the matter were that the Bank sought execution of a consent decree arising from a settlement agreement under which two sets of agreed amounts were to be satisfied through acquisition and sale of specified properties---The first portion of Rs.426,171,375/- was satisfied through acquisition of four properties, whereas the second portion of approximately Rs.120 million remained partly unsatisfied due to other executions and pending proceedings regarding one property---During execution, the Court issued a direction for blocking the CNICs of judgment debtors Nos.3 and 4---Judgment debtor No.4 later filed applications seeking recalling of that order---Held: A clear discrepancy appeared in the address of the judgment debtor and such position clearly supported his contention that due to his wrong address in the execution application he was never served in the present proceedings and therefore he did not have any knowledge about the instant execution application---The maxim ‘Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria’ provided that, ‘no one can benefit from their own wrong’---Such address was provided by the decree holder, for which the judgment debtor No.4 should not be punished---Attending to the next aspect of the matter and in order to justify the blocking of CNIC of judgement debtors, decree holder relied upon O.XXI R.77 of the Civil Procedure Code [C.P.C.] [KPK Amendment], which provided for blocking of National Identity Card of judgment debtors---It was to be noted after the 18th Constitutional Amendment, C.P.C. had become a Provincial subject, whereas no such provision was available in the C.P.C. as enforceable in the Province of Sindh---Hence, reliance on such a provision, which was neither available nor enforceable in the present jurisdiction, was completely misplaced---Secondly, it was also to be noted that for execution of a decree under the banking jurisdiction, a complete mechanism was provided under the C.P.C., being the general law and under the Financial Institutions Ordinance, 2001 [Ordinance 2001] being special law applicable to the present case, which provisions and mechanisms were required to be followed strictly in letter and spirit---Conspicuously, none of these two laws, as applicable in the Province of Sindh, contained any specific provision for blocking of CNIC of a judgment debtor in satisfaction of a decree---Further decree holder sought to rely on S.51 of C.P.C. seeking arrest and detention of the judgment debtor---Before issuance of a warrant under S.51 of C.P.C. certain mandatory pre-requisites had to be fulfilled---In the present case, neither any of pre-conditions was pleaded, nor was issuance of warrant ordered---Reliance on S.51 C.P.C. was therefore, completely misplaced---Lastly, an objection was raised that under O.XX1, R.23A the judgement debtor No.4 was first required to deposit the decretal amount before his objections could be heard---In this regard, the decree holder was first required to correct the address of judgment debtor No.4 on the title of the present execution application; and thereafter was also required to bring on record the exact outstanding amount which was to be recovered in final satisfaction of the decree, after deduction of the amounts received in partial satisfaction of Rs.120 million---After completion of such activity if the judgment debtor No.4 chose to file objections to this execution, that would be appropriate time when such an objection would be considered---Although the order impugned was passed under S.18 of the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 yet even under such Ordinance, Courts had repeatedly discouraged blocking of CNICs---Order impugned was recalled and consequently, National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)was directed to immediately unblock the CNIC of the judgement debtors---Both applications were allowed, in circumstances. Agha Abid Majeed v. Idrees Ahmad and others Civil Petition No. 3744 of 2023 rel. Zafar Hasan Khan and 2 others v. Messrs Habib Bank Limited 2024 CLC 1068; Abdul Basit Zahid and another v. Modaraba Al-Tijarah and another 2002 CLD 46; Precision Engineering Ltd. and others v. The Grays Leasing Limited PLD 2000 Lah. 290; Hafiz Hamdullah Saboor v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 2021 Isl. 305; Abbu Hashim and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and 2 others PLD 2021 Sindh 492; Muhammad Umar v. Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 2017 Sindh 585 and Syed Hasamuddin v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 MLD 1748 ref. Irfanullah Khan and Lubna Aman for Decree Holder. Farjad Ali Khan and Muhammad Umar Farooq for Judgment Debtor No. 4. Date of hearing: 9th September, 2025.

Summary: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Preamble---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.51, 141, 151 & O.XXIX, Rr.1 & 2---National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance (VIII of 2000), S.18---Execution proceedings---Order blocking CNIC of a judgment debtor in satisfaction of a decree, recalling of---Blocking of CNIC in such circumstances---Permissibility---Decree holder providing wrong address of the judgment debtor---Effect---Brief facts of the matter were that the Bank sought execution of a consent decree arising from a settlement agreement under which two sets of agreed amounts were to be satisfied through acquisition and sale of specified properties---The first portion of Rs.426,171,375/- was satisfied through acquisition of four properties, whereas the second portion of approximately Rs.120 million remained partly unsatisfied due to other executions and pending proceedings regarding one property---During execution, the Court issued a direction for blocking the CNICs of judgment debtors Nos.3 and 4---Judgment debtor No.4 later filed applications seeking recalling of that order---Held: A clear discrepancy appeared in the address of the judgment debtor and such position clearly supported his contention that due to his wrong address in the execution application he was never served in the present proceedings and therefore he did not have any knowledge about the instant execution application---The maxim ‘Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria’ provided that, ‘no one can benefit from their own wrong’---Such address was provided by the decree holder, for which the judgment debtor No.4 should not be punished---Attending to the next aspect of the matter and in order to justify the blocking of CNIC of judgement debtors, decree holder relied upon O. XXI, R. 77 of the Civil Procedure Code [C.P.C.] [KPK Amendment], which provided for blocking of National Identity Card of judgment debtors---It was to be noted after the 18th Constitutional Amendment, C.P.C. had become a Provincial subject, whereas no such provision was available in the C.P.C. as enforceable in the Province of Sindh---Hence, reliance on such a provision, which was neither available nor enforceable in the present jurisdiction, was completely misplaced---Secondly, it was also to be noted that for execution of a decree under the banking jurisdiction, a complete mechanism was provided under the C.P.C., being the general law and under the Financial Institutions Ordinance 2001 [Ordinance 2001] being special law applicable to the present case, which provisions and mechanisms were required to be followed strictly in letter and spirit---Conspicuously, none of these two laws, as applicable in the Province of Sindh, contained any specific provision for blocking of CNIC of a judgment debtor in satisfaction of a decree---Further decree holder sought to rely on S.51 of C.P.C. seeking arrest and detention of the judgment debtor---Before issuance of a warrant under S.51 of C.P.C. certain mandatory pre-requisites had to be fulfilled---In the present case, neither any of pre-conditions was pleaded, nor was issuance of warrant ordered---Reliance on S.51, C.P.C. was therefore, completely misplaced---Lastly, an objection was raised that under O. XXI, R. 23A the judgement debtor No.4 was first required to deposit the decretal amount before his objections could be heard---In this regard, the decree holder was first required to correct the address of judgment debtor No.4 on the title of the present execution application; and thereafter was also required to bring on record the exact outstanding amount which was to be recovered in final satisfaction of the decree, after deduction of the amounts received in partial satisfaction of Rs.120 million---After completion of such activity if the judgment debtor No.4 chose to file objections to this execution, that would be appropriate time when such an objection would be considered---Although the order impugned was passed under S.18 of the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 yet even under such Ordinance, Courts had repeatedly discouraged blocking of CNICs---Order impugned was recalled and consequently, National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) was directed to immediately unblock the CNIC of the judgement debtors---Both applications were allowed, in circumstances. Agha Abid Majeed v. Idrees Ahmad and others (Civil Petition No. 3744/2023) rel. Zafar Hasan Khan and 2 others v. Messrs Habib Bank Limited 2024 CLC 1068; Abdul Basit Zahid and another v. Modaraba Al-Tijarah and another 2002 CLD 46; Precision Engineering Ltd. and others v. The Grays Leasing Limited PLD 2000 Lah. 290; Hafiz Hamdullah Saboor v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 2021 Isl. 305; Abbu Hashim and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and 2 others PLD 2021 Sindh 492; Muhammad Umar v. Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 2017 Sindh 585 and Syed Hasamuddin v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 MLD 1748 ref. Irfanullah Khan and Lubna Aman for Applicant. Farjad Ali Khan and Muhammad Umar Farooq for Malik Ali Zain through Judgment Debtor No.4. Date of hearing: 9th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 185(3)---- Petition for leave to appeal—scope—principles governing interference with remand orders. Petition filed under Art. 185(3) of the Constitution requires demonstration of a substantial question of law of public importance. Jurisprudence establishes that leave may only be granted where a prima facie question of law arises, inconsistencies exist in evidence, or non-grant of leave would result in miscarriage of justice. A remand order, by its very nature, is not a final determination of rights but merely directs re-examination of issues by the subordinate forum. The Supreme Court, therefore, ordinarily refrains from interference unless the remand order is perverse, suffers from jurisdictional error, or where the matter could have been finally decided on the available record. (b) Civil Procedure—Remand Order ----Nature and effect—when interference justified. Remand order passed by the High Court directing the appellate court to re-decide the matter was examined. The High Court had noted that the first appellate court had recorded findings of superimposed thumb impressions and disbelieved certain documents (Exh.D-1 to D-3) without factual inquiry or evidence. Such findings could not stand without proper investigation; hence remand was justified. The contention that the High Court ought to have decided the case itself was found untenable, since the matter required factual determination. The remand did not suffer from illegality, jurisdictional error, or misreading of evidence. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----Remand jurisdiction—principles reaffirmed. It was reiterated that remand is appropriate when factual issues remain unexamined or evidence is incomplete; higher courts should not substitute themselves for the fact-finding forum. Only where the lower court’s remand is manifestly perverse or unnecessary on the face of record would intervention be warranted. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Shamin Ali v. Mst. Asma Begum 2011 SCMR 1238 • Abdul Rehman v. Rabon 2000 SCMR 1344 • Ghulam Rasool v. Government of Balochistan PLD 2002 SC 381 • Anab Din v. Member (SST) PLD 1986 Quetta 130 Disposition: Petition dismissed. Leave to appeal refused.