Summary: (a) Punjab Emergency Service Leave, Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 2007 --- Rr. 6(m) & 7 --- Unauthorized absence from duty --- Removal from service --- Validity --- Applicability of PEEDA Act, 2006. Petitioner, a regular employee (Fire Rescuer) of Rescue 1122, was removed from service for unauthorized absence without prior sanctioned leave. The department imposed removal under Rule 6(m) of the 2007 Rules. Held, the said rule merely prescribes deduction of one-fifth of salary for absence without permission and does not envisage the penalty of dismissal or removal. For regular employees, such as the petitioner, disciplinary proceedings including removal must be initiated under Rule 7 of the Rules read with the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (PEEDA), which allows for major penalties in cases of proven misconduct. The impugned removal order was, therefore, illegal and without lawful authority. Cited case: Faisal Mehboob Khan v. Chief Secretary Punjab (2018 PLC (C.S.) 216) (b) Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 --- S. 2(n)(vii) --- Misconduct --- Absence from duty --- Willful absence --- Determination --- Compelling circumstances. Absence due to arrest in a criminal case registered under Ss. 302/148/149, P.P.C., and incarceration for over five years, followed by acquittal, cannot be deemed a willful absence. Held, unauthorized absence is not always deliberate or intentional; it may arise from circumstances beyond the employee’s control. Departmental authorities are obligated to examine the element of willfulness before imposing any penalty. In the present case, the department failed to inquire into or determine whether the petitioner’s absence was willful, despite his justified explanation based on incarceration. Hence, removal from service was disproportionate and unsustainable in law. Cited cases: Ijaz Akbar v. Director General (Ext.), Punjab (2024 PLC (C.S.) 129) Muhammad Sardar Khan v. Senior Member, Board of Revenue (1985 SCMR 1062) — distinguished (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 --- Art. 199 --- Constitutional jurisdiction --- Judicial review of disciplinary orders --- Standard of review --- Principle of proportionality. Court held that judicial review of disciplinary action involves assessing whether punishment imposed is proportionate to the misconduct and whether relevant considerations were properly evaluated. An employer must act reasonably and consider the magnitude and circumstances of alleged misconduct. The doctrine of proportionality mandates that penalty be commensurate with the proven fault. In this case, removal from service was imposed without inquiry or consideration of compelling justification (incarceration), violating principles of fairness and proportionality. Impugned orders were accordingly set aside and reinstatement ordered. (d) Service law --- Delay in departmental appeal --- Justification --- Effect. Appeal filed after over five years was not barred by limitation where the delay was caused due to incarceration in a criminal case. Petitioner had not relied upon acquittal for reinstatement but only as a factual justification for his prolonged absence and delay in pursuing remedies. Held, delay was satisfactorily explained and could not form the basis for rejection of appeal without considering merits. Disposition: Petition allowed. Removal orders set aside. Petitioner reinstated in service. Department to decide quantum of back benefits within three months in light of proportionality.

Summary: Javed Iqbal, the respondent, was employed as a Bio-Medical Engineer on a contract basis with the Punjab Employees Social Security Institution (PESSI), Lahore, since 04.02.2009. His contract was extended periodically. However, unlike other contract employees, Iqbal was not regularized. He filed Writ Petition, during which he was granted interim relief that his services would not be terminated until further notice. Despite this, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him under the Punjab Employees, Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006, leading to his suspension and eventually dismissal from service on 05.05.2021. His departmental appeal against the dismissal was rejected on 21.03.2022. --- The main issue was whether the disciplinary actions taken against the respondent, leading to his dismissal and the subsequent rejection of his appeal, were justifiable in light of the interim relief granted by the High Court and the procedural and substantive aspects of his employment and dismissal --- The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, affirming the Lahore High Court's judgment that reinstated Javed Iqbal with all back benefits and directed the consideration of his regularization. ---The Supreme Court found no irregularity or perversity in the High Court's judgments. It noted that the allegations against Iqbal regarding poor performance and misconduct were not substantiated by evidence, as his performance evaluations from 2009 to 2020 were satisfactory. The Court also highlighted the mala fide intentions of the petitioners, evidenced by the timing of the disciplinary actions, which were initiated after Iqbal had sought legal redress. Furthermore, the Court observed that the High Court had thoroughly addressed all legal and factual aspects of the case. --- The judgment underscores the importance of fair and transparent disciplinary proceedings, especially when an employee is under the protection of interim relief granted by a court. It also emphasizes the need for employers to substantiate allegations against employees with clear and convincing evidence. --- This case reaffirms the judiciary's role in protecting employee rights against arbitrary and unjust disciplinary actions, particularly in the context of contractual employment within public institutions. It also highlights the need for administrative bodies to act in good faith and adhere to the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.

Summary: ''Discussion: (1) Dishonest investigation (2) Section 166, 375, 376 & 511 P.P.C. (3) Role of I.O. (4) Section 4 (l) Cr.P.C. read with Rule 25.2 of the Police Rules, 1934 (5) Section 22 of the Anti-Rape (Investigation and Trial) Act, 2021 (6) Rule 2 (v) of the Sindh Police (E & D) Rules, 1988 (7) Article 4 & 155 of Police Order 2002.'' --- Facts: The petitioner, a Sub-Inspector in the Investigation Wing of Police Station Mominabad, District West, Karachi, was assigned to investigate a rape case involving a minor victim. The petitioner was alleged to have improperly reduced the charge from rape to attempted rape despite substantial evidence confirming the rape, including medical reports and eyewitness accounts. This led to the issuance of a show cause notice, and subsequently, the petitioner was dismissed from service. The departmental appeal and subsequent appeal to the Sindh Service Tribunal were both dismissed.----Issue: The main issue was whether the disciplinary action taken against the petitioner, including his dismissal from service for allegedly converting a rape charge to an attempted rape charge in the investigation, was justified.----Holding: The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the petitioner was justified based on the overwhelming evidence indicating misconduct in the investigation. The court found no illegality or perversity in the judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his dismissal.----Reasoning: The court emphasized the crucial role of an Investigation Officer in the criminal justice system and the need for conducting investigations with integrity, impartiality, and in accordance with the law. Given the clear medical evidence and eyewitness accounts establishing the commission of rape, the court found no justification for the petitioner's decision to alter the charge. The court also highlighted the importance of discipline and integrity in the police force and upheld the disciplinary action as being conducted in compliance with due process.----Disposition: The Civil Petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused, thereby upholding the disciplinary action against the petitioner, including his dismissal from service. The court's findings were limited to the disciplinary action and did not affect ongoing proceedings related to the original FIR in the rape case, which was to be decided on its own merits and in accordance with the law.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, a sanitary worker employed by the City District Government Rawalpindi, was dismissed from service while incarcerated in a criminal case under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. The petitioner was accused of being absent from duty and dismissed following departmental proceedings. After release from jail under Section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the petitioner unsuccessfully applied for reinstatement. His subsequent grievance petition and appeal were dismissed by the Punjab Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, respectively. The petitioner challenged these decisions in the Lahore High Court. -----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner was properly served with show cause notices during his incarceration. -----2- Whether the show cause notices issued under outdated E&D Rules, 2000, affected the validity of the dismissal. -----3- Whether the petitioner’s dismissal complied with the principles of due process and law. -----4- Whether the petitioner’s release under Section 249 Cr.P.C. entitled him to reinstatement in service. -----5- Whether the decisions of the Labour Court and Labour Appellate Tribunal were sustainable. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Improper Service: The court held that the petitioner was not properly served with the show cause notices, as no attempt was made to serve them through the jail superintendent while the petitioner was incarcerated. This violated established legal principles regarding service to imprisoned individuals. --Invalid Legal Basis: The notices were issued under the outdated E&D Rules, 2000, which were no longer in effect at the time. This procedural defect rendered the subsequent dismissal proceedings flawed. --Violation of Due Process: The Labour Court's reliance on suppositions rather than evidence and its failure to consider the absence of proper service undermined the dismissal's legality. --Reinstatement Eligibility: The petitioner’s release under Section 249 Cr.P.C., even if not an acquittal, did not preclude him from seeking reinstatement. The departmental proceedings lacked procedural fairness and therefore could not stand. --Remand for Reconsideration: The High Court set aside the decisions of the Labour Court and Labour Appellate Tribunal and remitted the matter for reconsideration, instructing the Labour Court to decide afresh based on all relevant legal and factual considerations. -----Citations/Precedents: PIRIDNO and another v. Khurshid Begum, 1989 SCMR 880: Established the principle of proper service for incarcerated individuals. Niaz Muhammad v. Abdul Rehman, PLD 2015 Peshawar 90: Clarified the procedural requirements for substituted service. Muhammad Aslam v. Government of NWFP, 1998 PLC (C.S.) 1430: Held that employees acquitted or released due to lack of evidence are entitled to reinstatement. Tanveer Hussain v. Raviryan Limited, 2007 SCMR 737. Azizullah Memon v. Province of Sindh, 2007 SCMR 229. Khurrum Rasheed v. Secretary to Government of Punjab, 2017 PLC (C.S.) Note 110. Ghazi Khan Vehicle Driver v. Director General Agriculture Research Office, 2019 PLC (C.S.) Note-39.

Summary: (a) Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977: ----S. 7(3)(d)---Eligibility for promotion---Requirement of regular service---Misrepresentation regarding length of service---Effect. The appellant challenged the rejection of his candidature for the Section Officers Promotional Examination, 2016 (SOPE-2016) by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC), arguing that he had completed the required eight years of regular service. However, the FPSC rejected his application due to the non-issuance of a valid Departmental Permission Certificate (DPC) and misrepresentation of his service record. The appellant had been dismissed from service from 10.10.2012 to 08.11.2017, a period that was only later converted into “on-duty” through an office order dated 06.06.2023. The court held that the appellant did not meet the eligibility criteria at the time of applying for SOPE-2016 and had concealed material facts in his application. (b) Service Law: ----Dismissal from service---Concealment of material facts in FPSC application---Validity of candidature. The appellant was dismissed from service on 10.10.2012 due to misconduct, and his appeal was dismissed at various stages until the Supreme Court set aside his dismissal on procedural grounds. After reinstatement, he faced fresh disciplinary proceedings, culminating in a penalty of stoppage of increments for two years. The court observed that at the time of applying for SOPE-2016, the appellant was not in service but misrepresented his service record, stating that he had continuously served from 2008 to 2016. The court held that misrepresentation in an application for a competitive examination is a serious offense and disqualifies the candidate from consideration. (c) Administrative Law: ----FPSC discretion in evaluating candidate eligibility---Misstatement in application---Judicial review. The FPSC has the authority to assess the eligibility of candidates based on the criteria set in the advertisement and rules governing the examination. The court found that the appellant's application contained material misstatements regarding his length of service, and the FPSC was justified in rejecting his candidature. Since the appellant failed to disclose his dismissal, the FPSC’s decision to reject his review petition was neither arbitrary nor illegal. The court ruled that judicial interference in FPSC decisions is unwarranted unless there is a clear violation of law or due process, which was not established in the present case. (d) Civil Service Rules & Conduct: ----Requirement of Departmental Permission Certificate (DPC)---Withdrawal of DPC and its legal consequences. The appellant initially failed to obtain a DPC due to his ineligibility and later secured one from NH&MP, West Zone, Quetta, without disclosing his prior dismissal and the FPSC’s previous rejection of his candidature. Upon discovering this misrepresentation, NH&MP withdrew the DPC. The court held that without a valid DPC, the appellant was not eligible for SOPE-2016, and FPSC was correct in rejecting his application. The withdrawal of the DPC further reinforced the appellant’s ineligibility, rendering his claim baseless. (e) Judicial Review of FPSC Decisions: ----Scope of interference in recruitment and promotion decisions---Principles of fairness and good faith. The court reiterated that judicial review in service matters is limited to ensuring that decisions are made in accordance with law and due process. The appellant's misrepresentation and lack of required service at the relevant time justified the FPSC’s decision. The court dismissed the appeal with costs, holding that the appellant’s actions resulted in unnecessary litigation that could have been avoided with truthful disclosure. ----Disposition: Appeal dismissed with costs. FPSC’s decision upheld.

Summary: Background:Ghansham Das, the petitioner, was appointed as an Assistant Composite Wood Officer in the Pakistan Forest Institute, Peshawar (PFIP) in 2008. Due to security threats, he was transferred to various departments on deputation basis. After the devolution of powers in 2010, PFIP was transferred to the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Despite several attempts to repatriate Das, he remained in his current position. Subsequently, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him for alleged absenteeism, leading to his removal from service.---Issues:Whether the disciplinary action against the petitioner was justified.Whether the time limit for filing the service appeal was adhered to.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the judgment of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal. The tribunal's decision was deemed legally sound and well-reasoned. It concluded that there were no substantial legal questions warranting intervention by the Supreme Court. The court also noted that the petitioner failed to adhere to the prescribed time limit for filing the service appeal, rendering it time-barred. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.---Citations/Precedents:Khan v. Chief Engineer (1998 SCMR 2419)Aslam Warraich v. Secretary, Planning and Development Division (1991 SCMR 2330)Pakistan v. Fazal-ur-Rehman (PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 82)Ashraf Khan Mad v. Chairman, Board of Governors Allama Iqbal Medical College (2003 PLC (C.S.) 243)Dr. Shah-ur-Rehman Afridi v. C.D.A (2010 SCMR 378)S. Masood Abbas Rizvi v. Federation of Pakistan (2014 SCMR 799)

Summary: Facts: The petitioner, Muhammad Yaseen, was employed as an ASI in the Anti Narcotics Force (ANF). On February 3, 2016, he was charged with unlawfully taking an amount of Rs. 103,000 from a civilian, Khalid Mehmood, during an ANF operation. Following an inquiry, Yaseen was dismissed from service based on the recommendations. His departmental appeal was rejected, as was his subsequent appeal to the Federal Service Tribunal in Lahore.---Issue: The primary issue was whether the dismissal of Muhammad Yaseen from service was justified, especially in light of the leniency shown towards his co-accused on similar charges.---Decision: The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and set aside the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal to the extent of the petitioner. It directed that the petitioner be treated similarly to his co-accused by awarding a minor penalty instead of dismissal.---Reasoning: The Court found that the petitioner's case was not distinguishable from his co-accused, who were given minor penalties. Dismissing the petitioner while giving leniency to others was seen as discriminatory. The Court also considered the petitioner's long and unblemished service record and the fact that he had reached retirement age during the proceedings.---Order: The Court ordered that if the petitioner's retirement date had passed, he should be awarded all pensionary benefits he is entitled to within two months.

Summary: (a) Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 (as amended by the Act of 2022) ----Ss. 2(h), 4(4)(ii)(a), 4(4)(ii)(c), 6; read with Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013, Ss. 10 & 11; Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Rules, 2013, R.5 Sexual harassment—Definition—“Unwelcome” element—Power imbalance—Standard on appeal—Departmental inquiry—The definition in S.2(h)(i) requires that sexual advances/communication be “unwelcome”; inquiry record disclosed mixed interactions and certain inconsistencies in the complainant’s narration, yet also showed impropriety and sexually inappropriate exchanges—In hierarchical settings, even apparent “consent” may be mediated by power disparity; the senior bears a heightened duty to maintain zero-tolerance norms—On appeal under S.6, the Ombudsperson may re-appraise the material and tailor the penalty to proportionality, keeping in view mitigating and aggravating factors. (b) Departmental inquiry—Due process and procedure ----R.5 of the 2013 Rules; S.4 of the 2010 Act—Allegations of bias, denial of cross-examination, and failure to entertain counter-complaint—Inquiry committee’s process examined—No cogent material proved bias—Counter-complaint was considered in the inquiry findings; however, aspects of procedure (questionnaire method; incomplete exploration of “unwelcome” element) attracted appellate scrutiny but did not vitiate the entire proceedings. (c) Evidence—Circumstantial indicators vs. “unwelcome” requirement ----WhatsApp exchanges, travel conduct, gifts/selfies, and witness accounts—Committee itself recorded contradictions and engagement from both sides; charge of seeking sexual favours by misuse of position was not proved; explicit in-flight conversation and late-night tea incidents lacked independent corroboration—Nevertheless, overall conduct fell short of standards expected from a senior officer vis-à-vis a junior colleague, attracting liability under S.2(h). (d) Service law—Penalty—Proportionality ----S.4(4)(ii)—When record reveals mitigating factors (no prior harassment record; reciprocal communications; cordial conduct contemporaneously; committee’s own exclusions of key charges), the major penalty of “removal from service” [S.4(4)(ii)(c)] is harsh and disproportionate—Appropriate modification is to the major penalty in S.4(4)(ii)(a) (“reduction to a lower post/time-scale or to a lower stage in a time-scale”). (e) Institutional compliance—Zero tolerance framework ----Advisory directions—Department to adopt comprehensive anti-harassment policy; sensitize staff on prevention and complaint mechanisms; issue clear social-media usage rules for official/personal contexts; Head of Bureau to ensure strict compliance with zero-tolerance policy. (f) Appellate powers—Nature and scope ----S.6 of the 2010 Act (as amended); FOIRA, 2013—Ombudsperson may uphold findings of sexual harassment while recalibrating the sanction to meet the justice of the case, without remitting where record is sufficient for final disposition. (g) Disposition— Appeal partly allowed—Findings of sexual harassment under S.2(h) upheld; penalty of removal dated 02-03-2023 modified from S.4(4)(ii)(c) to S.4(4)(ii)(a), i.e., reduction to a lower post/time-scale or to a lower stage in a time-scale; zero-tolerance directions reiterated to the Head of Bureau.

Summary: [Effect of Departmental Inquiry in violation of E&D Rules. Powers of inquiry officer. Role of departmental representative. Article 10A of the Constitution. Vested right of cross examination under the E&D Rules. The Inquiry officer should be conversant with the applicable rules before conducting inquiry. The remand of matter cannot be claimed to rectify the lacunas or violation of rules in the inquiry proceedings by the inquiry officer] After reviewing the relevant rules and procedures, the Supreme Court finds that the inquiry was conducted in a slipshod manner. The Inquiry Officer did not adhere to the prescribed procedure, and no witnesses were called to support the allegations against the respondent. The Court emphasizes that a fair opportunity for cross-examination is essential to determine the credibility of witnesses and establish the truth. Based on these findings, the Supreme Court upholds the Tribunal's decision to convert the major penalty into a minor one and reinstate the respondent. The Court concludes that the inquiry was conducted in violation of the rules, denying the respondent his right to a fair trial. The judgment highlights the importance of following due process and ensuring the proper defense of the accused in disciplinary proceedings.

Summary: [The Court may judicially review the executive decision on the ground of proportionality and reasonableness. The petitioner (civil servant) without NOC travelled on five different passports by deceiving and impersonation as a businessman which is also an offence under Section 6 of the Passports Act, 1974. No latitude could be shown for conversion of penalty] The petitioner, Ijaz Badshah, challenged the notification of his dismissal from service by the Secretary of the Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan. The petitioner was accused of various misconducts, including unauthorized leave, traveling abroad without permission, and possessing multiple passports without departmental approval. The petitioner denied the allegations but did not participate in the inquiry. After an ex-parte inquiry, a dismissal order was passed. The petitioner requested the conversion of the dismissal into compulsory retirement, citing his mother's illness as the reason for traveling without permission. The court examined the gravity of the charges, the petitioner's conduct, and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. It concluded that the punishment of dismissal was proportionate and reasonable given the misconduct committed by the petitioner. The court found no illegality, perversity, or impropriety in the judgment and dismissed the petition.