Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- ----O.XVII, Rr.1(1) & 3 ---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.12---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell---Non-production of evidence despite several opportunities ---Dismissal of a suit for want of evidence ---Trend of granting 'last opportunity' then 'absolute last opportunity' deprecated by courts---Respondent No.1 (vendor) entered into an agreement to sell with the appellant (vendee)---Upon the vendor's refusal to execute the sale deed, the appellant filed a suit for specific performance---Despite numerous opportunities (thirty five in total; including five last and final opportunities), the appellant/vendee failed to produce complete evidence---The Trial Court dismissed the suit under O.XVII, R. 3, C.P.C. for want of evidence---The sole point for determination before the High Court was as to "whether the trial court rightly invoked the provision under O.XVII, R. 3 of C.P.C. to dismiss the suit for specific performance on account of the appellant's repeated failure to produce evidence despite being granted multiple opportunities, including final warnings"---Held: The record showed that the appellant/vendee was afforded with five last and final opportunities for production of his evidence and the adjournment was granted with costs and warning as to application of penal provision under O.XVII, R.3, CPC but even then the appellant/vendee failed to avail the same, which showed his adamant attitude towards the orders of the Trial Court---Trial Court used the discretion in favour of the appellant/vendee many a time by granting him adjournments for production of complete evidence but he failed to catch up to the said leniency shown to him by the Trial Court and even he himself did not jump into the witness box so as to record his statement---Such attitude of the appellant/vendee made it crystal clear as to how he had pursued his case and also showed his disobedience and indifferent demeanor towards the orders of the court; thus, such like indolent person could not seek favour of law, because law favours the vigilant and not the indolent---The impugned order, judgment and decree were passed with jurisdiction and were well within the parameters of law and the same were not interfered with by the High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under S.96 of C.P.C---Appeal being meritless, was dismissed, in circumstances. Rana Tanveer Khan v. Naseer-ud-Din and others 2015 SCMR 1401 rel. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- ---O.XVII Rr.1(1), (2) & 3 ---Non-production of evidence despite several opportunities---Dismissal of a suit for want of evidence---Practice of granting 'last opportunity' then 'absolute last opportunity' deprecated by courts---Powers of Trial Court to adjourn the case on sufficient grounds---Scope---Under Rule 1(1) of Order XVII, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the trial Court is vested with powers to adjourn the case on showing sufficient cause by either of the party and from time to time adjourn the hearing of the suit and R. 1(2) of the said Order empowers the Court seized of the matter to fix a day for further hearing of the suit subject to costs occasion by the adjournment ---In the present case, the Trial Court used the discretion in favour of the appellant many a time by granting him adjournments for production of complete evidence but he failed to catch up to the said leniency shown to him by the Trial Court and even he himself did not jump into the witness box so as to record his statement---The impugned order, judgment and decree dismissing the suit for want of evidence despite providing numerous opportunities were passed with jurisdiction and were well within the parameters of law and the same were not interfered with by the High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under S.96 of C.P.C. ---Appeal being meritless, was dismissed, in circumstances. Rana Tanveer Khan v. Naseer-ud-Din and others 2015 SCMR 1401 rel. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- ---O.XVII, Rr.1(1) & 3---Non-productionof evidence despite several opportunities---Dismissal of a suit for want of evidence---Trend of granting 'last opportunity' then 'absolute last opportunity' deprecated by courts---Duty of court for enforcing its order when last opportunity to comply with the same is granted---Scope---Prevailing pattern in the conduct of litigation in the lower courts of the country is heavily permeated with adjournments---What would otherwise be a quick trial, has become a lengthy, expensive time-consuming and frustrating process both for the litigant and the judicial system---While some adjournments are the consequences of force majeure, most are not---To cater for the later and to discourage misuse, the C.P.C. through O. XVII, R.3 has provided the court with a course of action that checks such abuse---It is important for the purpose of maintaining the confidence of the litigants in the court systems and the presiding officers that where last opportunity to produce evidence is granted and the party has been warned of consequences, the court must enforce its order unfailingly and unscrupulously without exception---Such order would not only put the system back on track and reaffirm the majesty of the law but also put a check on the trend of seeking multiple adjournments on frivolous grounds to prolong and delay proceedings without any valid or legitimate rhyme or reason---Where the court has passed an order granting the last opportunity, it has not only passed a judicial order but also made a promise to the parties to the lis that no further adjournments will be granted for any reason---The court must enforce its order and honor its promise---There is absolutely no room or choice to do anything else---The order to close the right to produce evidence must automatically follow failure to produce evidence despite last opportunity coupled with a warning---The trend of granting (Akhri Mouqa) then (Qatai Akhri Mouqa) and then (Qatai Qatai Akhri Mouqa) make a mockery of the provisions of law and those responsible to interpret and implement it and such practices must be discontinued. Rana Tanveer Khan v. Naseer-ud-Din and others 2015 SCMR 1401 and Moon Enterpriser CNG Station, Rawalpindi v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited through General Manager, Rawalpindi and another 2020 SCMR 300 rel. Muhammad Arslan Ayaz for Appellant. Zabih Ullah Nagra for Respondent No. 1. Sarfraz Akhtar for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Date of hearing: 3rd October, 2023. Judgment Shahid Bilal Hassan, J .--- The facts, in precision, are as such that the respondent No.1 being owner in possession of land measuring 38-Kanals, out of land measuring 303-Kanals 1-Marla, falling in Khewat No.64, Khatuni No.70, total 48-Qatas, Salam Khata of village Aasal Lakhowal, Tehsil Raiwind, District Lahore, entered into agreement to sell dated 11.02.2014 with the present appellant for a consideration of Rs.61,750,000/-, out of which Rs.32,000,000/- was paid by the appellant to the respondent No.1 whereas the remaining amount was to be paid at the time of execution of the sale deed. However, on refusal by the respondent No.1 to execute the sale deed, the appellant instituted suit for specific performance of agreement to sell against the respondents. The respondents Nos. 1 to 3 contested the suit by submitting written statement and also filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; however, the said application was dismissed by the learned trial Court on 24.02.2018. During pendency of the suit, the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 further alienated the suit property to the third party. The appellant filed an application under Order I, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but the same was dismissed on 12.06.2021. The appellant assailed the said order by filing C.R.No.40943 of 2021 before this Court, wherein further proceedings before the learned trial Court were stayed vide order dated 25.06.2021; however, on 24.02.2022, the revision petition of the appellant was dismissed by this Court. The proceedings in the suit were initiated and ultimately the suit of the appellant was dismissed for want of evidence while invoking jurisdiction under Order XVII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by the learned trial Court vide impugned judgment and decree dated 20.05.2022, which has culminated in filing of the appeal in hand. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the impugned judgment and decree is against law and facts of the case; that the same is based on biased approach and against the norms of legal procedure; that on different dates the appellant produced the witnesses but on one pretext or the other their evidence could not be recorded; that the impugned judgment and decree lacks judicial wisdom, misapplication of judicious mind and misuse of power; that the learned trial Court has failed to construe law on the subject and has passed the impugned judgment and decree in a hasty manner, which has resulted in miscarriage of justice; therefore, the same is not sustainable in the eye of law and liable to be set aside by allowing the appeal in hand. 3. Naysaying the above submissions, the learned counsel representing the respondents have argued that the appellant failed to produce his complete set of evidence despite availing of many opportunities, counted as 35 in number, including more than five last and final opportunities; therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly exercised jurisdiction vested upon it under Order XVII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and has rightly non-suited the appellant. Prayer for dismissal of the appeal in hand has been made. 4. We have keenly and patiently heard learned counsel for the parties and with their able assistance have gone through the record. 5. Considering the arguments and perusing the record, made available, as well as going through the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, it becomes diaphanous and vivid that after framing of issues on 01.11.2018, on different dates the appellant/plaintiff was directed to produce his evidence, however, despite affording many opportunities he failed to produce his complete evidence and on 29.09.2020 only examined P.W.1 whereas cross- examination upon the said P.W. was not conducted as complete set of evidence was not produced by the appellant. On 15.10.2020, the appellant filed an application under Order I, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which was dismissed on 12.06.2021 by the learned trial Court. Revision petition before this Court was filed wherein proceedings before the learned trial Court were held in abeyance on 25.06.2021; however, the said revision petition was dismissed on 24.02.2022. On 20.05.2022, additional issue was framed on filing of application by the appellant. The record shows that the appellant was afforded with five last and final opportunities for production of his evidence i.e. on 03.01.2019, 06.01.20202, 22.09.2020, 25.04.2022 and 27.04.2022 the adjournment was granted with costs and warning as to application of penal provision under Order XVII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but even then the appellant failed to avail the same, which shows his adamant attitude towards the orders of the learned trial Court. Under Rule 1(1) of Order XVII, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the trial Court is vested with powers to adjourn the case on showing sufficient cause by either of the party and from time to time adjourn the hearing of the suit and Rule 1(2) of the said Order empowers the Court seized of the matter to fix a day for further hearing of the suit subject to costs occasion by the adjournment. For ready reference the said provision of law is reproduced as under:- '1. Court may grant time and adjourn hearing. (1) The Court may, if sufficient cause is shown, at any stage of the suit grant time to the parties or to any of them, and may from time to time adjourn the hearing of the suit. (2). Costs of adjournment. In every such case the Court shall fix a day for the further hearing of the suit, and may make such order as it thinks fits with respect to the costs occasion by the adjournment: Provided that, when the hearing of evidence has once begum, the hearing of the suit shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the hearing beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recoded.' In the present case, the learned trial Court used the discretion in favour of the appellant many a time by granting him adjournments for production of complete evidence but he failed to catch up the said leniency shown to him by the learned trial Court and even he himself did not jump into the witness box so as to record his statement. The above picture of affairs makes it crystal clear that how the appellant pursued his case and also shows his disobedience and indifferent demeanour towards the orders of the Court; thus, such like indolent person cannot seek favour of law, because law favours the vigilant and not the indolent. In this regard reliance is placed on judgment reported as Rana Tanveer Khan v. Naseer-Ud-Din and others (2015 SCMR 1401), wherein it has been unequivocally held:- '????? it is clear from the record that the petitioner had availed four opportunities to produce his evidence and in two of such dates (the last in the chain) he was cautioned that such opportunities granted to him at his request shall be that last one, but still on the day when his evidence was closed in terms of Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. no reasonable ground was propounded for the purposes of failure to adduce the evidence and justification for further opportunity, therefore, notwithstanding that these opportunities granted to the petitioner were squarely fell within the mischief of the provisions ibid and his evidence was rightly closed by the trial court. As far as the argument that at least his statement should have been recorded, suffice it to say that the eventuality in which it should be done has been elaborated in the latest verdict of this Court (2014 SCMR 637). From the record it does not transpire if the petitioner was present on the day when his evidence was closed and/or he asked the court to be examined; this has never been the case of the petitioner throughout the proceedings of his case at any stage; as there is no ground set out in the first memo of appeal or in the revision petition.' It was further held that:- '2. ? Be that as it may, once the case is fixed by the Court for recording the evidence of the party, it is the direction of the court to do the needful, and the party has the obligation to adduce evidence without there being any fresh direction by the court, however, where the party makes a request for adjourning the matter to a further date(s) for the purpose of adducing evidence and if it fails to do so, for such date(s), the provisions of Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. can attract, especially in the circumstances when adequate opportunities on the request of the party has been availed and caution is also issued on one of such a date(s), as being the last opportunity(ies).' While affirming the above said view, the Apex Court of country in a judgment reported as Moon Enterpriser CNG Station, Rawalpindi v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited through General Manager, Rawalpindi and another (2020 SCMR 300) has invariably and vividly further held that:- '4. ????????? It is unfortunate that the prevailing pattern in the conduct of litigation in the Lower Courts of Pakistan is heavily permeated with adjournments which stretch, what would otherwise be a quick trial, into a lengthy, expensive time-consuming and frustrating process both for the litigant and the judicial system. While some adjournments are the consequences of force majeure, most are not. To cater for the later and to discourage misuse, the C.P.C. through Order XVII, Rule 3 has provided the Court with a curse of action that checks such abuse.' In the said judgment, it was further held:- '6. A bare reading of Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. and case law cited above clearly shows that for Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. to apply and the right of a party to produce evidence to be closed, the following conditions must have been met:- i. at the request of a party to the suit for the purpose of adducing evidence, time must have been granted with a specific warning that such opportunity will be the last and failure to adduce evidence would lead to closure of the right to produce evidence; and ii. the same party on the date which was fixed as last opportunity fails to produce its evidence. In our view it is important for the purpose of maintaining the confidence of the litigants in the court systems and the presiding officers that where last opportunity to produce evidence is granted and the party has been warned of consequences, the court must enforce its order unfailingly and unscrupulously without exception. Such order would in our opinion not only put the system back on track and reaffirm the majesty of the law but also put a check on the trend of seeking multiple adjournments on frivolous grounds to prolong and delay proceedings without any valid or legitimate rhyme or reason. Where the Court has passed an order granting the last opportunity, it has not only passed a judicial order but also made a promise to the parties to the lis that no further adjournments will be granted for any reason. The Court must enforce its order and honor its promise. There is absolutely no room or choice to do anything else. The order to close the right to produce evidence must automatically follow failure to produce evidence despite last opportunity coupled with a warning. The trend of granting (Akhri Mouqa) then (Qatai Akhri Mouqa) and then (Qatai Qatai Akhri Mouqa) make a mockery of the provisions of law and those responsible to interpret and implement it. Such practices must be discontinued, forthwith.' 6. In view of the above discussion and observations, when the impugned order, judgment and decree have been passed with jurisdiction and are well within the parameters of law as well as judgments referred above, the same cannot be interfered with at this stage by us in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 7. The crux of the above discussion and reasoning is that the appeal in hand being meritless comes to naught and the same stands dismissed. No order as to the costs. UN/R-11/L Appeal dismisse

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Petitioner seeks to set aside the impugned findings dated 29.03.2022 & decision on representation dated 28.03.2023.

Summary: Background: The petitioners sought relief against certain respondents alleged to have ousted them from the management of Tehzeb Bakers (Pvt.) Limited ("Tehzeb Bakers"), claiming a 20% partnership share in the business. The petitioners argued that Tehzeb Bakers, initially started by their predecessor in 1947 as SMILA Bakery, evolved through family business agreements but was fraudulently registered solely in the respondents' names without their consent. They sought declarations of ownership, cancellation of incorporation documents, financial disclosures, and a winding-up order. -----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioners have sufficient shareholding (10%) to invoke Section 286 of the Companies Act, 2017. -----2- Whether the petitioners are shareholders of Tehzeb Bakers with legal rights to the business as claimed. -----3- Whether the alleged fraudulent incorporation of Tehzeb Bakers was conducted in an unlawful or prejudicial manner under Section 286. -----4- Whether the petition is time-barred due to inaction by the petitioners over several years. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Shareholding Requirement: The court held that the petitioners did not fulfill the requirement of holding at least 10% of the company’s issued share capital, as necessary to pursue remedies under Section 286. The SECP’s records showed only respondents as shareholders, with no evidence of the petitioners holding or transferring shares. --Membership/Shareholder Status: The petitioners failed to establish their membership in Tehzeb Bakers. The court emphasized that membership requires inclusion in the Memorandum of Association and SECP records, which solely listed the respondents as directors and shareholders. --Allegations of Fraudulent Incorporation: The court found insufficient evidence to support the petitioners' claim that the respondents had fraudulently registered Tehzeb Bakers or managed the business unlawfully. The petitioners’ evidence, including partnership deeds, did not meet the statutory requirements to establish shareholder status or substantiate the fraud allegations. --Timeliness and Laches: The court dismissed the petition on the basis of laches, noting that the petitioners did not take timely action to contest the incorporation or assert their rights over a period of approximately ten years. The court stressed the importance of timely action in corporate disputes, especially when alternate forums and SECP resources were available but not utilized by the petitioners. -----Citations/Precedents: GOVERNMENT OF SINDH v. NIZAKAT ALI (2011 SCMR 592) FAUJI FOUNDATION v. SHAMIMUR REHMAN (PLD 1983 SC 457) M/s MANDVIWALLA BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS AND MANGLA VIEW RESORT (PVT.) LIMITED v. M. AWAIS SHEIKH CEO MANGLA VIEW RESORT AND MANGLA GARRISON HOUSING (PVT.) LIMITED (2023 CLD 885 Lahore) NADEEM KIANI v. M/s AMERICAN LYCETUFF PVT LIMITED (2021 CLD 7) ABDULLAH KHAN USMANI v. SECP (2022 CLD 821)

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, challenging an order dated 18.07.2023 by the Judicial Magistrate, who had agreed with a cancellation report under Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) for an FIR registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) in relation to cheque dishonor. The cancellation report was initially prepared by the investigating officer and subsequently submitted without an independent opinion by the Superintendent of Police (SP), violating procedural requirements under Rule 24.7 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. -----Issues: 1- Whether the cancellation report, forwarded without an independent opinion from the SP, complies with Rule 24.7 of the Punjab Police Rules. -----2- Whether the Magistrate’s decision to accept the cancellation report without hearing the complainant violated principles of natural justice. -----3- What procedural guidelines should be followed in future cases involving cancellation reports. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Compliance with Rule 24.7: The court held that Rule 24.7 requires an SP to apply independent judgment before forwarding a cancellation report, ensuring procedural safeguards against arbitrary dismissals. The SP admitted that no independent opinion was furnished, thus breaching this rule. --Violation of Audi Alteram Partem: The Magistrate’s failure to hear the complainant before accepting the cancellation report contravened the principle of audi alteram partem, a fundamental principle of natural justice requiring that all parties be allowed to present their case. The court emphasized that this principle applies to judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative proceedings to ensure fair-mindedness. --Non-compliance with Rule 25.57: The investigating officer failed to inform the complainant about the cancellation report’s conclusions, as required by Rule 25.57, which mandates notifying the complainant and obtaining their signature or thumb impression. --Guidelines for Future Proceedings: The court established specific guidelines to be followed in future cancellations of criminal cases: Investigating officers must inform the complainant and secure their signature or thumb impression on the report. Reports under Section 173 CrPC must reflect compliance with Rule 25.57. The SP must provide an independent opinion with every cancellation report. Prosecutors must not forward reports lacking the SP’s endorsement and should add their opinion. Magistrates should issue notices to all parties for a fair hearing before deciding on a cancellation report. -----Citations/Precedents: Ehsan Ullah Chaudhry vs. The State, etc. – PLD 2023 Lahore 233 Chief Commissioner, Karachi vs. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrak – PLD 1959 SC 45 Justice Qazi Faez Isa vs. President of Pakistan – PLD 2022 SC 119 Hazara Improvement Trust vs. Qaisra Elahi – 2005 SCMR 678 Mrs. Anisa Rehman vs. PIAC – 1994 SCMR 2232

Summary: Difference in Statements recorded under Sections: 154 & 161 Cr.P.C. (Statement immediately got recorded to the police after the occurrence by the complainant though suppressed and not brought on record is the First Information Report in terms of Section: 154 Cr.P.C. and subsequent application filed by the complainant for registration of case can be termed as statement under Section: 161 Cr.P.C. though F.I.R. was recorded on the basis of said application).

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Pending