Summary: (a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) --- ----Ss.4, 9, 15, 18, 23, 24 & 25--- Compulsory acquisition of land--- Payment of compensation---Fair market value---Determination---Factors to be considered---Award based on revenue classification and annual average rate---Legality---Potential value of land and future utility---Commercial character---Surrounding developments, effect of---Enhancement of compensation---Scope---Delay of twenty-five years in granting fair value as compensation---Right to fair and timely compensation---Briefly, land in question was acquired for the construction of the Islamabad-Murree dual carriageway pursuant to a notification under S.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, followed by an award, whereby compensation was fixed at Rs.1,60,241 per Kanal---Dissatisfied landowners sought reference under S.18 of the Act, resulting in enhancement of compensation to Rs.4,80,000 per Kanal with 15% compulsory acquisition charges by the referee court; Both sides challenged this order through cross appeals---The core issue before the High Court was the “determination of fair market value of the acquired land at the time of notification under S.4, including whether future potential and comparable sale transactions could be considered, and whether compensation could be enhanced beyond the amount initially claimed?”---Held: It was evident that the required land not only possessed commercial value at the time of acquisition but also significant future potential---The existence of nearby facilities such as a hospital, college and university reflect the prevailing market rate and the expected appreciation of the land’s value---Moreover, viz limiting the award of compensation, foundational precondition for invoking the restrictive provisions of S.25 of the Act, 1894 was not met in the present case and accordingly, the objection seeking to limit the award of compensation by respondent to Rs.1,60,241/- per Kanal was devoid of merit---High Court found it necessary to express its deep concern over the prolonged delay faced by the appellants/land owners, who had waited for long 25 years to receive the fair value of their land---High Court further observed that some of the appellants had not lived long enough to see the rightful value of their property acknowledged, let alone received---Such unconscionable delay reflected not just institutional indifference but a broader apathy within the system that failed to respond to the plight of citizens, whose only fault was trusting the process---Present case, regrettably, reflected a failure not of one institution, but of the entire machinery responsible for ensuring timely and adequate compensation--- Impugned order passed by referee court was modified by enhancing the compensation amount from Rs.4,80,000/- to Rs.40,00,000/- (4 Million) per Kanal with 15% compulsory acquisition charges and 6% interest from the date of acquiring possession till the final payment--- Appeal filed by respondents (N.H.A) stood dismissed and that of the land owners was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) --- ----Ss.9, 23, 24 & 25---Compulsory acquisition of land---Compensation, awarding of---Fair market value---Determination---Classification of land in the revenue record and annual average price---Legality--- Determinative factors to be considered while assessing fair compensation---Scope---Value in the revenue record may not be conclusive for determination of compensation value---Courts are required to consider the amount that a willing purchaser would pay to a willing seller in an open market transaction---This principle emphasizes that compensation must be based on actual market dynamics rather than arbitrary or obsolete criteria---In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded to the owners of land compulsorily acquired, the following considerations are relevant and may be duly taken into account: firstly, the value of comparable land situated in adjacent Khasras and Mouzas; secondly, the increase in land prices occurring during the period of acquisition, culminating in the issuance of the final award; thirdly, the potential future value of the acquired land; fourthly, the recent transactions of land in the same vicinity, which serve as reliable indicators of the prevailing market rate and must be accorded due consideration; and finally, it is recognized that no rigid or mechanical formula can be prescribed for the calculation of compensation in cases of compulsory acquisition---Compensation must be fair, and reflective of all relevant considerations including the market value and the potential use of the land. Province of Punjab v. Begum Aziza 2014 SCMR 75 and Government of Pakistan v. Mst. Ayesha Bibi (Widow) 2024 SCMR 1323 rel. (c) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)--- ----Ss.9 & 25---Rate of compensation---Limitation on award beyond claimed amount---Applicability---Whether rate of compensation can be enhanced beyond the amount claimed by the appellants in the reference application and to what extent---Section 25 of the Act, 1894 reflects that it sets a condition precedent to the limit of the compensation that could be awarded, where claim is made or not made pursuant to a notice given under S.9 of the Act, 1894---A careful reading of both provisions reveals that S.25 cannot be pressed into service unless the statutory obligations under S.9 are fully satisfied---Section 9 mandates the issuance of public notice and personal service of individual notices to all persons known or believed to be interested in the land being acquired --- Such notices must provide a clear opportunity for the affected persons to file compensation claims, raise objections, and assert their interests within the stipulated timeframe. Government of Pakistan v. Mst. Ayesha Bibi (Widow) 2024 SCMR 1323 rel. Zulfiqar Ali Abbasi and Shahid Munir for Appellants (in Regular First Appeal No. 63 of 2011). Ms. Shahina Akbar for Appellant (in Regular First Appeal No. 10 of 2014). Ms. Shahina Akbar for Respondents (in Regular First Appeal No. 63 of 2011). Zulfiqar Ali Abbasi and Shahid Munir for Respondents (in Regular First Appeal No. 10 of 2014). Research Assistance by Muhammad Fahad Khattak. Date of hearing: 12th May, 2025. Inaam Ameen Minhas, J .--- Through this single judgment, I intend to decide the above titled two appeals as the same have arisen out of the same order.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Ocular account supported by medical evidence---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant by firing and also causing firearm injuries to the complainant and a passerby---Case of complainant was that on the fateful day, he, his brother and son came to attend proceedings of a criminal case, where their opponents i.e., appellants and one unknown culprit were also present and that at 10:20 am, when they left the Court and reached near “A” Motors, appellant made indiscriminate firing at their back, due to which two bullets hit his deceased brother's right thigh, whereas he received a bullet on his right leg and that a passerby also received a bullet injury on his right leg---Nonetheless, complainant’s deceased brother succumbed to the injuries due to excessive bleeding---Complainant further averred that earlier on 15.02.2018, a dispute arose between the parties due to which criminal case was registered at Police Station, thus the appellant and co-accused persons having anguish of an old animosity, launched attack upon them---Despite lengthy cross-examination, complainant remained firm and consistent to his examination-in-chief, thus his statement went unshaken, which sounds natural, confidence inspiring and truthful---Son of complainant appeared as witness, his statement was in line with the statement of complainant and reiterated what complainant had stated---Said witness was cross-examined at length, but the defence failed to shatter his testimony as he remained firmed and consistent to his examination in chief, thus his testimony went un-shattered---Presence of the said witnesses had been found to be natural, who had no reason to falsely implicate the appellant---Defence had failed to bring anything on record to establish false implication or substitution of the real culprits with the appellant---Injured witness testified that on 09.05.2018, he went to Faisal Bank, with his wife, where whilst returning, suddenly firing started and that a bullet hit his left leg and he got injured, thus he was taken to the Civil Hospital---Later on, he came to know that a person had made firing due to some enmity, which resulted into death of a person---Although, injured witness did not identify any of the culprit, but importantly he did not deny the occurrence, thus his statement did not put any dent to the case of the prosecution, rather confirmed the occurrence---Presence of the eye-witnesses had been established and their testimonies had gone un-shattered, which by all means inspired confidence and truthful as the injuries sustained by complainant and passerby proved their presence at the place of occurrence, more particularly, when the medical evidence corroborated the ocular account, nature, time and locale of injuries sustained by deceased and the said Injured witnesses---Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved the indictment to the hilt without any glimpse of doubt---Appeal against conviction was dismissed, accordingly. Amanullah v. The State 2023 SCMR 723 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Co-accused persons acquitted on same set of evidence---Accused charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant by firing and also causing firearm injuries to the complainant and a passerby---It was alleged by the defence that the case of acquitted accused persons was at par with appellant, and they were acquitted of the indictment---Said contention of defence was unjustified as the said acquitted persons were not attributed any role of firing or with an overt act---Appellant had been specifically nominated with the role of firing upon deceased and causing injuries to complainant and a passerby, thus his case was distinguishable---Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved the indictment to the hilt without any glimpse of doubt---Appeal against conviction was dismissed, accordingly. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Related and interested witnesses, evidence of---Reliance---Scope---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant by firing and also causing firearm injuries to the complainant and a passerby---Undeniably, both of the eye-witnesses of the occurrence were related to the deceased, but merely for that reasons they could not be termed as interested' witnesses---Term 'related' was not equivalent to 'interested'---Witness may be called 'interested' only when, he or she derives some benefit in seeing an accused person punished---Witness, who is a natural one and is the only possible eye-witness in the circumstances of the case, cannot be said to be 'interested'---In the present case, one of the injured eye-witnesses was complainant and he was brother of deceased, who had not only proved his presence, but his testimony was consistent---Said witness had cogently described the manner of commission of the crime in detail, thus the testimony of an eye-witness, who had received injuries carried more evidentiary value---Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved the indictment to the hilt without any glimpse of doubt---Appeal against conviction was dismissed, accordingly. Aqil v. The State 2023 SCMR 831 rel. Aminullah Kakar for Appellant. Abdul Karim, State Counsel for the State. Date of hearing: 12th June, 2025. Shaukat Ali Rakhshani, J .--- Veracity and legality of judgment dated 01.06.2024 (“impugned judgment”) handed down by learned Additional Sessions Judge-VI, Quetta (“Trial Court”) has been called in question by the appellant, emanating from FIR No.76 of 2018 (Ex.P/13-A) registered with Police Station Civil Line, Quetta for the offences punishable under sections 302, 324 and 34 of Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (“P.P.C”), whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following terms;

Summary: (a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----S.17---Arbitration award---Award made rule of court merely on the ground that objections against it were barred by time---Duty of court to examine award on its own motion regardless of whether any objections or time-barred objections were filed or not---Scope---Court must ensure that award is free from any patent illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error---Facts of the matter in brevity were that the appellant/Capital Development Authority (CDA) awarded a construction contract to respondent company---Various disputes between the parties led them to arbitration---The sole arbitrator awarded Rs. 640 million to the respondent company---The appellant/CDA filed objections beyond the statutory limitation period which the Trial Court dismissed solely on grounds of delay and made the award rule of the court---The significant questions requiring determination by the High Court were as to (i) “Whether the objections filed against the arbitration award were rightly dismissed as time-barred without a substantive examination of the award itself?” and; (ii) “Whether the grounds raised for setting aside the award in appeal merit consideration despite the dismissal of objections on the ground of limitation?”---Held: While deciding the objections filed to the award Trial Court failed to appreciate the true import of the statutory mandate under S. 17 of the 1940 Act---Record demonstrated that the Trial Court failed to fulfill its legal obligation under S. 17 of the 1940 Act---Trial Court made the award rule of the court solely on the ground that the objections filed by the appellant/CDA were time-barred---Record clearly revealed that the Trial Court did not undertake the essential judicial scrutiny of the award as required by law under S. 17 of the Act 1940---It failed to assess the contents, fairness or legality of the award and did not determine whether the award was within the bounds of the arbitrator’s authority or in violation of any provision of law, instead, the court dismissed the objections on the ground of limitation and proceeded to make the award rule of the court without applying the standards mandated by law---This failure constituted a miscarriage of justice and a deviation from the fundamental principles of due process and procedural fairness---Trial Court made the award rule of court simply because the appellant/CDA had filed time barred objections to the award---Impugned order did not show any application of judicious mind to the contents of the award so as to determine whether any provision of law was violated or whether there was any reason to remit the award for reconsideration---This failure on the part of the Trial Court rendered the impugned order unlawful and against the law---Trial Court while relying on the question of time barred objections failed to discharge its statutory duty and hastily proceeded to make the award rule of the court, thereby compromising the sanctity of the judicial process envisaged under S. 17 of the 1940 Act---It was not open to the court to bypass the scrutiny as established in S.17 of the 1940 Act on the ground of time-barred objections---Impugned order and decree were set-aside and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court to decide the same afresh in accordance with the law---Present appeal was disposed of, in circumstances. Pakistan Through General Manager, Pakistan Railway v. Messrs Q.M.R. Expert Consultants PLD 1990 SC 800 and Ameen General Enterprises v. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government PLD 2010 SC (AJ&K) 1 rel. National Logistic Cell (NLC) v. Hakas (Pvt.) Ltd. 2010 YLR 1448 and Rashida Begum v. Ch. Muhammad Anwar PLD 2003 Lah. 522 ref. (b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----S.17---Arbitration award---Court to examine award on its own motion regardless of whether any objections or time-barred objections were filed or not---Scope---Court must ensure that award is free from any patent illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error---Duties and role of court in examining the award before making it the rule of court stated---Section 17 imposes a direct and mandatory obligation upon the Court once an award is submitted for making it a rule of Court---The statutory language does not envisage the Court acting as a mere conduit for converting the award into a decree rather, the Court is required to perform an active judicial function---It mandates that the Court must examine the award to determine whether there exists any ground for remitting it back to the arbitrator for reconsideration or for setting it aside---Only if the Court finds no legal flaw or procedural irregularity in the award, and after the expiry of the prescribed period for filing objections or upon lawful rejection of any objections filed, may the Court pronounce judgment in accordance with the award, thereby rendering it executable as a decree of the Court---Importantly, the Court’s duty of judicial scrutiny is not contingent upon the filing of objections by either party, nor it is negated by the expiry of the limitation period for such objections---Even in the absence of objections or where objections are barred by time, the court remains under a legal obligation to examine the award on its own motion---The absence of objections does not absolve the Court from its responsibility to ensure that the award is not tainted by any apparent illegality, procedural irregularity, or violation of law---The Court’s role under S. 17 of the 1940 Act is not that of a mere post office, mechanically endorsing the award upon the expiry of the limitation period for objections rather the Court must exercise its independent judicial mind to ensure that the award is free from any patent illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error---While making an award rule of the Court, in case parties have not filed objections, the Court is not supposed to act in a mechanical manner, like a post office but must subject the award to its judicial scrutiny---This however does not mean that a Court will sit in appeal over the award and try to fish or dig out the latent errors in the proceedings of the award---It only means that even in the absence of objections or time barred objections, the award may be set aside and not made a rule of the Court, if it is a nullity or is prima facie illegal or for any other reason, not fit to be maintained; or suffers from an invalidity, which is self-evident or apparent on the face of the record---The Court’s role is thus not purely procedural rather it involves a measure of judicial scrutiny to ensure that the award does not suffer from any fundamental legal infirmities---The Court’s obligation to examine the legality and enforceability of the award before making it a rule of the Court is inherent in the statutory scheme governing arbitral proceedings---Section 17 of the 1940 Act, casts a positive duty upon the Court to independently examine whether there exists any cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award---This duty is not contingent upon the filing of objections within limitation but is inherent in the judicial function prescribed by the statute---No derogation can be made from this duty, as it forms a foundational safeguard within the arbitration process to prevent the enforcement of awards that are patently illegal, unenforceable or contrary to law---The Court’s power to scrutinize an arbitral award is limited to patent illegality or error apparent on the face of the award and does not extend to reappraisal of evidence or merits---The arbitrator is the final judge of facts and law and his findings are to be respected unless there is a manifest error or misconduct. Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd v. Aeroflot Russian International Airline 2018 SCMR 662; A. Qutubuddin Khan v. Chec Millwala Dredging Co. (Pvt.) Limited 2014 SCMR 1268; Mian Corporation through Managing Partner v. Messrs Lever Brothers of Pakistan Ltd. through General Sales Manager PLD 2006 SC 169 and Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation Karachi v. Messrs Mustafa Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2003 SC 301 rel. Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation v. Javaid Iqbal and others 2020 YLR 2306 and Capital Development Authority through its Chairman v. Messrs Signage Security Systems (Pvt.) Ltd. through Accounts and Administrative Manager 2021 YLR 194 ref. Kashif Ali Malik, Amir Latif Gill and Qaisar Abbas Gondal for Appellant. Mashooq Ali Sheikh, Director Works, CDA. Muhammad Masood Khan, Muhammad Zeeshan Younas and Syed Faisal Hussain Shah for Respondent. Assisted by: Muhammad Yahya Khan Niazi, Judicial Law Clerk. Date of hearing: 25th March, 2025.

Summary: Execution of a decree by sale of immovable property involves strict procedural safeguards. These safeguards are not mere formalities; they are substantive protections against arbitrary deprivation of property. Under Order XXI Rule 66 of the CPC, the court is mandated to issue a sale proclamation prior to the auction, detailing the property, its value, any encumbrances, and to issue notice to all persons having an interest in the property. The proclamation must be settled after hearing both the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor, as well as any other party claiming an interest. The provision of Order XXI Rule 89 CPC allows a judgment-debtor or an interested person to have the sale set aside by depositing the sale price plus 5% of the purchase money as compensation within 30 days of the sale. However, this presupposes knowledge of the sale. The appellant, having received no notice or proclamation, nevertheless deposited the abovementioned sale price before the executing court. Order XXI Rule 90 CPC is the cornerstone of this case. It enables any person whose interest is affected by the sale to move an application to set aside the auction on the grounds of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale, provided that substantial injury has occurred. Order XXI Rule 91 CPC protects auction purchasers when it turns out, post-sale, that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest. However, this does not protect the sale itself; it merely entitles such purchaser to a refund or damages from the decree-holder who misrepresented the facts. The sale remains null and void as against the true owner. Order XXI Rule 92 CPC states that a sale must not be confirmed if there is an application pending under Rule 90 CPC. In the present case, no such application was filed prior to confirmation only because the petitioner was never notified or made aware of the proceedings. This procedural failure renders the confirmation itself contrary to law. Once a sale is set aside, Order XXI Rule 93 CPC mandates a refund to the auction purchaser. Order XXI Rule 94 CPC clarifies that title only passes upon confirmation and issuance of the sale certificate. Where confirmation is invalid due to a jurisdictional error or procedural fraud, no title ever validly passes to the purchaser. The wrongful sale of the appellant’s property—without notice, without trial, and without lawful authority—constitutes a violation of Article 10-A (Right to Fair Trial) and Article 24 (Right to Property) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. A person cannot be deprived of property except in accordance with law and after due process.

Summary: In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Qazalbash Waqf (supra), the decisive steps have already been taken in the matter, and the remaining step ie. the transfer of surplus land measuring 781 PIUs in favour of the Provincial Government, is a self-executory provision. Hence, the present case is not hit by the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Qazalbash Waqf (supra). The remaining surplus land measuring 781 PIUs is thus to be transferred in favour of the Provincial Government in terms of MLR-115 as well as the Act of 1977. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the Member-II, Board of Revenue, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, is not open to any exception. Resultantly, W.P No.6637-P/2018 filed by Dr. Muhammad Younas Khan stands dismissed.

Summary: (a) The doctrine of res gestae has been explained in Article 19 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The said doctrine of res gestae is based upon the assumption that statements of witnesses that constitute part of the res gestae are attributed a certain degree of reliability because they are contemporaneous making them admissible by virtue of their nature and strength of their connection with a particular event and their ability to explain it comprehensively. (b) Where the eyewitnesses were inmates of the house, their presence at the place of occurrence was deemed natural and expected. In such circumstances, their testimony cannot be discredited merely on the basis of their relationship with the deceased or injured. The law recognizes that in domestic incidents, particularly those occurring within the household premises, the presence of family members or household inmates is normal and does not, by itself, cast suspicion on their credibility as eyewitnesses. Their evidence, if otherwise consistent and trustworthy, carries full evidentiary value.

Summary: i. A 12(2) petition would only be maintainable and proceedable if the petitioner succeeded to establish that at the time of obtaining a decree, the decree holder had committed any fraud or misrepresentation or that the Court was lacking jurisdiction. ii. Any decree which has been passed on the basis of a concessional statement or consent or in terms of compromise then such decree could not be challenged in 12(2) petition, however, if such decree is passed on the basis of a void agreement between the parties then the same could validly be challenged in a 12(2) petition. iii. In the present case, the petitioner had not challenged the instant decree on the basis of any fraud or misrepresentation but only on the ground of want of jurisdiction, however, the record would show that in this case, firstly, the petitioner had never raised any such objection during the proceedings, secondly. the petitioner had personally appeared before the trial Court and was also represented by duly appointed legal practitioner and has recorded his no objection over the grant of a decree in favour of his brother/decree-holder and thirdly, the principle of estopel would also debars the petitioner to maintain the instant petition as if such objection is allowed to prevail at this belated stage then the same would erode the very confidence of the litigants over the judicial system. iv. There is no cavil to hold that a decree which was granted by a Court having no jurisdiction could validly be challenged in 12(2) petition, however, in the instant case, on one hand such objection has never been raised by the petitioner and on the other, on the available record, the Civil Court was having jurisdiction to entertain the instant suit and to pass the impugned decree.

Summary: Bare perusal of the revenue record so placed on file reveals that the petitioners remained unsuccessful in proving the mutation No. 137 was result of fraud or that the original owners did not execute the sale. The mutation No.137 being attested way back in the year 1936 is about a 90 years old documents, so presumption of correctness is attached to it u/a 117 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, while the burden to rebut the same lies on the shoulders of petitioners which they did not discharge. The petitioner also failed to produce any evidence in order to show that either the original owners were executed before attestation of the suit mutation or the power of attorney was invalid. Hence, the petitioners could not succeed to establish on record through confidence aspiring documentary or oral evidence that the mutation was void or illegal. The petitioners also failed to furnish any credible evidence in shape of court record or death certificate in order to prove the exact date of their execution which could suggest that the original owners Adam Khan and Juma Khan were executed before attestation of the mutation in question. Though in the order of Tehsildar/attesting officer there is mentioned that the original owners had been executed, but this fact has not been proved through cogent and independent evidence. No fraud whatsoever has been pointed by the petitioners. Therefore, mere allegation of fraud and misrepresentation are not sufficient for cancellation of about 90 years old mutation. The mutation in question was attested by attorney Niazmanna on the basis of power of attorney which was executed in her favour by the original owners Adam Khan and Juma Khan, however, the petitioners only assailed the mutation in question and did not challenge the power of attorney on the basis of which Mst. Niazmanna was authorized and she did so. No evidence, in order to prove the power of attorney as forged or invalid was produced by the petitioners. In addition, as provided u/s 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the pre- requisite of the sale are offer, acceptance and valid consideration, but in the instant case the petitioners did not question the sale transaction rather only the mutation was challenged, as the petitioners did not furnish any evidence revealing that the sale consideration was not paid or the sale was otherwise invalid. The title derives from sale transaction while the petitioners could not prove that sale transaction did not take place. It is by now well settled that mutation is mere a fiscal record and do not confer title rather the tile is ascertained by the actual sale transaction and the parties impugning the mutation is under obligation/burden to prove that no sale took place, hence, the petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proof. turning to another aspect of the present case, admittedly, the mutation in question was attested way back in the year 1936 while on one hand the legal heirs of the original owners who were minors at the time of attestation of mutation did not question the mutation after attaining the age of majority in their life time, and on the other hand, predecessors of petitioners kept mum for a considerable long period of time consisting is about 88/89 years, thus, the petitioners are stopped u/a 114 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The limitation Act, 1908 provide a period of limitation for instituting a declaratory suit is six years, while the mutation in question was attested on 16.11.1936. The petitioners filed the instant suit challenging the mutation in question with a considerable unexplained delay of about 80 years, hence, the suit of petitioners is miserably hit by law of limitation. The Hon`ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in plethora of judgments held the limitation a substantive law that extinguishes the right to sue if the suit is not filed within prescribed time. [Civil Revision petition dismissed in liminie and the concurrent findings of dismissal of suit of petitioners by the lower fora maintained.]

Summary: Execution of decree --- Objection to decree on basis of arbitration award--- Maintainability --- Scope --- Faisla Salisi not a statutory award in absence of arbitration agreement under Section 2(a) of Arbitration Act, 1940 --- Decree not challenged through appeal and attained finality --- Objection in execution proceedings held to be an indirect challenge to decree --– Executing Court cannot go behind decree --- Civil revision dismissed. Held: “Once a decree attains finality, it is not open to challenge in execution proceedings, especially on grounds that relate to merits or jurisdiction of the original suit. A Faisla Salisi without a valid arbitration agreement does not qualify as an award under the Arbitration Act, 1940”.

Summary: If complainant being eye witness of the occurrence states in his examination-in-chief that he submitted the application for registration of case but takes absolute somersault in cross-examination and denies submission of said application, then testimony of such witness who makes inconsistent statements on oath, cannot be relied rather to be kept out of consideration.