Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXI, R.90---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S. 19---Auction proceedings---Objection petition, filing/ hearing of---Condition precedent to deposit 50% of the sale proceeds ---Scope---Record revealed that in order to execute the judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court ,auction was conducted for the sale of mortgaged property---Appellants filed Objection Petition under O. XXI, R. 90 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (C.P.C.) against the auction proceedings---The Executing Court directed Appellants to deposit 50% of the sale proceeds as a condition precedent for the Objection Petition to be heard on merits, failing which, the same would be dismissed on said sole ground---Held: Appellants failed to make the required deposit ; consequently, the Objection Petition was dismissed through the impugned order---The condition to deposit the amount under O. XXI, R. 90, C.P.C. is mandatory when the Executing Court specifically requires such deposit and warns of consequences of non-deposit---No illegality, infirmity or jurisdictional defect in the impugned Order had been noticed---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Sulaman Bhatti for Appellant. Muhammad Saleem Iqbal for Respondent No.1. Rai Riyasat Ali Khan for Respondent No.2. Proceeded ex parte vide Order dated 15-9-2025 for Respondent 3. Date of hearing: 6th November, 2025.

Summary: The petitioner claimed that he purchased the property from his father and got it directly transferred to the respondent/plaintiff as discharge of the dower obligation within one month after the marriage ceremony, which was disbelieved by the Appellate Court below on the ground that in fact it was a sale between father-in- law and daughter-in-law and the admission of the respondent/plaintiff that the sale mutation is pursuant to dower obligation was a slip of tongue. Held that admission of the respondent/plaintiff that the petitioner had transferred the dower property through sale mutation is a slip of tongue is untenable inasmuch as cross- examination is a process through which truth is elicited and contradictions are tested, therefore, admission made therein cannot be termed as an inadvertent or mistaken utterance otherwise the purpose of cross-examination will become meaningless. 157Crl. Appeal- Against Conviction- Others 1101-25 SYED BASHARAT HUSSAIN SHAH VS STATE ETC Mr. Justice Sadaqat Ali Khan 06- 11- 2025 2025 LHC 6527

Summary: Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss.122(9), 177(1), 214-C & Second Schedule, Part IV, Clause 72B---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Petitioner / taxpayer assailed notice selecting its case for audit---Validity---Notice under S. 177(6) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was issued on 20-05-2017, as the audit was to be conducted within the financial year---Completion of audit lingered due to failing of petitioner/taxpayer to convey concerns, as required under S. 177(6) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---No concerns were raised to the audit except a plea that it should be completed by 30-06-2017---No such construction could be attributed to S.177(6) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 which manifested and envisaged that concerns were invited on audit report---Taxpayer had no objections regarding conduct of audit and preparation of report thereby---Proceedings for audit concluded for all intent and purposes, and stage to amend assessment of the latest tax year had triggered and authorities issued notice under Ss. 122(9) & 111(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---No objection was raised by petitioner / taxpayer that the notice was beyond limitation provided in S.122 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Petitioner / taxpayer failed to explain as to why response to notice dated 17-09-2021 was not filed and instead Constitutional petition was instituted---High Court in exercise of Constitution jurisdiction declined to interfere in the matter as there was no jurisdictional defect in issuance of notice dated 17-09-2021 and petitioner/taxpayer lacked cooperation / facilitation, to raise concerns to the audit report---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Sialkot and others v. Messrs Allah Din Steel and Rolling Mills and others 2018 SCMR 1328; Messrs SKF Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary (Law and Justice Division) and others 2024 PTD 716; The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Messrs Super Asia Mohammad Din and Sons and others 2017 SCMR 1427; Abdul Ghani v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2019 PTD 764 and Nagina Silk Milk, Lyallpur v. The Income Tax Officer, A-ward Lyallpur and others PLD 1963 SC 322 distinguished. Zahid Imran Gondal and Muhammad Junaid for Petitioner. Rana Ghulam Hussain, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan. Malik Muhammad Shahzad Awan for Respondents.

Summary: (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss. 25A & 25D---Revision of value determined sought---Subsequent Value Ruling, issuance of---Applicability---Importer not being part of revision proceedings---Petitioner/ Importer sought re-assessment of the into-bonded consignments of the petitioner and subsequent release of the same---Consignment of the petitioner was assessed vide Assessment Order dated 16.05.2025 under Valuation Ruling No. 1948/2025 dated 06.01.2025 while the noted Valuation Ruling (1948/2025), being the subject matter of Revision Petitions' preferred by various importers, excluding the petitioner, under S. 25D of the Customs Act 1969 (‘ the Act 1969’) before the Directorate of Customs Valuation subsequently came before the Customs Appellate Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) and ultimately, a fresh Valuation Ruling No.2008/2005 dated 14.07.2025 was issued, categorically revising the earlier / noted Valuation Ruling (1948/2025)---Argument of the department / respondent was that the applicability of the Valuation Rulings was only to the Importers seeking revision---Validity---In the present case, the goods were still lying in the bonded warehouse---The Valuation Rulings were statutory rulings and have the force of law, as once the Director General (Valuation) issues a ruling the same has to be duly notified, under the Customs General Orders, 2002---Thus, the arguments of the Respondent were misconceived in respect of the applicability of the Valuation Rulings only to the Importers seeking revision---Notified ruling under S. 25-A of the Act 1969 is applicable and binding until revised or rescinded by the competent authority---Once revised, the ruling takes effect from the date when the original/earlier ruling was given, otherwise the same will result in applying a ruling to the importer which is no longer in the field or which the department itself found to be erroneous---Therefore, the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of the revised ruling---Even otherwise, the benefit of any ambiguity or error, relating to the status or the interpretation of a ruling must go to the importer/taxpayer---High Court directed the respondents /Department to re-assess the consignments of the petitioner under Valuation Ruling No. 2008/2025 and release the same in accordance with law---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. The D.G Customs Valuation, Karachi and another v. M/s A.A. Tyre, Karachi, Special Customs Reference Application No. 1926/2023; Collector of Customs v. Wasim Radio 2023 SCMR 1716; Messrs Saghir Co. through Proprietor v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary 2013 PTD 636 and Collector of Customs through Additional Collector of Customs v. Messers Khas Trading Co 2015 PTD 22 ref. (b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss. 25D & 109---Revision of value determined sought---Subsequent Value Ruling, issuance of---Applicability---Importer not being part of revision proceedings---Petitioner / importer sought re-assessment of the into-bonded consignments of the Petitioner and subsequent release of the same---Consignment of the petitioner was assessed vide Assessment Order dated 16.05.2025 under Valuation Ruling No. 1948/2025 dated 06.01.2025 while the noted Valuation Ruling (1948/2025) being the subject matter of Revision Petitions preferred by various importers, excluding the petitioner, under S. 25D of the Customs Act, 1969, before the Directorate of Customs Valuation subsequently came before the Customs Appellate Tribunal (‘Tribunal’), and ultimately, a fresh Valuation Ruling No.2008/2005 dated 14.07.2025 was issued, categorically revising the earlier / noted Valuation Ruling (1948/2025)---Argument of the Department / respondent was that the applicability of the Valuation Rulings was only to the importers seeking revision---Validity---Under S. 109 of the Customs Act , 1969 the Petitioner was entitled to re-assessment of his consignments on the basis of fresh Valuation Ruling as it was only the subsequent Valuation Ruling i.e. 2008/2025 which remained in the field---High Court directed the respondents / Department to re-assess the consignments of the petitioner under Valuation Ruling No. 2008/2025 and release the same in accordance with law---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Global Produce Ltd. v. Collector of Customs and 2 others 1986 CLC 137 ref. Muhammad Adeel Awan for Petitioner. Ms. Mehreen Ibrahim, Deputy Attorney General for Respondent No.1. Sardar Zafar Hussain and Aamir Ali Sheikh for Respondents Nos.2 and 3. Tariq Aziz, Assistant Collector. Date of hearing: 27th October, 2025.

Summary: Sindh Land Revenue Act ( XVII of 1967)--- ----S. 42---Mutation---Amenity plots of Housing Society, sale of---Legality---Registered sale deed---Effect---Bona fide purchase, doctrine of---Scope---The subject plots were earmarked for public amenities-namely, a “Culture Center” and a “Hospital” as per the approved Layout Plan of the Housing Scheme---Record clearly showed that the Builder unlawfully alienated said amenity plots in contravention of the approved plan, which was impermissible under the law and public policy---The land reserved for amenity purposes in a sanctioned housing scheme cannot be converted, sold or utilized for any purpose other than that originally approved by the competent planning authority---Any such transaction was void and conferred no title, even upon a subsequent purchaser---The sale of amenity plots amounted to an illegality; the purchaser may, if advised, seek civil remedy against the Builder for recovery of his consideration, since the sale itself was null and void---The plea of bona fide purchase advanced by the applicant could not override the public interest or the sanctity of the approved layout plan---The doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value without notice does not apply when the sale itself is prohibited by law or is in respect of property incapable of private ownership---Thus, the petitioner’ claim could not sustain as it was conclusively established that the sale and corresponding mutation of the amenity plots were unlawful, void ab initio and against the public interest---The petitioner's plea of bona fide purchase holds no legal weight in respect of amenity plots that could not be transferred or owned privately under the governing laws and planning regulations---Both subordinate authorities had passed well-reasoned and justified orders supported by law and factual record---Board of Revenue directed the District Administration and the concerned Director, Town Planning Authority, to inquire about illegal sale of subject amenity-plots and directions issued in present order were to be complied with against the delinquents---Revision was dismissed, in circumstances. Sagar Soni for the Applicant.

Summary: The direction to the petitioner to alter the date of birth merely on the strength of birth certificate(s) issued almost two decades after the claimed date of birth was legally untenable. The matriculation certificate, issued on the basis of particulars supplied by the respondent herself, constitutes a contemporaneous and conclusive document. Once such particulars have been recorded and certified, the respondent cannot be permitted to turn around and seek alteration of the same through subsequent documents of doubtful probative value. This Court is of the opinion that record maintained/corrected/amended by NADRA qua correction of the date of birth does not bind educational boards, which maintain separate statutory functions. 164Jail Appeal 6763/25 Ayaz Adil Vs The State Mr. Justice Muhammad Amjad Rafiq 31-10- 2025 2025 LHC 8023

Summary: Effect of failing to prove availability of independent advice / counselling to a female, in view of the facts involved. 167Misc. Writ 82278/23 Shaukat Khanum Memorial Trust & 1 other Vs Province of Punjab etc. Mr. Justice Raheel Kamran 29- 10- 2025 2025 LHC 6441 PLD 2026 Lahore 122

Summary: Question of arbitrability of the dispute has to be decided prior to the appointment of Arbitrators. 166Civil Revision 1146062.2439-

Summary: (a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----Ss.11, 28 & 31(3)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115---Agreement for Package-2, ‘Orange line metro train project’---Arbitration clause---Reference to arbitral tribunal---Application for bifurcation/separate adjudication of multiple sub-claims, dismissal of---Interlocutory order of arbitral tribunal---Challenge before the civil court, legality of---Judicial non-interference in ongoing arbitration---Scope---Expiry of initial arbitral period (four months where contract silent)---Effect---Order passed after expiry but before formal enlargement of time---Enlargement of time by court for making award, powers of---Where such enlargement is granted after statutory time-limit---Legality---Retrospective operation of enlargement of time---Scope---Facts: Lahore Development Authority (LDA) and respondent executed a contract for Package-2 of the Orange Line Metro Train Project containing an arbitration clause; upon disputes, arbitration proceedings commenced before an arbitral tribunal where the respondent filed multiple sub-claims, and LDA applied to the tribunal for separation/bifurcation and separate adjudication of each sub-claim; the tribunal dismissed that application, LDA challenged the said order before the civil court, which dismissed the challenge and affirmed the tribunal’s decision, leading the LDA to file present civil revision petition before the High Court---Issues:---(i) “Whether an interlocutory/procedural order of an arbitral tribunal (refusing bifurcation of sub-claims) was independently amenable to challenge before the civil court?”;(ii) “Whether the tribunal’s order, made after expiry of the initial arbitral period but before formal enlargement of time by court, was legally sustainable?”; and (iii) Whether petitioner’s application for separation and individual adjudication of sub-claims was rightly dismissed?”---Held: As regards issue (i); there was no independent substantive right to challenge each interlocutory or procedural order passed by the arbitral tribunal---The legislature’s deliberate omission of such a right in the Act of 1940 underscored the principle that the arbitral tribunal was considered to be the master of its own procedure, particularly where it was composed of technical experts best suited to manage complex factual and procedural issues---Thus, the petitioner’s application for separation of sub-claims constituted a challenge to the tribunal’s case management discretion, which was not permissible under the Act---As per the principle of judicial non-intervention, arbitration had to proceed without interruption or judicial oversight of interlocutory matters---The application filed by the petitioner before the civil court challenging the arbitral tribunal’s order dated was thus not maintainable and was rightly dismissed---Consequently, the present civil revision, being an extension of the same challenge, was also not maintainable---As regards issue (ii); where the extension in time was granted by court after the expiry of the original period but before the making of the award, the order operated retrospectively, thereby validating the proceedings conducted beyond the original time limit---Similarly, where the extension was granted after the making of the award, it encompassed the situation where the award was rendered after the expiry of time and the subsequent enlargement by the Court related back, rendering the award valid as if made within the extended period---In such circumstances, there could be no doubt that the extension of time operated retrospectively---As regards issue (iii); while subscribing to the principle of minimal judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings, High Court observed that the expert arbitral tribunal was the master of its own procedure---In the absence of any allegation of bias, violation of the principles of natural justice, or a demonstrable and grave prejudice that could not otherwise be compensated, a court should be loath to interfere with such procedural determinations---Therefore, on the merits of the application itself, High Court found no compelling reason to substitute its own view for that of the expert arbitrators---Impugned order was passed in accordance with law---Present civil revision petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Messrs National Construction Co. v. WAPDA PLD 1987 SC 461 and Civil Aviation Authority, Karachi v. KIST Consultants (Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore 1998 SCMR 2393 ref. (b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----S.11---Arbitral tribunal---Interlocutory / procedural order---Challenge before civil court---Permissibility---Whether an interlocutory order passed by an arbitral tribunal, which does not finally determine the rights of the parties, is amenable to challenge before a civil court---Permitting parties to approach civil courts to challenge every procedural or interlocutory order passed by a arbitral tribunal would defeat the very object of arbitration, opening the floodgates for recalcitrant parties to delay proceedings and transforming the arbitrator into a trial court and the Civil Court into a court of first appeal for every minor procedural decision---The scheme of the Act of 1940 reveals no provision granting a right to challenge interlocutory order---If, however, a party is genuinely aggrieved by an arbitrator’s conduct, such as undue delay, partiality or biased procedure, the appropriate remedy lies under S. 11 of the Act of 1940, which empowers the Court to remove an arbitrator or umpire in certain circumstances---Arbitration, as a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), provides a speedy, efficient and cost-effective substitute for conventional and often protracted litigation---Particularly in commercial and complex disputes, arbitration is preferred due to its procedural flexibility, technical expertise and finality---Accordingly, if a party alleges misconduct, undue delay or procedural impropriety, it may invoke the provisions of S. 11 ibid for removal of the arbitrator. Injum Aqeel v. Latif Muhammad Chaudhry and others 2023 SCMR 1361 rel. (c) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----S.28 & First Sched. Para 3---Arbitral tribunal---Power of court to enlarge time for making award---Situation where no time-frame is provided---Scope---In the contract between the parties where the arbitration clause does not specify the time-frame for completion of arbitration proceedings, para 3 of first Schedule of Arbitration Act, 1940 shall come into play which shows that a period of four months is prescribed for making the award, which commences either from the date the arbitrator enters upon the reference or from the date he is called upon to act by notice in writing---The court possesses the discretion to enlarge the time for making an award “from time to time.” (d) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----S.28---Arbitral award beyond prescribed time, issuing of---Enlargement of time by court---Where such enlargement is granted after statutory time-limit---Order passed after expiry but before formal enlargement of time---Legality---Retrospective validation---Scope---Where award was given by arbitrator beyond period of limitation either prescribed by Arbitration Act itself or any rules or bye-laws or provided in agreement by which parties were governed, same could be extended by court either before or after giving of award as court had unfettered discretion under S. 28 of the Act to extend period of limitation---Moreover, extension of time granted under S. 28 of the Arbitration Act would operate retrospectively. Province of Sindh and 4 others v. Waseem Construction Co.' 1991 CLC 66 and Messrs Everest Corporation v. Messrs Dacca Mercantile Company, Karachi and 4 others 1993 MLD 1303 ref. (e) Estoppel--- ----Principle---A party cannot approbate and reprobate---A party cannot participate in proceedings or hold its peace while awaiting a potential favourable outcome and then, upon an adverse ruling, opportunistically challenge the very jurisdiction it had tacitly affirmed. WAPDA and another v. Messrs Khanzada Muhammad Abdul Haque Khan Khattak and Company PLD 1990 SC 359 rel. Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation v. Messrs Sheikh Muhammad Latif and another 1999 M L D 2773 ref. Sahabzada Muzaffar Ali for Petitioner. Bakhtawar Bilal Soofi for Respondent No.1. M. Waleed Waheed Ch., Registrar of Arbitral Tribunal, in person. Date of hearing: 14th October, 2025.