Summary: 262ITR (Income Tax Reference) 68412/17 CIR Zone-II Lahore Vs Ms Coca Cola Expert Corporation Gulberg-II Lahore Mr. Justice Khalid Ishaq 17- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5816 PLD 2026 Lahore 90

Summary: Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act (XIV of 1975)--- ----S.3 [as amended by Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) (Amendment) Act (XXI of 2022)]---Evacuee property, disposal of--- Cancellation of allotment---Utilization for public purpose---Petitioner claimed to be bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration from allottee of evacuee property---After cancellation of allotment of original allottee, petitioner filed application to purchase the property but the application was dismissed by Authorities---Validity---Subsequent purchasers of evacuee property from the allottee, whose allotment was cancelled and his title was completely extinguished, such vendees had to sail and sink with their vendors and they were debarred to claim any better title---After promulgation of Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) (Amendment) Act, 2022 all evacuee properties stood transferred to Provincial Government for utilization for public purposes and same went out from the jurisdiction of Notified Officer, Chief Settlement Commissioner or Full Board to decide regarding permanent disposal in any manner whatsoever---It was only the Provincial Government which had a limited jurisdiction to utilize such land only for public purpose---High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Board of Revenue / Chief Settlement Commissioner/ Administrator (Residual Properties)/ Notified Officer, Punjab, as petitioners failed to point out any illegality or material irregularity in the order and also did not identify any jurisdictional defect---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Yamin and others v. Settlement Commissioner and others 1976 SCMR 489; Province of the Punjab through Collector, Sheikhupura and others v. Syed Ghazanfar Ali Shah and others 2017 SCMR 172; Abdul Hamid v. M.B.R and others 1994 CLC 1160 Malik Allah Ditta and others v. Member, Board of Revenue/(Judicial-V)/ Chief Settlement Commissioner /Notified Officer, Punjab, Lahore and another 2022 CLC 414 and Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edition) rel. Sh. Usman Ali for Petitioner. Kunwar Sajid Ali, Assistant Advocate General Punjab for Respondents. Date of hearing: 16th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss. 179(3) & 179(4)---Mandatory adjudication period, non-observance of---Effect---Grant of extension after expiry of statutory time---Scope and effect---Order-in-Original was passed after over a year of issuance of Show-Cause Notice---Appellate Tribunal validated the Order-in-Original as being within limitation under S. 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969 (‘the Act, 1969’)---Claim of the Collectorate /Respondent was that an extension was granted by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) under Section 179(4) of the Act, 1969---Validity---Record revealed that the said claimed extension was granted after a lapse of 87 days from the expiry of the mandatory adjudication period under S. 179(3) of Act, 1969---Such an extension, made beyond the statutory limit and without lawful authority at that stage, is clearly in violation of the time-bound procedural mandate of Section 179 of the Act, 1969---Statutory timelines for the creation of liability against a taxpayer are mandatory---Though, S. 179(4) of the Act, 1969 empowers the FBR to regulate the system of adjudication, including the transfer of cases and the extension of time in exceptional circumstances (at the relevant time during Tax year 2016), however, for such an exceptional extension to carry legal effect, requisite approval must be obtained within the statutory timeframe prescribed under Section 179(3) of the Act, 1969---Once the mandatory period provided therein lapses, any subsequent extension granted by the Federal Board of Revenue is without legal force---Adherence to statutory timelines in tax adjudication is mandatory, not merely directory; the rationale behind which is rooted in the protection of taxpayer rights against administrative excess, ensuring certainty, fairness, and finality in tax matters---Permitting indefinite extensions would render the express language of the statute redundant, which is impermissible---Thus, the Order-in-Original was passed beyond the statutory period prescribed under S. 179(3) of the Act, 1969 and was, therefore, barred by limitation and the extension granted by the Board after laps of mandatory time frame had no legal value; consequently, the proceedings initiated under the Show-Cause Notice could not have lawfully continued beyond the expiration of the prescribed period---Customs Appellate Tribunal failed to properly consider said crucial legal aspects, rendering its findings, unsustainable in law---Hence, answer to the proposed question was in affirmative i.e. in favour of applicant-taxpayer and against the respondent-department---Special Customs Reference Application was allowed accordingly. Messrs Commander Agro (Private) Limited v. Customs Appellate Tribunal Bench-I, Lahore and others C.P. No.110 of 2023; Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others 2017 SCMR 1427; Wak Limited v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax 2018 SCMR 1474 and Messrs Wak Limited v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore and others 2025 SCMR 1280 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 189---Customs Act (IV of 1969), S. 179---Judicial precedents---Binding nature---"Stare decisis et non quieta movere", principle of---Customs Appellate Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) distinguished the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case referred to by the taxpayer on the ground that the ruling-under consideration pertains to the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and is inapplicable to the time limitation provided under the Customs Act, 1969---Validity---Tribunal fell into error while attempting to distinguish the binding principle enunciated in case referred to by Applicant/Taxpayer on said ground---Such reasoning is misconceived and contrary to the settled law regarding the binding nature of precedents as per Art. 189 of the Constitution---Any declaration of law or enunciation of a legal principle by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts within the country---The maxim "Stare decisis et non quietamovere" (to stand by decision and not to disturb settled matters) underscores the mandatory nature of adherence to judicial precedents--- Therefore, the Tribunal's disregard of the ratio decidendi of the Supreme Court constitutes a grave error in law---Consequently, the findings of the Tribunal not only lack legal sanctity but are also rendered void-ab-initio--- Thus, the impugned judgment, being based on misinterpretation and misapplication of law, is liable to be set aside---Hence, answer to the proposed question was in affirmative i.e. in favour of applicant-taxpayer and against the respondent-department---Special Customs Reference Application was allowed accordingly. Muhammad Shoaib Rashid, Muhammad Hameed Bakhsh, Manahil Khan and Ch. Muhammad Ashfaq for Applicant. Rana Muhammad Mehtab for Respondent-Department. Date of hearing: 16th September, 2025. MALIK JAVID IQBAL WAINS, J.--- This order shall also dispose of connected Customs References Nos. 24553 and 24554 of 2024, as they involve common questions of law and fact.

Summary: (a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)--- ----Ss. 122 & 127---'Insurance Tribunal' and 'Federal Insurance Ombudsman'---Jurisdiction---Distinction---Tribunal under S. 122 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000 is empowered to adjudicate claims by policyholders against insurance companies in respect of or arising out of insurance contracts---Jurisdiction on Federal Insurance Ombudsman conferred under S. 127 of Insurance Ordinance, is to entertain complaints from any aggrieved person alleging maladministration by an insurance company. (b) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)--- ----S. 127---Federal Ombudsman Institutional Reforms Act (XIV of 2013), S. 14---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maladministration---Insurance claim, denial of---Pre-existing conditions---Petitioner / insurance company was aggrieved of orders passed by Federal Insurance Ombudsman and Appellate Authority to pay insurance claim to respondents / insured persons---Plea raised by petitioner / insurance company was that respondents were suffering from ailments prior to their insurance which were covered under “pre-existing conditions”---Validity---Merely incorporating “pre-existing conditions are not covered” in the exclusion term of the Policy did not allow petitioner / insurance company to repudiate the claim---Where a stipulation was not merely unreasonable but impossible, in the sense that from the outset it never could be performed, it was a nullity, and was simply disregarded---Respondents / insured persons alleged mala fide conduct, delay in claim settlement, arbitrary repudiation, misrepresentation of policy terms and repudiation contrary to law---Federal Insurance Ombudsman rightly found maladministration and directed payment of reasonable compensation for the medical expenses incurred by respondents---Federal Insurance Ombudsman rightly assumed its jurisdiction while deciding complaints filed by respondents as their grievances fell squarely within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction under S.127 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000---High Court declined to interfere in the orders passed by two fora below---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances. Carter v. Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905; Jubilee Life General Insurance Company Co. Ltd., Karachi v. Ravi Steel Company, Lahore PLD 2020 SC 324; Saleem Ahmed Jan v. Deputy Commissioner and others 2024 CLC 953; Tabbasum Qureshi v. Deputy Commissioner and others I.C.A No. 85 of 2023; Export Promotion Bureau v. Qaiser Shafiullah 1994 SCMR 859; Lt. Gen. (R) Salahuddin Tirmizi v. Election Commission of Pakistan PLD 2008 SC 735 and Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Ltd. v. Abdul Gaffar 1993 SCMR 511 rel. (c) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)--- ----S.2(xlv)---Insurance policy---Principle---Where two constructions are possible, the one that tends to defeat intention of policyholder or renders the coverage practically illusory must be rejected. Ali Ibrahim and Barrister Faiza Asad for Petitioner. Muhammad Saeed Raja, DAG for Respondents Nos.1 and 3. Anees Jillani and Abid Hassan for Respondent (in W.P. No.294 of 2014, Rana Abdul Hafeez (in W.P. No.2015 of 2023) and Respondent No.2 in person (in W.P. No.605 of 2024). Assisted by: Muhammad Yahya Khan Niazi and Muhammad Fahad. Dates of hearing: 24th June and 3rd July, 2025. INAAM AMEEN MINHAS, J.--- This judgment shall decide the aforementioned writ petitions, as they involve similar questions of law and facts. (a) are within the jurisdiction of the Office of the Wafaqi Mohtasib under the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983, (P.O.1 of 1983); or

Summary: Section 115 CPC- Suit for recovery in pursuance of a foreign decree---Under Section 13 & 14 C.P.C presumption of validity is attached to the foreign decree if the said dictum complies with the conditions of aforesaid provisions of law, when the matter was directly and conclusively adjudicated between the same parties in the foreign jurisdiction which create a valid right in favour of the said decree holder. Civil Revision of foreign decree / judgment debtor is dismissed with heavy cost. 269Crl. Appeal 47572/23 Jamroz Khan Vs The State etc. Mr. Justice Muhammad Amjad Rafiq 16- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5787

Summary: Constitution of the Search Committee Act (II of 2022) --- ----Ss.3(2) & 14(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199--- Appointment of Chairmen of Educational Boards---Challenge to the recruitment process---Shortlisting of candidates through Search Committee---Alleged lack of transparency and deviation from statutory framework---Eligibility criteria---No recruitment can be done on criteria not mentioned in the advertisement, plea of --- Legality---Modification in advertisement---Whether substantial departure affecting fairness of process?---Briefly, the petitioners, being aspirants for appointment to the posts of Chairmen (BPS-20) of various Educational Boards challenged the shortlisting and recommendation of private respondents made through a recruitment process contending irregularities in the procedure adopted by the authorities; the controversy centered on the legality and validity of the recruitment process for appointment of Chairmen of Educational Boards and the scope of judicial review in such selection process---Held: More than hundred candidates were interviewed in nine batches and those who secured more than fifty marks were recommended by Search Committee for the Position of Chairmen in Educational / Technical Boards---This Tabulation showed that the private respondents had scored more marks than the petitioners and thus the private respondents were recommended for the said posts--- A proposal was made that whether candidates from the waiting list be selected in order to expedite the entire process, or fresh advertisement was given, and it had been decided that these two vacant posts were to be filled through re-advertisement in order to select best suitable candidates---This latest decision of respondents also nullified the objection of the petitioners’ side, that in such a competitive process no waiting list was required to be prepared---Constitution of the Search Committee Act, 2022 was promulgated with the sole object to make appointments in public sector Universities in a transparent manner---Since underlying object of the Boards in terms of the governing law was, inter alia, to regulate, develop and control Intermediate and Secondary Education; recognize and de-recognize educational institutions, grant certificates, diplomas to persons who had passed examinations; therefore, it was necessary to headhunt and select the best suitable candidates as Chairmen of the Board, who could ensure the accomplishment of the above statutory functions of the Universities and Board Department --- Hence, no illegality was committed by the Committee formed under the above Act of 2022, the composition whereof was mentioned under Subsection (2) of S.3, that included, the Chairman, Sindh Higher Education Commission--- Constitutional petitions were dismissed, in circumstances. M/s Shams and Brothers v. Government of Pakistan 2007 YLR 161 ref. S. Ali Ahmed Zaidi for Petitioners (in Constitution Petitions Nos. D-830 and D-1245 of 2025). Barrister Zeeshan Adhi, Additional Advocate General Sindh and Abdul Jalil Zubedi, Additional Advocate General Sindh along with Muhammad Sohail Imam, Legal Officer, Khadim Hussain, Law Officer, Syed Israr Hussain, Law Officer and Farhan Akhtar, Deputy Secretary [Admin], Universities and Boards Department [Respondent No. 2] for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in Constitution Petitions Nos. D-830 and D-1245 of 2025). Syed Saulat Hussain Rizvi and S.M. Mehdi Raza along with Dr. Syed Tariq Rafi, Chairman, Sindh HEC/Search for Respondent No. 3. Jaleel Ahmed Memon for Respondent No. 4 (in Constitution Petitions Nos. D-830 and D-1245 of 2025). Nasrullah Korai and Gulsher Mari for Respondent No. 5 (in Constitution Petition No. D-830 of 2025). Malik Naeem Iqbal and Malik Waseem Iqbal for Petitioners (in Constitution Petition No. D-1304 of 2025). Ms. Shazia Hajrah, D.A.G along with Muhammad Ishaque, Assistant Attorney General. Dates of hearing: 27th March, 20th and 23rd May, 2025.

Summary: Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----S. 135---Partition proceedings---Property inherited by female legal heir---“Naqis Kamil”, principle of---Right of co-owner(s), infringement of---Scope---Record transpired that the Revenue Officer carried out the partition proceedings of joint Khewat and subsequently instrument of partition was issued---Said process of partition was completed in five years but the petitioners did not appear before the Revenue Officer---Against the partition order, only one co-owner (one of the respondents) filed appeal before the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue)/ ADC (R), which was dismissed upholding the partition order---Said order of ADC (R) was assailed by the petitioners as well as the said respondent by filing appeals separately before the Additional Commissioner (Revenue), who dismissed the same too---Pertinently, the dispute was mainly between brothers, the petitioners, and the sister (respondent)---In an inherited land, no party can claim a specific piece of land on the basis of mere possession and land will be partitioned among legal heirs on the principle of “Naqis Kamil” i.e. all legal heirs will be given land of equal value---And in such cases, in order to provide land of equal value, it is not necessary to provide perfectly compact blocks as that may not be feasible---In such cases parties may be given different portions taking care of the approaches and irrigation sources also---Petitioners could not adduce any infringement of their rights in the aftermath of the impugned partition proceedings---Member -Board of Revenue maintained both the impugned order passed by the Additional Commissioner (Revenue)---Revision, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances. Malik Ghazanfer Khalid Saeed for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondent No. 4. Rest of the respondents were proceeded ex-parte on 08.01.2025.

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)- -Ss. 2(d), 5 & 13-Pre-emption-Distinction between sale and exchange-Transaction recorded in mutation as an exchange or a sale, classification of-Determination-Right of pre-emption, arising of-Pre-requisite-Occurrence of sale transaction being mandatory-Courts below concurrently holding that defendant failed to prove that the transaction was an exchange-Legality-Burden of proof-Onus of proof primarily lay with the plaintiff who asserted that mutation represented a sale rather than an exchange-The dispute arose over a parcel of land measuring 24 kanals and 3 marlas situated in Dera Ismail Khan, where-MT-, the owner, executed a mutation reflecting an exchange of land with the defendant, allegedly for better management-The plaintiff, claiming a superior right of pre-emption, instituted a suit asserting that the transaction, though recorded as an exchange, was in fact a sale-Trial Court treated the mutation as a sale and decreed that both parties, being co-owners in the same khata, were entitled to equal pre-emption rights-The appellate and revisional courts upheld this view-The legal issue requiring determination before the Supreme Court was-whether the transaction through mutation constituted a genuine exchange or a sale disguised as an exchange, thereby determining the applicability of the right of pre-emption under Section 5 of the KPK Pre-emption Act, 1987-?-Held: Courts below incorrectly surmised that the defendant failed to provide sufficient proof that the transaction was an exchange-The onus of proof primarily lay with the plaintiff (pre-emptor), who asserted that the recorded mutation represented a sale rather than an exchange-The mere failure of the defendant to establish the transaction as a legitimate and bona fide exchange did not automatically validate the conclusion that it was a sale-The absence of any credible proof indicating payment of price or a promise thereof led to the conclusion that the transaction documented in the mutation was an exchange rather than the sale claimed by the plaintiff (pre-emptor)-Courts below significantly misinterpreted the evidence presented and they also misapplied the relevant legal principles-According to Section 5 of the Act, the right of pre-emption was contingent upon the occurrence of a sale; this right did not extend to transactions such as gifts or exchanges-In the present case, the plaintiff (pre-emptor) failed to demonstrate that the transaction documented in mutation constituted a sale-Consequently, the plaintiff (pre-emptor) was not entitled to the decree he sought-Judgments and decrees issued by the courts below were legally untenable and same were set aside-Petitions were converted into appeals and petition brought forth by the plaintiff (pre-emptor) was dismissed and one brought forth by the defendant was allowed. Elahi Bakhsh through Legal Heirs and others v. Muhammad Iqbal and another 2014 SCMR 1217 rel. (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)- -Ss. 2(d) & 5-Pre-emption-Distinction between sale and exchange-Relevance-Transaction recorded in mutation as an exchange or a sale, classification of-Determination-According to Section 5 of the Act, a right of pre-emption arises in the case of a sale, which, as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act, refers to a permanent transfer of ownership of immovable property in exchange for valuable consideration-However, this definition explicitly excludes situations where agricultural lands are exchanged for purposes of better management-While the law of pre-emption can be evaded through lawful means, there is nothing inherently illegal about executing an exchange when a vendee or buyer fears that a straightforward sale in his favour might be pre-empted. (c) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)- -Ss.5 & 13-Pre-emption, right of-Essence, significance and effect-Pre-emptor to prove that transaction is indeed a sale transaction, obligation of-The right of pre-emption serves as a significant constraint on an owner's ability to transfer his property to whomever he likes-This right acts as a clog on the owner’s freedom to alienate his property; it has therefore to be strictly construed-In a pre-emption suit, the plaintiff must not only establish that he has a preferential or superior right over the buyer (vendee) involved in the transaction, but he also bears the burden of proof to demonstrate clearly and convincingly that the transaction he seeks to pre-empt is indeed a sale, and that he has made the necessary demands for pre-emption according to law-If there exists any ambiguity surrounding the nature of the transaction in question casting doubt on whether it constitutes a sale, the plaintiff must fail-In the same vein, if the circumstances lend themselves to multiple interpretations, the courts should be disinclined to favour a reading that does not classify the transaction as a sale.

Summary: (On appeal against the order/judgment dated 16.11.2022 passed by the Peshawar High Court, D.I.Khan Bench in Civil Revision No. 147-D of 2017). (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)--- ----Ss. 2(d), 5 & 13---Pre-emption---Distinction between sale and exchange---Transaction recorded in mutation as an exchange or a sale, classification of---Determination---Right of pre-emption, arising of---Pre-requisite---Occurrence of sale transaction being mandatory---Courts below concurrently holding that defendant failed to prove that the transaction was an exchange---Legality---Burden of proof--- Onus of proof primarily lay with the plaintiff who asserted that mutation represented a sale rather than an exchange---The dispute arose over a parcel of land measuring 24 kanals and 3 marlas situated in Dera Ismail Khan, where “MT”, the owner, executed a mutation reflecting an exchange of land with the defendant, allegedly for better management---The plaintiff, claiming a superior right of pre-emption, instituted a suit asserting that the transaction, though recorded as an exchange, was in fact a sale---Trial Court treated the mutation as a sale and decreed that both parties, being co-owners in the same khata, were entitled to equal pre-emption rights---The appellate and revisional courts upheld this view---The legal issue requiring determination before the Supreme Court was “whether the transaction through mutation constituted a genuine exchange or a sale disguised as an exchange, thereby determining the applicability of the right of pre-emption under Section 5 of the KPK Pre-emption Act, 1987”?---Held: Courts below incorrectly surmised that the defendant failed to provide sufficient proof that the transaction was an exchange---The onus of proof primarily lay with the plaintiff (pre-emptor), who asserted that the recorded mutation represented a sale rather than an exchange---The mere failure of the defendant to establish the transaction as a legitimate and bona fide exchange did not automatically validate the conclusion that it was a sale---The absence of any credible proof indicating payment of price or a promise thereof led to the conclusion that the transaction documented in the mutation was an exchange rather than the sale claimed by the plaintiff (pre-emptor)---Courts below significantly misinterpreted the evidence presented and they also misapplied the relevant legal principles---According to Section 5 of the Act, the right of pre-emption was contingent upon the occurrence of a sale; this right did not extend to transactions such as gifts or exchanges---In the present case, the plaintiff (pre-emptor) failed to demonstrate that the transaction documented in mutation constituted a sale---Consequently, the plaintiff (pre-emptor) was not entitled to the decree he sought---Judgments and decrees issued by the courts below were legally untenable and same were set aside---Petitions were converted into appeals and petition brought forth by the plaintiff (pre-emptor) was dismissed and one brought forth by the defendant was allowed. Elahi Bakhsh through Legal Heirs and others v. Muhammad Iqbal and another 2014 SCMR 1217 rel. (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)--- ----Ss. 2(d) & 5---Pre-emption---Distinction between sale and exchange---Relevance---Transaction recorded in mutation as an exchange or a sale, classification of---Determination---According to Section 5 of the Act, a right of pre-emption arises in the case of a sale, which, as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act, refers to a permanent transfer of ownership of immovable property in exchange for valuable consideration---However, this definition explicitly excludes situations where agricultural lands are exchanged for purposes of better management---While the law of pre-emption can be evaded through lawful means, there is nothing inherently illegal about executing an exchange when a vendee or buyer fears that a straightforward sale in his favour might be pre-empted. (c) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)--- ----Ss.5 & 13---Pre-emption, right of---Essence, significance and effect---Pre-emptor to prove that transaction is indeed a sale transaction, obligation of---The right of pre-emption serves as a significant constraint on an owner's ability to transfer his property to whomever he likes---This right acts as a clog on the owner’s freedom to alienate his property; it has therefore to be strictly construed---In a pre-emption suit, the plaintiff must not only establish that he has a preferential or superior right over the buyer (vendee) involved in the transaction, but he also bears the burden of proof to demonstrate clearly and convincingly that the transaction he seeks to pre-empt is indeed a sale, and that he has made the necessary demands for pre-emption according to law---If there exists any ambiguity surrounding the nature of the transaction in question casting doubt on whether it constitutes a sale, the plaintiff must fail---In the same vein, if the circumstances lend themselves to multiple interpretations, the courts should be disinclined to favour a reading that does not classify the transaction as a sale. Kazi Sheharyar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court along with Petitioner in person (in C.P.L.A. No. 4649 of 2022). Ahmed Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.P.L.A. No. 561 of 2023). Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 12th September, 2025.

Summary: Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)--- ----Ss.6 & 7---Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (New York Convention), Art. V---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.10A---Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award---Audi alteram partem, principle of---Applicability---Applicant sought enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award passed against respondent company---Plea raised by respondent company was that it was not provided proper opportunity of contesting the arbitration proceedings---Validity---Scope of legal maxim audi alteram partem read with Article 10A of the Constitution requires that everyone is entitled to a fair trial and due process, which includes basic right to be heard---Even in the objections nothing had been said as to the merits of the case and default committed by respondent-Company in paying outstanding amount---All steps were taken by respondent company to delay the proceedings before Tribunal, as it had no case on merits---High Court recognized the foreign award as binding and enforceable---Applicant was granted judgment in the amount mentioned in foreign award in question, which shall be executed as a decree of this Court---High Court directed the office to prepare a decree and converted the proceedings into execution proceedings under O.XXI, C.P.C.---Award was enforced accordingly. Taisei Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. A.M. Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2024 SCMR 640; Abdullah v. Messrs CNAN Group SPA through Chief Executive/ Managing Director and another PLD 2014 Sindh 349; Orient Power Company (Private) Limited v. Sui Southern Gas Pipelines Limited 2021 SCMR 1728; POSCO International Corporation v. RIKANS International and 4 others 2023 CLD 189; Messrs TRADHOL International SA Sociedad Unipersonal v. Messrs Shakarganj Limited PLD 2023 Lah. 621; Federal Government Employees Housing Authority through Director General, Islamabad v. Ednan Syed and others PLD 2025 SC 11; Federal Government Employees Housing Authority v. Ednan Syed PLD 2025 SC 11 and Parsons and Whittermore Overseas Inc v. RAKTA 508 F.2d 969 (1974) ref. Abdallah Azzaam Naqvi and Waqar Ahmed for Applicant. Abdul Ahad Nadeem Ammar Suria for Respondent. Dates of hearing: 7th and 19th May, 2025.