Summary: 369Review Application (Civil)- Review Application (Civil) 3-15 MST BAKHAN ETC VS PEER BUX ETC Mr. Justice Ahmad Nadeem Arshad 19- 06- 2025 2025 LHC 4210 PLJ 2025 Lahore 946 (DB) (Multan Bench, Multan)

Summary: "Title" with reference to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. "Title" refers to a legal right to any character or property or any entitlement attached with the property which indicates who has the lawful authority or claim over the property in question amongst the contesting parties qua their entitlement. The expression "title" is to be construed in a broader meaning as the legislature used it with all expressions of right mentioned in it. 368Writ Petition- Miscellaneous- Civil Suit 2348-17 NASIR JABBAR VS KHALID MEHMOOD AKHTAR ETC. Mr. Justice Sadaqat Ali Khan 19- 06- 2025 2025 LHC 4228

Summary: Held:: If a legal heir is deliberately and unjustifiably deprived of inheritance through a gift motivated solely by malice or bias, particularly, where the donee is one among several sons or daughters, such a transaction may fall within the mischief of zarar and be liable to be declared invalid. It would be a manifest error in such cases to uphold a gift that serves no purpose (love and affection) but the exclusion of others. However, when some children (the petitioners) have distanced themselves from their father, embroiled him in unwarranted litigation, and effectively severed familial ties, while another child (the respondent) remains devoted, provides companionship and support, and shoulders the responsibilities of care in old age, it is only natural that a father may incline towards the one who stood by him. In such circumstances, Islamic law does not restrain a Muslim owner from gifting his property to the child who has earned his trust and affection through personal service and care. Prima facie, it appears that the deceased, impressed by the conduct and care extended by the respondent (donee), chose to transfer his entire estate to him during his lifetime and the disobedience of the petitioners and their distancing from the donor in his life was only an ancillary aspect of the matter. Ratio laid down in case reported as Liaqat Ali v. Shahnaz Akhtar (2025 LHC 693) is distinguished. 367Civil Revision 31213/21 Sheikh Anwar ul Haq Vs Abdul Ghaffar etc Mr. Justice Malik Waqar Haider Awan 19- 06- 2025 2025 LHC 4441 2026 MLD 175 (Lahore)

Summary: Constitution Petitions Nos. 22, 20, 25 to 28 and 30 of 2025, decided on 19th June, 2025. (Constitutional Petitions under Article 184(3) of the Constitution for declaring Notification No. F.10(2)/2024-A.II dated 1st February 2025 regarding Transfer of Judges to Islamabad High Court as Illegal and Unconstitutional). AND C.M.A.2136/2025 IN C.P.22/2025 and C.M.A.2137/2025 IN C.P.20/2025 and C.M.A.2138/2025 IN C.P.26/2025 and C.M.A.2139/2025 IN C.P.27/2025 and C.M.A.2047/2025 IN C.P.28/2025 (Stay applications) Per Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Shahid Bilal Hassan and Salahuddin Panhwar, JJ.; Naeem Akhter Afghan and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ. dissenting. [Majority view] (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 175A, 184(3), 200(1) & 200(2)---Islamabad High Court Act (XVII of 2010), S. 3---Judges from Lahore High Court, Sindh High Court and Balochistan High Court transferred to Islamabad High Court by the President of Pakistan under Article 200(1) of the Constitution---Dispute over seniority between the transferred judges and judges that already existed prior to the transfer---Whether transfer of a Judge of the High Court to another High Court by the President amounted to a fresh appointment?---Held: Powers of the President of Pakistan under Sub-article (1) of Article 200 of the Constitution for the transfer of a Judge of the High Court from one High Court to another High Court and the provisions contained under Article 175A of the Constitution for appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court, High Courts, and the Federal Shariat Court by the Judicial Commission of Pakistan ("JCP") are two distinct provisions dealing with different situations and niceties---Neither do they overlap nor override each other---Article 200 of the Constitution is absolutely not dependent, concomitant, or at the mercy of Article 175A of the Constitution, but is an independent and stand alone provision dealing with the transfer of judges of a High Court (permanently or temporarily) and not the appointment of judges, which assignment has been incontrovertibly conferred to the JCP autonomously in terms of Article 175A of the Constitution---Transfer of a judge by the President of Pakistan by means of Article 200 of the Constitution (permanently or temporarily) cannot be construed as a fresh appointment---Furthermore, the powers of transfer conferred to the President by none other than the framers of the Constitution cannot be questioned on the anvil or ground that if the posts were vacant in the Islamabad High Court, then why they were not filled up by JCP through fresh appointments---Transfer from one High Court to another High Court can only be made within the sanctioned strength, which can only be regarded as a mere transfer and does not amount to raising the sanctioned strength of a particular High Court---Section 3 of the Islamabad High Court Act, 2010 is only germane to the appointment of judges and does not, in any way, mean that a judge can only join the Islamabad High Court through a fresh appointment and not by way of a transfer or, in other words, that Article 200 does not apply to the Islamabad High Court, which interpretation would be against the exactitudes of the Constitution---Neither can Section 3 of the said Act supersede/override a constitutional mandate, nor can it control, nullify, or rescind the powers of transfer that are vested in the President of Pakistan under Article 200 of the Constitution---Thus, for all intents and purposes the transfer of judges by the President of Pakistan, by means of the impugned Notification No. F.10 (2)/2024-A.II, dated 1st February 2025 ("Notification") was within the framework of the Constitution and cannot be declared ultra vires---There was no All Pakistan Cadre/unified or combined seniority list of High Court judges for determining their seniority at the time of transfer, therefore, the terms and conditions of transfer (permanently or temporary) including seniority should have been taken up and mentioned by the President of Pakistan at the time of issuing the Notification of transfer in terms of Article 200 of the Constitution---Supreme Court partially remanded the matter to the President of Pakistan, without upsetting the Notification of transfer, to determine the seniority after examining/vetting the service record of the transferee judges as soon as possible, including the question of whether the transfer was on a permanent or temporary basis---Supreme Court directed that till such time that the seniority and nature of transfer (permanent or temporary) of the transferee judges was determined by the President of Pakistan by means of notification/ order, the Judge already holding the office of Acting Chief Justice of the Islamabad High Court, would continue to perform as the Acting Chief Justice of the Islamabad High Court---Constitutional petitions were disposed of accordingly along with the applications. [Majority view] (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 200---Transfer of High Court judges from one High Court to another---Powers of the President of Pakistan---Scope---Exercise of the powers of transfer by the President of Pakistan under Article 200 of the Constitution is not unregulated or unfettered---It is structured on a four tier formula which expounds that no judge shall be transferred except with his consent and after consultation by the President with the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justices of both High Courts---It means that if at the very initial stage, a judge intended to be transferred from one High Court to another High Court refuses the offer/proposal, then obviously the matter ends forthwith---Even in the case of consent, the transfer shall be subject to consultation with two Chief Justices of the High Courts and the Chief Justice of Pakistan, as the paterfamilias of judiciary, who may, during the consultation process, pragmatically ruminate the pros and cons germane to the transfer proposal, including the aspect of public interest, if any---Hence, for all intents and purposes, it is reverberated beyond any shadow of doubt that before exercising the power of transfer, certain inbuilt procedures and mechanisms have to be followed in letter and spirit and the decision, or the right of refusal or primacy, is within the sphere and realm of judiciary and not within the domain of executives-- -Therefore, it does not in any case compromise the independence of the judiciary for the discernable reason that the decision to accept or reject is exclusively within the hands of the judiciary. Per Naeem Akhter Afghan, J. dissenting; Shakeel Ahmad, J. agreeing . [Minority view] (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 2A, 4, 25, 175A, 184(3), 200(1) & 200(2)---Islamabad High Court Act (XVII of 2010), S. 3---Judicial Commission of Pakistan (Appointment of Judges) Rules, 2024, R. 6---Judges from Lahore High Court, Sindh High Court and Balochistan High Court transferred to Islamabad High Court by the President of Pakistan under Article 200(1) of the Constitution---Dispute over seniority between the transferred judges and judges that already existed prior to the transfer---Whether transfer of a Judge of the High Court to another High Court by the President of Pakistan was a temporary appointment?---Held: Three Judges in question who had been transferred to Islamabad High Court (IHC) had been transferred by the President vide impugned notification on permanent basis---Clause (1) and Clause (2) of Article 200, read in conjunction with each other, do not provide for permanent transfer of a Judge of a High Court from one High Court to another High Court, but provide for transfer of a Judge of a High Court from one High Court to another High Court for a period i.e. on temporary basis---Permanent transfer of three Judges to IHC had been made by the President in wrong exercise of discretion under Clause (1) of Article 200 of the Constitution---It had offended Article 175A of the Constitution and had made the same redundant---Process for permanent transfer of three Judges to IHC suffered from concealment of relevant and material facts from the transferee Judges, from the Chief Justices of the Islamabad High Court (IHC), Lahore High Court (LHC), Sindh High Court (SHC), Balochistan High Court (BHC) and from the Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP)---Process for permanent transfer of three Judges to IHC was also lacking meaningful, purposive and consensus oriented consultation with the Chief Justices of IHC, LHC, SHC, BHC and CJP on all the relevant issues---Process for permanent transfer of three Judges to IHC had been completed in an unnecessary haste, and suffered from mala fide in facts as well as mala fide in law---Transfer had not been made by the President in the public interest---While transferring the three Judges to IHC on permanent basis, the President had failed to apply his independent mind with an objective opinion---Object of proportionate representation of all the Provinces in IHC could have conveniently been achieved by making fresh appointment of Judges from the Provinces by the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP) under Article 175A of the Constitution as Rule 6 of the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (Appointment of Judges) Rules, 2024 binds/mandates the Members of the JCP to ensure proper diversity in terms of region as well as gender and religion, subject to the prescribed criteria---Transfer of Judges in the present case was violative of Articles 2A, 4 and 25 of the Constitution and it had undermined the independence of judiciary, due process and principle of equality---Impugned Notification No.F.10(2)/2024-A.II dated 1st February 2025 issued by the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of Pakistan, whereby in exercise of powers conferred by Clause (1) of Article 200 of the Constitution, the President of Pakistan had transferred one Judge each from the Lahore High Court, High Court of Sindh and High Court of Balochistan to Islamabad High Court, was declared null and void and of no legal effect---Constitutional petitions were allowed. [Minority view] (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 200---Transfer of High Court judges from one High Court to another---Powers of the President of Pakistan---Scope---Clause (2) of Article 200 of the Constitution is subservient to Clause (1) of Article 200 of the Constitution and both are interconnected---According to the doctrine of harmonious construction, while interpreting Clause (1) and Clause (2) of Article 200 of the Constitution, both the clauses have to be harmonized and, being consistent with each other, have to be read in conjunction with each other for giving effect to both without creating conflict or absurdity. (e) Administration of justice--- ----If a case can be decided on other or narrower grounds, the court will abstain from deciding a larger constitutional question than what is necessary for the determination of the case. "Treatise on constitutional limitations" by Cooley pages 159 to 186; "Constitutional Law of India" Vol-I by H.M. Seervai, pages 260 to 262; "Fundamental Law of Pakistan" by the late Mr. A.K. Brohi, pages 562 to 592; "Judicial Review of Public Actions" Vol-I by Mr. Justice Fazal Karim, pages 488 to 492 and Lahore Development Authority v. Imrana Tiwana 2015 SCMR 1739 ref. (f) Constitution of Pakistan--- ---Arts. 175A & 200---Transfer/appointment of Judges of the Superior Courts---No role of intelligence agencies---Intelligence agencies, including Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), have no role under the Constitution for appointment or transfer of Judges---Being subordinate to the Executive, the intelligence agencies, including ISI, cannot override the Executive, the Judiciary, the Constitutional bodies and the Constitutional office holders. For the Petitioners: Muneer A. Malik, Senior Advocate Supreme Court Salahuddin Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record (in C.P. No. 22 of 2025) assisted by Ms. Zainab Janjua and Ms. Faaiza Qazi, Advocates. Idrees Ashraf Malik, Advocate Supreme Court Raja Muqsit Nawaz Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.Ps. Nos. 20 and 25 of 2025) Hamid Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court Waqar Rana, Advocate Supreme Court Ajmal Ghaffar Toor, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.Ps. Nos. 26 and 27 of 2025) Faisal Siddiqi, Advocate Supreme Court Riasat Ali Azad, Advocate Supreme Court Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record Assisted by M. Ammar Rafique and Sikandar Naeem Qazi, Advocate (in C.Ps. Nos. 28 and 30 of 2025). For the Respondents: For the Federation, the President of Pakistan Registrar SCP and Secretary JCP Mansoor Usman Awan, A.G.P. Ch. Aamir Rehman, Addl. A.G.P. Raja Shafqat Mehmood Abbasi, D.A.G. Muhammad Amir Malik, Advocate-on-Record Assisted by: Mr.Hasan Mehmood, Legislative Advisor, Ministry of Law, Ms. Mariyam Ali Abbasi and Saad Javed Satti, Advocates. For Province of Punjab: Muhammad Amjad Pervaiz, A.G. Waseem Mumtaz Malik, Addl. A.G. Rao Muhammad Aurangzeb, Asstt. A.G. Assisted by: Muhammad Adil Chattha, Sr.Consultant For Province of Sindh: Suresh Kumar, Addl. A.G. Sibtain Mehmood, Addl. A.G. and Barrister Zeeshan Adhi, Addl. A.G. For Province of KPK: Shah Faisal Ilyas, Addl. A.G. For Province of Balochistan: Muhammad Ayaz Swati, Addl. A.G. and Tahir Iqbal Khattak, Addl. A.G. For ICT: Ayyaz Shaukat, A.G. and Dr. Mirza Muhammad Usman, Advocate-on-Record For the Registrar LHC: M. Shahid Latif Khan, Dy. Registrar For the Registrar PHC: Wajid Ali Khan, Director (Regulations) (via video link from Peshawar) For the Registrar HCS: Sohail Muhammad Laghari, Registrar (via video link from Karachi) For the Registrar IHC: M. Asif Iqbal, Dy. Registrar For the Transferee Judges: Nemo. Dates of hearing: 14th, 17th, 22nd, 29th, 30th April; 07th, 08th, 14th, 15th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 23rd, 26th, 27th, 29th May and 16th June to 19th June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Remedy- -Special and general remedy-Distinction-Where a special remedy is provided under special law, same may not be by-passed-Civil Court cannot be approached directly without exhausting the highest forum in the hierarchy under special law. Administrator, Thal Development through EACO Bhakkar and others v. Ali Muhammad 2012 SCMR 730 (2-MB) and Muhammad Siddique (Deceased) through LRs and others v. Mst. Noor Bibi (Deceased) through LRs. and others 2020 SCMR 483 (2-MB) rel. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)- -S. 3-Period of limitation to invoke jurisdiction-Object, purpose and scope-Limitation is not a mere technicality and instead limitation is a statute of repose, designed to quieten title and to bar stale and water-logged disputes-Limitation is to be strictly complied and the statutes of limitation by their very nature are strict and inflexible-There is no scope in limitation law for any equitable or ethical construction to get over them-Justice, equity and good conscience do not override law of limitation-Hurdles of limitation cannot be crossed under the guise of any hardship or imagined inherent discretionary jurisdiction of Court; ignorance, negligence, mistake-Hardship does not save limitation, nor does poverty of the parties-Plea of limitation cannot be deemed as unjust or discreditable defence-There is nothing morally wrong and there is no disparagement to the party pleading limitation-It is not a mere technical plea as limitation is based on sound public policy-No one should be deprived of the right he has gained by the law and limitation is indeed often a righteous defence. Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others PLD 2016 SC 872 (5-MB) rel. (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)- -Ss. 42 & 54-West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (IX of 1948), S.3-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 3, 18, First Schedule, Arts. 95 & 120-Suit for declaration and injunction-Inheritance right-Limitation-Scope-Suit filed by respondents / plaintiffs was with regard to share of a deceased widow whose husband (owner of land) died in year 1947 during migration to Pakistan-Suit was filed in year 2009 and Lower Appellate Court partially decreed the suit in favour of respondents / plaintiffs-Validity-Claim of inheritance must cross the bridge of limitation, waiver and acquiescence-Unchecked tendency of encouraging a relief in the guise of inheritance was not warranted under the law-Encouragement of such claims and long drawn trials in statute barred suits is counterproductive for genuine and bona fide claims of female heirs-Predecessor-in-interest respondents/ plaintiffs (deceased widow) never voiced any grievance against mutation of inheritance even on her demise in year 1988-Legal heirs of deceased widow (respondents/plaintiffs), kept silent for almost 21 years and suddenly woke up from their slumber and had filed suit in year 2009, which was not permissible under the law-At the time of sanction of mutation of inheritance in year 1952 provisions of Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948 had to be applied-Jurisdiction of Civil Court was barred for the purpose of suit filed by respondents/ plaintiffs-Suit was even otherwise statute barred, in terms of Arts. 95 and 120 of First Schedule, read with section 18 of Limitation Act, 1908-High Court set aside judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court resultantly suit filed by respondents/ plaintiffs was dismissed-Second Appeal was allowed accordingly. Ghulam Haider and others v. Murad through Legal Representatives and others PLD 2012 SC 501 (5-MB); Ahmad Din v. Muhammad Shafi and others PLD 1971 SC 762; PLD 1960 SC 229; PLD 1960 Lah. 834; Mst. Zainab v. Mst. Raji and others PLD 1960 SC (Pak.) 229 (5-MB); Mst. Zainab Bibi and others v. Fazal Muhammad and others 2005 SCMR 1660 (2-MB); Faizuddin Ahmad v. Muhammad Yousaf and another 1988 SCMR 1289 (2-MB); Muhammad Saleem and others v. Sardar Ali and others 2004 SCMR 1640 (3-MB); Nazeer Ahmad and others v. Ghulam Mehdi and others 1988 SCMR 824 (3-MB); Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLD 2022 SC 353 (3-MB); The limitation for laying a challenge to a fraud. Also see (2005 SCMR 1660); Muhammad Rustam and another v. Mst. Makhan Jan and others 2013 SCMR 299 (3-MB); Mst. Grana through Legal Heirs and others v. Sahib Kamala Bibi and others PLD 2014 SC 167 (2-MB); Ghulam Ali v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1 (2-MB); Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh and others 2007 SCMR 1446) (3-MB); Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and othersPLD 2022 SC 353 (3-MB); Syed Kausar Ali Shah and others v. Syed Farhat Hussain Shah and others 2022 SCMR 1558 (2-MB); Abdul Haq and another v. Mst. Surrya Begum and others 2002 SCMR 1330 (2-MB); Taj Muhammad Khan through L.Rs. and another v. Mst. Munawar Jan and 2 others 2009 SCMR 598 (2-MB); Muhammad Rustam and another v. Mst. Makhan Jan and others 2013 SCMR 299 (3-MB); Ghulam Abbas and others v. Mohammad Shafi through LRs and others 2016 SCMR 1403 (2-MB); Jamila Khatoon and others v. Aish Muhammad and others 2011 SCMR 222 (2 MB); Saadat Khan and others v. Shahid-Ur-Rehman and others PLD 2023 SC 362 (3-MB); Shabla and others v. Ms. Jahan Afroz Khilat and others 2020 SCMR 352 (2-MB); Mohammad Boota (Deceased) through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fatima daughter of Gohar Ali and others 2023 SCMR 1901 (3-MB); Noor Din (Deceased) through LRs v. Pervaiz Akhtar and others 2023 SCMR 1928 (3-MB); Madan Gopal and 4 others v. Maran Bepari and 3 others PLD 1969 SC 617 (2-MB); Sheikh Akhtar Aziz v. Mst. Shabnam Begum and others 2019 SCMR 524) (2-MB); Alloo v. Sher Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 382 (3-MB) and Muhammad Tufail and 2 others v. Ghaus Muhammad through Legal Representatives PLD 2007 SC 26 (2-MB) rel.

Summary: ----Special and general remedy---Distinction---Where a special remedy is provided under special law, same may not be by-passed---Civil Court cannot be approached directly without exhausting the highest forum in the hierarchy under special law. Administrator, Thal Development through EACO Bhakkar and others v. Ali Muhammad 2012 SCMR 730 (2-MB) and Muhammad Siddique (Deceased) through LRs and others v. Mst. Noor Bibi (Deceased) through LRs. and others 2020 SCMR 483 (2-MB) rel. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S. 3---Period of limitation to invoke jurisdiction---Object, purpose and scope---Limitation is not a mere technicality and instead limitation is a statute of repose, designed to quieten title and to bar stale and water-logged disputes---Limitation is to be strictly complied and the statutes of limitation by their very nature are strict and inflexible---There is no scope in limitation law for any equitable or ethical construction to get over them---Justice, equity and good conscience do not override law of limitation---Hurdles of limitation cannot be crossed under the guise of any hardship or imagined inherent discretionary jurisdiction of Court; ignorance, negligence, mistake---Hardship does not save limitation, nor does poverty of the parties---Plea of limitation cannot be deemed as unjust or discreditable defence---There is nothing morally wrong and there is no disparagement to the party pleading limitation---It is not a mere technical plea as limitation is based on sound public policy---No one should be deprived of the right he has gained by the law and limitation is indeed often a righteous defence. Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others PLD 2016 SC 872 (5-MB) rel. (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 42 & 54---West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (IX of 1948), S.3---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 3, 18, First Schedule, Arts. 95 & 120---Suit for declaration and injunction---Inheritance right---Limitation---Scope---Suit filed by respondents / plaintiffs was with regard to share of a deceased widow whose husband (owner of land) died in year 1947 during migration to Pakistan---Suit was filed in year 2009 and Lower Appellate Court partially decreed the suit in favour of respondents / plaintiffs---Validity---Claim of inheritance must cross the bridge of limitation, waiver and acquiescence---Unchecked tendency of encouraging a relief in the guise of inheritance was not warranted under the law---Encouragement of such claims and long drawn trials in statute barred suits is counterproductive for genuine and bona fide claims of female heirs---Predecessor-in-interest respondents/ plaintiffs (deceased widow) never voiced any grievance against mutation of inheritance even on her demise in year 1988---Legal heirs of deceased widow (respondents/plaintiffs), kept silent for almost 21 years and suddenly woke up from their slumber and had filed suit in year 2009, which was not permissible under the law---At the time of sanction of mutation of inheritance in year 1952 provisions of Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948 had to be applied---Jurisdiction of Civil Court was barred for the purpose of suit filed by respondents/ plaintiffs---Suit was even otherwise statute barred, in terms of Arts. 95 and 120 of First Schedule, read with section 18 of Limitation Act, 1908---High Court set aside judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court resultantly suit filed by respondents/ plaintiffs was dismissed--- Second Appeal was allowed accordingly. Ghulam Haider and others v. Murad through Legal Representatives and others PLD 2012 SC 501 (5-MB); Ahmad Din v. Muhammad Shafi and others PLD 1971 SC 762; PLD 1960 SC 229; PLD 1960 Lah. 834; Mst. Zainab v. Mst. Raji and others PLD 1960 SC (Pak.) 229 (5-MB); Mst. Zainab Bibi and others v. Fazal Muhammad and others 2005 SCMR 1660 (2-MB); Faizuddin Ahmad v. Muhammad Yousaf and another 1988 SCMR 1289 (2-MB); Muhammad Saleem and others v. Sardar Ali and others 2004 SCMR 1640 (3-MB); Nazeer Ahmad and others v. Ghulam Mehdi and others 1988 SCMR 824 (3-MB); Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLD 2022 SC 353 (3-MB); The limitation for laying a challenge to a fraud. Also see (2005 SCMR 1660); Muhammad Rustam and another v. Mst. Makhan Jan and others 2013 SCMR 299 (3-MB); Mst. Grana through Legal Heirs and others v. Sahib Kamala Bibi and others PLD 2014 SC 167 (2-MB); Ghulam Ali v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1 (2-MB); Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh and others 2007 SCMR 1446) (3-MB); Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and othersPLD 2022 SC 353 (3-MB); Syed Kausar Ali Shah and others v. Syed Farhat Hussain Shah and others 2022 SCMR 1558 (2-MB); Abdul Haq and another v. Mst. Surrya Begum and others 2002 SCMR 1330 (2-MB); Taj Muhammad Khan through L.Rs. and another v. Mst. Munawar Jan and 2 others 2009 SCMR 598 (2-MB); Muhammad Rustam and another v. Mst. Makhan Jan and others 2013 SCMR 299 (3-MB); Ghulam Abbas and others v. Mohammad Shafi through LRs and others 2016 SCMR 1403 (2-MB); Jamila Khatoon and others v. Aish Muhammad and others 2011 SCMR 222 (2 MB); Saadat Khan and others v. Shahid-Ur-Rehman and others PLD 2023 SC 362 (3-MB); Shabla and others v. Ms. Jahan Afroz Khilat and others 2020 SCMR 352 (2-MB); Mohammad Boota (Deceased) through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fatima daughter of Gohar Ali and others 2023 SCMR 1901 (3-MB); Noor Din (Deceased) through LRs v. Pervaiz Akhtar and others 2023 SCMR 1928 (3-MB); Madan Gopal and 4 others v. Maran Bepari and 3 others PLD 1969 SC 617 (2-MB); Sheikh Akhtar Aziz v. Mst. Shabnam Begum and others 2019 SCMR 524) (2-MB); Alloo v. Sher Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 382 (3-MB) and Muhammad Tufail and 2 others v. Ghaus Muhammad through Legal Representatives PLD 2007 SC 26 (2-MB) rel. Sheikh Naveed Sheharyar, Uneza Siddiqui, Safina Safdar Bhatti, Muhammad Ali Naveed and Bashir Mirza for Appellants. Rana Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Rana Bilal Ghaffar and Asad Abbas Butt for Respondents. Date of hearing: 18th June, 2025.

Summary: Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.42 & 54---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 115---Suit for declaration and injunction---Sale---Bona fide purchaser---Proof---Petitioner / defendant alleged that despite revoking of power of attorney, suit land was sold by the attorney in favour of respondents / plaintiff---Plea raised by petitioner / defendant was that no sale consideration was given to him therefore, sale was not concluded---Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court concurrently decided the matter in favour of respondent/plaintiff---Validity---Burden of proof was squarely on respondent / plaintiff to establish that he was indeed a bona fide purchaser---Respondent / plaintiff had to provide clear and convincing evidence showing not only that the purchase was made in good faith and for fair value but also that it was done without any knowledge, actual or constructive, of the revocation of the authority under which the sale was conducted---Mere assertion of good faith and bona fide purchaser was insufficient and without such proof on record, claim of respondent / plaintiff of a bona fide purchase was not tenable---Scope of revisional jurisdiction under S.115, C.P.C. is limited and narrowly defined---While exercising revisional powers, High Court refrains from interfering with concurrent findings of Courts below---Such principle is grounded in judicial discipline and respect for factual determinations made by subordinate Courts---However, this rule is not absolute and does not entirely bar High Court from exercising its revisional jurisdiction in appropriate cases---Powers under S.115, C.P.C. is specifically intended to prevent gross miscarriage of justice and to correct decisions that are patently illegal or perverse---Trial Court as well as Lower Appellate Court misapplied relevant legal provisions and incorrectly evaluated evidence on record, thereby rendering a decision that was not only legally flawed but had also caused serious prejudice to the rights of affected party---High Court set aside judgments and decrees passed by two Courts below, as interference under S.115, C.P.C. was not only justified but necessary to uphold the principles of justice and legality---Resultantly suit filed by respondent / plaintiff was dismissed---Revision was allowed in circumstances. Hafiz Tassaduq Hussain v. Lal Khatoon PLD 2011 Sc 296 and Nannu Mal v. Rani Chander AIR 1931 All 277(FB) rel. Zulfiqar Ali Abbasi and Shahid Munir for Petitioner. Muhammad Wajid Hussain Mughal and Ali Waqas for Respondent No. 1. Ex-parte for Respondents Nos. 2 to 12. Muhammas Asif Javed for Respondent No. 13. Date of hearing: 21st April, 2025.

Summary: Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)--- ----Ss. 142, 144(2)(a) & 145 (1)---Election Rules, 2017, R.145---Election petition---Presentation---Word “complete”---Scope---Applicant / returned candidate sought dismissal of petition on the ground that it was non-compliant with mandatory provisions of Ss.142(2)(a) & 144(2) of Elections Act, 2017 wherein complete list of witnesses had not been annexed---Validity---Term ‘complete’ must be construed in a practical and purposive manner---Petitioner provided names of all witnesses, private as well as official---Even if affidavits of some of the witnesses were missing or particulars in respect of few others contained clerical errors, overall compliance was substantial---Law did not prescribe automatic rejection of election petition for such lapses inasmuch as the petitioner could elect not to rely on any of the listed witnesses whether his affidavit was available or not---List of witnesses and their respective affidavits were duly annexed with the petition---Witnesses were individually named and their affidavits clearly disclosed nature and scope of their proposed deposition---Any minor typographic discrepancy, such as inconsistency in parentage of witnesses or CNICs, could not obstruct identification of witnesses or understanding of their proposed evidence---Official witnesses were named, along with clear reference to the polling stations where irregularities occurred in the main petition---This had constituted sufficient justification for the purposes of R.145 or Election Rules, 2017, which was procedural and had not been listed under S.145(1) of Elections Act, 2017 as one of the provisions, breach whereof would result in summary rejection of petition---Purpose of R.145 (1) of Elections Rules, 2017 was to control irrelevant summoning of official witnesses and not to bar the petition itself---Election Tribunal held that election petition was competently presented under S.142 of Elections Act, 2017 and list of witnesses substantially satisfied S.144(2)(a) of Elections Act, 2017---Reference to official witnesses fulfilled requirement of R.145 of Election Rules, 2017 and if any objection was to be pressed to the extent of summoning of official witnesses that could be decided when stage of summoning of said witnesses would reach---Application was dismissed, in circumstances. Kamlabai v. Rajendra Singh and others Writ Appeal No. 2165 of 2023; Tara v. Dabla alias Lalita and others 2002 (2) MPHT 554; Rachna v. Savita and others AIR 2017 Raj 18; Mir Hammal Khan v. Election Commission of Pakistan through Secretary, Islamabad and others 2025 SCMR 584; Mir Tariq Mahmood Khan Khetran and others v. Mir Baz Muhammad Khetran and others 1992 CLC 1766; Anju Singh v. Gauri 2017 (3) cdr 1627 (Raj); Kali Meena v. Rekha Devi Dhanka and others 2017 (3) CDR 1576 (Raj); Ali Madad Jattak v. Mir Muhammad Usman Pirkani and others 2025 SCMR 466; Zain Pervez v. Election Commission of Pakistan and others Election Petition No. 52 of 2024; Abdul Rauf Mengal v. Maulvi Qamar-ud-Din and others 2014 CLC 687 and S.M Ayub v. Syed Yusuf Shah and others PLD 1967 SC 486 rel. Barrister Sameer Khosa for Petitioner, assisted by Ms. Momal Malik, Haseeb Randhawa, Ira Nawaz Osto and Ijaz Ahmad. Imran Khan, Assistant Advocate General. Imran Arif Ranjha Legal Advisor for Respondent-Election Commmission of Pakistan (“ECP”). Muhammad Shan Gul and Muhammad Usman Ghani for Respondent No. 1/Returned Candidate. Muhammad Imran Nawaz for Respondents Nos. 5 and 6.

Summary: (a) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S.52---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.107, 115 & 146 & ,O.I, R.10 & O.XXII, R.10---Alienation of suit property to subsequent purchaser/vendee during pendency of appeal---Subsequent purchaser/vendee claiming impleadment in appellate proceedings---Legality---Lis pendens, doctrine of---Applicability and scope---Rule of lis pendens cannot preclude a subsequent vendee from being impleaded as a party to the pending proceedings---Facts in brevity were that the respondents Nos. 1 and 2/plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration which was decreed in their favour, while a similar suit filed by the petitioner was dismissed---During the pendency of respondents' appeal, respondent No.3 (subsequent vendee) purchased the suit property from respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and moved an application under O. I R. 10, C.P.C. to be impleaded as an appellant---Petitioner opposed the said application by invoking the doctrine of lis pendens under S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, arguing that the purchaser was neither a necessary nor proper party---Appellate court allowed impleadment of respondent No. 3 (subsequent vendee)---Substantial question of law placed for determination before the High Court was as to "Whether the subsequent purchaser of the suit property, having acquired the same during pendency of litigation, could be impleaded as a party to the proceedings under O. I R. 10, C.P.C. despite being bound by the doctrine of lispendens?"---Held: By virtue of S.146 of the C.P.C. where any proceeding might be taken or application made by or against any person, then the proceeding might be taken or the application might be made by or against any person claiming under him---Furthermore, O. I of the C.P.C. dealt with the parties to suits and sub-rule (2) of R. 10 of O. I of the C.P.C. postulated that the court could at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as might have appeared to the court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name, of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court might be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added---To this effect reference could also be made to O. XXII R. 10 of the C.P.C. which regulated the procedure of the suit and provided that in case of assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit might, by leave of the court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest had come or devolved---Moreover, S.107 of the C.P.C. bestowed powers upon the appellate court as conferred and imposed by the C.P.C. on court of original jurisdictions in respect of suits instituted therein subject to conditions and limitations prescribed therein---After having a brief survey of the above noted provisions of law, there remained no cavil to hold that transfer or alienation of the property pending proceedings and seeking impleading in the array of parties by the subsequent vendee were two distinct and different phenomena and were to be dealt with independently in the light thereof---Approach of District Court while allowing the application under O. I R. 10 of the C.P.C. moved by the respondent/applicant was completely in consonance with law and the petitioner had failed to point out any illegality or material irregularity, justifying interference by the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction---Resultantly revision petitions failed and were dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S.52---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R.10---Alienation of suit property to subsequent vendee during pendency of litigation---Lis pendens---Principle---Impleadment of subsequent vendee in the pending proceedings---Effect, validity and scope---A subsequent purchaser cannot claim any independent right or interest as compared to his transferor (vendor) but at the same time he is not precluded to claim his impleadment as party in the pending proceedings because if his transferor opts to keep himself aloof from the proceedings after parting with his rights and interests in the property latter if not allowed to be impleaded would be deprived of his right to defend his cause and it would naturally offend the principle of natural justice. Rashid Ahmad v. Mst. Jiwan and 5 others 1997 SCMR 171 and Muhammad Shahban and others v. Falak Sher and others 2007 SCMR 882 rel. (c) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S.52---Alienation of suit property during pendency of litigation---Lis pendens---Principle---Applicability, object and scope---Subsequent purchaser/vendee's consequentposition and interest in the suit property---Legal effect and validity---Subsequent vendee wound be bound by the outcome of pending proceedings and would steps into the shoes of the transferor without acquiring any independent right against the original parties---Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (the Act 1882) ordains that during the pendency in any court having authority in Pakistan or established beyond the limits of Pakistan by the Central Government of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the court and on such terms as it may impose---From the bare perusal of S.52 of the Act, 1882 it clearly manifests that the very purpose and object of this provision is to protect the parties to the litigation against alienation of the property by their opposing party during the pendency of the litigation, so as to avoid deprivation of any right or interest of such party which he ultimately may be held entitled to by the court on the one hand and on the other to stop the adversary from alienating the property to a person alien to proceedings as it would result into an endless litigation---Prime principle embodied in S.52 of the Act, 1882 is that if somebody purchases the property during the pendency of the litigation, he is bound to follow the decision of the court as his purchaser and he has to swim and sink together with his transferor and would be precluded to claim any independent right or protection in the garb of such transfer of property---Section 52 of the Act, 1882 thus safeguards the rights and interests of the parties to litigation and discourages the alienation of the property subject matter of litigation to be alienated during the pendency. Mst. Tabassum Shaheen v. Mst. Uzma Rahat and others 2012 SCMR 983; Farzand Ali and another v. Khuda Bakhsh and others PLD 2015 SC 187 and Rashid Ahmad v. Mst. Jiwan and 5 others 1997 SCMR 171 rel. (d) Precedent--- ----Conflicting legal views by Benches of equal strength---Effect---Later view to prevail---When there are conflicting views with regard to question of law of Bench comprising of equal members of judges, the view of the latter will prevail. Engineer Jameel Ahmad Malik v. Shaukat Aziz and 6 others 2007 CLC 1192; Mst. Hira Rehman v. Chancellor, Government College University, Lahore and 2 others 2011 CLC 377 and Muhammad Hanif and 2 others v. Muhammad Sadiq and 14 others 2019 MLD 846 ref. Ahmed Nawaz Khan for Applicant. Nemo for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Sardar Bilal Firdous for Respondent No. 3. Date of hearing: 18th June, 2025. (v) an alienation of such immovable property without the permission or order of the court; and

Summary: The prime question which emanates for the determination of this Court is related to the impleading of a person (subsequent vendee) who purchases the property, subject matter of the suit/proceedings. 374Crl. Revision 1746635.91-