Summary: (a) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (IX of 1963)--- ----S. 17---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.100, 101 & 103---Ejectment proceedings---Execution of eviction order---Objection application by the tenant, adjudication of---Scope---While adjudicating objection application of the tenant the court was obligated to frame issues and record evidence in order to resolve disputes raised by the tenant---Petitioner (landlord) filed an ejectment petition against respondent No.2 (tenant) regarding the shop in question resulting in passing of eviction order---Respondent No.2/tenant claimed to be a tenant of petitioner with respect to shop No.986-A and raised grievance that in execution of eviction order the possession of his rented premises was taken, whereas, eviction order was passed with respect to a different shop bearing No. 986 against another person 'MS'---Tenant's objection application filed under O. XXI, R. 100, C.P.C. was allowed by the Rent Controller directing restoration of possession---Held: It was an imperative aspect of the matter that such order was passed without proper investigation, framing of issues, or recording of evidence---Petitioner/landlord was admittedly the owner of two shops having No. 986 and 986-A---He had filed ejectment petition against another person 'MS'---As per stance of the petitioner/landlord, he rented out property measuring 32x13 sq. ft. to one 'MS', after removing partition wall between two adjacent shops---The number of shop given in eviction petition was No. 986, however, the rent agreement was with respect to shop No. 986-A, which was relied upon---The agreement clearly stipulated that the property subject of rent agreement was measuring 32x13 sq. ft---The number of property mentioned therein was No. 986-A---Somehow, respondent No.2/tenant who instituted the objection application under O. XXI R. 100 of C.P.C., previously approached the Rent Controller with an application claiming that petitioner/landlord had executed a rent agreement in his favour---He claimed that he was tenant in the shop which was subject of eviction-petition and sought to be impleaded in the array of parties---This application, under O. I, R. 10 of C.P.C. was rejected---Then respondent No.2/tenant never raised any challenge to the said order until the conclusion of trial---It was admitted position that 'MS' maintained in ejectment proceedings that he was tenant of shops subject to eviction proceeding until 13.08.2000 and then respondent No.2/tenant obtained the same shops on rent under separate arrangement---Thereafter, 'MS' stopped pursuing the proceeding and he was proceeded ex-parte---Statements of three witnesses were recorded in support of the stance of ejectment petitioner---These statements went un-rebutted as they were never cross-examined---Finally, the ejectment-petition was allowed---The disputes raised by respondent No.2/tenant in his objection filed under O. XXI, R. 100 of C.P.C. clearly involved such questions which should not have been resolved in his favour in a summary manner---The impugned order without due investigation and proper exercise of jurisdiction could cause miscarriage of justice---The case was remanded to the Rent Controller for decision afresh, after framing relevant issues and permitting the parties to lead their evidence---The impugned order and the subsequent orders passed by Rent Controller were set-aside, in circumstances. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.XXI, Rr.100, 101 & 103---Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (IX of 1963), S. 17---Ejectment proceedings---Execution of eviction order---Adjudication of questions as to title, right, interest or possession by the Executing Court---Powers and jurisdiction of Executing Court---Scope---Rule 103 of O. XXI of C.P.C. was substituted through Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972---Under the substituted provision, any party not being judgment-debtor against whom order is made for restoration of possession in terms of O. XXI, R. 101 was permitted to institute a suit to establish rights to claim possession of the property---This position stood changed after the above substitution---Now all the questions arising as to title, right, interest in or possession of immovable property are required to be adjudicated by the Executing Court---The orders passed, in this regard, become conclusive and no separate suit is permitted---The legislature has used the words "adjudicate upon" and "determined by the Court" besides restricting separate suit---Any person other than judgment-debtor dispossessed from immovable property by decree holder, can make an application under O. XXI R. 100 of C.P.C., which then requires investigation in terms of O. XXI R. 100(2) of C.P.C.---Order XXI R. 100 of C.P.C. is to be read with Rules 101 and 103 of Order XXI of C.P.C.---Order XXI R. 101 of C.P.C. provides that the Court can make the order when satisfied that the applicant was in possession on his own account or on account of some person other than judgment-debtor---The scheme of law is such that it confers full jurisdiction upon the Executing Court to decide the issues involved therein. Qasim Ali and 5 others v. Fazal and another 1986 MLD 2997; Ibrahim v. Mst. Saeeda Bano 1984 MLD 1124 and Hindu Panchayat of Sukkur v. Matloob Ahmed and others 1991 MLD 480 ref. Barrister Ch. Saeed Hussain Nagra and Mian Usman Ramzan for Petitioner. Shakeel Ahmad Malik for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing: 16th June, 2025.

Summary: Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (IX of 1963) --- ----S.17---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R.10---Ejectment of tenant---The appellant (tenant) challenged the order passed by the Rent Controller, whereby, the ejectment petition in respect of rented premises was accepted and vacant possession along with arrears of rent was directed to be handed over to the respondent (landlord)---The appellant (tenant) argued that the rent agreement actually pertained to 'another property' and not the property in question and that another person had been a tenant since long---Held: The ownership of the respondent (landlord) with respect to the property in question and 'another property' was an admitted fact---The appellant (tenant) got recorded his statement with respect to an application under O.I R.10, C.P.C. filed by the purported tenant---After conceding that the appellant (tenant) gained possession of the premises as a tenant, he took a stance that another person (the purported tenant) became subsequent tenant of the respondent (landlord), however, it was clearly stated that the appellant/tenant was not a witness of any subsequent arrangement with the purported tenant---Application of the purported tenant was dismissed by the Rent Controller which order was never challenged hence attained finality---Instead of raising any challenge against such order at the relevant time, while the present appeal was pending an application under O.I R.10 of C.P.C. was instituted on the same grounds which were available to the purported tenant before the Rent Tribunal---Appellant despite availing number of opportunities to file reply to the ejectment petition failed to do the same as such he was proceeded against ex-parte, resultantly, the Rent Controller proceeded to record ex-parte evidence---No request was made before the Rent Controller to permit him to participate in the process of evidence or to cross-examine the witnesses of the respondent (landlord)---The affidavits (examination-in-chief) of three PWs were brought on record and since they were not cross-examined, the same went un-rebutted--- The default on the part of the appellant (tenant) also stood established--- The three PWs clearly deposed that the premises in question was rented out in the shape of a hall---Needless to say that the relationship of landlord and tenant was an admitted fact---The appellant (tenant) failed to make out any case---Present appeal along with the application under O.I, R.10, C.P.C. filed by the purported tenant were dismissed, in circumstances. Sardar Muhammad Ramzan for Appellant. Barrister Ch. Saeed Hussain Nagra for Respondent. Date of hearing: 11th June, 2025. Judgment Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, J .--- This appeal is directed against order dated 02.02.2022 passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller, Lahore Cantt., whereby, the following relief is granted in favour of the respondent:- "....Therefore, the titled ejectment petition is accepted and the respondent is directed to hand over the vacant possession of the rented premises 986, Tufail Road, Saddar Bazar, Lahore Cantt to the petitioner within 30 days, failing which the petitioner will have the right to obtain possession of the rented premises through execution of the order from the competent court of law. The petitioners will have the right to receive the arrears of rent as per ejectment petition." 2. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the impugned order is against the law and the facts of the case. He further contended that the ejectment-petition is with respect to property No. 986, whereas, the rent agreement relates to the property No. 986-A, Tufail Road, Lahore Cantt. Added that the learned Rent Controller has ignored that from 13.08.2000 one Azam Ali is the tenant in property, therefore, the order to pay arrears of rent from the said date is not tenable in law. 3. Learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently opposed this appeal. 4. Heard. The ownership of the respondent with respect to the properties Nos. 986 and 986-A is not denied, who sought the eviction of the appellant claiming that he has rented out the hall measuring 32 x 13 sq.ft. to the respondent. As per the stance of the respondent the above mentioned properties are adjacent to each other and wall between the shops was removed at the time of renting out the premises. The fact that the shops are adjacent to each other is not denied by the learned counsel for the appellant. 5. The appellant appeared before the learned Rent Controller on 03.02.2021. His signatures and thumb impressions were obtained on the margin of the order-sheet. Azam Ali also filed an application under Order I Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to be impleaded as a party. The appellant recorded statement through his learned counsel with respect to the application of Azam Ali on 22.09.2021 (available at page No. 27 of this file). After conceding that the appellant gained possession of the premises as a tenant, he took a stance that Azam Ali became subsequent tenant of the respondent, however, in paragraph No. 1 of the said statement it is clearly stated that the appellant is not a witness of any subsequent arrangement with Azam Ali. 6. The learned Rent Controller after hearing the arguments of the concerned, rejected the application of Azam Ali vide order dated 29.09.2021. This order was never challenged by Azam Ali, which attained finality. Instead of raising any challenge against order dated 29.09.2021 at the relevant time, while this appeal was pending an application under Order I Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (C. M. No. 05-C of 2022) has instituted on the same grounds which were available to him before the learned Rent Tribunal. 7. Record further reflects that the appellant despite availing a number of opportunities to file reply to the ejectment-petition has failed to do the same. He was proceeded against ex-parte on 15.11.2021. Resultantly, the learned Rent Controller proceeded to record ex-parte evidence. No request was made before the learned Rent Controller to permit him to participate in the process of evidence or to cross-examine the witnesses of the respondent. The affidavits (examination-in-chief) of three PWs were brought on record and since they were not cross-examined, the same went un-rebutted. The default on the part of the appellant also stood established. The three PWs clearly deposed that the premises in question was rented out in the shape of a hall. Needless to say that the relationship of landlord and tenant is an admitted fact. 8. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the appellant has failed to make out any case. Therefore, this appeal as well as application / C. M. No. 05 of 2022 are dismissed. No order as to costs. UN/M-126/L Appeal dismissed.

Summary: (a) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)--- ----Ss.2(l), 22(3) & 24---Proceedings before the Rent Controller---Application for production of an extra witness---Ceiling regarding number of witnesses to be produced in rent proceedings---Scope---Whether such provision was directory or mandatory---Principle---Depositing of rent in court pending proceedings---Exceptions---Facts in brevity were that the dispute arose during rent proceedings where respondents Nos. 1 to 3 (alleged tenant/who denied relationship of landlord and tenant) moved an application for the production of a witness---Petitioner (landlady) filed an application seeking directions for the respondents to deposit rent in the court---Former application was allowed and latter application was dismissed---In appeal the decision of the Trial Court was upheld against which present Constitutional petition was filed---The two pivotal questions for determination before the High Court were as to (i) Whether provision of S. 22(3) of the Act is directory or mandatory in nature? and (ii) Whether order for deposit of rent in Court can be passed by the Special Judge (Rent)/Rent Tribunal when relationship of landlord and tenant is yet to be determined?---Held: A bare perusal of the interpretation of a mandatory and directory provision would make it crystal clear that S. 22(3) of the Act, 2009 was "directory" in nature, however, courts were required to make all endeavors to follow the directory persuasions but not at the cost of justice---Although in S. 22(3) of the Act, 2009, the words "affidavits of not more than two witnesses" have been mentioned but these words were directory in nature and court could exercise its jurisdiction keeping in view the facts of the case and could allow more witnesses to appear in the witness box and depose---The purpose of the Act, 2009 was to regulate the relationship between landlords and tenants and to provide a mechanism for resolving disputes in a timely and cost-effective manner---The rationale behind mentioning of number of witnesses was actually to curtail the time spent in rent matters and expeditious disposal thereof---Trial Court being at the helm of affairs closely monitored and controlled the speed of trial and could exercise its discretion but in accordance with legal principles while applying judicious mind---If production of witness was permitted, even then it would not have prejudiced the case of either party as the petitioner would have the right to cross-examine the said witness and in this way, permission to produce the said witness would not have prejudiced the rights of the petitioner (landlady)---As regards deposit of rent in court, it was noted that when relationship of landlord and tenant had been denied by tenant, he could not be burdened with deposit of rent, especially in the present case when respondents Nos. 1 to 3 (alleged tenants) had already vacated the premises---Where relationship of landlord and tenant was denied by the tenants, they could not be compelled to deposit the rent till the relationship was established---No jurisdictional defect, illegality, legal infirmity or perversity in the impugned order and judgment could be pointed out---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)--- ----Ss. 2(l) & 24---Eviction application---Relationship of landlord and tenant, denial of---Order for payment of rent pending proceedings---Principle---Where the relationship of landlord and tenant is denied, the Rent Tribunal would lack jurisdiction, on account of the doctrine of jurisdictional fact, to pass an order for payment of rent due under S. 24 of the Act until and unless the Tribunal positively ascertains the relationship of tenancy and establishes that the respondent to the eviction application is in fact a 'tenant' in terms of S. 2(l) of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009. Mian Umar Ikram-ul-Haque v. Dr. Shahida Hasnain and another 2016 SCMR 2186 rel. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Words "may" and "shall" used in a section of an Act or an Ordinance---Whether directory or mandatory---Principle---'May' and 'shall' are interchangeable and their interpretation as to whether they are directory or mandatory in nature depends upon the context in which they are used and cannot be interpreted with the rigidity attributed to them in ordinary parlance---If no penal consequences are given in a provision, even if the word "shall" is used therein, the said provision becomes directory (and not mandatory) and the word "shall" will be read as "may". Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Officer (RTO), Mayo Road, Rawalpindi and another v. Messrs Sarwaq Traders, 216/1-A, Adamjee Road, Rawalpindi and another 2022 SCMR 1333 and Orient Power Company (Private) Limited through Authorized Officer v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited through Managing Director 2021 SCMR 1728 rel. (d) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Provision in a statute---Whether directory or mandatory---Principle---In order to determine whether a proviso is directory or mandatory, the duty of the court is to try to unravel the real intention of the legislature---The ultimate test is the intent of the legislature and not the language in which the intent is clothed---The object and purpose of enacting the provision provide a strong and clear indicator for ascertaining such intent of the legislature---The intention of the legislature must govern and this is to be ascertained not only from the phraseology of the provision but also by considering its nature, its object, and the consequences which would follow from construing it one way or the other---This exercise entails careful examination of the scheme of the Act in order to discover the real purpose and object of the Act---A provision in a statute is mandatory if the omission to follow it renders the proceedings to which it relates illegal and void, while a provision is directory if its observance is not necessary to the validity of the proceeding---One of the important tests that must always be employed in order to determine whether a provision is mandatory or directory in character is to consider whether the non-compliance of a particular provision causes inconvenience or injustice and, if it does, the court would say that that provision must be complied within and that it is obligatory in its character---There are three fundamental tests, which are often applied with remarkable success in the determination of this question---They are based on considerations of the scope and object, sometimes called the scheme and purpose, of the enactment in question, on considerations of justice and balance of convenience and on a consideration of the nature of the particular provision, namely, whether it affects the performance of a public duty or relates to a right, privilege or power - in the former case the enactment is generally directory, in the latter mandatory. Province of Punjab through Conservator of Forest, Faisalabad and others's case 2021 SCMR 328 rel. (e) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Provision in a statute---Whether directory or mandatory---Principle---The test to determine whether a provision is directory or mandatory is by ascertaining the legislative intent behind the same---The general rule expounded by the Supreme Court is that the usage of the word "shall" generally carries the connotation that a provision is mandatory in nature---However, other factors such as the object and purpose of the statute and inclusion of penal consequences in cases of non-compliance also serve as an instructive guide in deducing the nature of the provision. Province of Punjab through Secretary Excise and Taxation Department, Lahore and others v. Murree Brewery Company Limited (MBCL) and another 2021 SCMR 305 rel. Muhammad Akbar Awan for Petitioner. Muhammad Usman Rasheed, Ahtisham-ud-Din Khan and Nouman Sarwar for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3. Date of hearing: 6th May, 2025.

Summary: Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----S. 15(2)(ii), proviso---Ejectment of tenant---Default in payment of rent---Subsequent payment---Effect---Petitioner / tenant claimed that subsequently it paid the rent due, therefore, there was no default under proviso to S. 15(2)(ii) of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979---Validity---Provision of proviso to S. 15(2)(ii) of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 was available, where sole ground in rent application against tenant was default and the tenant on the first day of hearing had admitted his liability to pay---Rent Controller was to satisfy that tenant had not made such default on any previous occasion and the default was not exceeding six months---Only if such conditions were met, the Rent Controller was mandated to direct tenant to pay all rent claimed on a date to be fixed by Rent Controller, thereafter he was mandated to dismiss the rent application---High Court declined to interfere in eviction orders passed by two Courts below, as subsequent tender of rent by petitioner / tenant did not extinguish the default---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Allies Book Corporation v. Sultan Ahmad and others 2006 SCMR 152; Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique and 2 others PLD 2007 SC 45; Aamir Aslam Shaikh and others v. Court of Ivth Rent Controller Karachi (South) and others C.P. No. S-518 of 2013; Haji Abdul Ghani v. VIIth Additional District Judge, South Karachi and 2 others 2008 CLC 1598; Shakila Appa (Late) v. Nadeem Ghani and others 2022 CLC 1146; Mrs. Alima Ahmad v. Amir Ali PLD 1984 SC 32; Syed Waris Ali Tirmizi v. Liaquat Begum 1980 SCMR 601 and Messrs Pragma Leather Industries v. Mrs. Sadia Sajjad PLD 1996 SC 724 ref. Ali T. Ebrahim for Petitioner. Shan ur Rehman for Respondents. Date of hearing: 30th April, 2025.

Summary: (a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----Ss. 5 & 20---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)---Eviction petition---Oral tenancy, proof of---Relationship of landlord and tenant, denial of---Proof---Jurisdiction of the Rent Controller---Scope---Respondent No.1 (alleged to be a tenant) claimed that he never remained in possession of the suit property---Copy of rent agreement was not produced by the petitioner (claiming to be a landlady)---The petitioner claimed that her father (purportedly the landlord) had rented out the suit property to the father of respondent No.1 (purportedly the tenant) through an oral agreement in 1988---After predecessor-in-interest of both parties passed away, the respondent allegedly continued as tenant but defaulted on rent, and subsequently, an ex-parte eviction order was passed against him---The respondent challenged the order under S. 12(2), C.P.C., denying any landlord-tenant relationship claiming that he never remained in possession of the property---Respondent's application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. was dismissed against which he filed civil revision which was allowed, constraining the petitioner (daughter of the purported landlord) to file the present Constitutional petition---The central issue for adjudication was "whether a relationship of landlord and tenant had been established on record in the proceedings culminating in the eviction order passed by the rent controller"?---Held: In the absence of written agreement the burden fell on the party asserting the relationship to prove the same by adducing compelling and unimpeachable evidence from which the court could infer such relationship on the principle of the preponderance of probabilities---Establishment of relationship in absence of written agreement must be supported by a high threshold of evidence---In the present matter, prima facie, the petitioner (successor-in-interest of purported landlord) had not discharged that burden---No rent agreement, receipt, or any other document were produced in order to establish a landlord-tenant relationship---There can be verbal/oral tenancy also but in order to establish such tenancy an evidence of very high standard is required, from which the facts of tenancy is established on the principle of preponderance of probabilities---The Rent Controller had allowed the application only on the ground that no rebuttal had been offered in response to the tenancy claim---However, respondent No. 1 (purported tenant) in the application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. had denied the existence of relationship of landlord-tenant between the parties and called into question the maintainability of the entire proceedings---Since there was serious dispute regarding relationship between the parties and the petitioner had not produced any documentary evidence in order to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, it was imperative for the Rent Controller to decide the application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. as per directions given in the impugned order and then proceed further---No irregularity or infirmity in the impugned order was pointed out---Rent Controller was directed to decide application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. expeditiously---Constitutional petition being devoid of merits was dismissed, in circumstance. Hafeezuddin and 2 others v. Badaruddin and 2 others PLD 2003 Karachi 444 ref. (b) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----Ss. 5 & 20---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)---Application under S. 12(2) C.P.C.---Maintainability---Powers available to the Rent Controller---Objection regarding maintainability of application under S. 12(2) C.P.C. in light of S. 20 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979---Validity---Bar under S. 20 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 is not absolute and the Rent Controller in an appropriate case may invoke the provisions of the C.P.C.---Moreover, equitable principle of C.P.C. can be invoked by the Rent Controller. Mst. Fehmida Begum v. Muhammad Khalid and another 1992 SCMR 1908 and Ismail v. Subedar Gul Inayat Shah PLD 1991 SC 997 rel. (c) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----S. 20---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)---Question of jurisdiction to be addressed at the outset---Principle---Relationship of landlord and tenant, denial of---Where the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller is questioned on the point that no relationship of landlord and tenant exists, the question of jurisdiction has to be addressed first before proceeding to the merits of the case. Mst. Fehmida Begum v. Muhammad Khalid and another 1992 SCMR 1908 and Ismail v. Subedar Gul Inayat Shah PLD 1991 SC 997 rel. Attorney Yameen Ali Khoso in person for Petitioner. Abdul Mujeeb Shaikh for Respondent No. 1. Shaharyar Awan, Assistant Advocate General, Sindh for Respondents Nos. 2 to 4. Date of hearing: 3rd March, 2025.

Summary: (Against the impugned judgment dated 16.12.2020 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in R.F.A. No. 281-P of 2019). Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)--- ----S. 17---Ejectment of tenant---Default---Payment of rent---Proof---Adjustment of loan---Tentative Rent Order---Non-compliance---Effect---Appellants/landlords were aggrieved of setting aside of ejectment order against respondents/tenants---Plea raised by respondents/tenants was that rent was being adjusted towards payment of loan by predecessor-in-interest of appellants/landlords---Validity---No documentary evidence to such effect was produced before the Courts below, which otherwise was sufficient to establish the willful default in payment of rent for period in question---Non-compliance of Tentative Rent Order itself was sufficient ground for ejectment of appellants / tenants without further inquiry into merits as it had constituted willful default---High Court passed its judgment without appreciating factual position and evidence produced by parties in support of their respective claims and had misdirected itself while setting aside order passed by Rent Controller on the issue of default in payment of rent, nor could appreciate the effect of non-compliance of Tentative Rent Order passed---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by High Court on the ground of default in payment of rent and judgment of Rent Controller was upheld---Appeal was allowed. M.H. Mussadaq v. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal and another 2004 SCMR 1453 and Misbahullah Khan v. Mst. Memoona Taskinuddin 1995 SCMR 287 rel. Irfan Javed, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants. Iftikhar Ahmad Bashir and Khaliq uz Zaman, Advocates Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 16th April, 2025.

Summary: (a) Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963 – Ss. 7, 17 —Ejectment petition—Default in payment of rent—Tentative Rent Order—Effect of non-compliance—Scope of appellate jurisdiction Tenant failed to pay or tender rent to landlord after ownership devolved upon appellant via mutation dated 21.12.1999—Ejectment petition filed on grounds of default and subletting—Tenant contested default, asserting adjustment against alleged loan, but failed to produce any documentary proof—Additional Rent Controller allowed petition for default, finding wilful non-compliance of Tentative Rent Order dated 05.07.2006 and absence of rent receipts prior to 2013—High Court set aside ejectment order, holding no default occurred and that rent was Rs.6,000/month, not Rs.10,000/month as claimed—Supreme Court held that High Court misread record and failed to consider that even default at reduced rent rate remained unproven—Non-compliance of Tentative Rent Order constitutes wilful default and is an independent ground for ejectment. Cited Cases: • M.H. Mussadaq v. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal (2004 SCMR 1453) • Misbahullah Khan v. Mst. Memoona Taskinuddin (1995 SCMR 287) (b) Evidence Act (1872), General Principles—Burden of proof—Failure to exhibit documents—Adjustment of rent claim—Legal consequences Tenant alleged adjustment of rent against prior loan extended to landlord’s predecessor—Held, in absence of any documentary evidence or proper pleadings, burden of proving such adjustment remained unmet—Pagri and rent deeds were contradictory and improperly exhibited—Tenant’s own witness admitted lack of documentary support—Ejectment upheld. Disposition: Appeal allowed—High Court judgment set aside—Judgment of Additional Rent Controller restored on ground of default—Subletting not pressed—Findings limited to rent default.

Summary: (a) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)--- ----Ss. 2(j), 17, 17(8), 17(9) & 24 ---Ejectment application---Default in payment of rent and personal bona fide need of the landlord---Tentative rent order passed, non-compliance of---Eviction of tenant ordered---Tenancy relationship, denial of---Tenant, definition of---Scope---Person remaining in possession and paying rent qualifies as tenant, even after expiry of prior tenancy agreement---Respondent (landlord) filed an ejectment application seeking eviction of appellant (tenant) on the grounds of default in payment of rent and personal bona fide need---Initially, the appellant had entered into a written tenancy agreement with the respondent dated 15.05.2018 and upon its expiry, a new alleged agreement was executed between the respondent (landlord) and the appellant's (tenant's) wife, effective from 10.03.2020 to 10.05.2025---The appellant (tenant's), in defense, claimed he was no longer a tenant and had been wrongly impleaded, as the tenancy had been transferred to his wife---During proceedings before the Additional Rent Controller, a tentative rent order was passed on 22.09.2023---The respondent later filed an application under S. 17(9) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 (the "Act, 1963"), alleging non-compliance with the tentative rent order by the appellant---The Additional Rent Controller accepted this application, struck off the appellant's defense, and ordered him to vacate the premises within 30 days vide order dated 11.12.2023---The appellant challenged this eviction in the present appeal, arguing that the tenancy relationship no longer existed between him and the respondent, thus precluding the Additional Rent Controller from passing any order against him---The proposition placed for determination before the High Court was that "where an individual remained in possession of the rented premises and continued to tender rent payments, notwithstanding the expiration of the original tenancy agreement executed in his name and the subsequent execution of a fresh tenancy agreement in favour of his spouse, did such continued occupation and conduct sustain his status as a tenant within the contemplation of section 2(j) of the Act, 1963, and did his failure to comply with a tentative rent order lawfully warranted the striking off of his defence"---Held: As per the definition provided in S. 2(j) of the Act, 1963 a tenant can be a person, who undertakes or is bound to pay rent as consideration for the possession or occupation of a building by him or by any other person on his behalf and it includes any person, who continues to be in possession or occupation of the building after termination of his tenancy and in the event of death of the tenant, his heirs and successors and after termination of the tenancy, his heirs and successors who continue to be in possession or occupation of the building---In the instant case, though a fresh tenancy agreement was executed between the respondent and wife of the appellant but the record revealed that the appellant kept depositing the monthly rent of the rented premises to the respondent even after the execution of fresh tenancy agreement---The appellant was thus a tenant for all intents and purposes---The appellant failed to point out any material irregularity justifying interference with the impugned order---The appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)--- ----Ss. 2(j), 17, 17(8), 17(9) & 24---Eviction of tenant---Non-compliance with tentative rent order passed by Rent Controller, consequences of---Scope---Failure to deposit rent, as ordered under S. 17(8) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 (Act, 1963), leads to striking off defence and eviction without further proceedings as provided under S. 17(9) of the Act, 1963---Compliance with tentative rent order is mandatory to sustain defence---Eviction order issued for failure to comply with tentative order---Held: Section 17 of the Act, 1963 outlined the grounds for eviction of a tenant ---Subsection (8) of S. 17 ordains that on the first hearing of proceedings under this section or as soon thereafter as may be but before the issues are framed, the Controller shall direct the tenant to deposit in his office before a specified date all the rent due from him, and also to deposit regularly till the final decision of the case, before the 5th day of each month, the monthly rent which subsequently becomes due, and if there be any dispute as to the amount of rent due, the Controller shall determine such amount approximately---Whereas subsection (9) of S. 17 of the Act, 1963 provides the consequences of non-compliance of tentative rent order passed in terms of Subsection (8)---The Additional Rent Controller was fully justified to pass the tentative rent order, which admittedly was not complied with by the appellant (tenant)---As per S. 17(9) of the Act, 1963 if the tenant fails to deposit the amount of rent before the specified date or, as the case may be, before the 5th day of the month, his application, if he is a petitioner, shall be dismissed, or his defence, if he is a respondent, shall be struck off, and the landlord shall be put in possession of the building without any further proceedings---Once, the appellant failed to comply with the tentative rent order, no option was left with the Additional Rent Controller, except to strike off his defence and to pass the eviction order, which was unexceptionable in the circumstances---The appellant had failed to point out any material irregularity justifying interference with the impugned order---The appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Yasir for Appellant. Syed Muzammil Ullah Salari for Respondent. Date of hearing: 7th April, 2025.

Summary: (a) Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 ----S. 2(j), 21 Landlord–Tenant relationship—Oral tenancy between father and son—Scope—Petitioner, father of Respondent No.3 (son), claimed existence of an oral tenancy agreement for 11 months over an upper portion of his residential property and sought eviction based on alleged default in rent payment—Petitioner failed to establish tenancy relationship as required under S.2(j) of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001—No written agreement existed and no independent witness was produced to corroborate oral tenancy—Held, in absence of clear evidence and where relationship of landlord and tenant is disputed, burden lies heavily on party asserting tenancy—Payments made by Respondent No. 3 to Petitioner lacked regularity and consistency, could not conclusively be deemed as rent—Courts below rightly dismissed ejectment petition—No illegality or material irregularity found. Disposition: Writ Petition dismissed. Cited Provision: Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001, S. 2(j) (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Art. 133 & General Principles Rebuttal evidence—Scope and discretion—Petitioner’s application to produce rebuttal evidence was dismissed by Rent Controller—Petitioner argued denial of fair trial—Held, rebuttal evidence is permissible after cross-examination under Art. 133, but such permission remains within trial court’s discretion—In present case, Petitioner had already led evidence but failed to substantiate oral agreement—No miscarriage of justice or violation of fair trial rights established. (c) Constitutional Jurisdiction ----Art. 199 Supervisory jurisdiction of High Court—Concurrent findings of fact—High Court declined to interfere with concurrent judgments of Rent Controller and Appellate Court—Held, where findings are based on proper appreciation of evidence and law, constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 cannot be exercised to reappraise evidence—Petitioner failed to establish any perversity, misreading, or illegality requiring interference. Disposition: Constitutional petition dismissed in limine.

Summary: Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979) --- ----Ss.15-A & 15(2)(vii)---Eviction of tenant---Personal bona fide need of land lord---Default in payment of rent---Landlord's testimony viz. bona fide need sufficient if unshaken in cross-examination---Landlord's testimony going unrebutted---Ejectment upheld---Protection to tenants---Accountability mechanism in place to discourage the misuse of ejectment proceedings by landlord---Scope---Reletting of the same premises by landlord within one year attracts penalty ---The respondent No.1 (landlord) filed ejectment petition on the ground of default by petitioner (tenant) and personal bona fide need---Rent Controller allowed the ejectment application and appeal of the petitioner (tenant) was dismissed---Against the concurrent findings of the courts below petitioner (tenant) filed the present constitutional petition---Held Once the landlord stepped into the witness box and the plea of personal need went unrebutted, the ejectment application must be allowed under S.15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979---It was evident from perusal of the cross-examination conducted on the respondent No.1 (landlord) that the plea of the landlord had not been shattered and no further cross-examination was conducted and only a suggestion regarding personal bona fide need was put to the witness and no other question in relation to the same was asked---For seeking eviction of a tenant from the rented premises the only requirement of law was to prove bona fide need by the landlord---However, where a landlord who obtained possession of a building from a tenant on account of his personal bona fide need and then re-let the building or premises to any person other than the previous tenant or utilized the premises for a use other than his personal use within one year of such possession then he would liable to be punished with fine not exceeding one year's rent of the building premises and the tenant who was evicted may apply to the Rent Controller for an order directing that he be restored possession ---This accountability mechanism provided under S.15-A of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 was introduced to ensure that ejectment proceedings were not abused and due protection was given to the tenant in cases where landlord had misused the provisions of the Ordinance, 1979---The protection given by the said provision was also available to the petitioner, however, his case did not fall within the parameters of the same, hence, the Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Jehangir Rustom Kakalia v. State Bank of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 1296; Wasim Ahmad Adenwalla v. Shaikh Karim Riaz 1996 SCMR 1055; Rabia Jamal v. Mst. Nargis Akhtar C.P. No. S-495/2023 Order dated 21.07.2023; Shakeel Ahmed and another v. Muhammad Tariq Farogh 2010 SCMR 1925; Mst. Zubeda through her son and General Attorney v. Muhammad Nadir 1999 MLD 3011 and Mst. Dilshad Bibi v. Ramzan Ali 2006 CLC 1853 rel. Muhammad Aslam and S.M. Jahanbir for Petitioner. Iftikhar Javed Qazi, Asfandyar Jahangir, Samil Malik Khan and Koonj Bhutto for Respondents. Irshad Ahmed Shaikh, A.A.G. for the State. Date of hearing: 17th March, 2025. Order Muhammad Jaffer Raza, J .--- The instant petition has impugned the concurrent findings of learned lower fora. In seriatim, Judgment dated 11.12.2024 passed in F.R.A. No.173/2024 by learned Additional District Judge-XII, South, Karachi and Judgment dated 25.05.2024 passed in Rent Case No. 1295/2016 by learned Rent Controller-II, South, Karachi ("Impugned Judgments") Facts of the case are summarized as under: - 1. The Respondent No.1 being owner of the tenement in question filed Rent Case No. 1295/2016 on the ground of default and personal bona fide need. The same was disposed of vide Judgment dated 25.05.204 by the learned Rent Controller and the rent application was allowed. The points for determination were settled as follows: - Point No.1: Whether the opponent is liable to pay rent of the demised premises at an agreed enhanced rat of 10% every year by virtue of the Memorandum of Understanding dated 18.08.2011? Point No.2: Whether the opponent has committed willful default in payment of rent of the demised premises as per MOU dated 18.08.2011? Point No. 3: Whether the applicant is in bona fide need of the demised premises for its personal use in order to set up the charitable hospital in collaboration with the German and British Red Crescent Society? Point No.4: Whether the opponent has committed default in payment of water and conservancy charges since 2001 in terms of clause-2 of the lease agreement dated 18.02.1984? Point No.5: What should the judgment be? 2. The rent application was allowed and all four points stood proved, thereafter, the Petitioner filed F.R.A. No. 173/2024 and the same was dismissed vide Impugned order. 3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has argued that he is a doctor and running hospital in the name of Sindh Medical Center and providing services in the field of Health Care Management. Learned counsel states that the relationship between the parties is not denied, however, the ejectment application filed by the Respondent No.1 ought to have been dismissed on both grounds for the reason that no default was committed by the Petitioner and the Respondent No.1 has failed to prove his personal bona fide need. Learned counsel in this respect concedes that earlier in the year 2006, the compromise took place between the parties as a result of which an MoU was executed. It is further stated that the judgment passed by the learned Rent Controller is based on another MoU, the execution of which is denied by the Petitioner. It is further stated that requirements of personal bona fide need have been elaborated by the Respondent No.1 in paragraph number 9 of his rent application and it is stated by the learned counsel that the same does not meet the requirements of law set out under Section 15(2)(vii) of the SRPO. For the purpose of convenience, the learned counsel has read out the paragraph number 9 of the rent application which is reproduced as under:- "9. That it is also to be mentioned that Applicant in connivance with the German Red Cross and British Red Cross is planning to establish a Charitable Hospital for the poor and needy persons. Since the Opponent is a clear default and liable to be ejected from the demise premises. The Application in order to build up its Charitable Hospital need the said demise premises for its personal bona fide need." 4. At this juncture, both learned counsel agreed that for the purposes of the instant petition, it may be convenient to first adjudicate the ground of personal bona fide need and if the need arises, the ground of default can be adjudicated upon. I have specifically asked the learned counsel for the Petitioner, to point out the part of cross-examination in which according to him, the ground of personal bona fide need has been shattered. Learned counsel in response has invited my attention to page 403 which is a cross-examination of the applicant/Respondent No.1 and the same is reproduced hereunder: - It is in my knowledge that after filling of my ejectment application, the opponent filed his written statement. It is correct to suggest that some documents were attached with written statement. It is correct to suggest that document attached with written statement dated 10.04.2004 as annexure "A" is a correspondence between applicant and opponent. It is incorrect to suggest that the document attached with written statement as annexure "B" which is memorandum of understanding dated 12.04.2012 was executed between applicant and opponent. It is incorrect to suggest that the document which is annexure "B" bears ay signature. It is not in my knowledge whether opponent had sent the letter to the applicant to bring all the relevant documents in respect of demised premises before this court. It is correct to suggest that the correspondence in respect of demised premises has taken place time to time between opponent and the applicant. Yes, I can produce the record in respect of correspondence held between applicant and the opponent from the year 2011 till to date again says all the relevant documents in respect of correspondence, I have already produced before this court. It is correct to suggest that annexure "C" dated 13.08.2011 attached with written statement has been issued by the applicant. It is correct to suggest that we have received the annexure "D" dated 15.08.2011 attached with written statement is correct to suggest that the applicant has issued letter dated 28.07.2001 which is attached with written statement as annexure "E". It is correct to suggest that the document dated 30.06.2007 which is annexure "F" attached with written statement is available in the record of applicant. It is correct to suggest that apparently this document which is annexure "F" states that the water dues have been adjusted from the account of opponent but it is subject to verification as we have not officially received this letter from KWSB. It is correct to suggest that the applicant had issued letter dated 17.03.2016 which is annexure "G" and same is attached with written statement. It is correct to suggest that the applicant had filed one rent case No. 1366/2006 under section 15 SRPO against the opponent in the year 2006. It is incorrect to suggest that the applicant had levelled similar allegations in above rent case as have been levelled in this case. It is correct to suggest that apparently annexure H/1 attached with written statement has been issued by the applicant but it is subject to verification from the office as it is an old document pertaining to year 2003 and same is signed by Hussain Bux Hoat but not me. It is not in my knowledge whether opponent had written a letter which is annexure H/2 voluntarily says that this letter is undated. It is incorrect to suggest that I am deliberately not producing the relevant documents before this court voluntarily says that I have already produced. It is correct to suggest that the rent case bearing No. 1366/2006 was disposed of on the basis of compromise. It is correct to suggest that annexure H/5 dated 19.03.2009 attached with written statement has been issued by me. It is correct to suggest that both the parties were bound on the terms and condition mentioned in a document dated 12.02.1984 produce by me and same has been marked as x until the signing of MOU dated 18.08.2011, Further cross-examination is reserved on the request of learned counsel for the opponent. It is incorrect to suggest that another MOU was also prepared/executed after the execution of MOU produced at Ex. A/2. is correct to suggest that some properties are mentioned in indenture of was executed in the year 1984 which has been marked on Xi correct to suggest that the details of sad properties are not mentioned in ejectment application as well as in my affidavit-in-evidence voluntarily says that details of current properties are mentioned in MOU signed on 18 August 2011 which has been produced at Es. A/2. It is correct to suggest that the applicant had filed one rent case tearing No 1306/2006 against the opponent. I don't remember at present whether applicant had not mentioned the details of properties mentioned in ar deed executed in the year 1984 in memo. of ejectment application as well as in affidavit in evidence of above rent case (1366/2006). It is correct to suggest that the applicant obtained possession of some of the properties mentioned in lease deed executed in the year 1984 from the opponent after exerting pressure upon him and thereafter rented out the same to some other tenants. At the moment I am not aware of the letter dated 19 July 2017 allegedly sent by the opponent through courier service to the applicant whether it was received by our office or not but we will give due reply after confirmation. The applicant has not received the letter dated 19.07.2017 voluntarily says that I have filed statement on 11.01.2018 and has also attached photocopies of paid water bills. It is incorrect to suggest that I have deposed falsely that the applicant has not received letter dated 19.07.2017. It is correct to suggest that I have filed the photocopies of paid water bills of entire building where the demised premises is situated but not exclusively of the demised premises. There are 20/22 tenants in the entire building It is correct to suggest that I have not produced the document showing the breakup of amount of the each tenant in respect of water voluntarily says that I have attached documents as annexure D to D/23 which show the water bills and maintenance charges along with Tet of the demised premises. It is correct to suggest that I have not duced original bills of paid water bilis. It is correct to suggest that the document attached with memo. of ejectment application as annexure D/1 which shows the amount of Rs.26,064/- as bill of water consumption for the month of October 2016 for the demised premises. It is incorrect to suggest that I have attached fake bills with memo. of ejectment application as annexure D to D/23. It is incorrect to suggest that the landlord has to pay all the Government taxes in respect of demised promises voluntarily says that the landlord has only to pay the property tax whereas the water and conservancy tax is to be paid by the tenant. I see annexure D of the meme of ejectment application and say that it allows the outstanding amount of Rs 87,20,839/-in respect of water and conservancy charges up to the month of October 2016 for the demised premises. It is correct to suggest that annexure D does not show the breakup of outstanding amount in months voluntarily says that when the opponent raised objections in this regard the applicant made correspondence and produced the rent account which is annexed with memo. of ejectment application as annexure F/1. It is correct to suggest that one bill dated 03.11.2016 is also part of the annexure D which shows the outstanding amount up to the month of October 2016 as Rs.57,04,773/-. It is incorrect to suggest that I have not mentioned the difference in both bills of annexure D voluntarily says that the both bills are different wherein one bills is for rent and second one is a maintenance bill therefore the difference between both bills cannot be compared. I don't remember the exact amount for charging the maintenance bill per square feet for demised premises. It is incorrect to suggest that the plaintiff has not sent the documents which are attached with memo. of ejectment application as annexure D to D/23 to the opponent nor received by the opponent. It is correct to suggest that the opponent is paying the rent regularly through cheque to the applicant voluntarily says that he is paying without enhancement of 10% rent and has also defaulted in payment of arrears of water and conservancy charges. It is correct to suggest that as per lease agreement, the rent of the demised premises was to be increased 10% after every three years voluntarily says that in August 2011, opponent agreed to pay 10% annual enhancement of rent. It is correct to suggest that the lease agreement dated 18th February 1984 which is marked as X is a registered document voluntarily says that the applicant had not got it registered but as per claim of the opponent it has been registered by the opponent. The original of the document marked as X is not in our custody. It is incorrect to suggest that I have not produced original of the annexure X with mala fide intention. I don't know at present whether the opponent has been paying the rent with 10% enhancement after every three years voluntarily says that I have to check it from my office. It is correct to suggest that the opponent is paying the monthly rent of the premises regularly, Voluntarily says that however, he is not paying the water charges. It is incorrect to suggest that any other MOU was made between the applicant and opponent subsequently MOU referred at para No. 2 of the letter dated 20.01.2016 vide Ex. A/5. It is correct to suggest that the sub lease between the parties is registered in respect of the premises in question. I don't know that the MOUs have got any precedence over the registered sub lease legally. Voluntarily says that however the said MOUs were made with mutual consent of the parties and same are part and parcel of sub lease. The MOUs made between the parties are not registered. It is incorrect to suggest that the opponent uses to pay the water charges to the water board directly. I don't reme bar as to how the MOUs were sent to the opponent. It is correct to suggest that any document on refusal to be received in person is sent through courier service. It is correct to suggest that I have not produced any postal/courier service receipt in respect of such MOUSJ. It is correct to suggest that the said MOUs don't bearing any receiving. It is correct to suggest that a letter dated 17.03.2016 vide Ex. A/7 was sent to the opponent through courier service and that its reply was also sent by the opponent dated 05.05.2016 at Ex. A/10. It is incorrect to suggest that the letters dated 07.04.2016 and 27.04.2016 vide Ex. A/8 and A/9 have never been sent to the opponent and that same have been prepared /fabricated only for the purpose of record. It is correct to suggest that the letter dated 10.04.2016 attached as Annexure A with written statement was sent by the accountant of the applicant to the opponent. It is incorrect to suggest that MOU dated 12.04.2012 was made between me being the representative of the applicant and tenants. Voluntarily says that it is false and fabricated document. It is incorrect to suggest that it bears my signature. Voluntarily says that the original is not being shown in order to properly verify the same. It is correct to suggest that the letter dated 13.08.2011 was sent by me to the opponent. It is correct to suggest that the said letter was responded by the opponent through its letter dated 15.08.2011 being annexure D attached with the written statement. It is correct to suggest that the letter dated 28.07.2001 was sent by the applicant to the MD of KWSB in respect of water charges. It is incorrect to suggest that the KWSB sent any letter in response to the said letter to us/applicant. It is correct to suggest that the rent case No: 1366/2006 was filed by the applicant against the opponent. It is correct to suggest that the said case was withdrawn since compromise was effected. It is incorrect to suggest that the said rent case was filed on the same ground of non-payment of water charges and default in payment of the rent. Voluntarily says that it was in respect of enhancement of the rent. It is incorrect to suggest that the applicant is adopting different methods in order to make the applicant to enhance the rent. It is incorrect to suggest that the applicant has ever stopped the water supply of to the opponent. It is correct to suggest that the applicant has asked the opponent to get installed separate electricity connection/meter. It is incorrect to suggest that neither the opponent has committed in default in payment of the rent nor in payment of water charges. It is correct to suggest that almost all of the offices are rented out and the clinics are situated therein. The 10 percent of the property of the applicant is in its own use. It is incorrect to suggest that the premises-in-question are not in personal need of the applicant. Voluntarily says that the same are needed for setting up medical centre, OPD etc for the welfare of public. It is incorrect to suggest that I am deposing falsely. It is incorrect to suggest that I have filed false application against the opponent in order to harass him. (Emphasis Added) 5. Learned counsel further argued that in paragraph number 9 (reproduced above) it is evident that the tenement is not required for the personal use and the intention of the Respondent is mala fide. It was also argued that it is apparent from bear reading of paragraph Number 9 (reproduced above) that the Respondent No.1 wishes to rent out the property to another tenant. 6. Conversely, learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 has argued that witness of the Respondent No.1 has reiterated his stance taken in the rent application as well as in the affidavit in evidence. He has further stated that the Respondent No.1 has fully discharged its burden and the Petitioner failed to shatter the evidence of the witness of the Respondent No.1. He has further argued that it is unconscionable that a landlord has being deprived of the tenement even though the rent application was filed in the year 2016. On the averment of the Petitioner regarding renting out the property to another tenant, learned counsel stated that adequate protection is provided under Section 15A of the SRPO. 7. Heard learned counsel and perused the record. It is evident that the Petitioner conducted a very detailed cross-examination of the Respondent No.1, on several dates, only a portion of which has been reproduced above. It is evident from perusal of the cross-examination reproduced above, that the plea of the landlord has not been shattered and no further cross-examination was conducted in reference to this ground by the Petitioner. It is noticeable from a bare perusal of the cross-examination that only a suggestion regarding personal bona fide need was put to the witness and no other question is relation to the same was asked. 8. The argument of the Petitioner in reference to tenement being rented out to another tenant, I agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent No.1, that Section 15A of the SRPO provides adequate relief/protection to the tenant in such circumstances. It is a settled principle of law that once the landlord steps into the witness box and the plea of personal need is unrebutted, the ejectment application must be allowed under Section 15 of the SRPO. The following judgements advance the said proposition. The respective judgments and their relevant parts are reproduced below: - ? Jehangir Rustom Kakalia v. State Bank of Pakistan "Rule laid down in the cases mentioned above is that on the issue of personal need, assertion or claim on oath by landlord if consistent with his averments in his application and not shaken in cross-examination, or disproved in rebuttal is sufficient to prove that need is bona fide." ? Wasim Ahmad Adenwalla v. Shaikh Karim Riaz "3. Leave was granted to consider the contention that the plea of personal requirement was not bona fide as a flat was available in the same premises which A the Respondent did not occupy. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the Respondent is residing in a bugalow in Defence Housing Authority and that it is not imaginable that he would shift in a small house in a dingy and congested locality. He further contended that during the pendency of the case a portion of the house, which was an independent apartment, fell vacant, but the Respondent did not occupy it and rented it out to the tenant. On the basis of these facts it is contended that the Respondent's need is neither genuine nor bona fide. So far the first contention is concerned the learned counsel for the Respondent stated that the Respondent is residing in a rented house with his son in the Defence Housing Authority. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant therefore does not hold water because firstly, the Respondent is not residing in his own house, but is residing with his son who has rented out a house in that area, and secondly, in these circumstances if a landlord chooses to reside in his own house which may be in a locality which is much inferior and congested than the place where he is residing on rent, it cannot be termed as mala fide. It is the choice of the landlord to choose the house or the place where he wants to reside." (Emphasis added) ? Rabia Jamal v. Mst. Nargis Akhtar "22. On the basis of the above decisions of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, it is apparent that once the landlord has adduced evidence by stating that they require the Said Tenement for their personal use in good faith, thereafter the burden shifts on the tenant to show either that the landlord did not require the Said Tenement for her personal use in good faith or that the Said Tenement could not be used by the landlord for the purpose as indicated in the Application under clause (vii) of subsection (2) of Section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. However, while raising such a contention it is not open to the tenant to allege mala fide on the part of the landlord by adducing evidence to state that the landlord had alternative premises or for that matter that the landlord had alternative premises that were more suitable for the needs of the landlord. This right to choose from amongst a host of properties that are available to a landlord as to which of those properties the landlord requires for their personal use vests solely with the landlord to the exclusion of all others." (Emphasis added) ? Shakeel Ahmed and another v. Muhammad Tariq Farogh "6. For seeking eviction of a tenant from the rented shop, the only requirement of law is the proof of his bona fide need by the landlord, which stands discharged the moment he appears in the witness box and makes such statement on oath or in the form of an affidavit-in-evidence as prescribed by law, if it remains unshattered in cross-examination and un-rebutted in the evidence adduced by the opposite party." 9. Any adjudication on Section 15(2)(vii) would be deficient without referring to the accountability mechanism provided for under Section 15-A of the SRPO. The same is reproduced below: - 3[("15-A"] 4[ Where the land-lord, who has obtained the possession of a building under section 14 or premises under clause (vii) of section 15, relets the building or premises to any person other than the previous tenant or puts it to a use other than personal use within one year of such possession-- (i) he shall be punishable with fine which shall not exceed one year's rent of the building of the premises, as the case may be, payable immediately before the possession was so obtained. (ii) The tenant who has been evicted may apply to the Controller for an order directing that he shall be restored to possession of the building or the premises, as the case may be, and the Controller shall make an order accordingly."] 10. The provision reproduced above was introduced by the legislature through the Sindh Ordinance No. II of 1980 on January 21, 1980, to ensure that ejectment proceedings are not abused and due protection is given to the tenant in cases where the landlord/owner has misused the provisions of the Ordinance. An embargo of one year has been placed on the landlord in case the landlord wishes to rent out the property to another tenant. The protection given, which is also available to the present Petitioner, has been expounded in the following judgments, relevant parts of the same are reproduced: - a) Mst. Zubeda through her son and General Attorney v. Muhammad Nadir. "Sufficient protection has been postulated in section 15-A of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 which in the event of use of premises other than personal rise not only postulates punishment for the landlord but also provide an effective mechanism for restoration of the possession to the evicted tenant before the Controller who would be entitled to exercise such authority on due consideration of the facts. Since the law provides an alternate and effective remedy to defuse the impression of the Respondent, I think the apprehension is not well founded in the present state of circumstances." b) Mst. Dilshad Bibi v. Ramzan Ali. "Keeping in view the only restriction imposed on the personal need by way of section 15-A of the SRPO as well as authorities quoted by the Petitioner and the evidence brought on record the Petitioner has proved that the shop is required for personal need to be used by her son and no doubt has been created in this respect. The apprehension of the Respondent that the Petitioner may let out the premises after obtaining the same to other tenant is covered by section 15-A of the SRPO which remove the above apprehension." For the foregoing reasons the instant petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. UN/H-7/Sindh Petition dismissed.