Summary: QAMAR AFTAB and others-Respondents (Against orders dated 08.12.2020 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Writ Petition No. 23888 and 23889 of 2014). Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)- -S.19-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.56-Ejectment proceedings, stay of-Execution of decree-Appellant / landlord filed ejectment application against respondent / tenant regarding factory premises-Respondent / tenant claimed to be director of the company who had participated in auction and since he was the highest bidder therefore, he was not under any obligation to pay rent until and unless his bid was refused conclusively by High Court where appeal was pending-Validity-It may not be fair to comment as to whether respondent / tenant was under obligation or not to pay rent on account of pendency of appeal as the relationship was yet to be decided by Rent Controller-Courts below in fact had misdirected themselves when they got influenced by an order of status quo which order under no circumstances could influence rent proceedings which were independent in nature as governed by Special Law and were to be taken to its logical end, as required under the law, until and unless a title was bestowed upon respondent / tenant by a Court of competent jurisdiction-Supreme Court set aside the orders and remanded the matter to Rent Controller where ejectment petition was deemed to be pending-Supreme Court directed that Rent Controller, was under an obligation to decide applications for leave to appear and defend first and thereafter issue of relationship between the petitioner / landlord and respondent / tenant be decided, irrespective of pendency of appeal, where auction proceedings were pending-Appeal was disposed of.

Summary: (Against orders dated 08.12.2020 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Writ Petition No. 23888 and 23889 of 2014). Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S.19---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.56---Ejectment proceedings, stay of---Execution of decree---Appellant / landlord filed ejectment application against respondent / tenant regarding factory premises---Respondent / tenant claimed to be director of the company who had participated in auction and since he was the highest bidder therefore, he was not under any obligation to pay rent until and unless his bid was refused conclusively by High Court where appeal was pending---Validity---It may not be fair to comment as to whether respondent / tenant was under obligation or not to pay rent on account of pendency of appeal as the relationship was yet to be decided by Rent Controller---Courts below in fact had misdirected themselves when they got influenced by an order of status quo which order under no circumstances could influence rent proceedings which were independent in nature as governed by Special Law and were to be taken to its logical end, as required under the law, until and unless a title was bestowed upon respondent / tenant by a Court of competent jurisdiction---Supreme Court set aside the orders and remanded the matter to Rent Controller where ejectment petition was deemed to be pending---Supreme Court directed that Rent Controller, was under an obligation to decide applications for leave to appear and defend first and thereafter issue of relationship between the petitioner / landlord and respondent / tenant be decided, irrespective of pendency of appeal, where auction proceedings were pending---Appeal was disposed of. Mahmood A. Sheikh, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (In both cases). Taffazul Haider Rizvi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1 (In both cases). Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court for MCB (Through video-link from Lahore). Date of hearing: 18th September, 2025.

Summary: Proceedings under section 12(2) CPC and appellate proceedings are in distinct legal domains. The pendency of one cannot furnish a lawful ground to suspend or frustrate the other. 258Writ Petition- Service- Miscellaneous 2613-23 KHURSHID VS PUNJAB WORKERS WELFARE FUND ETC Mr. Justice Malik Muhammad Awais Khalid 18- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 6386 2026 PLC (CS) 106 [Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)]

Summary: Execution of decree—Jurisdiction of executing court—Scope of revisional jurisdiction—Principle that executing court cannot go behind the decree. Held, the executing court is bound to execute the decree as it stands and cannot sit in appeal over a decree that has attained finality, except to the extent of declaring any part of it inexecutable or a nullity if severable. The executing court exceeded its jurisdiction by calling for fresh revenue record, reassessing title, and effectively re-adjudicating matters already concluded by the trial and appellate courts. The High Court rightly exercised revisional powers to correct this jurisdictional overreach and restore the legal boundaries of execution. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ali and others v. Ghulam Sarwar and others (1989 SCMR 640) • Mst. Naseem Akhtar and 4 others v. Shalimar General Insurance Co. Ltd. and 2 others (1994 SCMR 22) • Tauqeer Ahmad Qureshi v. Additional District Judge, Lahore and 2 others (PLD 2009 SC 760) (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- O. VIII, R.2 & O. XVIII, R.2 ---- Civil suit—Pleadings—Matters not pleaded, confronted, or proved—Effect. Held, a plea not taken in pleadings, not made subject of an issue, not confronted during cross-examination, and unsupported by evidence cannot be raised subsequently, particularly at the execution stage. The petitioners/judgment-debtors failed to plead that the properties were self-acquired by the deceased’s sons, led no evidence in defence, and did not challenge the 2nd ex parte decree; their attempt to introduce such plea during execution was an afterthought. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- Ss. 96, 100 & 47 ---- Ex parte decree—Finality—Effect of non-challenge—Execution of decree. Held, the 2nd ex parte judgment and decree dated 22.02.2021, unchallenged by the petitioners, attained finality and was binding upon them. Once a decree becomes final, the executing court cannot reassess its merits or reopen settled findings. (d) Evidence Act (I of 1872) ---- Arts. 71, 73 & 75 ---- Documentary evidence—Revenue record—Probative value—Tampered or forged documents produced later. Held, documentary evidence exhibited by decree-holder (including jamabandi, fard, and mutations) produced through official witnesses remained unshaken in cross-examination and supported ownership of the deceased. Subsequent tampered or forged documents produced before the executing court had no legal worth and were rightly ignored by the High Court. (e) Administration of justice ---- Supervisory jurisdiction—Correction of jurisdictional error—High Court’s revisional interference—When warranted. Held, the High Court was justified in exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C., as the executing court had acted in excess of jurisdiction and contrary to settled principles by re-opening concluded questions of title. The High Court’s order was well-reasoned and consistent with established precedent. Disposition: Civil Petition dismissed and Leave to Appeal refused. The judgment of the High Court of Balochistan dated 08.04.2024 was upheld, and the interim order dated 30.10.2024 was recalled.

Summary: (a) Oil and Gas Development Corporation Pension and Gratuity Regulations, 1985 - -Regln.15(1A)-Oil and Gas Development Corporation Ordinance (XXXVII of 1961), S.5-Oil and Gas Development Corporation (Reorganization) Ordinance (XXVIII of 2001), Ss.4 & 5-Oil and Gas Development Corporation Employees (Service) Regulations, 1994, Regln.265-General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)-Claim of-additional pension-, denial of-Claim for 2% increment per extra year of service beyond 30 years-Entitlement-Oil and Gas Development Corporation converted into OGDCL-Continuity of service conditions and pension rights of employees of corporation despite the conversion-Scope-Supreme Court directed the company to grant additional pension-The petitioner joined the Oil and Gas Development Corporation (OGDC) as Accounts Assistant in 1995 after serving in the Pakistan Military Accounts Department-Upon reorganization under the Oil and Gas Development Corporation (Reorganization) Ordinance, 2001, the corporation was converted into the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL), and the petitioner became an employee of the new company by operation of law-He retired as ‘senior accountant’ on 17 June 2021 after serving for about 40 years and 10 months, including his earlier government service-He claimed entitlement to-additional pension-under Regulation 15(1A) of the Pension Regulations 1985, providing an extra 2% of gross pension for each year of service beyond 30 years, up to a 10% maximum-The company rejected his claim through an office memorandum, which the High Court upheld on, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court-Held: It was an admitted position between the parties that the Pension and Service Regulations made under the erstwhile Ordinance continued to regulate the affairs of the Company-Even otherwise, Supreme Court had already affirmed the continuing enforceability of said Regulations even after promulgation of Ordinance, 2001-Besides, under Section 24 of the General Clauses Act 1897, the Regulations were deemed to have been issued under Ordinance, 2001 unless inconsistent with the said Ordinance-Section 5 of the Ordinance 2001 provided that-all employees of the Corporation shall on the date of incorporation of the company be deemed to be the employees of the company on the same remuneration and other conditions of service, rights and privileges including the pension, provident fund and gratuity as were applicable to them before the conversion of the corporation into the company-This provision saved and protected the terms and conditions of the employees of the erstwhile corporation-Under Regulation 15(1A) of the Pension Regulations, the benefit of-additional pension-was extended to the employees of the Corporation on 19.04.1987-As per the respondents, the benefit of additional pension had been withdrawn under the office memorandum dated 04.09.2001 which being a directive/instruction of the federal government was binding on the company under Regulation 265 of the Service Regulation-The office memorandum dated 04.09.2001 could not be constructed as a directive or instruction issued to the company by the federal government under Regulation 265-Any decision of board of directors, which without reference to the office memorandum stated that board of directors had resolved that the maximum scale of gross pension would continue to be equal to 70% of the pensionable salary upon completion of 30 years or more service at the time of retirement, was inconsequential as the same was in violation of Section 5 of the Ordinance 2001 read with Regulation 15(1A) of the Pensions Regulation-Moreover, the office memorandum whereby company declined claim of the petitioner was set aside keeping in view the statutory framework regulating the working of the company-Ordinance, 2001, not only recognized but also protected pension by ensuring that the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the erstwhile Corporation, and now of the successor Company, could not be altered to their disadvantage-Impugned judgment was set aside by declaring that the petitioner was entitled to-additional Pension-under Section 5 of the Ordinance, 2001 read with Regulation 15(1A) of the Pension Regulations with the direction to the company to pay the-additional pension-to the petitioner in accordance with the Pension Regulations-Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed, in circumstances. Syed Tahir Abbas Shah v. OGDCL through MD 2012 PLC (C.S.) 885 and OGDCL v. Nazar Hussain 2010 SCMR 1559 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 185(3)-Supreme Court-Precedent-Scope-A case which does not decide any question of law or enunciate any principle of law and is a leave declining order does not pass as a binding precedent. Allied Bank Limited v. Habib-Ur-Rehman and others 2023 PLC (C.S.) 1319; Syed Hammad Nabi and others v. Inspector General of Police Punjab, Lahore and others 2023 SCMR 584 and Muhammad Salman v. Naveed Anjum and others 2021 SCMR 1675 rel. (c) Oil and Gas Development Corporation Ordinance (XXXVII of 1961) - -S.4-Transition of Oil and Gas Development Corporation into a public limited company-Company’s autonomy in managing its internal governance, emphasis upon-Scheme and framework discussed-The creation of the Corporation under the Ordinance, 1961 was not a mere bureaucratic arrangement but a deliberate legislative choice to insulate a vital sector of the economy from the day-to-day interference of ministerial control-The statute envisaged a Board of Directors empowered to conduct the affairs of the Corporation-on commercial considerations having regard to public interest-while federal directives were binding only insofar as they fell within the domain of policy-Significantly, it was the Board itself which was authorized to determine whether a matter constituted-policy-This governance architecture reflected the legislative intent: to endow the Corporation with institutional autonomy so that commercial decisions could be taken in the best interest of the enterprise and the country, free from fluctuating political currents-The transition of the Corporation into a public limited company in 2001 strengthened, rather than diluted, this autonomy-By registering it as a company limited by shares under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 subject to the fiduciary duties of its directors and the discipline of company law, the legislature shifted the governance model closer to that of the private sector, where independent Boards are entrusted with decision-making in the interests of the company and its stakeholders-This progression underscores a legislative trajectory toward greater independence, transparency, and accountability in the governance of state-owned enterprises-Accordingly, any statutory reference of adherence to government directives/instructions cannot be read as compelling the Board to mechanically implement instructions-Such a reading would negate both the original intent of the Ordinance, 1961 and the autonomy conferred under the Ordinance, 2001 corporate structure-Rather, it is incumbent upon the Board to assess whether a directive is commercially sound, consistent with the fiduciary duty of directors, in furtherance of the company’s statutory purpose and in the general public interest-Only if the seconditions are satisfied can a directive legitimately become part of the Company’s internal governance-To hold otherwise would reduce the Board to a mere rubber stamp, defeating the very rationale for creating autonomous commercial entities under the law-Public corporations are designed not as extensions of government departments but as independent bodies entrusted with bringing efficiency, autonomy, and commercial discipline to vital sectors of economic activity-Commercial autonomy is thus not only a legislative design but also a constitutional necessity for public sector companies engaged in strategic areas of the economy-Strong, independent public institutions are the bedrock of economic development, good governance, and the rule of law-When boards of statutory corporations or public companies are permitted to exercise independent judgment, they advance the twin objectives of commercial viability and public interest, thereby serving the larger purposes of the State-Conversely, when such bodies are reduced to administrative subordinates of the executive, both economic growth and democratic accountability suffer-In a constitutional democracy committed to the separation of powers and the strengthening of institutions, autonomy of state-owned enterprises is therefore indispensable. Muhammad Yousaf v. Province of Sindh 2024 SCMR 1689; Qazi Khalid Ali v. Federation of Pakistan C.P.L.A.147-K/2023; Province of Sindh through Secretary Government of Sindh, Karachi and others v. Mst. Sorath Fatima and another 2025 SCP 278 and The Province of Punjab through Secretary, Finance Department, Government of the Punjab, Lahore and others v. Kanwal Rashid and others 2021 SCMR 730 rel. (d) Constitution of Pakistan- -Arts. 9 & 14-Employment-Pension-Right to pension-Entitlement and scope-Pension is not a matter of bounty, charity, or benevolence, it is a right protected under Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution and inseparably linked with the right to life, dignity and livelihood, for without sustenance in old age, these rights ring hollow-It should be taken more seriously for those public servants for whom it is a crystallized return on years of faithful service, a form of deferred wages earned through the sweat, labour, and loyalty of an employee-It embodies the principle that those who serve must not be cast aside in their twilight years-To deny or withhold pension is to strip a person of the security they have justly earned, leaving them exposed to indignity, vulnerability, and want-Therefore this right must be protected in the shape of the grant of pension that is not only adequate but also predictable-Moreover, an element of respect and empathy is to be maintained while granting pension which would be inconsonance with the values that our Constitution espouses with dignity as the highest constitutional value-The law itself stands as ashield to protect the rights of such employees, ensuring that long earned entitlements are not eroded by institutional caprice-To trifle with pension is, therefore, to trifle with constitutional justice itself.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 02.02.2022 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Writ Petition No. 4096 of 2021). (a) Oil and Gas Development Corporation Pension and Gratuity Regulations, 1985 --- ----Regln.15(1A)---Oil and Gas Development Corporation Ordinance (XXXVII of 1961), S.5---Oil and Gas Development Corporation (Reorganization) Ordinance (XXVIII of 2001), Ss.4 & 5---Oil and Gas Development Corporation Employees (Service) Regulations, 1994, Regln.265---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)---Claim of “additional pension”, denial of---Claim for 2% increment per extra year of service beyond 30 years---Entitlement---Oil and Gas Development Corporation converted into OGDCL---Continuity of service conditions and pension rights of employees of corporation despite the conversion---Scope---Supreme Court directed the company to grant additional pension---The petitioner joined the Oil and Gas Development Corporation (OGDC) as Accounts Assistant in 1995 after serving in the Pakistan Military Accounts Department---Upon reorganization under the Oil and Gas Development Corporation (Reorganization) Ordinance, 2001, the corporation was converted into the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL), and the petitioner became an employee of the new company by operation of law---He retired as ‘senior accountant’ on 17 June 2021 after serving for about 40 years and 10 months, including his earlier government service---He claimed entitlement to “additional pension” under Regulation 15(1A) of the Pension Regulations 1985, providing an extra 2% of gross pension for each year of service beyond 30 years, up to a 10% maximum---The company rejected his claim through an office memorandum, which the High Court upheld on, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court---Held: It was an admitted position between the parties that the Pension and Service Regulations made under the erstwhile Ordinance continued to regulate the affairs of the Company---Even otherwise, Supreme Court had already affirmed the continuing enforceability of said Regulations even after promulgation of Ordinance, 2001---Besides, under Section 24 of the General Clauses Act 1897, the Regulations were deemed to have been issued under Ordinance, 2001 unless inconsistent with the said Ordinance---Section 5 of the Ordinance 2001 provided that “all employees of the Corporation shall on the date of incorporation of the company be deemed to be the employees of the company on the same remuneration and other conditions of service, rights and privileges including the pension, provident fund and gratuity as were applicable to them before the conversion of the corporation into the company”---This provision saved and protected the terms and conditions of the employees of the erstwhile corporation---Under Regulation 15(1A) of the Pension Regulations, the benefit of “additional pension” was extended to the employees of the Corporation on 19.04.1987---As per the respondents, the benefit of additional pension had been withdrawn under the office memorandum dated 04.09.2001 which being a directive/instruction of the federal government was binding on the company under Regulation 265 of the Service Regulation---The office memorandum dated 04.09.2001 could not be constructed as a directive or instruction issued to the company by the federal government under Regulation 265---Any decision of board of directors, which without reference to the office memorandum stated that board of directors had resolved that the maximum scale of gross pension would continue to be equal to 70% of the pensionable salary upon completion of 30 years or more service at the time of retirement, was inconsequential as the same was in violation of Section 5 of the Ordinance 2001 read with Regulation 15(1A) of the Pensions Regulation---Moreover, the office memorandum whereby company declined claim of the petitioner was set aside keeping in view the statutory framework regulating the working of the company---Ordinance, 2001, not only recognized but also protected pension by ensuring that the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the erstwhile Corporation, and now of the successor Company, could not be altered to their disadvantage---Impugned judgment was set aside by declaring that the petitioner was entitled to “additional Pension” under Section 5 of the Ordinance, 2001 read with Regulation 15(1A) of the Pension Regulations with the direction to the company to pay the “additional pension” to the petitioner in accordance with the Pension Regulations---Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed, in circumstances. Syed Tahir Abbas Shah v. OGDCL through MD 2012 PLC (C.S.) 885 and OGDCL v. Nazar Hussain 2010 SCMR 1559 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 185(3)---Supreme Court---Precedent---Scope---A case which does not decide any question of law or enunciate any principle of law and is a leave declining order does not pass as a binding precedent. Allied Bank Limited v. Habib-Ur-Rehman and others 2023 PLC (C.S.) 1319; Syed Hammad Nabi and others v. Inspector General of Police Punjab, Lahore and others 2023 SCMR 584 and Muhammad Salman v. Naveed Anjum and others 2021 SCMR 1675 rel. (c) Oil and Gas Development Corporation Ordinance (XXXVII of 1961) --- ----S.4---Transition of Oil and Gas Development Corporation into a public limited company---Company’s autonomy in managing its internal governance, emphasis upon---Scheme and framework discussed---The creation of the Corporation under the Ordinance, 1961 was not a mere bureaucratic arrangement but a deliberate legislative choice to insulate a vital sector of the economy from the day-to-day interference of ministerial control---The statute envisaged a Board of Directors empowered to conduct the affairs of the Corporation “on commercial considerations having regard to public interest” while federal directives were binding only insofar as they fell within the domain of policy---Significantly, it was the Board itself which was authorized to determine whether a matter constituted “policy”---This governance architecture reflected the legislative intent: to endow the Corporation with institutional autonomy so that commercial decisions could be taken in the best interest of the enterprise and the country, free from fluctuating political currents---The transition of the Corporation into a public limited company in 2001 strengthened, rather than diluted, this autonomy---By registering it as a company limited by shares under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 subject to the fiduciary duties of its directors and the discipline of company law, the legislature shifted the governance model closer to that of the private sector, where independent Boards are entrusted with decision-making in the interests of the company and its stakeholders---This progression underscores a legislative trajectory toward greater independence, transparency, and accountability in the governance of state-owned enterprises---Accordingly, any statutory reference of adherence to government directives/instructions cannot be read as compelling the Board to mechanically implement instructions---Such a reading would negate both the original intent of the Ordinance, 1961 and the autonomy conferred under the Ordinance, 2001 corporate structure---Rather, it is incumbent upon the Board to assess whether a directive is commercially sound, consistent with the fiduciary duty of directors, in furtherance of the company’s statutory purpose and in the general public interest---Only if the seconditions are satisfied can a directive legitimately become part of the Company’s internal governance---To hold otherwise would reduce the Board to a mere rubber stamp, defeating the very rationale for creating autonomous commercial entities under the law---Public corporations are designed not as extensions of government departments but as independent bodies entrusted with bringing efficiency, autonomy, and commercial discipline to vital sectors of economic activity---Commercial autonomy is thus not only a legislative design but also a constitutional necessity for public sector companies engaged in strategic areas of the economy---Strong, independent public institutions are the bedrock of economic development, good governance, and the rule of law---When boards of statutory corporations or public companies are permitted to exercise independent judgment, they advance the twin objectives of commercial viability and public interest, thereby serving the larger purposes of the State---Conversely, when such bodies are reduced to administrative subordinates of the executive, both economic growth and democratic accountability suffer---In a constitutional democracy committed to the separation of powers and the strengthening of institutions, autonomy of state-owned enterprises is therefore indispensable. Muhammad Yousaf v. Province of Sindh 2024 SCMR 1689; Qazi Khalid Ali v. Federation of Pakistan C.P.L.A.147-K/2023; Province of Sindh through Secretary Government of Sindh, Karachi and others v. Mst. Sorath Fatima and another 2025 SCP 278 and The Province of Punjab through Secretary, Finance Department, Government of the Punjab, Lahore and others v. Kanwal Rashid and others 2021 SCMR 730 rel. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 9 & 14---Employment---Pension---Right to pension---Entitlement and scope---Pension is not a matter of bounty, charity, or benevolence, it is a right protected under Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution and inseparably linked with the right to life, dignity and livelihood, for without sustenance in old age, these rights ring hollow---It should be taken more seriously for those public servants for whom it is a crystallized return on years of faithful service, a form of deferred wages earned through the sweat, labour, and loyalty of an employee---It embodies the principle that those who serve must not be cast aside in their twilight years---To deny or withhold pension is to strip a person of the security they have justly earned, leaving them exposed to indignity, vulnerability, and want---Therefore this right must be protected in the shape of the grant of pension that is not only adequate but also predictable---Moreover, an element of respect and empathy is to be maintained while granting pension which would be inconsonance with the values that our Constitution espouses with dignity as the highest constitutional value---The law itself stands as ashield to protect the rights of such employees, ensuring that long earned entitlements are not eroded by institutional caprice---To trifle with pension is, therefore, to trifle with constitutional justice itself. Muhammad Bashir Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Sultan Mazhar Sher Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 17th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss.65A, 120, 122(5A) & 133(1)---Tax credit, disallowing of---Sales to registered persons---Computation of 90% threshold---Whether exports to unregistered foreign buyers are to be included---Threshold condition---Application limited to sales made to registered or (liable to be registered) persons---Present income tax reference under S.133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was filed against respondent company which arose out of an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue---Precisely, for tax year 2011, the taxpayer declared that 85.32% of its sales were made locally to a registered person, while 14.68% of its sales were exports made to a foreign entity not registered or liable to be registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990---The return was initially deemed assessed under S. 120, but was later amended by the tax authorities under S.122(5A), disallowing tax credit claimed under S.65A---The disallowance was upheld by the commissioner (appeals) but set aside by the tribunal, which allowed the tax credit---The issue requiring determination before the High Court was “whether, for purposes of S.65A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, the statutory requirement that ninety percent of sales be made to registered persons was to be calculated with reference to total sales including exports, or only with reference to local sales made to persons registered or liable to be registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990”?---Held: It was an admitted position under the law that ‘foreign entity’ was an entity, which was neither registered in Pakistan nor it was liable to be registered, therefore, the interpretation sought to be placed by the Revenue was clearly misconceived as the entire purpose and essence of the condition/threshold of 90% sales to registered persons was rooted in the rationale of promoting and incentivizing the sales to registered persons---It was for this reason that a tax credit was being inured for those who made 90% of the total sales to registered persons---The threshold requirement of 90% in the present case was not applicable against the entire magnitude of the ‘sales’ made---The term ‘registered persons’ as defined in the Act clearly manifested that persons not even liable to be registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, could not be included for the purpose of calculation of 90% threshold required under S.65A of the Ordinance, 2001---Moreover, while highlighting the principles for interpretation of statues, High Court greatly emphasized that term ‘sales’, as used in S.65A of the Ordinance could not be read in isolation and must be construed in line with the overall scheme of the Ordinance---Impugned order having been passed in accordance with law did not warrant intervention---Proposed questions were answered in negative and resultantly present reference application was dismissed, in circumstances. Combined Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Wali Bhati and others PLD 2016 SC 730 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Imperial Electric Company Pvt. Ltd 2015 PTD 884 rel. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Whole text canon---Principle---A provision not to be read in isolation---Contextual and harmonious construction---Legislative intent to be gathered from the statute as a whole---Scope---In interpreting an enactment, all its parts must be construed together as forming one whole and it is not in accordance with sound principles of construction to consider one section, or group of sections, divorced from the rest of the statute---Further, so far as possible, that construction must be placed upon words used in any part of the statute which makes them consistent with remaining provisions and with the intention of the legislature to be derived from a consideration of the enactment---When the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute, it is not only legitimate but proper to read that provision in its context---It is a rule now firmly established that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole---In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the Court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of statute as a whole---Meaning of a statute is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in all the parts together and in their relation to the end in view---In our jurisprudence, it is also firmly settled that the provisions of a statute have to be read as a whole and all its provisions must be harmoniously construed and reconciled---The intention of the lawmaker is gathered by reading the enactment as a whole and not in isolation and any interpretation of a provision, which is made in isolation of other provisions and overall scheme of the statute, is not in accordance with the canons of construction of statutes. Kamaluddin Qureshi v. Ali International Co. PLD 2009 SC 367; Combined Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Wali Bhati and others PLD 2016 SC 730; Collector of Customs, Customs House, Karachi v. Syed Rehan Ahmed 2017 SCMR 152 and Waqar Zafar Bakhtawari and 6 others v. Haji Mazhar Hussain Shah and others PLD 2018 SC 81 rel. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Any interpretation of a particular provision, which leads to render other provisions of the same statute as redundant or tend to make them anomalous, cannot be resorted to. Judges Pension’s Case PLD 2013 SC 829; Searle IV Solution (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2018 SCMR 1444; Aam Log Ittehad and another v. The Election Commission of Pakistan and others PLD 2022 SC 39 and Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Messrs White Gold Steel Mills and others 2025 SCMR 1521 rel. (d) Interpretation of statutes--- ----No surplusages can be attributed to the legislature---In the field of interpretation of statutes the Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof with a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect---Effect must be given, if possible, to all the words used in the statutory provision, for the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain. Judges Pension’s Case PLD 2013 SC 829; Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Messrs White Gold Steel Mills and others 2025 SCMR 1521; East and West Steamship Co. v. Queensland Insurance Co. PLD 1963 SC 663 and Syed Jalal Mehmood Shah and another v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 1999 SC 395 rel. (e) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal statutes---Two possible interpretations---Doubt about a true import of a provision---Effect---Benefit of doubt to go to the taxpayer---Principle---Even if it may be construed that two interpretations of the provision in question are possible, the one in favour of taxpayer has to be resorted to as it is well recognized canon of construction of fiscal statutes that where a provision is susceptible of two interpretations and there is a doubt about its true import, the benefit will go in favour of the taxpayer and the language used in a tax or financial statute is not to be either stretched in favour of the State or narrowed in favour of the taxpayer. Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Imperial Electric Company Pvt. Ltd 2015 PTD 884; Capital Development Authority, CDA through Chairman, CDA, Islamabad v. Ahmed Murtaza and another 2023 SCMR 61; Government of Sindh through Secretary and Director General, Excise and Taxation and another v. Muhammad Shafi and others PLD 2015 SC 380; Messrs Mehran Associates Limited v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi 1993 SCMR 274 and The Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Mekotex (Pvt.) Limited and others PLD 2024 SC 1168 rel. (f) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal statutes---Two possible interpretations---Out of the two interpretations, that which ends in the furtherance of the object of the statute should be preferred to the one that would frustrate it. Liaquat Ali Chaudhry for Applicant. Umair Ahmad and Haris Irfan for Respondent. Date of hearing: 17th September, 2025.

Summary: ----Ss.65A, 120, 122(5A) & 133(1)---Tax credit, disallowing of---Sales to registered persons---Computation of 90% threshold---Whether exports to unregistered foreign buyers are to be included---Threshold condition---Application limited to sales made to registered or (liable to be registered) persons---Present income tax reference under S.133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was filed against respondent company which arose out of an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue---Precisely, for tax year 2011, the taxpayer declared that 85.32% of its sales were made locally to a registered person, while 14.68% of its sales were exports made to a foreign entity not registered or liable to be registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990---The return was initially deemed assessed under S. 120, but was later amended by the tax authorities under S.122(5A), disallowing tax credit claimed under S.65A---The disallowance was upheld by the commissioner (appeals) but set aside by the tribunal, which allowed the tax credit---The issue requiring determination before the High Court was “whether, for purposes of S.65A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, the statutory requirement that ninety percent of sales be made to registered persons was to be calculated with reference to total sales including exports, or only with reference to local sales made to persons registered or liable to be registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990”?---Held: It was an admitted position under the law that ‘foreign entity’ was an entity, which was neither registered in Pakistan nor it was liable to be registered, therefore, the interpretation sought to be placed by the Revenue was clearly misconceived as the entire purpose and essence of the condition/threshold of 90% sales to registered persons was rooted in the rationale of promoting and incentivizing the sales to registered persons---It was for this reason that a tax credit was being inured for those who made 90% of the total sales to registered persons---The threshold requirement of 90% in the present case was not applicable against the entire magnitude of the ‘sales’ made---The term ‘registered persons’ as defined in the Act clearly manifested that persons not even liable to be registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, could not be included for the purpose of calculation of 90% threshold required under S.65A of the Ordinance, 2001---Moreover, while highlighting the principles for interpretation of statues, High Court greatly emphasized that term ‘sales’, as used in S.65A of the Ordinance could not be read in isolation and must be construed in line with the overall scheme of the Ordinance---Impugned order having been passed in accordance with law did not warrant intervention---Proposed questions were answered in negative and resultantly present reference application was dismissed, in circumstances. Combined Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Wali Bhati and others PLD 2016 SC 730 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Imperial Electric Company Pvt. Ltd 2015 PTD 884 rel. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Whole text canon---Principle---A provision not to be read in isolation---Contextual and harmonious construction---Legislative intent to be gathered from the statute as a whole---Scope---In interpreting an enactment, all its parts must be construed together as forming one whole and it is not in accordance with sound principles of construction to consider one section, or group of sections, divorced from the rest of the statute---Further, so far as possible, that construction must be placed upon words used in any part of the statute which makes them consistent with remaining provisions and with the intention of the legislature to be derived from a consideration of the enactment---When the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute, it is not only legitimate but proper to read that provision in its context---It is a rule now firmly established that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole---In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the Court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of statute as a whole---Meaning of a statute is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in all the parts together and in their relation to the end in view---In our jurisprudence, it is also firmly settled that the provisions of a statute have to be read as a whole and all its provisions must be harmoniously construed and reconciled---The intention of the lawmaker is gathered by reading the enactment as a whole and not in isolation and any interpretation of a provision, which is made in isolation of other provisions and overall scheme of the statute, is not in accordance with the canons of construction of statutes. Kamaluddin Qureshi v. Ali International Co. PLD 2009 SC 367; Combined Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Wali Bhati and others PLD 2016 SC 730; Collector of Customs, Customs House, Karachi v. Syed Rehan Ahmed 2017 SCMR 152 and Waqar Zafar Bakhtawari and 6 others v. Haji Mazhar Hussain Shah and others PLD 2018 SC 81 rel. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Any interpretation of a particular provision, which leads to render other provisions of the same statute as redundant or tend to make them anomalous, cannot be resorted to. Judges Pension’s Case PLD 2013 SC 829; Searle IV Solution (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2018 SCMR 1444; Aam Log Ittehad and another v. The Election Commission of Pakistan and others PLD 2022 SC 39 and Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Messrs White Gold Steel Mills and others 2025 SCMR 1521 rel. (d) Interpretation of statutes--- ----No surplusages can be attributed to the legislature---In the field of interpretation of statutes the Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof with a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect---Effect must be given, if possible, to all the words used in the statutory provision, for the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain. Judges Pension’s Case PLD 2013 SC 829; Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Messrs White Gold Steel Mills and others 2025 SCMR 1521; East and West Steamship Co. v. Queensland Insurance Co. PLD 1963 SC 663 and Syed Jalal Mehmood Shah and another v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 1999 SC 395 rel. (e) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal statutes---Two possible interpretations---Doubt about a true import of a provision---Effect---Benefit of doubt to go to the taxpayer---Principle---Even if it may be construed that two interpretations of the provision in question are possible, the one in favour of taxpayer has to be resorted to as it is well recognized canon of construction of fiscal statutes that where a provision is susceptible of two interpretations and there is a doubt about its true import, the benefit will go in favour of the taxpayer and the language used in a tax or financial statute is not to be either stretched in favour of the State or narrowed in favour of the taxpayer. Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Imperial Electric Company Pvt. Ltd 2015 PTD 884; Capital Development Authority, CDA through Chairman, CDA, Islamabad v. Ahmed Murtaza and another 2023 SCMR 61; Government of Sindh through Secretary and Director General, Excise and Taxation and another v. Muhammad Shafi and others PLD 2015 SC 380; Messrs Mehran Associates Limited v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi 1993 SCMR 274 and The Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Mekotex (Pvt) Limited and others PLD 2024 SC 1168 rel. (f) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal statutes---Two possible interpretations---Out of the two interpretations, that which ends in the furtherance of the object of the statute should be preferred to the one that would frustrate it. Liaquat Ali Chaudhry for Applicant. Umair Ahmad and Haris Irfan for Respondent. Date of hearing: 17th September, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 02.02.2022 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Writ Petition No. 4096 of 2021). (a) Oil and Gas Development Corporation Pension and Gratuity Regulations, 1985 --- ----Regln.15(1A)---Oil and Gas Development Corporation Ordinance (XXXVII of 1961), S.5---Oil and Gas Development Corporation (Reorganization) Ordinance (XXVIII of 2001), Ss.4 & 5---Oil and Gas Development Corporation Employees (Service) Regulations, 1994, Regln.265---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)---Claim of “additional pension”, denial of---Claim for 2% increment per extra year of service beyond 30 years---Entitlement---Oil and Gas Development Corporation converted into OGDCL---Continuity of service conditions and pension rights of employees of corporation despite the conversion---Scope---Supreme Court directed the company to grant additional pension---The petitioner joined the Oil and Gas Development Corporation (OGDC) as Accounts Assistant in 1995 after serving in the Pakistan Military Accounts Department---Upon reorganization under the Oil and Gas Development Corporation (Reorganization) Ordinance, 2001, the corporation was converted into the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL), and the petitioner became an employee of the new company by operation of law---He retired as ‘senior accountant’ on 17 June 2021 after serving for about 40 years and 10 months, including his earlier government service---He claimed entitlement to “additional pension” under Regulation 15(1A) of the Pension Regulations 1985, providing an extra 2% of gross pension for each year of service beyond 30 years, up to a 10% maximum---The company rejected his claim through an office memorandum, which the High Court upheld on, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court---Held: It was an admitted position between the parties that the Pension and Service Regulations made under the erstwhile Ordinance continued to regulate the affairs of the Company---Even otherwise, Supreme Court had already affirmed the continuing enforceability of said Regulations even after promulgation of Ordinance, 2001---Besides, under Section 24 of the General Clauses Act 1897, the Regulations were deemed to have been issued under Ordinance, 2001 unless inconsistent with the said Ordinance---Section 5 of the Ordinance 2001 provided that “all employees of the Corporation shall on the date of incorporation of the company be deemed to be the employees of the company on the same remuneration and other conditions of service, rights and privileges including the pension, provident fund and gratuity as were applicable to them before the conversion of the corporation into the company”---This provision saved and protected the terms and conditions of the employees of the erstwhile corporation---Under Regulation 15(1A) of the Pension Regulations, the benefit of “additional pension” was extended to the employees of the Corporation on 19.04.1987---As per the respondents, the benefit of additional pension had been withdrawn under the office memorandum dated 04.09.2001 which being a directive/instruction of the federal government was binding on the company under Regulation 265 of the Service Regulation---The office memorandum dated 04.09.2001 could not be constructed as a directive or instruction issued to the company by the federal government under Regulation 265---Any decision of board of directors, which without reference to the office memorandum stated that board of directors had resolved that the maximum scale of gross pension would continue to be equal to 70% of the pensionable salary upon completion of 30 years or more service at the time of retirement, was inconsequential as the same was in violation of Section 5 of the Ordinance 2001 read with Regulation 15(1A) of the Pensions Regulation---Moreover, the office memorandum whereby company declined claim of the petitioner was set aside keeping in view the statutory framework regulating the working of the company---Ordinance, 2001, not only recognized but also protected pension by ensuring that the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the erstwhile Corporation, and now of the successor Company, could not be altered to their disadvantage---Impugned judgment was set aside by declaring that the petitioner was entitled to “additional Pension” under Section 5 of the Ordinance, 2001 read with Regulation 15(1A) of the Pension Regulations with the direction to the company to pay the “additional pension” to the petitioner in accordance with the Pension Regulations---Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed, in circumstances. Syed Tahir Abbas Shah v. OGDCL through MD 2012 PLC (C.S.) 885 and OGDCL v. Nazar Hussain 2010 SCMR 1559 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 185(3)---Supreme Court---Precedent---Scope---A case which does not decide any question of law or enunciate any principle of law and is a leave declining order does not pass as a binding precedent. Allied Bank Limited v. Habib-Ur-Rehman and others 2023 PLC (C.S.) 1319; Syed Hammad Nabi and others v. Inspector General of Police Punjab, Lahore and others 2023 SCMR 584 and Muhammad Salman v. Naveed Anjum and others 2021 SCMR 1675 rel. (c) Oil and Gas Development Corporation Ordinance (XXXVII of 1961) --- ----S.4---Transition of Oil and Gas Development Corporation into a public limited company---Company’s autonomy in managing its internal governance, emphasis upon---Scheme and framework discussed---The creation of the Corporation under the Ordinance, 1961 was not a mere bureaucratic arrangement but a deliberate legislative choice to insulate a vital sector of the economy from the day-to-day interference of ministerial control---The statute envisaged a Board of Directors empowered to conduct the affairs of the Corporation “on commercial considerations having regard to public interest” while federal directives were binding only insofar as they fell within the domain of policy---Significantly, it was the Board itself which was authorized to determine whether a matter constituted “policy”---This governance architecture reflected the legislative intent: to endow the Corporation with institutional autonomy so that commercial decisions could be taken in the best interest of the enterprise and the country, free from fluctuating political currents---The transition of the Corporation into a public limited company in 2001 strengthened, rather than diluted, this autonomy---By registering it as a company limited by shares under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 subject to the fiduciary duties of its directors and the discipline of company law, the legislature shifted the governance model closer to that of the private sector, where independent Boards are entrusted with decision-making in the interests of the company and its stakeholders---This progression underscores a legislative trajectory toward greater independence, transparency, and accountability in the governance of state-owned enterprises---Accordingly, any statutory reference of adherence to government directives/instructions cannot be read as compelling the Board to mechanically implement instructions---Such a reading would negate both the original intent of the Ordinance, 1961 and the autonomy conferred under the Ordinance, 2001 corporate structure---Rather, it is incumbent upon the Board to assess whether a directive is commercially sound, consistent with the fiduciary duty of directors, in furtherance of the company’s statutory purpose and in the general public interest---Only if the seconditions are satisfied can a directive legitimately become part of the Company’s internal governance---To hold otherwise would reduce the Board to a mere rubber stamp, defeating the very rationale for creating autonomous commercial entities under the law---Public corporations are designed not as extensions of government departments but as independent bodies entrusted with bringing efficiency, autonomy, and commercial discipline to vital sectors of economic activity---Commercial autonomy is thus not only a legislative design but also a constitutional necessity for public sector companies engaged in strategic areas of the economy---Strong, independent public institutions are the bedrock of economic development, good governance, and the rule of law---When boards of statutory corporations or public companies are permitted to exercise independent judgment, they advance the twin objectives of commercial viability and public interest, thereby serving the larger purposes of the State---Conversely, when such bodies are reduced to administrative subordinates of the executive, both economic growth and democratic accountability suffer---In a constitutional democracy committed to the separation of powers and the strengthening of institutions, autonomy of state-owned enterprises is therefore indispensable. Muhammad Yousaf v. Province of Sindh 2024 SCMR 1689; Qazi Khalid Ali v. Federation of Pakistan C.P.L.A.147-K/2023; Province of Sindh through Secretary Government of Sindh, Karachi and others v. Mst. Sorath Fatima and another 2025 SCP 278 and The Province of Punjab through Secretary, Finance Department, Government of the Punjab, Lahore and others v. Kanwal Rashid and others 2021 SCMR 730 rel. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 9 & 14---Employment---Pension---Right to pension---Entitlement and scope---Pension is not a matter of bounty, charity, or benevolence, it is a right protected under Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution and inseparably linked with the right to life, dignity and livelihood, for without sustenance in old age, these rights ring hollow---It should be taken more seriously for those public servants for whom it is a crystallized return on years of faithful service, a form of deferred wages earned through the sweat, labour, and loyalty of an employee---It embodies the principle that those who serve must not be cast aside in their twilight years---To deny or withhold pension is to strip a person of the security they have justly earned, leaving them exposed to indignity, vulnerability, and want---Therefore this right must be protected in the shape of the grant of pension that is not only adequate but also predictable---Moreover, an element of respect and empathy is to be maintained while granting pension which would be inconsonance with the values that our Constitution espouses with dignity as the highest constitutional value---The law itself stands as ashield to protect the rights of such employees, ensuring that long earned entitlements are not eroded by institutional caprice---To trifle with pension is, therefore, to trifle with constitutional justice itself. Muhammad Bashir Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Sultan Mazhar Sher Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 17th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.VI, R.17---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Plaintiff failing to mention in plaint exact date, time, place and witnesses of the transaction---Amendment in pleadings sought in order to fill such lacunas---Legality and permissibility---The petitioners/plaintiffs filed a Writ Petition challenging orders passed by the trial court and district court, respectively, whereby their application under O. VI R.17, C.P.C. for amendment of the plaint was partly allowed and their civil revision was dismissed---The petitioners had sought to substitute and expand paragraph No.1 of their plaint to introduce new facts, including specific dates, witnesses, and details of payments allegedly made over 44 years ago in connection with the purchase of the suit property---The trial and appellate courts held that while a minor clarification about sale receipts could be permitted, the proposed additions amounted to a material change in the factual foundation of the case after completion of trial and remand proceedings, rendering the same as an afterthought---Held: In the application for amendment, the petitioners sought to delete جز"ب " of the plaint and to add amended جز"ب " in its place, which prayer was allowed by the Trial Court---This amendment related to the receipts for the sale consideration---The Trial Court observed that these receipts were already mentioned in the original plaint and were part of the record---This part of proposed amendment was correctly deemed a clarification and necessary for the proper adjudication of the existing controversy---Regarding the second amendment sought by the petitioners/plaintiffs, a side by side comparison of the original plaint and the proposed insertions revealed that the proposed amendments were not just a clarification, but a complete overhaul of the factual matrix---It sought to introduce, for the very first time, the specific date of the alleged agreement, the names of three witnesses, the exact time and place of the transaction and a detailed breakdown of installment payments with specific dates and amounts---These were not minor details rather foundational facts that form the very basis of the cause of action---The courts below had exercised their jurisdiction judiciously and in accordance with the settled principles of law governing the amendment of pleadings---Petitioners failed to point out any illegality or jurisdictional error in the orders passed by the courts below, warranting interference of the High Court in the exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution---Petition being devoid of any merit, was dismissed in limine. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.VI, R.17---Amendment in pleadings---Scope---An application for amendment of pleadings under R. 17 of O. VI, C.P.C. can be moved at any stage of proceedings---However, authority of the court under the aforementioned Rule remains discretionary---This is manifest not only from the use of word “may” but also “in such manner and on such terms as may be just” in that provision---Nonetheless, guideline has been provided by the legislature to the effect that only such amendments to the pleadings are to be allowed which are necessary for determining real questions in controversy between the parties. Abaid Ullah Malik v. Additional District Judge, Mianwali and others PLD 2013 SC 239 rel. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.VI, R.17---Amendment in pleadings can be sought at any stage of the proceedings---Exception---Where suit was instituted more than a decade ago and it has undergone a full trial, a decision, and an appeal, and was subsequently remanded and throughout the entire first round of litigation, the petitioners never breathed a word about the specific facts they subsequently wished to plead, the profound silence at the most opportune moments would lead to the inference that the proposed amendment was an afterthought, designed to fill the lacunae and cure the defects exposed in the first round of the litigation. Ch. Zahid Imran for Petitioners.