Summary: Remedy of appeal in terms of Section 14 of the Family Court Act, 1964 being available against dismissal of application under Section 476 Cr.P.C. by the Family Court, which was not available, hence, constitution petition was premature and not maintainable.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 188---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O. XXVIII, R. 1---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XLVII, R. 1---Review---Error apparent on the face of the record---Scope---Petitioner sought review of the majority judgment dated 29.12.2022 in C.P.L.A. Nos.3436-L and 3437-L of 2022, reported as Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi v. Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif (2023 SCMR 636), whereby petitions against the Lahore High Court consolidated order dated 07.12.2022, upholding striking out of his defence in a defamation suit, had been dismissed by a majority of 2-1---Held, that under Art. 188 the Supreme Court may review any judgment or order, subject to law and rules; O. XXVIII, R. 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, provides that in a civil proceeding review may be on grounds similar to those in O. XLVII, R. 1, C.P.C.---A petition for review is neither a surrogate for an appeal nor a disguised revision; it does not permit a de novo rehearing or recursive re-argument of merits already adjudicated---Mere procedural irregularities which do not fundamentally alter the scales of justice lack the gravity to disturb a judgment in review---An error apparent on the face of the record, whether of fact or law, must be self-evident, floating conspicuously on the surface, requiring no meticulous search; an error that necessitates an intricate process of reasoning, or where a reasonable divergence of opinion may exist, falls outside that narrow ambit---Scope of an error apparent extends to instances where a judgment proceeds upon an erroneous assumption of material facts, or where the Court has overlooked a fundamental question of law or a pivotal aspect of the record having a direct and decisive bearing on the conclusions---Where the Court has arrived at a conscious and deliberate determination on a point of law or fact, the remedy of review remains incompetent---Sanctuary of review is reserved strictly for rectification of patent errors, ensuring that finality does not become a shield for injustice---By a majority of two-to-one, the majority judgment under review was held to suffer from errors apparent on the face of the record resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. XI, R. 21---Non-compliance with order to answer interrogatories---Striking out defence---Penal provision---Willful default---Lex non cogit ad impossibilia---Trial Court by order dated 20.10.2022 dismissed objections to interrogatories and directed answers, and by order dated 24.11.2022 struck out the petitioner's defence---Petitioner had been shot at a political rally on 03.11.2022, underwent surgery and was hospitalized; the Trial Court itself accepted that ground for adjournment on 08.11.2022 and 17.11.2022---Held, that O. XI, R. 21 is not a routine tool of case management; it is the death knell of a party's defence and is strictly penal, to be construed strictissimi juris---Penal provisions should be strictly construed and used with caution (Messrs United Bank Limited v. Yousuf Haji Noor Muhammad Dhadhi, PLJ 1987 SC 636)---Two requirements: an order for discovery or answers to interrogatories, and non-compliance therewith---Test of default is whether it was willful, i.e. deliberate and intentional, not accidental, inadvertent or for reasons beyond the party's control---Underlying consideration before invoking R. 21 is that non-compliance was willful, deliberate, intentional and contumacious---An order striking out defence should not be made unless there has been obstinacy or contumacy or a willful attempt to disregard the order of the court, and the rule must be worked with caution as a last resort (Messrs Babar Sewing Machine Company v. Tirlok Nath Mahajan, AIR 1978 SC 1436)---Power vests in the court but does not oblige it to strike out defence in every case---Once the Trial Court accepted the factum of the shooting on 08.11.2022, the element of wilfulness was legally extinguished---When a party is hospitalized due to gunshot wounds, failure to sign an affidavit or consult counsel is a physical impossibility, not a contumacious act---A default occasioned by physical catastrophe or force majeure cannot be characterised as willful---Willfulness of a default must be assessed strictly in relation to the specific order on the relevant date of hearing, and invocation of R. 21 cannot be predicated upon past conduct or a retrospective tally of adjournments---Judiciary's duty to ensure expeditious justice does not grant a licence to commit summary injustice---Trial Court had lesser alternatives, including imposition of costs (Qazi Naveed ul Islam v. District Judge, 2023 SCP 32)---Striking out of defence in the circumstances was mechanical and a gross injustice; the right to a fair defence must prevail. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. XI, R. 21---Formal application by party interrogating---Suo motu striking out of defence---Majority (Ishtiaq Ibrahim, J., concurring with Ayesha A. Malik, J.) held that the statutory architecture of R. 21 provides a self-contained and mandatory mechanism: existence of a specific order; failure to comply; and that the party interrogating or seeking discovery may apply to the Court for an order to that effect---When the law prescribes a particular mode for performance of an act, that act must be performed in that manner or not at all---Phrase "apply to the Court" is a statutory command vesting the initiative in the aggrieved party; the legislature avoided language such as "the Court may" used elsewhere (e.g. O. VIII, R. 10) when suo motu powers are intended---Power to strike out a defence under R. 21 is contingent and derivative, remaining dormant until a formal application is preferred---Record was void of any such application by the respondent---Repeated opposition to adjournments could not be treated as an oral application for striking out defence; for a penal action as grave as deprivation of the right of defence, a formal, written and documented application is a mandatory prerequisite---By proceeding in the absence of a statutory trigger, the Trial Court erred, and the majority judgment under review, by validating that overreach through an inference of suo motu empowerment, ignored the clear letter of the law. (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 10A---Fair trial---Striking out defence---When a court contemplates a measure that deprives a person of the fundamental right of defence, a right anchored in the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial under Art. 10A, it must exhibit the utmost judicial restraint and proceed with absolute caution---Right of defence cannot be struck out without considering all relevant factors, and the court must weigh the balance between a fair trial and the circumstances at hand, including the petitioner's public shooting and injury. Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, J., dissenting: Review petitions disclosed no error apparent on the face of the record; the case was one of delay on the part of the petitioner, written statement having been filed after about four years, and failure to answer interrogatories despite repeated opportunities amounted to willful disobedience; there was no justification to depart from the earlier view, and the petitions ought to be dismissed on merits. Cited Cases: • Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi v. Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif 2023 SCMR 636 • Messrs United Bank Limited v. Yousuf Haji Noor Muhammad Dhadhi PLJ 1987 SC 636 • M/s. Babar Sewing Machine Company v. Tirlok Nath Mahajan (1978) 4 SCC 188 • Messrs Babar Sewing Machine Company v. Tirlok Nath Mahajan AIR 1978 SC 1436 • Miss Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash and others (1980) 3 SCC 610 • Bilmal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal (1981) 3 SCC 486 • Asha Rani Gupta v. Vineet Kumar 2022 SCC OnLine SC 829 • Qazi Naveed ul Islam v. District Judge 2023 SCP 32 Disposition: By a majority of two-to-one (Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, J., dissenting), Civil Review Petition No.2-L of 2023 allowed; majority judgment dated 29.12.2022 set aside along with the judgments of the High Court and the Trial Court; matter remanded to the Trial Court with direction to provide the petitioner reasonable opportunity to file his reply to the interrogatories and to proceed with the suit in accordance with law. Civil Review Petition No.1-L of 2023 dismissed. (C.R.P. Nos.1-L and 2-L of 2023, Supreme Court of Pakistan, announced in open Court on 11.06.2026 at Islamabad; Approved for Reporting)

Summary: Justice Ayesha Malik's note: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.188---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XXVI, R.1---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLVII, R.1---Review jurisdiction---Scope---Review was neither substitute for appeal nor disguised rehearing of matter already adjudicated---Court could not revisit a conscious determination merely because another view was possible---Jurisdiction was confined to discovery of new and important matter, mistake or error apparent on face of record or other sufficient reason---Error had to be patent, self-evident and capable of being noticed without elaborate reasoning---Review was nevertheless available where judgment proceeded on erroneous assumption of material fact, overlooked a fundamental legal question or ignored a pivotal aspect of record having direct bearing upon result. Cited Cases: • Inter Quest Informatics Service v. Commissioner Income Tax 2025 SCMR 257 • Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2024 SC 1199 • Haji Musharraf Mahmood Khan v. Sardar Zada Zafar Abbas PLD 2023 SC 588 • Oil & Gas Regulatory Authority v. Gas & Oil Pakistan Ltd. PLD 2025 SC 351 • District Education Officer v. Sonia Begum PLD 2025 SC 720 • Commissioner Inland Revenue, Karachi v. MSC Switzerland Geneva 2023 SCMR 1011 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XI, R.21---Failure to answer interrogatories or comply with discovery order---Striking out defence---Nature of provision---Rule was penal in character and its invocation could result in dismissal of suit or complete deprivation of defendant’s right to defend---Being strictissimi juris, provision was to be construed strictly and exercised with utmost judicial caution---Two foundational requirements were existence of a specific order directing answers, discovery or inspection and a failure to comply with such order---Penal consequence was not automatic and could be imposed only where default was proved to be wilful, deliberate, intentional, obstinate or contumacious. Cited Cases: • Messrs United Bank Limited v. Yousuf Haji Noor Muhammad Dhadhi PLJ 1987 SC 636 • Messrs Babar Sewing Machine Company v. Tirlok Nath Mahajan AIR 1978 SC 1436 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XI, R.21---Wilful default---Test---Wilfulness was to be assessed with reference to circumstances attending non-compliance with particular order on relevant date rather than retrospectively inferred merely from earlier adjournments or past procedural conduct---Default caused by accident, incapacity, force majeure or circumstances beyond party’s control could not be characterized as contumacious disobedience---Provision was intended to discipline recalcitrant litigant, not punish one physically incapable of compliance. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XI, R.21---Defendant injured in widely reported shooting incident and hospitalized---Failure to submit answers to interrogatories---Trial Court had accepted hospitalization and inability to contact defendant as sufficient grounds on 08.11.2022 and 17.11.2022 but struck out defence on 24.11.2022 while same incapacity continued---Once Court accepted factual inability to comply, element of wilfulness stood negated---Failure to sign affidavit, consult counsel or finalize answers while hospitalized with gunshot injuries was physical impossibility, not deliberate defiance---Law did not compel performance of an impossible act: lex non cogit ad impossibilia. (e) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.10-A---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XI, R.21---Fair trial and right of defence---Striking out defence was an exceptional and drastic measure, described as death knell of party’s defence---Court contemplating deprivation of substantive right to defend was required to exercise maximum restraint, consider all relevant circumstances and prefer adjudication on merits over technical knockout---Expeditious disposal, though important, did not authorize summary injustice. (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XI, R.21---Judicial discretion---Proportionality and alternative sanctions---Rule vested discretion in Court and did not oblige it to strike out defence in every case of default---Before imposing ultimate penalty, Court was required to assess explanation, duration and nature of default, prejudice to opposite party and overall conduct, and consider lesser measures including realistic peremptory directions and compensatory or deterrent costs---Power could appropriately be exercised where party persistently absented itself or caused prolonged, inordinate and inexcusable delay resulting in substantial prejudice---Mechanical invocation without recorded finding of wilful disobedience was impermissible. Cited Cases: • Asha Rani Gupta v. Vineet Kumar 2022 SCC OnLine SC 829 • Miss Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash and others (1980) 3 SCC 610 • Bimal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal (1981) 3 SCC 486 • Qazi Naveed-ul-Islam v. District Judge 2023 SCP 32 (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XI, R.21---Past history of adjournments---Effect---Earlier delay and repeated adjournments could inform case management but could not retrospectively convert a presently justified and involuntary default into wilful disobedience---Trial Court had routinely granted numerous adjournments for years without imposing costs or recording deliberate obstruction, yet abruptly resorted to most severe sanction less than a month after defendant’s shooting and hospitalization---Such disproportionate shift ignored immediate circumstances and constituted mechanical exercise of discretion. (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XI, R.21---Application by interrogating party---Jurisdictional prerequisite---Statutory sequence required: a specific discovery or interrogatory order; non-compliance attracting potential penal consequence; and an application by party interrogating or seeking discovery or inspection for an order to that effect---Phrase “may apply to the Court” vested initiative in aggrieved party and kept penal jurisdiction dormant until formally invoked---Unlike provisions expressly authorizing Court to act on its own motion, O.XI, R.21 did not confer suo motu power to strike out defence. (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XI, R.21---Formal written application---Requirement---For grave penal action depriving a party of defence, informal opposition to adjournment or presumed oral request was legally insufficient---Record showed respondent had sought imposition of costs but had not filed an application seeking striking out of defence---Formal, written and documented application was mandatory statutory trigger---Trial Court acted without jurisdiction by invoking R.21 suo motu, and majority judgment under review committed patent error by treating repeated opposition to adjournments as equivalent to an oral application. Cited Cases: • Mrs. Namita Dhar v. Dr. Amalendu Sen AIR 1977 Calcutta 187 • Ranipet Chemicals & Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Swastik Stainless Steel Stores AIR 1986 Calcutta 76 (j) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.188---Error apparent on face of record---Review of majority judgment---Original majority validated striking out of defence by relying upon petitioner’s historical conduct while overlooking immediate medical incapacity and also assumed suo motu jurisdiction under O.XI, R.21 despite absence of formal application---Both errors were patent, went to root of penal jurisdiction and resulted in manifest miscarriage of justice---Review was therefore maintainable and necessary to prevent finality of judgment from becoming shield for injustice. (k) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XI, R.21---Case management---Duty of Trial Court---Courts were responsible for timely progression of litigation and could discourage adjournments through diligent case management, costs and lawful procedural sanctions---Nonetheless, balance between expedition and fair trial had to be maintained---Public shooting, surgery and hospitalization furnished legitimate cause for reasonable adjournment, and right to defence prevailed over mechanical insistence upon immediate compliance. (l) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.188---Review jurisdiction---Dissenting opinion---One learned Judge found no error apparent, considered record to demonstrate persistent delay including filing of written statement after approximately four years and repeated failure to answer interrogatories, and would have dismissed review petitions---By majority of two to one, however, review concerning order striking out defence was allowed. Disposition---Civil Review Petition No.1-L of 2023 dismissed---Civil Review Petition No.2-L of 2023 allowed by majority of two to one---Majority judgment dated 29.12.2022, along with judgments of Lahore High Court and Trial Court striking out petitioner’s defence, set aside---Matter remanded to Trial Court to provide reasonable opportunity to petitioner to file answers to interrogatories in compliance with order dated 20.10.2022 and thereafter proceed with suit in accordance with law. Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi v. Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif, Civil Review Petitions Nos.1-L and 2-L of 2023, Supreme Court of Pakistan, heard on 08.04.2026 and announced on 11.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: A conjoint reading of Sections 391 and 306 of the Companies Act, 2017 ("Act") demonstrates that while Section 391 regulates transfers and alterations effected after the commencement of the winding up proceedings, Section 306 merely identifies the point in time from which such commencement is to be reckoned. By itself, Section 306 of the Act neither invalidates nor does render void any transfer, disposition, or alteration in the status of a member of the company. The legal consequence contemplated by Section 391 of the Act is not attracted merely upon the filing of a winding up petition; rather, the provision becomes operative upon the passing of a winding up order. A transfer of shares made after the presentation of a winding up petition but prior to the passing of a winding-up order does not ipso facto becomes void under Sections 306 and 391 of the Act, as the presentation of a winding up petition cannot be treated as equivalent to a winding up order so as to automatically invalidate bona fide transactions undertaken during the intervening period.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: A decree of jactitation does not fetter the criminal court from probing the victim's consent in a rape trial