Summary: Chapter XI of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 deals with the partition of the joint land. Section 147 of the Act ibid provides a mechanism for affirmation of partitions privately effected. This provision clearly manifests that if a party pleads some private partition effected under some family settlement with regard to partition of joint land, he has to apply to the revenue officer obtaining an order for affirmation of such partition. In other words in absence of any order of affirmation in terms of Section 147 of the "Act, 1967" party relying upon private partition would be precluded to claim any right thereunder. It would not be out of context to mention here that Chapter 18 of the Land Record Manual provides a procedure in partition cases and clause 18.1 especially deals with private partitions. Guidance in this respect can be sought from MUHAMMAD MUKHTAR and others versus MUHAMMAD SHARIF and others (2007 SCMR 1867) and Mst. WALAYAT BEGUM and 3 others versus MUHAMMAD AFSAR and 3 others (2014 CLC 1103).

Summary: Background:Masood Ahmad Bhatti, acting as the general attorney for Najeeb Ahmed Bhatti, sold a property known as "Najeeb Plaza" to Khan Badshah based on an agreement to sell dated 26.01.2017. The plaza was located in Sector 1-9 Markaz, Islamabad, with a total sale consideration of Rs.80,000,000/-. Part of the consideration was paid through a pay order, and the remaining amount was to be paid upon transfer of the plaza to Khan Badshah. Despite efforts, including an extension of the agreement, Khan Badshah failed to obtain a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the Capital Development Authority (CDA) for the transfer.---Issues:Whether Khan Badshah fulfilled his obligations under the agreement to sell.Whether Masood Ahmad Bhatti and Najeeb Ahmed Bhatti unlawfully refused to accept the remaining sale consideration from Khan Badshah, thereby breaching the agreement.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that Khan Badshah had fulfilled his commitments under the agreement by tendering the payment and attempting to fulfill the remaining conditions, including obtaining the necessary NOC. The court found that Masood Ahmad Bhatti and Najeeb Ahmed Bhatti unlawfully refused to accept the remaining sale consideration, even though Khan Badshah demonstrated his readiness and capability to pay through pay orders. As a result, the court dismissed the petition and declined leave to appeal.---Citations/Precedents:Muhammad Abdul Rehman Qureshi vs. Sagheer Ahmad (2017 SCMR 1696)Mattik Imam Paktish vs. Muhammad Saqheer Bakhsh (2017 SCMR 516)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan- (b) Constitution of Pakistan- -Arts. 16, 17(2), 19 & 188-Judgment passed by the Supreme Court in respect of Islamabad-Rawalpindi sit-in protest/dharna by members of a religious political party ('the Judgment')-Review petitions challenging said Judgment not fixed for hearing for almost five years-Manipulation in the Supreme Court-In the present case, review petitions and applications were filed in early 2019 but were not fixed for several years-In the interim the other signatory to the Judgment retired-Concerned officers of the Supreme Court submitted a report in this regard-Perusal of said report showed the manipulation resorted to in the Supreme Court by not fixing the review petitions and applications-To set an example for others to follow, the Supreme Court acknowledged the manipulation resorted to in the Supreme Court by not fixing the said petitions and applications-Supreme Court observed that it endeavoured to regain the confidence of the people by acknowledging this, and would be demonstrating that the mistakes of the past will not be repeated; that lack of trust in public institutions engendered autocracy and threatened democracy, and that if individuals began to overshadow the institutions they worked in, they caused irreparable harm, diminished their institution, and rendered them as their alter ego.

Summary: POTTER-Respondent Decided on 15th November, 2023. Limitation- -Loan agreement and related payment protection insurance policy (-PPI policy-) between claimant and commercial lender (defendant)-Lender receiving secret commission and failing to disclose fact and extent of commission payment-Breach of duty by defendant-Concealment of facts-Whether commencement of limitation period for claimant’s statutory remedy would be postponed on the basis that facts were-deliberately concealed-by defendant; whether non-disclosure of commission amounted to concealment, and whether recklessness sufficient to establish requisite mental element of deliberateness-Held, that claimants can bring PPI policy-unfair commission-claims against banks, even after the usual six-year time limit has passed, if the bank has-deliberately concealed-facts essential to the pleading of a claim, which meant that the claimant was unable to bring proceedings within the usual time limit-In this regard, the term-deliberate concealment-means that the bank has kept a secret from the claimant, either by taking active steps to hide it or by failing to disclose it-Words-deliberately-and-concealed-must be given their ordinary meanings-To conceal means to keep something secret, either by taking active steps to hide it, or by failing to disclose it-Addition of the word-deliberately-meant that the concealment must be an intended concealment, whether by positive steps or by a withholding of information, but in either case, where the concealment was an intended result-Recklessness was not sufficient-Nor was a mere failure to disclose, unless that failure was a deliberate breach of a legal duty owed by the defendant to the claimant-Existence and amount of the commission were facts that the claimant in the present case needed to know to bring her claim and, as she did not find out about the commission earned by the defendant until shortly before she issued her claim, her claim was brought in time-Claimant’s claim was not time barred because section 32(1)(b) of the Limitation Act, 1980 postponed the commencement of the six-year limitation period until November 2018, when the claimant was advised that the premium was likely to have included substantial commission-Defendant had deliberately concealed those facts by consciously deciding not to tell her about the commission-However, the defendant’s conduct did not amount to a-deliberate commission of a breach of duty-for the purposes of section 32(2) of the Limitation Act 1980, as the defendant did not intend its failure to disclose the commission to the claimant to render their relationship unfair within the meaning of section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974-Claimant had succeeded in extending the time limit (for her claim) by virtue of section 32(1)(b) of the Limitation Act, 1980-Defendant’s appeal was dismissed. The Limitation Act 1980 (-the 1980 Act-) sets out the time limits (or limitation periods) for bringing different kinds of legal claims. Section 32(1)(b) postpones the commencement of the ordinary limitation period where any fact relevant to the claimant’s right of action has been-deliberately concealed-from them by the defendant. Section 32(2) provides that, for the purposes of section 32(1), -deliberate commission of a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time amounts to deliberate concealment of the facts involved in that breach of duty.- In 2006 the claimant-lady entered into a loan agreement with the defendant company, which was a commercial lender. The agreement was a pre-printed standard form prepared by the defendant and signed by both parties, and was a credit agreement within the meaning of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 as amended (‘the 1974 Act’). It stated that the total amount of credit was £20,787.24, made up of a cash amount of £16,953.00 and a payment protection premium of £3,834.24. The premium related to the claimant’s purchase of a payment protection insurance policy (‘the PPI policy’). The loan was repayable in instalments over a period of 54 months. As well as being a commercial lender, the defendant was also an insurance intermediary. Over 95% of the amount described in the agreement as the PPI premium constituted the defendant’s commission on the PPI policy. The sum paid to the insurer was only £182.50. The Defendant did not inform the claimant that it would receive or retain commission on the policy (commission was paid at a rate of >95% of the PPI premium). The claimant completed the payments under the agreement early, and the agreement came to an end on 8 March 2010. In 2018 the claimant complained to the defendant that the PPI policy had been mis-sold to her. She received compensation in accordance with a redress scheme established by the Financial Conduct Authority for the mis-selling of PPI policies. She subsequently consulted solicitors and proceedings were issued against the defendant, seeking recovery of the sums paid by her, under the terms of the PPI Policy. The defendant argued that the claim was statute barred, as the limitation period of 6 years imposed by section 9 of the Limitation Act 1980, had expired. The claimant sought to rely on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, arguing that the six year limitation period did not begin to run until she had discovered the commission being paid to the defendant and that only took place in 2018. At first instance, the County Court decided that section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980 applied and gave judgment in the claimant’s favour. The defendant appealed, unsuccessfully, to both the High Court and to the Court of Appeal. A claimant who wishes to rely on the defence under section 32(1)(b) of the Limitation Act, 1980 must prove that there was a fact relevant to the claimant’s right of action, which was deliberately concealed from him/her by the defendant. With regard to the meaning of-concealed-, a fact will have been concealed if the defendant has kept it secret from the claimant, either by taking active steps to hide it or by failing to disclose it. The claimant does not need to establish that the defendant was under a legal, moral or social duty to disclose the fact, nor does he/she need to show that the defendant knew the fact was relevant to the claimant’s right of action. All that is required is that the defendant deliberately ensures that the claimant does not know about the fact in question and so cannot bring proceedings within the ordinary time limit. Coming to the meaning of-deliberately-, the defendant’s concealment of a relevant fact will be deliberate if the defendant intended to conceal the fact in question. The Court of Appeal’s finding that-deliberately-can also mean-recklessly-in this context is incorrect. AIC Ltd v ITS Testing Services (UK) Ltd (The Kriti Palm) [2006] EWCA Civ 1601; [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 667 disapproved. Cave v Robinson Jarvis & Rolf [2002] UKHL 18; [2003] 1 AC 384 ref. The existence and amount of defendant’s commission on the PPI policy were facts which were relevant to claimant’s right of action under section 140A of the 1974 Act, since she could not plead her case without knowing them. The defendant deliberately concealed these facts from the claimant by consciously deciding not to tell her about the commission. Section 140A was not in force when the defendant initially decided not to disclose the commission. However, the defendant continued to withhold the information from the claimant after section 140A was brought into force, even though the agreement between the claimant and defendant remained in force and the commission continued to be paid. The claimant did not find out about the commission until November 2018, shortly before she issued her claim against the defendant. It was not suggested that, with reasonable diligence, she could have discovered the concealment any earlier. Therefore, the requirements of section 32(1)(b) of the 1980 Act were met. The claimant’s claim against the defendant was not time barred, because section 32(1)(b) of the 1980 Act postponed the commencement of the ordinary six-year limitation period for bringing her claim until November 2018. The Court of Appeal concluded that the creation of an unfair relationship within the meaning of section 140A of the 1974 Act amounted to a breach of duty by the defendant for the purposes of section 32(2) of the 1980 Act. Question was whether such breach of duty was deliberate. A claimant who wishes to rely on section 32(2) of the 1980 Act must show that the defendant knew it was committing a breach of duty or intended to commit a breach of duty. Supreme Court rejected the submission that-deliberate-includes-reckless-so that a defendant could be said to commit a breach of duty deliberately if it realised that there was a risk that what it was doing might be a breach of duty and took that risk in circumstances where it was objectively unreasonable for it to do so, for four reasons. First, -deliberate-and-reckless-have different ordinary meanings and are used to mean different things in both judicial decisions and legislation. Secondly, the case law supports the view that that recklessness was not sufficient to establish a deliberate breach of duty for the purposes of section 32(2). Thirdly, section 32 should not be construed as a restatement of the old law of concealed fraud. Fourthly, interpreting-deliberate-to include-reckless-would be likely to result in practical problems. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, it had not been shown that the defendant knew or intended that its failure to disclose the commission to the claimant would render their relationship unfair within the meaning of section 140A of the 1974 Act. Accordingly, the defendant’s breach of duty was not deliberate, meaning that the claimant could not rely on section 32(2) of the 1980 Act to postpone the commencement of the ordinary six-year limitation period for bringing her claim. Grace v Black Horse Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1413; [2015] Bus LR 1; [2015] 3 All ER 223 and Primeo Fund v Bank of Bermuda (Cayman) Ltd (-Primeo-) [2019] CICA JO613-1 ref. The claimant had succeeded in extending the time limit (for her claim) by virtue of section 32(1)(b) of the Limitation Act, 1980, Defendant’s appeal was dismissed. Dates of hearing: 14th and 15th June, 2022.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Held that in relation to the formal decision making processes concerning recruitment and selection, possibility that potential conflict of interest may arise cannot be ruled out. Integrity of a selection panel like the Departmental Selection Committee (DSC) vested with power to award marks in interview matters a lot and it is expected that if any conflict of interest arises, the disclosure is made and such member of the selection committee should recuse from proceeding further in order to lend credence and maintain transparency and public confidence in recruitment process, let alone heading the DSC as it happened in the instant case. Appointment of respondent No.6, who was son of the Chairman of the DSC, was set aside as admittedly respondent No.3 never disclosed said conflict of interest and had not recused from the selection process.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: As already observed that initially respondent moved an application to respondent No.7 which was founded on general and bald allegations and the petitioner was even not named in the said application as perpetrator of the alleged offence. On receipt of petition under Section 22-A/22-B of the "Cr.P.C." Ex-Officio Justice of Peace requisitioned report from the police wherein it is mentioned that the dispute interse petitioner and "respondent" is relatable to land and no such incident as reported by the "respondent" has taken place. It is trite law that functions performed by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace under Section 22-A of the Cr.P.C are quasi-judicial in nature and it cannot be termed as executive/administrative or ministerial. At the same time powers exercised by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace are neither unbridled nor indefinite. While exercising powers under Section 22-A(6) of the Cr.P.C the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace is not supposed to proceed mechanically and in vacuum. After requisitioning a report from the police, Ex-Officio Justice of Peace is not expected to brush aside such report without assigning any lawful reasoning. In the case of YOUNAS ABBAS and others versus ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE, CHAKWAL and others (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 581), while examining the scope of sub-section (6) of Section 22-A of the "Cr.P.C." the Supreme Court of Pakistan laid down certain guidelines for the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace.

Summary: Summary pending