Summary: ----S. 115 & O. XIV, Rr. 1, 5---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 54---Issues, framing of---Suit dismissed without addressing all the issues framed---Legality---Suit for declaration with permanent injunction---No declaration as to ownership was sought by the petitioners---Issues were framed in the suit---Suit was dismissed solely on the basis of issue of maintainability---Contention of the petitioners was that remaining issues framed by the Trial Court had not been addressed at the time of dismissing the suit---Validity---High Court held that both the courts below had rightly dismissed the suit on the ground that the same was not maintainable, as it sought a negative declaration- --Main issue in the revision was the maintainability of the suit, thus, on that score too the revision was liable to be dismissed---High Court while concluding that the suit was not maintainable went on to examine the contents of the plaint and the written statement and found that there was no reason for the Trial Court to have even framed Issues Nos. 2, 4 and 5---Respondents had not denied anything in the written statement that contravened plaintiff's assertion that could culminate in framing Issues Nos. 2 & 4---Issue No.3 regarding the predecessor of petitioners being allegedly harassed by the respondents stood abated on the death of the predecessor of the petitioners---Plaint further contained no assertion, which could lead the Trial Court to frame Issue No.5, therefore, the Trial Court correctly concluded not to decide any other issue except the issue of maintainability as all the remaining issues were misconceived and did not arise from the pleadings---Trial Court cannot frame an issue, which does not arise from the plaint and written statement---High Court has the power to strike down an issue which has been wrongly framed and modify the settlement of issues while exercising its civil jurisdiction under S. 115, C.P.C., yet there might be no need to do so at this stage as the two courts below had rightly dismissed the suit on the ground of maintainability---Revision petition was dismissed accordingly. 1982 SCMR 815; PLD 2009 Kar. 38; 2002 CLC 1262; 1992 CLC 1022; 1987 CLC 229; 2021 YLR 2944 and 1999 CLC 62 r ef. Zahid Hussain Awan v. United Bank Limited 2018 MLD 1369 rel. Imdad Ali Mashori for Applicant No.1. Respondent No. 1 in person. Abdul Waris Bhutto, Assistant Advocate General, Sindh for Respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4. Date of hearing: 2nd February, 2024.

Summary: ----Ss. 265 & 272---Application for grant of Letter of Administration---Term "District Delegate"---High Court may appoint such judicial officer within any district to act for the District Judge as Delegates to grant Letter of Administration in non-contentious case under S. 265 subsection (1) of the Succession Act, 1925; Judicial Officers so appointed are called "District Delegates". (b) Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)--- ----Ss. 286, Explanation & 272---Application for grant of Letter of Administration---Term 'contention'---Term 'contention is defined in Explanation of S. 286 of Succession Act, 1925, which (contention) means the appearance of any one in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader duly appointed to act on his behalf, to oppose the proceeding. (c) Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)--- ----Ss. 265, 272, 286 & 288---Application for grant of Letter of Administration---Contentious case---District Delegate, powers of---Scope---Contention (objection) raised in the application---Scope and effect---Succession appeal was filed against the order passed by the District Delegate whereby the application made by the respondent for grant of Letter of Administration was allowed---Objection/contention of the appellants was that the respondent had divorced the deceased about 35 years back; as such, application made for grant of Letter of Administration was unjustified and mala fide---Validity---Under S. 272 of the Succession Act, 1925, the District Delegate may grant Letter of Administration in an application for grant of the same, in which there is no contention---In the present case, there was contention of the appellant, as such, the District Delegate could not have granted Letter of Administration under S. 286 of the Succession Act, 1925---District Delegate can only deal with non-contentious matter; as soon as, caveat is entered and proceeding becomes contentious, he loses his jurisdiction and therefore, cannot grant Letter of Administration---In contentious cases, S. 288 of the Succession Act, 1925, provides procedure which prescribes two alternatives in contentious cases---District Delegate may either return the petition to the applicant in order that the same may be presented to the District Judge ,or the District Delegate may impound the petition and, in that case, he shall himself send the same to the District Judge-- -Section 288 of the Succession Act, 1925, firstly, applies to all contentious cases, and secondly in doubtful cases, but in either case, the District Delegate has no jurisdiction to frame issues and proceed with the proceedings after contest---In the present case, appellants opposed the grant of Letter of Administration to the respondent with the contention that the deceased/lady was divorced and, therefore, respondent could not be granted Letter of Administration---District Delegate on submission of such contention ought to have, either returned the application to the respondent for presentation to the District Judge or should have by himself sent the same to the District Judge---District Delegate instead of doing that, proceeded to frame issues and granted the Letter of Administration and exercised jurisdiction of District Judge which was not vested in him under the said provision---Thus, impugned order was simply void and liable to be set aside---District Delegate ought to have taken notice of S. 288 of the Succession Act, 1925, however, he appeared to have overlooked the mandatory provision of S. 288 of the Succession Act, 1925---High Court set-aside the impugned order passed by the District Delegate (Civil Judge) in application of Letter of Administration and matter was remanded to the District Delegate with direction to deal with the said application strictly in accordance with S. 288 of the Succession Act, 1925---Appeal was disposed of accordingly. Jameel Ahmed Khan Babai for Appellants. Muhammad Nawaz Khan Tareen for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Date of hearing: 6th November, 2023.

Summary: ----Ss. 7 & 12---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Habeas corpus---Custody of minor---Determining factors---Pendency of matter before Family Court---Petitioner was father of minor children who sought their custody on the plea that respondent-mother had illegally removed them from habitual residence in Canada to Pakistan---Validity---In custody disputes, concept of child's best interest prioritizes the child's welfare and well-being above parents' interests---It requires a thorough assessment of various factors, including their physical, emotional and psychological welfare and their cultural, social and educational needs---It emphasizes that subject to their age and maturity, child's opinions and preferences should be given due consideration when determining custody arrangements, ensuring their active participation in decision-making---Decisions must not discriminate against the child based on factors such as gender, race or disability---Instead, children should be provided a safe growth and long-term happiness---Respondent-mother applied to Family Court in Lahore under S. 7 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 for appointment as guardian of children and her application was accepted by Family Court---Petitioner-father alleged fraud and misrepresentation by respondent-mother and had challenged that order under S. 12(2), C.P.C.---Family Court suspended its order to inquire into such allegations and matter was pending, where evidence was needed to be recorded to resolve such controversy between the parties---High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction declined to interfere in the matter and petitioner-father was to seek remedy before Family Court---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly. J v. C (an infant) [1970] AC 668, at pp.710-711; Re L (minors), [1974] 1 All ER 913, at pp.925-926; Abu Saeed A. Islahi v. Talat Mir and others 1994 MLD 1370; Muhammad Ajmal Khan v. Lt.-Col. Muhammad Shafaat and others PLD 1976 Lah. 396; Qurat-ul-Ain v. Station House Officer, Police Station Saddar Jalalpur Jattan, District Gujrat and others 2024 SCMR 486; Nadia Perveen v. Alimas Noreen and others PLD 2012 SC 758; R v. Barnardo (1891) 1 QB 194; Muhammad Javed Umrao v. Uzma Vahid 1988 SCMR 1891; Nisar Muhammad and another v. Sultan Zari PLD 1997 SC 852; Naziha Ghazali v. The State and another 2001 SCMR 1782; Khalida Perveen v. Muhammad Sultan Mehmood and another PLD 2004 SC 1; Mirjam Aberras Lehdeaho v. SHO 2018 SCMR 427; Ahmed Sami and others v. Saadia Ahmed and another 1996 SCMR 268; Ghulam Fatima v. The State 1998 SCMR 289; Jahan Ara v. Province of Sindh and others 2019 MLD 1722; Louise Anne Fairley v. Sajjad Ahmed Rana PLD 2007 Lah. 300; Iza Nowak v. Federal Investigation Agency and others (W.P. No. 3181/2022 decided by the Islamabad High Court by order dated 28.12.2022); Muhammad Faraaz Shaikh v. Javeria Shahani and others 2024 YLR 1330; Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. Devan Sugar Mills Limited and others PLD 2018 SC 828; J v. C (an infant) [1970] AC 668 and Shaista Habib v. Muhammad Arif Habib and others (Civil Petition No. 3801 of 2022) ref. (b) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)--- ----S. 12---Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 1980, Art. 1---Child rights---Transborder abduction---Scope---Hague Convention seeks to prevent unlawful removal or retention of children across international borders by their parents, thus shielding them from harmful consequences of abduction---It aims to (i) secure prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State and (ii) to ensure rights of custody and access under law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in other Contracting States---Convention aims to prevent forum shopping by establishing uniform procedures for resolving abduction cases and addressing human rights concerns related to rights of children and parents---Hague Convention adopts proactive and remedial approach and its focus is not to adjudicate merits of custody disputes but rather to address breach of rights of custody established by law in child's habitual residence---Underlying principle is that the most appropriate jurisdiction for custody disputes is typically the child's habitual residence before abduction---This ensures that long-term decisions regarding their upbringing are made in the environment most familiar to them and by a Court having access to the most relevant information. Office of the Children's Lawyer v. Balev, 2018 SCC 16, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 398; re J (a child) (FC), [2005] UKHL 40; The proceedings brought by A (Case C-523/07)[2010] Fam 42; Mercredi v. Chaffe (Case C-497/10 PPU) [2012] Fam 22; re A (Children) (AP) [2013] UKSC 60; McKee v. McKee [1951] AC 352; re Barrios and Sanchez [(1989) FLC 77, 602; Lehartel v. Lehartel [1993] 1 NZLR 578; re M (Abduction: Non-Convention Country) [1995] 1 FLR 89; re JA (Child Abduction: Non-Convention Country) [1998] 1 FLR 231; re J (a child) (FC), [2005] UKFIL 40 and Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State (Nct of Delhi) and another (2017) 8 SCC 454 rel. (c) Administration of justice--- ----Maintainability of lis and entitlement to relief---Distinction---If a case is deemed not maintainable, the Court does not proceed to examine its merits---On the other hand, "entitlement to relief" involves a claimant's substantive right to the remedy or relief sought in a lawsuit---Such determination is based on merits of the case, requiring Court to evaluate evidence and apply relevant laws to decide if claimant has a valid claim---Entitlement to relief is considered only after the Court has determined that the case is maintainable. Muhammad Nasim Siddiqui v. Ali Akbar PLD 2018 Sindh 703 and Capt. Tariq Mehmood Malik v. PALPA Pilots Occupational Disability Fund Trust 2022 CLC 862 rel. Irfan Sadiq Tarar for Petitioner. Ch. Akbar Ali Shad for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Sittar Sahil, Assistant Advocate General with Raza, S.I. for Respondents Nos. 3 to 8. Sher Hassan Pervez, Research Officer, LHCRC and Muhammad Shahid, Librarian, Research Assistance. Date of hearing: 3rd April, 2024.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199(1)(b)(ii)---Territorial jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Writ of quo warranto---Maintainability---Appointment of respondent as a Member and then Chairman of National Tariff Commission (NTC) on the same day was challenged through a constitutional petition in the Lahore High Court---Validity--- Wo r d s " w ith i n th e t e rr i t o ri a l j ur i s d i c t i o n o f th e C o u r t ho l d i n g o r pu r po r t i n g t o h o l d pub li c o f f i c e " w o u l d l e ad t o th e i n e lu c t a b l e c o n c lu s i o n t h at f o r th e pu r p o s e o f w r i t o f q u o w arr a n t o , a p e r s o n a g a i ns t w ho m , c on s t i t ut i o n a l p e t i ti o n h ad b e e n f i l e d , m us t b e h o ld i n g o r p u r p o r t i n g t o h o l d p u b l i c o f f i ce w i thi n the t e rr it o r i a l j u r is d i c ti o n o f t h a t C o u r t ---Re s p o n d e n t was h ol d in g t h e p os t o f Me m b er a n d C h a i r m an N T C at I sl a m a b a d a n d was n o t h o ld i n g o r pu r p o r ti n g t o ho l d a pu b l i c o f f i c e w i t h i n t h e t err it o r i al j u r i s d i c t io n o f High Court i n Pr o v i n ce o f P u n j a b --- C o u rt had t o s ee w h at was th e d o m i n a n t ob j e c t o f f i li n g o f w r i t p e t i t i o n--- N e i th e r i m pug n ed n ot i f i ca ti o ns w ere is su e d b y P un j ab G ov e r n m e n t n o r r e s po nd e n t was h ol d i n g a p ub li c o f f i ce i n t h e Pr o v i n ce o f P un j a b , thus, th e d o m in a n t ob j e ct o f filing the w r i t p e t i t i o n being a t I s l a m a b ad a n d n o t L a ho r e , c o n s t i tu t i o n a l p e ti t io n was n o t m a i n t a in a b l e at Lahore o n such s c o re---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Messrs Madni Paper Mart, through its Proprietor Irshad Ahmad and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others Writ Petition No. 3965 of 2023 ref. Sandalbar Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd v. Central Board of Revenue and others PLD 1997 SC 334 and Mirza Luqman Masud v. Government of Pakistan and others 2015 PLC (C.S.) 526 rel. Shahid Mehmood Khan v. Federation of Pakistan Writ Petition No.18698 of 2016 and Musa Raza v. Federation of Pakistan and others Writ Petition No.1091-P of 2017 distinguished. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 199(1)(a)(i), (ii), 199(1)(b)(ii) & 199(1)(c)---Territorial jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Terms " p erf o r m i n g f u n c ti o n s w i th i n t h e t err it o r i al j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e C o u r t " and "holding or purporting to hold public office within territorial jurisdiction"---Scope---Term " p erf o r m i n g f u n c ti o n s w i th i n t h e t err it o r i al j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e C o u r t " u s e d i n A r ts . 1 9 9 ( 1 )(a) ( i ) , ( i i ) & 199(1)(c) o f t h e C o n s t it u t i o n , i s m u ch wi d er t erm th e n w o r d s " hold in g o r p u r p o r t i n g t o h o l d pu b l i c o f f i ce wi t hi n t er r i t o r i al j u r i sd i c ti on " u s e d i n A r t . 1 9 9 ( 1 )( b )( ii ) o f the C o n s ti t u t io n ---Pe r s o n m ay p erf o rm f u n c ti o n s w i t h i n th e t e rr it o r i al j u r i s d i c t io n o f t h e C ou r t e v e n i f h e i s n o t h o l di n g pu b l i c o f f i ce w i t h i n t h e t er r i t o r i al ju r i s d i c t i o n o f s a i d C o u r t , thus, c o n s t it u t i o n a l p et i tio n m a y b e m a int a in a bl e i n s a i d C o u rt c o n s i d er in g th e do m in a n t ob j e c t f o r f i l i n g o f w r i t p e t it i o n---H o w e v er, i n c a s e o f w r i t o f q u o - w ar r a nt o u n d er A r t. 1 9 9 ( 1 ) ( b ) ( i i ) o f t h e C o n s t it u t i o n , a p e r s o n m us t ho l d o r pu r p o r t to h ol d p ub li c o ff i c e w i t h i n t e r r i t o r i a l j u r is di c t i o n o f C o u r t , wh ere c o n s ti t u t i o n al p e t i t io n h a s be en f i l e d--- Constitutional petition was dismissed being not maintainable. Shafqat Mehmood Chohan for Petitioner. Barrister Syed Sajjad Haider Rizvi, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.

Summary: ----Arts. 26 & 199---Constitutional petition---Environment protection---Necessary legislation--- Continuing mandamus, doctrine of---Applicability---Petitioner was aggrieved of destroying of National Park Area through anti-environmentalism activities---Authorities contended that to control all affairs regarding preservation, conservation, sustainable development and protection of Kohsar Eco-System, necessary legislation was in process---Held, that purpose of filing Constitutional petition was only to protect Eco-System of Murree, which was a place of public resort and entertainment for citizens of Pakistan, therefore, High Court directed concerned authorities to make a specific legislation in such regard---Provision of Art. 26 of the Constitution grants fundamental right to every citizen of the country to have access to all places of public entertainment or resort---High Court succeeded to conclude the case in shape of a Draft Act, therefore, under the doctrine of continuing mandamus, all State functionaries were directed to strictly follow awaited law/legislation after its approval by Standing Committee of the Cabinet on Legislative Business---Constitutional petition was disposed accordingly. Subay Khan v. Secretary, Labour, Government of the Punjab PLD 2019 Lah. 253; Sheikh Asim Farooq v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2019 Lah. 664; Muhammad Tahir Jamal, Advocate v. Government of the Punjab and others PLD 2020 Lah. 407; Muhammad Ahmad Pansota and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2020 Lah. 229; Mst. Fatima Faryad and others v. Government of Punjab and others 2020 CLC 836; 2012 CLD Journal at page 79; Suo Motu case No. 10 of 2005; 2010 SCMR 361; 2005-2006, SC of Pakistan, Golden Jubilee Edition, 106; Moulvi Iqbal Haider v. Capital Development Authority PLD 2006 SC 394; Muhammad Umais v. Cantonment Board, Rawalpindi and others PLD 2022 Lah. 148; Muhammad Yousaf v. Secretary Finance and others PLD 2021 Lah. 156 = 2021 PLC (C.S.) 195; Mst. Sana Khursheed v. Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary and 9 others PLD 2022 Lah. 346 and Sheikh Asim Farooq v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2019 Lah. 664 rel. Sardar Taimoor Aslam Khan, Barrister Owais Aziz, Barrister Khalique Zaman and Uzair Bin Shafie for Petitioner. Barrister Raja Hamza Anwar Abbasi for Petitioner (in W.P. No.2937 of 2019). Mirza Asif Abbas and Waheed Asad Raja, Assistant Advocates-General with Akhtar Javaid, Secretary Law and Parliamentary Affairs Department, Government of the Punjab, Nawaz Manik, Director Legal, EPA Punjab, Muhammad Rafique, Deputy Director, ENUH, Rawalpindi, Waqas Sikandari, Assistant Commissioner, Murree and Yasir Ashraf, Assistant Commissioner, Kahuta. Muhammad Sajid Khan Tanoli, Deputy Attorney General and Asif Ikram, Assistant Attorney General along with Aamir Shehzad, SDFO Murree, Raza Anwar Sh. DFO, M. Jamshed Iqbal Chaudhary, Senior Manager, Research and Conservation, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Pakistan, Islamabad and Muhammad Asif Sahibzada, Director (Enr. Policy), Ministry of Climate Change, Islamabad. Ali Tauqeer Sheikh, Independent Expert on Climate Change and Development [ex-Chief Executive Officer (CEO), LEAD Pakistan, Director, Asia Climate and Development Knowledge (CDKN)] along with Hassan Adnan Ahmed, Advocate. Masood Ahmad Abbasi for Respondent No.4 (in W.P. No.2937 of 2019). Malik Abdul Rashid Awan for the Respondents Nos.6 to 8 (in W.P. No.2937 of 2019). Rashid Mehmood, Civil Judge/Research Officer, Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) --- ----S. 497--- Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 199, 9, 10, 14 & 175(2)--- Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.56(d), 56(e), 56(i) & 56(j)--- Constitutional jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in passing restraining/injunctive orders in a bail matter involving factual controversy including medical grounds---Legality---Contention of the respondent (accused in a criminal case) was that passing of restraining order by High Court in his bail application sought on serious medical grounds amounted to depriving him of his fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 9, 10 & 14 of the Constitution and no injunctive order could be passed by High Court in criminal cases---Validity---High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction does not delve into factual controversies requiring inquiry, evidence etc.---While the admissibility and weightage of a medical opinion might be considered by a trial/appellate court, however, no case was apparent before the High Court as to how the same merited interference via direct recourse to writ jurisdiction---Art.199 of the Constitution contemplates discretionary relief, however, such discretion may only be exercised if permissible under the law---Such discretion can never be unfettered, and it has to be exercised per settled judicial principles and cannot be employed to defeat the manifest legislative intent---Any restraint placed upon proceeding with a bail application would judicially presume that a person/respondent was disentitled to bail, which determination was for the court of competent criminal jurisdiction, and the court concluding appropriate proceedings, and under no circumstances within the remit of High Court---Ordinary course of criminal proceedings could not be allowed to be deflected by resort to writ jurisdiction---Statutory fora were competent to determine the viability of the relevant criminal proceedings and regulate the custody of any accused and no case had been set forth before High Court to merit the invocation of the discretionary writ jurisdiction of High Court in such regard---Constitutional petition was dismissed with costs accordingly. 2016 CLC 1; 2015 PLC 45; 2015 CLD 257; 2011 SCMR 1990; 2001 SCMR 574; PLD 2001 SC 415; Ghulam Muhammad v. Muzammal Khan and others PLD 1967 SC 317; Abdul Rehman Bajwa v. Sultan and others PLD 1981 SC 522; Abdul Aleem v. Special Judge (Customs) Lahore and others 1982 SCMR 522; A Habib Ahmed v. MKG Scott Christian and others PLD 1992 SC 353; Haji Sardar Khalid Saleem v. Muhammad Ashraf and others 2006 SCMR 1192; Syed Iqbal Hussain Shah Gillani v. PBC and others 2021 SCMR 425 and Muhammad Fiaz Khan v. Ajmer Khan and another 2010 SCMR 105 rel. Muhammad Afzal Jagirani and Muhammad Ibrahim Lashari for Petitioner. Abdul Rehman Mughal for Respondent No.6. Abdul Hamid Bhurgri, Additional Advocate General and Aitbar Ali Bullo, Deputy Prosecutor General for Official Respondents. Date of hearing: 15th May, 2024.

Summary: ----Art. 70(6) & Fourth Schedule, Part I, Entry No. 50---Federal Legislative List---"Taxes on land and buildings" and "taxes on capital value of assets"---Scope---Both type of taxes are separate subjects/entries---Prior one primarily belongs to Provincial Legislature and the later subject belongs to Federal Legislature. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 270A---Interpretation of Constitution---Vires of laws---Principle---Supremacy of the Constitution has to be safeguarded---Laws which cannot withstand legislative competence must yield their way to Parliamentary and Constitutional supremacy, and laws after such scrutiny, if found transgressing such mandate, must be seen to have melted down to the frame of the Constitution---Laws made during the period mentioned in Art. 270A of the Constitution, if found violative, must be eclipsed by the supreme law, i.e. the Constitution and it cannot be vice versa---Laws in derogation of such principle are ultra vires. (c) Cantonments Act (II of 1924)--- ----Ss. 60, 80, 106 & 109---Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainments Duty) Order (P.O. No. 13 of 1979), Art. 3---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), S. 15A---Constitution of Pakistan, Fourth Sched., Part I, Entry No. 50 [as amended by Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution]---Federal Legislative List---Property tax, recovery of---Jurisdiction of Cantonment Boards---Tax, utilization of---Petitioners/owners of properties assailed tax demand based on annual rental value of property by respondents/Cantonment Boards---Validity---Taxes on immovable properties had been excluded from the domain of the Federation, the Federal Legislature and consequently respondents/Cantonment Boards could not levy, impose, charge and/or recover such taxes as levied by it on immovable properties from the date of restoration of the Constitution and more particularly after Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, either under Cantonments Act, 1924 or under Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainments Duty) Order, 1979---Such levy by respondents/Cantonment Boards had been initiated in terms of Cantonments Act, 1924---Laws on the basis of which respondents/ Cantonment Boards were recovering taxes opposed the Constitutional/ Legislative competence and was beyond their legal powers and capacity, which was ultra vires under existing frame of the Constitution on legislative competence---There is no special provision for a tax on annual rental value of immovable property to be utilized as an "expenditure" under Cantonments Act, 1924, thus general provisions of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 cannot be applied---"Tax" per se on immovable property, under S. 15A of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 can be utilized or adjusted as "expenditure"---This is a general provision for all levies on property and is not specific to any particular fee or tax and a direct nexus of subject tax can be a misapplication---Power to levy, charge, impose and recover any or all taxes separately on immovable property is an alien object under Cantonment laws in existing frame of the Constitution---Tax on annual rental value of immovable property was a tax and not a fee or any other genre of levy-- -Respondents/Cantonment Boards had no power to levy tax on immovable property including tax on annual rental value of immovable property---After revival of the Constitution, and Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, provisions of Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainments Duty) Order, 1979 had no effect on the subject---Subject law to the extent of provision of S. 3 of Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainments Duty) Order, 1979 was no longer protected---High Court declared that after Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, Entry 50 in Fourth Schedule to the Constitution was amended, consequently Federation and all Cantonment Boards lacked competence, power and jurisdiction to levy, charge, impose and recover any or all taxes on any immovable property, including but not limited to tax on annual rental value of immovable property---High Court further declared that Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution consequently restored competence and jurisdiction of Province to levy, charge, recover and legislate on subject so identified and to pursue it accordingly---High Court directed that amounts so recovered by Cantonment Boards under subject of tax in question, since Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution also called for an account---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. I.A. Sharwani and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division, Islamabad and others 1991 SCMR 1041; Haider Mukhtar and others v. Government of Punjab and others PLD 2014 Lah. 214; Khalid Mahmood and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 74 others PLD 2003 Lah. 629; Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi v. Saeed Ahmad Khan and others PLD 1974 SC 152; Mehmood Khan Achakzai and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 426; Sargodha Textile Mills v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi and 3 others PLD 2004 SC 743; Pakistan through Ministry of Defence v. Province of Punjab PLD 1975 SC 37; Messrs Gulzar Cinema v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1978 Kar. 500; Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416; Sajjad Hussain v. The State PLD 1989 FST 50; State v. Sajjad Hussain 1993 SCMR 1523; C.P. No.D-4942 of 2022; Zaka Ud Din Malik v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 PTD 268; State Bank of Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 Pesh. 46; Ghulam Musfafa Khan's case PLD 1989 SC 26; Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan 2016 PTD 2269; Mst. Nargis Moeen v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2003 Lah. 730; Mst. Sultan Jahan v. Cantonment Board Lahore Cantt. 2007 YLR 1681; Lahore Station Commander v. Col. (R) Muhammad Abbas Malik 2006 CLC 1674; Continental Biscuits Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2011 MLD 1006; Pakistan International Freight of Forwarders Association v. Province of Sindh 2017 PTD 1; Pakistan Mobile Communications Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 PTD 266; Cantonment Board's case Civil Appeal No.1363 of 2018; Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal 95 1 SCC 707; Jalkal Vibhag Nagar Nigam v. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation AIR 2021 SC 5316; Workers' Welfare Funds, Ministry of Human Resources Development, Islamabad and others v. East Pakistan Chrome Tannery (Pvt.) Ltd. and others PLD 2017 SC 28; Messrs Cherat Cement Co. Ltd., Nowshera and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and others PLD 2021 SC 327; Exide Pakistan Limited v. Cantonment Board Clifton 2012 CLC 1124; The Bank of Khyber v. Municipal Corporation Gujrat PLD 2021 Lah. 108; Raj Kumar v. Hyderabad Cantonment Board 2006 MLD 549; Civil Appeal No.1363 of 2018; Cyrus Cowasjee v. KMC PLD 2022 Sindh 106; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs Wi-Tribe Pakistan Ltd. 2020 SCMR 420; Muhammad Ayaz Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2020 PTD 2200; Federation of Pakistan v. Durrani Ceramics 2014 SCMR 1630; Azgard Nine v. Government of Pakistan 2013 PTD 1030; Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2020 SC 641; Southern Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals v. State of Kerala (1981) 4 SCC 391 and Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1983)4 SCC 353) rel. Ghulam Musfafa Khan's case PLD 1989 SC 26 distinguished. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Fourth Sched., Part I, Entry No. 50---Levy of tax---Classification of properties according to their value---Principle---If classification is dependent upon improved facilities, it counts good but purpose could be achieved by one master/regulator i.e. the Province---If classification does not rest on good tests, then it is bound to collapse which creates discrimination and there should be one parameter/yardstick to evaluate- --Different properties in an area/common area may have different values notwithstanding the area itself is classified as a category but within that category the value of property/building may vary, depending upon its characteristics to evaluate and measure rental value it may fetch, hence the fact that property situated in a particular local body/ municipality, itself should not form basis of classification---There should be one regulator to deal with evaluation with common tools of evaluations. (e) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Constitutionality of law---Principle---Constitutionality of any law, on the touchstone of any provision of the Constitution, being opposed, could always be challenged and only because such challenge had not been thrown earlier does not amount to an acquiescence and would not be immune from a challenge in future---In enforcing Constitutional frame work, the concept of acquiescence is an alien object. (f) Cantonments Act (II of 1924)--- ----Ss. 60 & 80---Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainments Duty) Order (P.O. No. 13 of 1979), Art. 3---Sindh Local Government Act (XLII of 2013), S. 14---Constitution of Pakistan, Fourth Sched., Part I, Entry No. 50 [as amended by Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution]---Federal Legislative List---Property tax, recovery of---Jurisdiction of Cantonment Boards---Petitioners/owners of properties assailed tax demand based on annual rental value of their properties by respondents/Cantonment Boards---Plea raised by respondent/Cantonment Boards was that annual rental value on immovable properties had devolved upon local Government hence Cantonment Boards as Local Government were also empowered for the same---Validity---Cantonment Boards were excluded under S. 14 of Sindh Local Government Act, 2013, therefore, no power to levy such tax could be derived by respondents/Cantonment Boards from such law, and no powers could be drawn from any Federal law as it was a provincial subject---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (g) Cantonments Act (II of 1924)--- ----S. 80---Tax on annual rental value of immovable property---Non-payment---Effect---Tax imposed on immovable property, under S. 80 of Cantonments Act, 1924 runs on the property itself and not on the owner or occupier---As such it is a tax on immovable property and not a tax on a person's income. Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal 95 1 SCC 707 and Jalkal Vibhag Nagar Nigam v. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation AIR 2021 SC 5316 rel. (h) Cantonments Act (II of 1924)--- ----Ss. 60, 80 & 200---Constitution of Pakistan, Fourth Sched., Part I, Entry 50 [as amended by Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution]---Federal Legislative List---Tax and fee---Distinction---Principle of quid pro quo---Applicability---Petitioners/owners of properties assailed tax demand based on annual rental value of their properties by respondents/ Cantonment Boards---Plea raised by respondent/Cantonment Boards was that they were charging fee under S. 200 of Cantonments Act, 1924---Validity---For imposition of any fee, services under the principle of quid pro quo must be specified in the exhaustive list provided under S. 200 of Cantonments Act, 1924---If a particular fee claimed for a service under the principle of quid pro quo is not provided for under S. 200 of Cantonments Act, 1924, such fee cannot be imposed---Provision of S. 200 of Cantonments Act, 1924 is meant for levying fee, and an exhaustive list of all those levies against which, by applying principle of quid pro quo, a fee could be levied---If any nature of service to claim fee was not mentioned therein then it could not be imposed by respondents/Cantonment Boards at all---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal 95 1 SCC 707; Jalkal Vibhag Nagar Nigam v. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation AIR 2021 SC 5316; Workers' Welfare Funds, Ministry of Human Resources Development, Islamabad and others v. East Pakistan Chrome Tannery (Pvt.) Ltd. and others PLD 2017 SC 28; Messrs Cherat Cement Co. Ltd., Nowshera and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and others PLD 2021 SC 327; Exide Pakistan Limited v. Cantonment Board Clifton 2012 CLC 1124; The Bank of Khyber v. Municipal Corporation Gujrat PLD 2021 Lah. 108 and Raj Kumar v. Hyderabad Cantonment Board 2006 MLD 549 rel. (i) Cantonments Act (II of 1924)--- ----Ss. 106 & 109---Property tax---Cantonment Funds---Principle of quid pro quo---Applicability---Details provided under S. 109 of Cantonments Act, 1924 are neither specific nor exhaustive but rather general in nature---Principle of quid pro quo is applied when specific provision/facility as against such recovery of fee is made---Cantonment Boards have several other services which they are rendering and are also recovering amount which could have a specific purpose---Amount of tax on property recovered as a tax on annual rental value, cannot be equated to be meant for such a purpose---Purpose must be specific and must relate to a levy itself---There may not be a requirement of arithmetic precision but there must be a direct co-relation between them for applying quid pro quo. Ayan Mustafa Memon assisted by Ali Zuberi, Habibullah Masood, Amna Khalil, Nawaz Khan and Shahreen Chugtai, Khwaja Shamsul Islam along with Imran Taj, Imtiaz Ali Shah and Khalil Awan (in C.P. No. D-2603/2023), Ms. Naheed A. Shahid and Daniyal Ellahi (in C.Ps. Nos. D-71 /2022 and 848/2023), Ali John, Altamash Arab, (in C.P. No. D-6819/2022), Abdul Wajid Wyne, M. Rafi Kamboh (in C.Ps. Nos. D-6396 and 6397 of 2020), Arif Khan, M. Saad Siddiqui and Sahibzada Mubeen (in C.P. No. D-840/2022), 5861/2021, 3246/2021, 2970/2020, 1494/2019), Farhan Zia Abrar, Zain A. Jatoi, Muhammad Mustafa Mumdani (in C.P. No. D-2521/2022), Ghulam Haider Shaikh (in C.P. No. D-1251/2021), (Abid Hussain and Zahid Mehmood (in C.Ps. Nos. D-3170 and 3171 of 2021), Fahad Arif Khilji (in C.Ps. Nos. D-3763 and 3764/2021), Ahmed Mujtaba (in C.P. No. D-3803/ 2022), Naeem Suleman, Arshad Hussain Shehzad, Waseem Farooq, Tauqir Randhawa, Kashan Ahmed, Mian Mushtaq Ahmed (in C.Ps. Nos. D-4306 to 4327 of 2017 and 3532/2018), Hanif Faisal Alam, Hassan Khursheed Hashmi (in C.P. No. D-5521/2022), Salman Mirza and Ahmed Magsi (in C. Ps. Nos. D-132/2019, 3135/2021 and 3359/ 2021), Abdul Qayoom Abbasi, Raja Muhammad Safeer, Syed Maqbool Hussain Shah (in C.P. No. D-2797/2021), Syed Noman Zahid Ali, Arsal Rahat Ali, Mehmood Ali for IBA and Behzad Haider (in C.P. No. D-5459/2022), Ahmed Madni and Peer Ali, in C.P. No. D-446 of 2023), Ms.Sadia Sumera (in C.P. No. D-4184/2022), Ahmed Nizamani (in C.P. No. D-3246/2021), Dr. Rana Khan, Rajesh Kumar (in C.P. No. D-5673/2021), Malik Khushhal Khan in C.Ps. Nos. D-3987/2018 and 946/2022), Muhammad Naved, Fazal Mehmood Sherwani (in C.P. No. D-4159/2020) and Masood Ali for Petitioners. Abdullah Munshi, Shajeeuddin Siddiqui and Imdad Ali Bhatti for Clifton Cantonment Board (in C.P. No. D-4985/2018, 5391/2018, 3426/ 2018, 5166/2018, 5167/2018, 6506/2020 and 1251/2021), Farooq Hamid Naek assisted by Syed Qaim A. Shah, G.Murtaza Bhanbhro and Saad H. Ammar (in C.P. No. D-132/2019 and 1220/2023) for Respondent No.2), Dr. Farogh Naseem, Ahmed Ali Hussain, S. Zaeem Hyder, Aman Aftab, M. Aizaz Ahmed, Syed Shohrat Hussain Rizvi for Karachi Cantonment Board, Aqib Hussain, Afnan Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, Iftikhar Hussain, Zohra Ahmed for CBC (in C.P. No. D-1228/ 2019, 1949/2019 and 946/2022), Dr. Shahab Imam and Syeda Abida Bukhari for CBC (in C.Ps. Nos.D-1220 and 2603/2023), Ashraf Ali Butt, Rehmatunnisa, Sohail H.K. Rana, Ms.Huma F. Bhutto, Fahim Haider Moosvi, Zain A. Soomro for Respondent No.2 (in C.Ps. Nos. D-1661 and 249 of 2021), Akhtar Hussain Shaikh, Syed M. Ghazen, Shahid Ahmed for KW and SC, K, A. Jahangir (in C.P. No. D-3100/2023) for CBC, Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi (in C.P. No. D-4606/2020), Shahid Hussain Korejo (in C.P. No. D-6803/2022) for Respondent No.2, Saqib Soomro and Ahmed Mujtaba (in C.P. No. D-6806/2022) for Respondent No.2, Ameer Ali Soomro (in C.P. No. D-6805/2022) for Respondent No.2, Asif Amin for Respondent No.2 (in C.P. No. D-1333/2021), Fozia M.Murad for Respondent (in C.Ps. Nos. D-132/2019, 3023, 3669, 7318, 7460 of 2015), Talha Abbasi for DHA (in C.P. No. D-4985/2018) for Respondents. Zeeshan Adhi, Addl. AG, Saifullah and Sandeep Molani, Asst. A.G., Qazi Abdul Hameed Siddiqui, D.A.G., Khaleeq Ahmed, D.A.G., Malik Sadaqat Khan Addl., Attorney General and Qazi Ayazuddin, Asst. Attorney General Dates of hearing: 17th, 24th, 25th, 30th October, 1st, 6th, 10th, 13th, 15th, 20th, 21st, 28th November, 4th, 13th and 14th December, 2023.

Summary: ----Ss. 42, 104, 151 & 152---Powers of courts under S.152, C.P.C. to correct clerical or arithmetical errors---Scope---Petitioner against auction of the property in execution proceedings preferred an appeal, which was allowed in the year 2021---Application filed by the petitioner under S. 152, C.P.C. in the year 2023 for correction of name of the appellant in the title of appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Court on the ground of delay of two years---Validity---There is no restriction on the power of the Court under Ss.151 & 152 of C.P.C. to correct the mistake in the plaint, judgment or decree, if the same occurs due to a bona fide mistake or oversight and the party is not found to be guilty of gross negligence---Mere fact that the petitioner sought correction after a lapse of a period of two years was not a valid ground to refuse the relief---Correction was not sought in the judgment and decree of Trial Court, rather the same was sought qua correction of the name in the title of appeal filed under S. 104, C.P.C., without prejudicing the other side---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Administration of justice--- ----Procedural law---Purpose and scope---All the rules of procedural law have been enacted for the purpose of administration of justice---Basic purpose of all the rules is to serve the administration of justice and they should be subordinate to it---Procedural law should not be construed strictly so as to put the parties to undue inconvenience because the principle object behind all legal formalities is to safeguard the paramount interest of justice---No one should be defeated merely on the basis of technicalities unless offering insurmountable hurdles---Legal technicalities should not be allowed to stand in the way of justice, which may lead to unsettlement and uncertainty of law. Saifullah Baloch for Petitioner. Date of hearing: 25th September, 2024.

Summary: ----Ss. 42, 104, 151 & 152---Powers of courts under S.152, C.P.C. to correct clerical or arithmetical errors---Scope---Petitioner against auction of the property in execution proceedings preferred an appeal, which was allowed in the year 2021---Application filed by the petitioner under S. 152, C.P.C. in the year 2023 for correction of name of the appellant in the title of appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Court on the ground of delay of two years---Validity---There is no restriction on the power of the Court under Ss.151 & 152 of C.P.C. to correct the mistake in the plaint, judgment or decree, if the same occurs due to a bona fide mistake or oversight and the party is not found to be guilty of gross negligence---Mere fact that the petitioner sought correction after a lapse of a period of two years was not a valid ground to refuse the relief---Correction was not sought in the judgment and decree of Trial Court, rather the same was sought qua correction of the name in the title of appeal filed under S. 104, C.P.C., without prejudicing the other side---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Administration of justice--- ----Procedural law---Purpose and scope---All the rules of procedural law have been enacted for the purpose of administration of justice---Basic purpose of all the rules is to serve the administration of justice and they should be subordinate to it---Procedural law should not be construed strictly so as to put the parties to undue inconvenience because the principle object behind all legal formalities is to safeguard the paramount interest of justice---No one should be defeated merely on the basis of technicalities unless offering insurmountable hurdles---Legal technicalities should not be allowed to stand in the way of justice, which may lead to unsettlement and uncertainty of law. Saifullah Baloch for Petitioner. Date of hearing: 25th September, 2024.

Summary: (a) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Rights of subjects---Scope---Statute which transgresses on the rights of a subject whether as regards his person or property, should be construed, if possible, in such a way that it may preserve such rights. Crawford, "Statutory Construction" Page 474, Understanding Statute, Page 258 and The State v. Syed Qaim Ali Shah 1992 SCMR 2192 rel. (b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)--- ----S. 24-A---Speaking order---Object, purpose and scope---Statutory authority dealing with rights of people whether exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, while passing any order under any statute, is required to give reasons for passing that order---Reasons must confirm that statutory authority while passing an order has considered the matter as required by statute conferring power to it to pass such order and it is satisfied that the circumstances exist which are prerequisite for passing such order---Such reasons must be reflected from the contents of the order---Any vague order of a statutory authority, though authorized under the law to pass the order, is nullity in the eye of law. R v. HEFC, ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery (1994) 1 WLR 242 rel. (c) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--- ----S. 12(a)---Word "reasonable"---Object, purpose and scope---Word "reasonable" itself attracts judicial process of ascertainment of quality of consistency with reasons---Word "reasonable" excludes subjective satisfaction and in judging whether a restriction is reasonable, an objective standard, that is, the standard of average prudent man has to be applied. Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Central Secretariat, Islamabad and others 2015 SCMR 630 and PLD 1964 SC 673 rel. (d) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--- ----S. 12(a)---Words "his property"---Applicability---Words "his property" occurring in S. 12 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 cannot be given wider meaning as to include any of the property owned by accused---Such words have to be restricted only to those assets or properties of accused which are subject matter of investigation---If wider meaning is given to it as to include any of the property of accused then it has the effect of enlarging scope of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 to those properties of accused, the acquisition whereof is no offence under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---Penal statute has to be construed strictly to preserve the rights of citizens. The State v. Syed Qaim Ali Shah 1992 SCMR 2192 and Khan Asfandyar Wali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 607 rel. (e) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--- ----S. 12---Freezing of property---Exercise of power---Essential conditions---Essential conditions for invoking S. 12 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 in a case are; (i) the power under S. 12 can be exercised by Chairman NAB (delegatee) or the Court trying an accused for any offence as specified under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999; (ii) there must be reasonable grounds for believing that accused has committed an offence under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999; (iii) the reasons for such belief of his must be provided in the order; and (iv) property/assets so frozen by the order under S. 12 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 must have some nexus with alleged crime of accused being investigated. (f) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--- ----S. 12---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 18 & 23---Constitutional petition---Freezing of accounts---Confirmation by Accountability Court- --Petitioners/accused persons were aggrieved of freezing of all their bank accounts including those having no nexus with investigation---Validity-- -Accounts of petitioners/accused in question had no connection with alleged inquiry/investigation being conducted by NAB, and if said accounts remained frozen then it would have an adverse effect on execution of the contract as it would hamper mode of receiving payment from the employer as well as payment to employees and payment towards other contractual obligations of petitioners/accused---Defense offered by petitioners/accused persons required evidence---Orders passed by Chairman NAB neither contained any reasons nor he had mentioned in the orders any relevance of amount allegedly earned by petitioners through corruption and corrupt practices with the accounts so frozen---So far guilt of petitioners/accused persons had not been established---Harsh order of NAB authorities had the effect of depriving both the petitioners / accused persons of carrying on lawful trade as well as right to hold property in terms of Arts. 18 & 23 of the Constitution---Orders of NAB authorities were unreasonable, harsh, deficient in its contents and incorrect in its result---Freezing orders were an offhand decision by NAB authorities which completely lacked essential attributes of S. 12 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and were not sustainable in the eye of law---High Court declared that orders passed by NAB authorities followed by orders of Accountability Court were illegal and without lawful authority---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances . Dr. Muhammad Azam Kasi v. The State through Deputy Prosecutor-General Accountability Court No.1, NAB, Quetta 2012 PCr.LJ 1950; Shah Rukh Jamal v. National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad and others PLD 2022 Isl. 1; Dr. Arsalan Iftikhar v. Malik Riaz Hussain and others PLD 2012 SC 903; Mst. Rukhsana Bangash v. Chairman, National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and 4 others 2021 PCr.LJ 1813; Messrs Memom Motors Private Limited through Genral Manager v. National Accountability Bureau through Chairman and 2 others 2014 PCr.LJ 1378; Ehsan Ullah Sirazai and another v. Director General (Karachi) National Accountability Bureau and another PLD 2018 Sindh 696; Haji Muhammad Arif Khattak and 2 others v. Chairman/ Director General, National Accountability Bureau and another PLD 2018 Pesh. 207; Adam Amin Chaudhry and another v. National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Islamabad through Chairman and 29 others 2023 PCr.LJ 1536; Pir Mazharul Haq v. The State through Chief Ehtesab Commissioner, Islamabad PLD 2005 SC 63; Mansur ul Haque v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2008 SC 166; Fazlul Qader Choudhury v. Crown PLD 1952 FC 19; Ch. Abdul Malik v. The State PLD 1968 SC 349; Chaudhry Shujat Hussain v. The State 1995 SCMR 1249; United Business Lines, S.I.E. Gujranwala and another v. Government of Punjab through Secretary, Local Government, Lahore and 5 others PLD 1997 Lah. 456 and Messrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 rel. (g) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--- ----Ss. 12 & 13---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Freezing of bank accounts---Alternate and efficacious remedy---Scope---During pendency of objection petitions before Accountability Court, petitioners/accused persons assailed orders passed by NAB officials freezing all their bank accounts including those which were not subject matter of inquiry and investigation before NAB---Objection was raised by NAB to maintainability of Constitutional petition on the ground that S. 13 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 provided mechanism for receiving and adjudication of an objection by any person aggrieved by freezing order passed under S. 12 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and such objection petition was already pending before Accountability Court---Validity---Almost 75 bank accounts of petitioners/accused persons had been frozen by NAB authorities without realizing that those accounts related to existing business activities of petitioners/ accused persons, in which not only pecuniary interest of petitioners/ accused persons were involved but the accounts related to their business activities regarding execution of public contracts and huge interest of the government/semi government organization were also involved---Remedy under S. 13 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 was merely illusory---It was not a settled rule that in all circumstances availability of an alternate remedy to an aggrieved person would be a bar for maintaining Constitutional petition---High Court overruled the objection of NAB authorities---Constitutional petition was held to be maintainable, in circumstances. Arshad Mehmood v. Commissioner/Delimitation Authority, Gujranawala and others PLD 2014 Lah. 221 and Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd v. Muhammad Ramzan and others PLD 2020 SC 414 rel. Shumail Ahmad Butt and Barrister Qasim Wadoud for Petitioners. Syed Azeem Dad, D.P.G. and Muhammad Ali, A.D.P.G. for Respondents. Date of hearing: 3rd July, 2024.