Summary: Execution of Decree?Judicial Auction?Maintainability of Objections?Finality of Earlier Adjudication?An issue finally determined between the parties cannot be permitted to be reopened in subsequent execution proceedings merely on the basis of a later judicial exposition of law. Order XXI Rule 90, C.P.C.?PLD 2024 SC 873 (Mst. Samrana Nawaz)?Prospective Operation of Judicial Pronouncements?Subsequent declaration of law does not automatically unsettle judicial determinations that have already attained finality inter se the parties. Doctrine of Finality of Litigation?Binding Effect of Earlier Judicial Orders?Where an order regarding maintainability of objections has attained finality after exhaustion of remedies, the same cannot be circumvented through collateral proceedings. Execution Proceedings?Judicial Discipline?Execution cannot be converted into endless litigation by repeatedly raising controversies already concluded by competent Courts. Speaking Order?Validity?A judicial order is to be assessed by the substance and quality of its reasoning, not by its length or elaboration?Mere brevity does not render an order non-speaking. Judicial Sale?Order XXI Rules 84 & 85, C.P.C.?Material Irregularity?Substantial Injury?Every procedural deviation does not ipso facto vitiate a judicial sale?Interference is justified only where material irregularity is coupled with proof of substantial prejudice. Judicial Auction?Deposit of Auction Money?Banking Instruments?Deposit through demand drafts/pay orders accepted by Court Auctioneers under authority of the executing Court constitutes valid compliance in the absence of statutory violation or demonstrable prejudice. Substantial Injury?Essential Ingredient?A challenge to a concluded judicial sale cannot succeed unless the objector establishes both material irregularity and consequential substantial injury. Court Auction?Competing Bidder?Higher Offer?Absence of any rival bidder, superior offer or demonstrable financial loss strongly negatives the plea of prejudice or inadequacy of sale. Judicial Sale?Reserve Price?Undervaluation?Valuation Report?A subsequent valuation report represents only an expert opinion and cannot, by itself, invalidate a concluded auction or establish inadequacy of price. Judicial Sale?Mere Inadequacy of Price?Not a Ground for Setting Aside Sale?Unless directly attributable to fraud, material irregularity or illegality resulting in substantial injury. Valuation Evidence?Contemporaneous Challenge?Failure to challenge valuation before the executing Court precludes reopening the issue on the basis of subsequently procured valuation reports. Fraud and Collusion?Standard of Proof?Fraud must be specifically pleaded and proved through clear, cogent and legally admissible evidence?Suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute proof. Unproved Documents?No Evidentiary Value?Findings of fraud or collusion cannot be founded upon disputed or unproved material. Jurisdiction of Executing Court?Transfer Application?Section 12(2), C.P.C.?Pendency of collateral proceedings, in the absence of an express stay order, does not divest the executing Court of jurisdiction to proceed with execution. Execution Proceedings?Statutory Jurisdiction?Banking Court?Section 19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?Executing Court remains competent to supervise execution and determine objections unless specifically restrained. Bona Fide Auction Purchaser?Protection of Vested Rights?Rights acquired through a court-supervised auction deserve protection and cannot be unsettled except upon proof of fraud, fundamental illegality or substantial injury. Judicial Auctions?Public Confidence?Sanctity and Finality?Frequent interference with concluded judicial sales on speculative or technical objections would erode public confidence and discourage genuine participation in court auctions. Appellate Jurisdiction?Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?Interference is unwarranted in the absence of illegality, jurisdictional defect, material irregularity, or misreading or non-reading of evidence. Execution First Appeals?Dismissal?Auction Sale Upheld?Where objections stand barred by finality and otherwise fail on merits for want of proof of fraud, illegality, material irregularity or substantial injury, confirmation of sale and issuance of sale certificate call for no interference.

Summary: (a) Contract Act (IX of 1872) ---- S. 11 --- Transfer of a minor's property --- Exchange deed and Iqrar Nama --- Proof of attested documents --- Dispute concerning land measuring 2 kanals and 4 marlas situated in khasra No.3728 at Moza Kalpani, District Buner --- Petitioners (Sher Said and others) sought declaration of ownership on the basis of an exchange deed dated 25.03.1980 allegedly executed by their predecessor Said and an Iqrar Nama dated 02.11.1985, together with correction of revenue entries and compensation for improvements; respondent No.1 (Umar Akhtar) sought ejectment and recovery of rent --- Suits were consolidated; after remand, the Trial Court dismissed the declaratory claim, decreed ejectment, but awarded Rs.10,00,000 as compensation for improvements; Appellate Court maintained that decree; High Court allowed the revision of Umar Akhtar, set aside the award of compensation, dismissed the revision of Sher Said and others, and maintained the decree for ejectment --- Held, that the High Court found Umar Akhtar was a minor at the time of both transactions, and the record supported that conclusion --- Alleged documents did not disclose execution through a lawful guardian nor compliance with the principles governing transfer of a minor's property --- S. 11 of the Contract Act, 1872, renders a minor incompetent to contract; a transaction entered into directly with a minor is void ab initio and incapable of conferring enforceable rights --- Even otherwise, the documents were not proved in accordance with law; material attesting witnesses and scribes were not produced, and the mandatory requirements regarding proof of attested documents were not satisfied --- Courts below rightly declined to recognize the alleged transfer. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (X of 1984) ---- Art. 100 --- Documents more than thirty years old --- Presumption as to execution --- Held, that the presumption under Art. 100 is merely evidentiary and rebuttable --- It cannot validate a transaction that is void under substantive law, nor can it cure the incapacity of a minor or dispense with proof where execution is specifically disputed --- A presumption regarding execution cannot transform an invalid transaction into a valid one. (c) Transfer of Property Act ---- Ss. 41 & 53-A --- Ostensible owner --- Part performance --- Held, that neither provision was attracted --- S. 41 requires proof that the transferor was an ostensible owner and/or acting with the consent of the true owner; no such evidence existed on the record --- S. 53-A presupposes a valid and enforceable contract; since the alleged transaction itself had not been proved and was legally incapable of enforcement, no protection could be claimed thereunder. (d) Improvements on another's property --- Compensation --- Unauthorized construction --- Tenant or occupant in permissive possession --- Local Commissioner's report merely noted the existence of structures; it did not establish who raised them, when they were raised, or whether they were constructed with the consent of the owner --- Burden to establish those facts rested upon Sher Said and others --- Held, that a person who voluntarily raises construction or effects improvements upon another's property without the consent of the owner does so at his own risk --- Such unauthorized improvements neither confer title nor create a legal entitlement to compensation --- Law protects ownership and possession; it does not permit an unauthorized occupant to impose financial liability upon the true owner by making unilateral alterations to the property --- A person occupying another's property as a tenant or under permissive possession cannot claim compensation for improvements or constructions raised without the consent of the owner; any such expenditure is incurred at his own risk and does not create a proprietary, equitable or compensatory right in his favour --- High Court was fully justified in setting aside the award of Rs.10,00,000 granted by the courts below. Cited Cases: • Jan Muhammad v. Mst. Zubaida Begum 1982 SCMR 367 • Dilawar Shah v. Jannat Gul PLD 2004 SC 59 Disposition: Civil Appeal No.140-P of 2018 dismissed; Civil Petition No.444-P of 2018 dismissed and leave to appeal refused. (Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment by Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J. (Yahya Afridi, C.J. and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J. on the Bench), Islamabad, 10.06.2026; Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.9---Criminal trial---Benefit of doubt---Probabilities and presumptions---Baldia Town factory fire---Duty of State---Occurrence at Ali Enterprises Garments Factory, Plot No.F-67, Karachi, on 11.09.2012 at about 6:30 p.m. was one of the most unfortunate tragedies in the history of the country, wherein 264 precious human lives were lost and about 60 persons sustained burn injuries---An incident of such magnitude directly engaged the constitutional guarantee of life under Art.9 of the Constitution---Right to life casts a corresponding duty upon the State to protect human life, to enforce safety obligations, and, where life is lost on such a massive scale, to conduct a prompt, scientific, impartial and effective inquiry/investigation so that the actual cause of tragedy may be discovered and the real culprits, if any, may be brought before the Court---At the same time, it is the duty of the Court to see whether the prosecution has proved its case against an accused beyond the shadow of any doubt, in order to ensure that a person who may be innocent should not go to the gallows merely on the basis of presumptions or unreliable evidence---Finding of guilt against an accused person cannot be based merely on high probabilities inferred from evidence---Mere conjectures and probabilities cannot take the place of proof---If there is no reliable evidence or conclusive proof against the petitioners to prove the alleged motive or other charges, convictions and sentences cannot be maintained merely on the basis of presumptions, probabilities or general allegations---There may be some individuals involved in criminal acts, but due to acts of said individuals the entire community or their representative party cannot be blamed or penalized merely on the basis of presumptions or general allegations, unless proved otherwise through tangible and convincing evidence. Naveed Asghar v. The State PLD 2021 SC 600; Ghulam Qadir v. The State 2008 SCMR 1221 and Abdul Mateen v. Sahib Khan PLD 2006 SC 538 ref. (b) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997----S.7---Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss.302(a), 324, 337, 384, 385, 386, 435, 436, 109 & 34---Baldia Town factory fire---FIR initially against factory owners for negligence---Subsequent implication of petitioners after delay of about two and a half years---FIR No.343 dated 12.09.2012 registered at Police Station Site-B, Karachi, by Muhammad Nawaz Gondal, SI/SHO, after more than 21 hours from the occurrence and after thorough inspection of the site---Complainant stated that out of four gates of the factory, three were permanently shut down, iron grills were installed on windows, and no proper arrangement for emergency exit had been made by factory owner Abdul Aziz, his sons Arshad Bhaila (PW-397) and Shahid Bhaila, and management, in collusion with labour, building control, electricity, social security, civil defence and other departments---Petitioners were not named in the FIR---For about two and a half years the prosecution case proceeded on the same lines---After lapse of about two and a half years a completely new story was introduced, upon alleged disclosure of one Rizwan Qureshi, arrested in another case FIR No.61 of 2013 under S.23(1)A of the Sindh Arms Act at Police Station Artillery Maidan, Karachi, before a Joint Investigation Team, that the factory was set on fire by the petitioners and co-accused due to non-payment of ransom of rupees twenty-five crore demanded by leaders of Muttahida Qaumi Movement (Altaf)---Rizwan Qureshi was neither implicated as an accused in the instant case, nor declared a proclaimed offender, nor produced as an approver or witness, and as such the main foundation of the subsequently introduced story was missing---Out of 400 witnesses produced, only Muhammad Arshad (PW-374) claimed to have seen Muhammad Zubair @ Charya petitioner and five unknown co-accused sprinkling chemicals, and only Arshad Bhaila (PW-397), one of the owners, stated that Abdul Rehman @ Bhola petitioner insisted on payment of rupees twenty-five crore---Both said witnesses were initially accused and later made prosecution witnesses after delay of two and a half years, and thus had a motive to falsely depose to save their own skins---Trial Court convicted Muhammad Zubair @ Charya and Abdul Rehman @ Bhola, inter alia, to death on 264 counts under S.7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and S.302(a), P.P.C. read with S.34, P.P.C., with further sentences under Ss.7(b), 7(c) and 7(h) of the Act, Ss.324, 435, 436, 384, 385 and 386, P.P.C., sentences to run concurrently with benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C.---High Court upheld convictions of the petitioners but acquitted four co-accused---Held, that utmost caution and care was required---Prosecution failed to prove its case beyond the shadow of doubt. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.164---Retracted judicial confession---Independent corroboration---Delay in recording confession after police custody---Confession of Abdul Rehman @ Bhola petitioner was recorded on 22.12.2016 after nine days of continuous police custody, he having been arrested on 13.12.2016---No cogent and convincing reason was given for the said delay---A retracted judicial confession of an accused needs independent corroboration, which was very much lacking---Even according to the said confession, the petitioner himself did not set the factory on fire; to that extent the confession was exculpatory and inadmissible---No judicial confession of Muhammad Zubair @ Charya petitioner---It was admitted that no ransom amount was paid---Forensic Science Laboratory reports did not mention that any chemical was detected on items collected from the spot---No incriminating material was recovered from Abdul Rehman @ Bhola petitioner---Part of the confession regarding other murders and setting vehicles on fire was not corroborated by production of any FIR---A delayed confessional statement loses its evidentiary value---Delay of over 24 hours would normally be fatal to acceptance of judicial confession where prosecution fails to explain the delay---Retracted judicial confession could not be relied upon to maintain convictions of the petitioners. Aala Muhammad v. The State 2008 SCMR 649; Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Raza 2008 SCMR 329; Muhammad Ismail v. The State 2017 SCMR 898; Daniel Boyd v. The State 1992 SCMR 196; Sher Ahmed v. The State 2025 SCMR 1717; Muhammad Pervez v. The State 2007 SCMR 670 and The State v. Ahmed Omar Sheikh 2021 SCMR 873 ref. (d) Criminal trial---Belated statements of witnesses---Former accused as star witnesses---Unexplained delay of about two and a half years---Dishonest improvements---Arshad Bhaila (PW-397), being owner of the factory, was himself an accused at the initial stage, his bail petition was dismissed and he was arrested, and he later proceeded abroad after grant of post-arrest bail---His evidence was recorded through video link from Pakistan Consulate, U.A.E.---Excuse of threat by Muttahida Qaumi Movement (Altaf) did not appeal to a prudent mind when the witness and his family were living out of Pakistan and he was himself facing a case punishable with death---Evidence of a witness who remained mum for about two and a half years without plausible explanation is not worthy of reliance---Muhammad Arshad (PW-374) was also himself an accused for about two and a half years---It was not understandable that if Muhammad Zubair @ Charya petitioner intended to sprinkle chemicals, he would ask PW-374 to come in the evening so as to become a witness against him---PW-374 was a fitter, neither a cook nor a waiter---Arshad Bhaila (PW-397) admitted that after the occurrence he employed Muhammad Zubair @ Charya petitioner in his other factory at Godhra Camp, New Karachi, which showed that he himself was sure about innocence of the said petitioner---Muhammad Kashif (PW-360) did not depose the facts attributed to him by PW-397---PW-374 had stated in his police statement that Muhammad Zubair @ Charya petitioner tried to save lives of female workers, but changed his evidence and made dishonest improvements before the Trial Court---Evidence of a witness who makes dishonest improvements about material facts is not worthy of reliance---Presence of PW-374 and other witnesses who deposed against the petitioners, except PW-397, at the spot was not free from doubt---PW-374 did not produce service card, was summoned from Punjab, and did not give address of the factory in statements under S.161, Cr.P.C. or before the Magistrate. Ghulam Qadir v. The State 2008 SCMR 1221; Muhammad Asif v. The State 2017 SCMR 486; Rahat Ali v. The State 2010 SCMR 584; Fateh Khan v. The State 2025 SCMR 1408; Khial Muhammad v. The State 2024 SCMR 1490; Bashir Muhammad Khan v. The State 2022 SCMR 986; Naveed Asghar v. The State PLD 2021 SC 600; Muhammad Javed v. The State 2020 SCMR 2116; Farman Ahmed v. The State 2007 SCMR 1825 and Ibrar Hussain v. The State 2007 SCMR 605 ref. (e) Forensic evidence---Chemical examination---Crime scene---Belatedly introduced story that the factory was intentionally set on fire with chemicals was not corroborated by any Forensic Science Laboratory report---Articles were recovered from the spot and sent to the chemical examiner/Forensic Science Laboratory with delay of almost three years from the occurrence---Crime scene was not shown to have been secured---High-powered commission constituted in the case declined to carry out expert chemical tests to conclusively uncover the cause of fire---Opinion in one report that, due to discontinued pattern of fire, there was chance of human intervention, did not mention use of chemicals and did not support the subsequently introduced story. (f) Criminal trial---Injured witnesses---Star witnesses---Out of 60 injured, 34 appeared in the witness box but none uttered a single word against both petitioners---Liaquat Hussain (PW-315) stated that he did not find any suspect in the area where fire took place, and Saleem Khan (PW-372) stated that he did not see anybody causing fire or throwing chemical inside the factory---Prosecution eye-witnesses who deposed against the petitioners were neither injured nor produced convincing evidence of their presence at the spot---No record of the factory was produced to establish that Muhammad Zubair @ Charya petitioner or his five unknown guests entered the factory on the day of occurrence---Injured witnesses produced their service cards, whereas witnesses who deposed against the petitioners did not. (g) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984----Art.129(g)---Withholding of best evidence---CCTV cameras---CCTV cameras were installed in Ali Enterprises Garments Factory but recording was never produced---Best evidence of CCTV camera recordings having been withheld, an adverse inference under Art.129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, can validly be drawn against the prosecution that had the said evidence been produced it would not have supported the prosecution case---Whenever best evidence is withheld by the prosecution, the prosecution cannot avoid its adverse consequences. Azhar Iqbal v. The State 2026 SCMR 182; Lal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1846; Riaz Ahmed v. The State 2010 SCMR 846 and Riasat Ali v. The State 2024 SCMR 1224 ref. (h) Criminal trial---Motive---Demand of ransom---Leaders of political party acquitted---No personal motive of petitioners---According to the prosecution's own case, ransom was demanded by leaders of Muttahida Qaumi Movement (Altaf), but the said leaders, namely Abdul Rauf Siddiqui, Dr. Abdul Sattar Khan and others, had already been acquitted by the Trial Court and appeal against their acquittal had been dismissed by the High Court, and no petition had been filed against them before Supreme Court---Motive disbelieved against the leaders of the party cannot be believed against the petitioners---Majority of employees/workers of the factory were affiliated with the same party to which the petitioners belonged---Ransom was demanded from factory owners, not from the deceased or injured workers, yet the owners did not receive a single scratch though present at the spot---Prosecution failed to prove the alleged motive---Statements of Amir (PW-373), Muhammad Mansoor (PW-376), Muhammad Kashif (PW-360) and Abdul Raees (PW-361) that they saw Muhammad Zubair @ Charya petitioner after the occurrence smoking cigarettes in a cool manner and that he locked the doors, were unreliable---Guards of the factory gates, who according to the prosecution were present, had already been acquitted by the High Court and no appeal against their acquittal had been filed---FIR itself stated that three of four doors had been locked by the owners few months earlier---Not a single legal heir of the deceased persons or a single injured supported the prosecution case against the petitioners---If there is a single circumstance which creates doubt in the prosecution case, the same is sufficient to acquit the accused, whereas the instant case was replete with a number of circumstances creating serious doubts. Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 and Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 ref. Cited Cases: • Naveed Asghar and 2 others v. The State PLD 2021 SC 600 • Ghulam Qadir and 2 others v. The State 2008 SCMR 1221 • Abdul Mateen v. Sahib Khan and others PLD 2006 SC 538 • Aala Muhammad v. The State 2008 SCMR 649 • Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Raza 2008 SCMR 329 • Muhammad Ismail v. The State 2017 SCMR 898 • Daniel Boyd v. The State 1992 SCMR 196 • Sher Ahmed v. The State 2025 SCMR 1717 • Muhammad Pervez v. The State 2007 SCMR 670 • The State v. Ahmed Omar Sheikh 2021 SCMR 873 • Muhammad Asif v. The State 2017 SCMR 486 • Rahat Ali v. The State 2010 SCMR 584 • Fateh Khan v. The State 2025 SCMR 1408 • Khial Muhammad v. The State 2024 SCMR 1490 • Bashir Muhammad Khan v. The State 2022 SCMR 986 • Muhammad Javed v. The State 2020 SCMR 2116 • Farman Ahmed v. The State 2007 SCMR 1825 • Ibrar Hussain v. The State 2007 SCMR 605 • Azhar Iqbal v. The State 2026 SCMR 182 • Lal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1846 • Riaz Ahmed v. The State 2010 SCMR 846 • Riasat Ali v. The State 2024 SCMR 1224 • Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 • Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 Disposition: Criminal Petition Nos.178-K of 2023 and 179-K of 2023 converted into appeals and allowed; judgments dated 11.09.2023 of High Court of Sindh at Karachi in Special Criminal A.T.A. Nos.133 and 134 of 2020 and Confirmation Case No.06 of 2020, and dated 22.09.2020 of Anti-Terrorism Court-VII, Central Prison at Karachi, set aside; Muhammad Zubair alias Chariya and Abdul Rehman alias Bhola acquitted of all the charges while extending them the benefit of doubt, to be released forthwith unless required in any other case. Criminal Petition No.231-K of 2023 for expunction of remarks against Muttahida Qaumi Movement Pakistan disposed of as having borne fruit. Criminal Petition Nos.110-K of 2021 and 111-K of 2021, filed by legal heirs of ten deceased persons, became infructuous and were disposed of accordingly. (Crl.P. Nos.178-K, 179-K & 231-K of 2023 and Crl.P. Nos.110-K & 111-K of 2021, detailed reasons of short order dated 10.06.2026, Islamabad, by Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, J. (Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ. on the Bench); Approved for reporting)

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----S. 302---Murder---Violence against woman exercising lawful rights---Death/life sentence---Concurrent findings---Held, no perversity or misreading of evidence; findings well reasoned and based on proper appreciation of record---Constitutional imperative to protect life and dignity of women and ensure those exercising lawful rights are not subjected to violence with impunity---No basis to interfere with concurrent conviction. Disposition: Petition dismissed; leave refused. Dated 10.06.2026.

Summary: (a) Supreme Court Rules, 2025 (as adopted by the Federal Constitutional Court)----O. XXVIII, R. 1 & Code of Civil Procedure, 1908----O. XLVII---Review jurisdiction---Scope---Petitioner (PIA) sought review of order dated 17.10.2025 of the Supreme Court dismissing C.P.L.A. No. 5882/2021 as withdrawn, contending that its request for withdrawal was conditional upon an observation that the High Court of Sindh's judgment dated 12.10.2021 would not operate as a precedent in similar cases of its employees---Held, review is not a routine procedure nor an appeal in disguise; its jurisdiction is extremely limited and may be exercised only where there is a patent and manifest error apparent on the face of the record, an omission of material significance, or a circumstance resulting in miscarriage of justice---No error apparent on the face of the record was pointed out and no sufficient ground was made out---Petitioner failed to bring its case within the parameters of O. XXVIII, R. 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2025 read with O. XLVII, C.P.C. (b) Review---Conduct and delay of petitioner---Order allegedly not reflecting what was announced in open Court---Held, petitioner was expected to act with due diligence and promptitude by immediately bringing the matter to the notice of the Bench, or the concerned member, through the office of the Court; no such effort was made and petitioner remained silent for more than a month before filing review---Such conduct does not inspire confidence and militates against bona fide exercise of the discretionary review jurisdiction. (c) Precedential value of impugned judgment---Observation sought to be incorporated in order of withdrawal---Held, the observation sought was itself not legally warranted; without hearing the parties on merits and without adjudicating upon the issues, the Court could not render any declaration or observation regarding precedential value or future applicability of the impugned judgment in similar cases, and any such observation, made without proper adjudication, would travel beyond the scope of the proceedings and might prejudice rights of parties not before the Court. (d) Withdrawal of petition---Request for withdrawal not a concession---Reliance on Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius (AIR 1954 SC 526) on error regarding concession of counsel---Held, reliance wholly misconceived and distinguishable on facts and in law; matter did not pertain to a concession regarding rights or liabilities of parties or misunderstanding as to its scope---Request by counsel for withdrawal of a petition cannot be equated with a concession on a question of law or fact, particularly when respondents were not present before the Court; petitioner's own case was that it sought withdrawal when it sensed the Bench was not inclined to grant leave. Cited Cases: • Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 526 (e) Advocates---Affidavit by counsel regarding facts of case in which he is engaged---Propriety---Held, affidavit subsequently filed by learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be permitted to override, vary or supplement a judicial order formally passed by the Court---Superior Courts have consistently deprecated the practice of advocates filing affidavits concerning facts of cases in which they are professionally engaged, as not in consonance with professional ethics and propriety. Cited Cases: • Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Nawaz PLD 2004 SC 489 Disposition: Review petition (F.C.R.P. No. 12/2025 in C.P.L.A. No. 5882/2021) found meritless and dismissed; no order as to costs. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan (as amended by Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025)----Arts. 175F(1)(c) & 175F(2), 199---Federal Constitutional Court---Jurisdiction---Appeals from judgments of High Courts under Art. 199---Transfer of pending matters---Held, that Federal Constitutional Court was established with exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals arising from judgments, decrees or final orders of the High Courts passed under Art. 199, subject to grant of leave under Art. 175F(1)(c), and Supreme Court ceased to have jurisdiction over such matters---Present case being of that nature stood automatically transferred to the Federal Constitutional Court by virtue of Art. 175F(2). (b) Compulsory Service in the Armed Forces Ordinance, 1971----S. 9A (as inserted by Ordinance of 1978 and amended by Ordinances of 1984 and 2000)---Medical practitioner released from Armed Forces---Counting of compulsory service towards seniority and pay---Subsequent employment in Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL), a public limited company---Respondent, a qualified doctor called up on 04.03.1981 under the Ordinance of 1971 and released on 21.10.1989 after nine years and twenty-nine days, joined the Oil and Gas Development Corporation on 18.08.1992 after a gap of almost three years during which he had joined Cadet College Petaro, and his successive applications for benefit of S. 9A were declined, except for grant of two advance increments---Held, that S. 9A is beneficial and compensatory in nature, intended to mitigate hardship of medical practitioners and other essential persons compulsorily inducted into Armed Forces, and its non obstante clause gives it primacy over other laws---However, the provision affects the rights and expectations of existing civil servants and operates in a delicate balance between relief to persons subjected to compulsory service and stability of service structures; benefit under S. 9A is neither automatic nor absolute, a person seeking it must strictly satisfy the statutory conditions, and claim must fall squarely within the provision and cannot be extended by implication or liberal construction---OGDCL, in its present corporate form as a public limited company, does not prima facie owe any statutory obligation under S. 9A, it not being the case of respondent that OGDCL is the Federal or a Provincial Government, is controlled by either of them through majority shareholding, or is a local body---Statutory body, upon incorporation as public limited company, loses its earlier legal character. Cited Cases: • Maqsood Ahmed Toor v. Federation of Pakistan 2000 SCMR 928 (c) Oil and Gas Development Corporation (Re-organization) Ordinance, 2001----Ss. 5 & 7---Successor-in-interest of statutory Corporation---Transfer of employees---Saving and continuity provision---Whether OGDCL as successor was liable for claim under S. 9A of Ordinance of 1971 allegedly accrued against predecessor Corporation---Corporation was incorporated as public limited company on 23.10.1997, and Ordinance of 2001 given retrospective effect from that date repealed the Ordinance of 1961 by S. 7---Held, that S. 5 is a saving and continuity provision, embodying principle that conversion was merely a change in juristic form and not termination or novation of service relationship; it creates legal fiction only to the extent of treating employees as employees of OGDCL on the same terms and conditions applicable on date of incorporation, neither creates new rights nor enlarges existing rights and does not revive claims which had either not accrued or had been declined and allowed to become stale---Claim of respondent under S. 9A had been expressly rejected by Corporation on 19.10.1994, hence no vested or crystallized right existed on date of incorporation which could be preserved by S. 5---Section 5 protects only rights and privileges actually subsisting and available immediately before conversion, and cannot be construed as making OGDCL inherit liabilities in respect of disputed, unrecognized or stale claims; respondent could derive no assistance from S. 5. (d) Precedent---Ratio decidendi---Distinguishable facts---Capt. (Retd.) Abdul Qayyum's case---High Court had relied on judgment in Capt. (Retd.) Abdul Qayyum v. Government of Punjab (C.A. No. 1895 of 2000 decided on 16.12.2002), where officer was appointed in the same year as his release from Pakistan Army in a department of Provincial Government---Held, that in that case subsequent employment fell squarely within S. 9A and there was hardly any break between military release and civil appointment, whereas in present case OGDCL did not fall within any entity enumerated in S. 9A and there was neither continuity of service nor an immediate transition from military service---Ratio decidendi of a judgment is to be understood in the backdrop of its own facts, and a slight variation in facts may make a world of difference to precedential value---Analogy drawn by High Court was wholly misconceived and judgment was of no assistance to respondent. Cited Cases: • Capt. (Retd.) Abdul Qayyum v. Government of Punjab 2003 PLC (C.S.) 1008 (e) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Delay and laches---Repeated representations---Fresh cause of action---Respondent's claim under S. 9A was rejected on 19.10.1994, whereafter he submitted successive applications dated 05.07.2000, 01.12.2002, 27.01.2009 and 01.02.2011, all rejected, and filed constitutional petition on 21.11.2011 after last rejection dated 29.04.2011---High Court neither adverted to objection of delay and laches nor returned any finding thereon---Held, that laches is a doctrine under which a party possessing an enforceable right may lose the remedy if the claim is hit by delay and acquiescence; laches per se is not an absolute bar to constitutional jurisdiction, and question has to be examined in the light of facts of each case, but unless a satisfactory and plausible explanation for delay is forthcoming it cannot be overlooked---Distinction exists between delay in instituting proceedings within period prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1908, where each day's delay is to be explained under S. 5, and lapse of time in invoking constitutional jurisdiction, for which no period of limitation is prescribed, which is examined on equitable principles since such jurisdiction is discretionary and relief equitable; party guilty of contumacious lethargy, inaction, laxity or gross negligence may be non-suited---Cause of action, if any, accrued in 1994 on rejection of first claim, and subsequent applications, not contemplated by any law or rules, did not give rise to fresh cause of action or extend limitation or revive a stale cause of action; permitting litigant to overcome bar of laches through repeated applications on same subject would render the doctrine nugatory---Constitutional petition invoked after about seventeen years without plausible explanation, High Court having failed to advert to this material aspect, and petition ought not to have been entertained---On ground of delay and laches alone, constitutional petition was liable to be dismissed. Cited Cases: • Jawad Mir Muhammadi v. Haroon Mirza PLD 2007 SC 472 • State Bank of Pakistan v. Imtiaz Ali Khan 2012 PLC (C.S.) 218 • S.A. Jameel v. Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Cooperative Department 2005 SCMR 126 • John Ojobo Agbeyegbe v. Festus Makene Ikomi PLD 1953 Privy Council 19 • Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Hurd L.R. 5 P.C. 221 • Premier Cloth Mills Ltd., Lyallpur v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance PLD 1976 Lahore 1553 Disposition: By majority of 2 to 1 (Syed Arshad Hussain Shah, J. dissenting), petition converted into appeal and allowed; impugned order dated 26.10.2022 of the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court Hyderabad in C.P. No. D-1850/2011 set aside and writ petition filed by respondent dismissed; no order as to costs; reasons for short order dated 10.06.2026. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Where material before the Court prima facie discloses obstruction in execution of judicial orders or interference with judicial proceedings by a public functionary, the Court is justified in referring the matter to the competent authority for departmental action or investigation in accordance with law. Such referral does not constitute a finding of guilt or impose any punishment and, being merely recommendatory in nature, ordinarily does not warrant interference in constitutional jurisdiction.