Summary: The appellants had availed the benefit of a specific notification (SRO No. 266) that allowed them to import silver and gold for the manufacture of jewelry, with the condition that the jewelry should be exported within 180 days. Since the jewelry was not exported, the Collector of Customs imposed penalties, which were upheld by the Customs Appellate Tribunal and the High Court. The appellants argued that a subsequent notification (SRO No. 760) had replaced SRO No. 266, thereby eliminating the obligation to export the jewelry. However, the High Court rejected this argument, stating that since the benefit of SRO No. 266 was availed, its conditions had to be fulfilled. The appellants further contended that the Tribunal had not decided their appeals within the prescribed time frame of 60 days, as required by the Customs Act. They argued that this rendered the Tribunal's judgments void and a nullity in law. The Supreme Court considered a similar provision in the Sales Tax Act and held that the time frame for deciding an appeal was mandatory. However, they noted that the Customs Act did not specify the consequences for non-compliance with the time frame. The Court concluded that if an appeal is not decided within the stipulated period, it does not negate the appeal, and the taxpayer cannot be non-suited on this ground. They emphasized that the taxpayer's right to be dealt with in accordance with the law is protected by the Constitution. They also stated that an order belatedly passed on a taxpayer's appeal is not a void order or a nullity. Based on these findings, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals on merit and confirmed that the judgments of the Tribunal were valid, even though they were decided beyond the prescribed time frame. No costs were awarded to either party.

Summary: The appellants had availed the benefit of a specific notification (SRO No. 266) that allowed them to import silver and gold for the manufacture of jewelry, with the condition that the jewelry should be exported within 180 days. Since the jewelry was not exported, the Collector of Customs imposed penalties, which were upheld by the Customs Appellate Tribunal and the High Court. The appellants argued that a subsequent notification (SRO No. 760) had replaced SRO No. 266, thereby eliminating the obligation to export the jewelry. However, the High Court rejected this argument, stating that since the benefit of SRO No. 266 was availed, its conditions had to be fulfilled. The appellants further contended that the Tribunal had not decided their appeals within the prescribed time frame of 60 days, as required by the Customs Act. They argued that this rendered the Tribunal's judgments void and a nullity in law. The Supreme Court considered a similar provision in the Sales Tax Act and held that the time frame for deciding an appeal was mandatory. However, they noted that the Customs Act did not specify the consequences for non-compliance with the time frame. The Court concluded that if an appeal is not decided within the stipulated period, it does not negate the appeal, and the taxpayer cannot be non-suited on this ground. They emphasized that the taxpayer's right to be dealt with in accordance with the law is protected by the Constitution. They also stated that an order belatedly passed on a taxpayer's appeal is not a void order or a nullity. Based on these findings, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals on merit and confirmed that the judgments of the Tribunal were valid, even though they were decided beyond the prescribed time frame. No costs were awarded to either party.

Summary: The appellants had availed the benefit of a specific notification (SRO No. 266) that allowed them to import silver and gold for the manufacture of jewelry, with the condition that the jewelry should be exported within 180 days. Since the jewelry was not exported, the Collector of Customs imposed penalties, which were upheld by the Customs Appellate Tribunal and the High Court. The appellants argued that a subsequent notification (SRO No. 760) had replaced SRO No. 266, thereby eliminating the obligation to export the jewelry. However, the High Court rejected this argument, stating that since the benefit of SRO No. 266 was availed, its conditions had to be fulfilled. The appellants further contended that the Tribunal had not decided their appeals within the prescribed time frame of 60 days, as required by the Customs Act. They argued that this rendered the Tribunal's judgments void and a nullity in law. The Supreme Court considered a similar provision in the Sales Tax Act and held that the time frame for deciding an appeal was mandatory. However, they noted that the Customs Act did not specify the consequences for non-compliance with the time frame. The Court concluded that if an appeal is not decided within the stipulated period, it does not negate the appeal, and the taxpayer cannot be non-suited on this ground. They emphasized that the taxpayer's right to be dealt with in accordance with the law is protected by the Constitution. They also stated that an order belatedly passed on a taxpayer's appeal is not a void order or a nullity. Based on these findings, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals on merit and confirmed that the judgments of the Tribunal were valid, even though they were decided beyond the prescribed time frame. No costs were awarded to either party.

Summary: Facts:The Sindh Revenue Board (SRB) sought to levy sales tax on services provided by various service providers under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011. The dispute centered around whether the tax should be levied on the gross amount charged by the service providers, including the salaries and allowances paid to the personnel supplied by them.----Issues:The interpretation of "value of taxable service" under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, particularly whether it includes salaries and allowances paid to the personnel supplied by service providers.The legality and impact of amendments to Rule 42E by the SRB, which sought to include salaries in the gross amount charged for the levy of sales tax on services.---Holding:The Supreme Court dismissed the civil petitions filed by the SRB, affirming the High Court's judgment.---Rationale:The Supreme Court found that the sales tax on services should be levied solely on the consideration paid for the services rendered, excluding any reimbursable expenses such as salaries paid to the personnel. The Court clarified that such salaries do not constitute part of the service rendered and, therefore, should not be included in the taxable value. The Court also held that amendments to Rule 42E by the SRB, which sought to include salaries in the taxable value, were beyond the scope of the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, and hence, non-consequential.---Judgment:The petitions were dismissed, and the High Court's judgment was upheld, confirming that sales tax on services should be levied only on the value of the services rendered, excluding salaries and allowances paid to the personnel supplied by the service providers.

Summary: Background: The petitioners, government officials involved in tax collection, issued an adjudication order demanding sales tax from the respondent, a hotel owner, for the period from July 2001 to June 2006. The respondent was found to have been irregular in filing the required sales tax returns. After an initial ruling in favor of the tax authorities, the respondent successfully appealed the decision before the Collector Sales Tax Appeals. The petitioners' subsequent appeal to the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) was dismissed. The petitioners then filed a reference under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, challenging the ATIR's decision. ----Issues: 1- Whether the ATIR was legally justified in deciding the appeal without addressing the arguments and written submissions provided by the petitioners. 2- Whether the decision rendered by the ATIR six months after the hearing violated the principle of audi alteram partem (right to a fair hearing) and thus rendered the judgment void. 3- Whether the ATIR failed to consider specific legal objections raised by the petitioners, including issues related to the jurisdiction of the appellate authority and the timeliness of the appeal. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found that the ATIR's decision, issued six months after the hearing, violated the principle of audi alteram partem, as it is not feasible to expect the tribunal to retain the details of the arguments after such a long period. This delay amounted to a failure to provide a fair hearing. The court held that the decision of the ATIR was void due to the significant delay in rendering the judgment and remanded the matter back to the ATIR for a fresh decision after proper hearings. ----Citations/Precedents: Wapda vs. Muhammad Razzaq and others (Civil PLA No.98 of 2020) Mst. Bassi Begum and others vs. Mst. Kakam Noor and others (PLD 1960 AJ&K 11) Pathana vs. Mst. Khandal (PLD 1952 BJ 38)

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act, 1990---Sections 2(16), 3, 11, 13, and Entry No.10, Table-II of Sixth Schedule: Definition of "Manufacturer" and Agriculture Produce Exemption ---The term "manufacture" as defined under Section 2(16) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 requires a process where goods are transformed into a distinct product or reshaped for different use. Cutting raw wood, such as "poplar" and "eucalyptus" trees, into smaller pieces does not constitute a manufacturing process under this definition. Such wood remains agricultural produce exempt from sales tax under Entry No.10 of Table-II, Sixth Schedule, provided it has not undergone further manufacturing. (b) Sales Tax Act, 1990---Sections 3(3) and 13: Liability for Sales Tax---Exempt Supplies ---Sales tax liability arises when there is a supply of taxable goods under taxable activities. Goods exempted under Section 13 do not trigger liability. In this case, raw wood purchased as agricultural produce, not subjected to further manufacturing, falls within the exemption provided under Entry No.10 of Table-II. (c) Interpretation of Statutory Terms: Agriculture Produce and Common Parlance Rule ---Where statutory definitions are absent, terms like "agriculture produce" should be understood in their trade context and common parlance. "Poplar" and "eucalyptus" trees, recognized in trade as agricultural produce, remain exempt from sales tax unless subjected to further manufacturing processes. (d) Case References and Principles Applied: ---The Court rejected reliance on precedent (Malik Shamas Din case) interpreting "manufacture" under a repealed Sales Tax Act, 1951, emphasizing the distinct statutory definitions under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The ejusdem generis principle was applied to clarify ancillary manufacturing processes. -----Disposition: The Sales Tax References were answered in the positive, affirming that the purchase of raw, cut wood, categorized as agricultural produce, is exempt from sales tax under Entry No.10 of Table-II, Sixth Schedule to the Sales Tax Act, 1990.

Summary: [Exemption of customs duty, sales tax and withholding tax on Import of Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs). The exemption clause is interpreted in favour of the assessee. Discussion on Pakistan Climate Change Act, 2017 and Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (PEPA), 1997. The technology of Hybrid Electric Vehicles is an alternative solution to resolve the issues related to vehicle emissions which contribute to formation of ground level ozone (smog) and toxic pollutants/airborne toxins] The case involved a legal dispute regarding the exemption of customs duty, sales tax, and withholding tax on the import of Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs) in Pakistan. The petitioner, an importer of HEVs, argued for the full implementation of the exemption provided under S.R.O.499 (I)/2013. The respondent, the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), contended that the exemption did not apply to the petitioner's vehicles based on a subsequent circular issued in 2018. In its legal analysis, the Supreme Court examined relevant statutes, including the Pakistan Climate Change Act, 2017, and the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, which underscored the significance of combating climate change and protecting the environment. The court applied established legal principles stating that exemptions in taxing statutes should be strictly interpreted, but without defeating their intended benefits. It emphasized that the burden of proof lies with the taxpayer to substantiate their entitlement to an exemption. Furthermore, once the taxpayer satisfies the conditions outlined in the exemption notification, a liberal interpretation should be adopted in their favor. After considering the arguments and legal principles, the Supreme Court concluded that the denial or circumvention of the exemption of customs duty, sales tax, and withholding tax on the import of HEVs based on a subsequent circular was unwarranted. The court recognized that HEVs represent an environmentally friendly and efficient technology for addressing climate change and reducing pollution. Consequently, it held that the petitioner was entitled to the exemption provided under S.R.O.499 (I)/2013. The Supreme Court's legal analysis in this case reaffirmed the importance of implementing comprehensive measures to mitigate climate change and safeguard the environment. It emphasized the need for a careful interpretation of taxing statutes and exemption notifications, ensuring that the intended benefits for taxpayers are upheld while promoting sustainable development and environmental protection. Civil Petition dismissed, leave refused.

Summary: Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990)------Ss. 3(1A), 6, 11(2), 26, 33(13), 34 & 47--Non-payment of furthertax--Supplies made to unregistered persons--Show-cause notice--Order for further tax withdefault charge--Recoverable penalty--Appeal--Accepted--Question of whether respondents areliable to pay further tax under Section 3(1A) of act or not--Challenge to--Provisions of subsection (1-A) only apply where taxable supplies are made to a person who has not obtainedregistration number and shall be in addition to sub-sections mentioned in (1-A)--Respondentdoes not pay any sales tax on supply of final products being produced by appellant but sales taxliability is discharged in form of ten and half rupees per unit of electricity consumed--Appellantis not paying sales tax--It will be unreasonable and irrational for Applicant Department to allegethat appellant is liable to payment of further tax when appellant does not pay any sales tax undereither of sub-Sections of Section 3--No legal or factual infirmity in orders of CIR and Tribunalour answer to proposed questions is in negative--Tax reference dismissed.

Summary: Section 33(25) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 does not empower any Officer of In-Land Revenue to issue show cause notice or adjudication thereof under the said section and in the instant case where the mechanism and procedure laid down under Section 11 of the Act ibid has not been traversed through, the imposition of penalty under penal provision is illegal, more particularly, when it was admitted on part of the respondent-Department that no show cause notice in terms of Section 11 of the Act ibid was issued.

Summary: ''(1) Taxing statute must be strictly construed. (2) Section 2, 3, 4, 8 and 71 of the Sales Tax Act 1990. (3) Doctrine of ultra vires. (4) Retroactive application of curative and remedial legislations. (5) Effect of SROs.'' --- Background: The petitioners, various entities engaged in textile-related manufacturing, challenged a specific provision in SRO 491(I)/2016 that disallowed the adjustment of Sales Tax on packing material as Input Tax. This provision was later withdrawn via SRO 777(I)/2018. The petitioners argued that the withdrawal should be retrospective, thereby allowing them to claim input tax adjustments for the period when the provision was in effect.Issue: The central issue was whether the withdrawal of the contentious provision via SRO 777(I)/2018 should have retrospective effect, enabling the petitioners to claim input tax adjustments for the period during which the provision disallowing such adjustments was in effect.---Judgment: The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions and refused to grant leave to appeal, upholding the judgment of the Sindh High Court which had dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petitions.---Reasoning: The Court noted that tax laws are subject to strict construction and should not be applied retrospectively unless expressly stated or clearly intended by the legislature. The Court found no evidence that the withdrawal of the provision was intended to have retrospective effect. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the provision in question was within the powers conferred to the Federal Government by the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and its subsequent withdrawal did not automatically imply a retrospective application. The Court also clarified that curative legislation is intended to correct errors or omissions in existing laws, but such legislation does not automatically have retrospective effect unless clearly intended by the legislature.---Conclusion: The Supreme Court's decision underscores the principle that tax statutes and their amendments are generally prospective in application unless there is an explicit provision or clear intent for retrospective application. The Court's refusal to grant the petitions reinforces the notion that legislative changes to tax provisions, including their withdrawal, are not automatically applied retrospectively unless such intent is unequivocally expressed by the legislature.