Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Invalidity of possession orders passed in a complaint under Section 7 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, lacking specificity and proper procedural consideration. 393Civil Revision 197736/18 Muhammad Babar Shah Vs Muhammad Nadeem Etc Mr. Justice Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi 11- 06- 2025 2025 LHC 4382

Summary: Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (IX of 1963) --- ----S.17---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R.10---Ejectment of tenant---The appellant (tenant) challenged the order passed by the Rent Controller, whereby, the ejectment petition in respect of rented premises was accepted and vacant possession along with arrears of rent was directed to be handed over to the respondent (landlord)---The appellant (tenant) argued that the rent agreement actually pertained to 'another property' and not the property in question and that another person had been a tenant since long---Held: The ownership of the respondent (landlord) with respect to the property in question and 'another property' was an admitted fact---The appellant (tenant) got recorded his statement with respect to an application under O.I R.10, C.P.C. filed by the purported tenant---After conceding that the appellant (tenant) gained possession of the premises as a tenant, he took a stance that another person (the purported tenant) became subsequent tenant of the respondent (landlord), however, it was clearly stated that the appellant/tenant was not a witness of any subsequent arrangement with the purported tenant---Application of the purported tenant was dismissed by the Rent Controller which order was never challenged hence attained finality---Instead of raising any challenge against such order at the relevant time, while the present appeal was pending an application under O.I R.10 of C.P.C. was instituted on the same grounds which were available to the purported tenant before the Rent Tribunal---Appellant despite availing number of opportunities to file reply to the ejectment petition failed to do the same as such he was proceeded against ex-parte, resultantly, the Rent Controller proceeded to record ex-parte evidence---No request was made before the Rent Controller to permit him to participate in the process of evidence or to cross-examine the witnesses of the respondent (landlord)---The affidavits (examination-in-chief) of three PWs were brought on record and since they were not cross-examined, the same went un-rebutted--- The default on the part of the appellant (tenant) also stood established--- The three PWs clearly deposed that the premises in question was rented out in the shape of a hall---Needless to say that the relationship of landlord and tenant was an admitted fact---The appellant (tenant) failed to make out any case---Present appeal along with the application under O.I, R.10, C.P.C. filed by the purported tenant were dismissed, in circumstances. Sardar Muhammad Ramzan for Appellant. Barrister Ch. Saeed Hussain Nagra for Respondent. Date of hearing: 11th June, 2025. Judgment Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, J .--- This appeal is directed against order dated 02.02.2022 passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller, Lahore Cantt., whereby, the following relief is granted in favour of the respondent:- "....Therefore, the titled ejectment petition is accepted and the respondent is directed to hand over the vacant possession of the rented premises 986, Tufail Road, Saddar Bazar, Lahore Cantt to the petitioner within 30 days, failing which the petitioner will have the right to obtain possession of the rented premises through execution of the order from the competent court of law. The petitioners will have the right to receive the arrears of rent as per ejectment petition." 2. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the impugned order is against the law and the facts of the case. He further contended that the ejectment-petition is with respect to property No. 986, whereas, the rent agreement relates to the property No. 986-A, Tufail Road, Lahore Cantt. Added that the learned Rent Controller has ignored that from 13.08.2000 one Azam Ali is the tenant in property, therefore, the order to pay arrears of rent from the said date is not tenable in law. 3. Learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently opposed this appeal. 4. Heard. The ownership of the respondent with respect to the properties Nos. 986 and 986-A is not denied, who sought the eviction of the appellant claiming that he has rented out the hall measuring 32 x 13 sq.ft. to the respondent. As per the stance of the respondent the above mentioned properties are adjacent to each other and wall between the shops was removed at the time of renting out the premises. The fact that the shops are adjacent to each other is not denied by the learned counsel for the appellant. 5. The appellant appeared before the learned Rent Controller on 03.02.2021. His signatures and thumb impressions were obtained on the margin of the order-sheet. Azam Ali also filed an application under Order I Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to be impleaded as a party. The appellant recorded statement through his learned counsel with respect to the application of Azam Ali on 22.09.2021 (available at page No. 27 of this file). After conceding that the appellant gained possession of the premises as a tenant, he took a stance that Azam Ali became subsequent tenant of the respondent, however, in paragraph No. 1 of the said statement it is clearly stated that the appellant is not a witness of any subsequent arrangement with Azam Ali. 6. The learned Rent Controller after hearing the arguments of the concerned, rejected the application of Azam Ali vide order dated 29.09.2021. This order was never challenged by Azam Ali, which attained finality. Instead of raising any challenge against order dated 29.09.2021 at the relevant time, while this appeal was pending an application under Order I Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (C. M. No. 05-C of 2022) has instituted on the same grounds which were available to him before the learned Rent Tribunal. 7. Record further reflects that the appellant despite availing a number of opportunities to file reply to the ejectment-petition has failed to do the same. He was proceeded against ex-parte on 15.11.2021. Resultantly, the learned Rent Controller proceeded to record ex-parte evidence. No request was made before the learned Rent Controller to permit him to participate in the process of evidence or to cross-examine the witnesses of the respondent. The affidavits (examination-in-chief) of three PWs were brought on record and since they were not cross-examined, the same went un-rebutted. The default on the part of the appellant also stood established. The three PWs clearly deposed that the premises in question was rented out in the shape of a hall. Needless to say that the relationship of landlord and tenant is an admitted fact. 8. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the appellant has failed to make out any case. Therefore, this appeal as well as application / C. M. No. 05 of 2022 are dismissed. No order as to costs. UN/M-126/L Appeal dismissed.

Summary: (a) An agreement to sell an immovable property squarely falls within the purview of the provisions of Article 17(2) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, and must be compulsorily attested by two witnesses. This is a sine qua non for the validity of the agreement. If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until at least two attesting witnesses have been called for the purpose of proving its execution, provided they are alive, subject to the process of the Court, and capable of giving evidence. For the purposes of proving such an agreement, it is mandatory that two attesting witnesses be examined by the party, as required under Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984. The scribe of an agreement to sell immovable property is not a substitute for an attesting witness and does not legally qualify as such. Therefore, while his evidence may have a supportive value, it is neither in line with the mandate of law nor does it satisfy the requirements of Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984. (b) It is settled law that the plaintiffs could not be allowed to draw any benefits from the lapses or lacunas in the case of the defendants, and it is entirely for the plaintiff to prove their case independently as required under Article 117 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat Order, 1984. It is only thereafter that the burden would shift to the defendant to prove his own stance as required under Articles 118 and 119. The aforesaid burden of proof on the part of the plaintiff is enrooted in Article 117 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, which declares that any person who desires a Court to issue a judgment in his favour has to prove all those facts which he has pleaded in his plaint. The evidence and record must reveal that the plaintiff has proved the existence of all those facts on which the plaint is based. The term “burden of proof” entails the burden of substantiating a case. The meaning of onus probandi is that if no evidence is produced by the party on whom the burden is cast, then such issue must be found against him. Lawsuits are determined on the preponderance or weighing of the scale of probabilities, in which the Court has to see which party has succeeded in proving its case and discharging the onus of proof. This must be scrutinized as a whole, together with contradictions, discrepancies, or inconsistencies, to enable the Court to detach the truth from falsehood. An endeavour should be made, in terms of the well-known metaphor, to “separate the grain from the chaff,” which connotes and obligates the Court to scrutinize and evaluate the evidence recorded in the lis judiciously and cautiously, in order to distinguish falsehood from truth, and to judge the quality—not the quantity—of the evidence.

Summary: Held: (1) The trial court failed to apply the correct legal standard by treating khula as conditional upon a subsequent talaq by the husband. (2) The punitive measures directed against the petitioner, in the absence of legal justification, are ultra vires and arbitrary. (3) It is settled law that once a decree for khula is passed by the competent court, the marriage stands dissolved and there remains no legal necessity to compel the husband to pronounce talaq, whether orally or in writing. The imposition of penal consequences i.e civil imprisonment and financial penalties are also beyond the statutory mandate conferred upon Family Courts under the relevant laws, unless explicitly sanctioned by legislative provisions or through binding judicial precedents. (4) A judge is duty-bound to decide cases strictly within the ambit of authority conferred by law. Any exercise of power beyond the statutory framework amounts to judicial overreach, which is antithetical to the rule of law and undermines the integrity of the judicial process. When a court steps outside its jurisdiction or renders a decision in contradiction to established legal principles, such a decision is void ab initio—a nullity in the eyes of law. (5) The judicial role is not one of personal discretion or subjective interpretation; rather, it entails interpreting and applying the law objectively, in line with binding precedent and statutory mandates. A judgment must reflect a logical and lawful reasoning process, not personal beliefs or considerations. Findings that fall outside the legal framework not only compromise the validity of the judgment but also erode public confidence in the justice system. (6) Accordingly, this petition is partially allowed to the extent of upholding the decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula. However, the remaining portion of the impugned order, whereby unwarranted conditions were imposed upon the petitioner by the learned Civil Judge-I, Paharpur, D.I.Khan—including directives for pronouncement of written talaq, civil imprisonment, and imposition of daily compensation—is hereby declared to be erroneous, illegal, and without any lawful authority or statutory backing, hence, set aside. Consequently, this petition stands partly allowed in the above terms.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Article 199 – Regularization – Petitioners were engaged through third-party contractors for services at National Bank of Pakistan – Appointment letters issued by private outsourcing companies – No evidence of direct appointment or absorption by the Bank – Mere long service or continuous performance of duties at Bank premises does not create employment relationship with principal employer – Regularization cannot be claimed as a right unless specifically provided by statute – Writ not maintainable in disputes involving contractual arrangements with third-party service providers – Petitioners at liberty to seek remedy under applicable labour laws – Held, employment relationship must be established before invoking writ jurisdiction – Disputed questions of fact and private contractual issues are not triable under Article 199 – Petitions dismissed. Cases referred: 1.Vice Chancellor, Bacha Khan University Charsadda v. Tanveer Ahmad and others (2022 PLC (C.S.) 85) 2.Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Sher Aman and others (2022 SCMR 406) 3.Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. v. Zeeshan Usmani and others (2022 PLC (C.S.) 424) 4.Province of Punjab v. Prof. Dr. Javed Iqbal and others (2022 SCMR 897) 5.National Bank of Pakistan v. Sohaib Iftikhar (C.P. No.425-L/2014, decided on 20.6.2018) 6.National Bank of Pakistan v. Kashif Salah-ud-Din (C.A. Nos.1340–1342/2014, decided on 3.3.2016) Held: All writ petitions dismissed as not maintainable. Petitioners may approach appropriate labour forum.

Summary: A defect in signing, verifying or presenting a pleading or memorandum of appeal or revision would not affect merits of a case or jurisdiction of a court and same should be treated as curable irregularity of proceedings.

Summary: (a) Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 ---- Ss. 3 & 7(1); Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 10A; Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 ---- Ss. 435 & 439 Interim relief under Illegal Dispossession Act --- Premature restoration of possession --- Scope and interpretation of “during trial” --- Petitioner challenged order of the trial court whereby he was directed to hand over possession of one room to the complainant under S.7(1) of the Act --- Held, interim relief under S.7(1) can only be granted "during trial" i.e., after framing of charge --- In the instant case, order was passed at a pre-trial stage without charge being framed --- Such order violated the condition precedent set out in S.7 and was legally untenable --- Supreme Court in PLD 2024 SC 1152 authoritatively held that “trial” begins post-charge and not at cognizance stage --- Further held, impugned order was non-specific, lacked identification of room in question, and improperly delegated judicial function to police by directing enforcement without clear demarcation --- Absence of material particulars and procedural safeguards rendered the direction unenforceable and violative of due process under Art.10A of the Constitution --- Impugned order set aside. Cited Cases: • Niaz Ahmed v. Aijaz Ahmed (PLD 2024 SC 1152) • Haq Nawaz v. The State (2000 SCMR 785)

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending