Summary: Supreme Court of Pakistan's Landmark Ruling on Article 62(1)(f) --- Majority Decision Sets Aside Lifetime Disqualification, Establishing a Five-Year Limit --- The court declared that Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution is not self-executory and lacks clarity on the court responsible for making the mentioned declaration, the procedure for making it, and the duration of disqualification. --- It emphasized the absence of a law outlining the procedure for Article 62(1)(f) and highlighted the violation of the Fundamental Right to a fair trial and due process guaranteed by Article 10A. --- The court rejected the interpretation of Article 62(1)(f) that imposes a lifetime disqualification through an implied declaration of a civil court, considering it beyond the article's scope. --- The court ruled that until a law is enacted to make its provisions executable, Article 62(1)(f) serves as a guideline for voters, similar to other subsections of Article 62(1). ---- The court overturned the decision in Sami Ullah Baloch v Abdul Karim Nausherwani (PLD 2018 SC 405), stating that it amounted to reading into the Constitution and was therefore overruled. --- The court acknowledged Section 232(2) of the Elections Act, 2017, added through the Elections (Amendment) Act, 2023, which sets a five-year disqualification period and subjects the declaration to due process. --- As a result of these determinations, specific civil appeals and petitions were allowed, dismissed, or disposed of based on the individual circumstances of each case. The court also addressed withdrawal requests and de-listed certain cases for separate hearings. The order was announced on January 2024, with one judge dissenting on the interpretation of the duration of disqualification under Article 62(1)(f).

Summary: Background:In a landmark judgment, the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the scope and application of Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution, which pertains to the disqualification of members of the parliament. The case involved multiple appellants challenging the legality of their disqualification under this Article, particularly focusing on whether such disqualification should be considered lifetime based on decisions made by civil courts in matters concerning civil rights and obligations.---Issues:The central issue was the constitutionality and interpretation of Article 62(1)(f) regarding lifetime disqualification imposed by civil courts and whether such interpretations infringe upon fundamental rights, particularly the right to a fair trial and electoral participation under Articles 10A and 17 of the Constitution.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The majority of the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Qazi Faez Isa, held that Article 62(1)(f) was not self-executory and required explicit legal procedures to be established for its enforcement. The Court overruled the previous interpretation that allowed for lifetime disqualification based on civil court declarations concerning breaches of civil rights, stating this was a misreading of the Constitution. It was emphasized that until a specific law is enacted detailing the process and implications of such disqualifications, Article 62(1)(f) should only serve as a guideline for voters.Article 62(1)(f) does not specify the court responsible for issuing disqualifications nor outline the process and duration.There is no existing law that meets the requirements of Article 10A for a fair trial in the context of disqualification under Article 62(1)(f).The imposition of a lifetime disqualification by civil courts on this basis is beyond the scope of Article 62(1)(f) and infringes on fundamental electoral rights.The Supreme Court also noted that Section 232(2) of the Elections Act, 2017, as amended, provides a five-year period for such disqualifications, aligning them with due process requirements.----Citations/Precedents:Sami Ullah Baloch v. Abdul Karim Nausherwani, PLD 2018 SC 405: This case was explicitly overruled for extending lifetime disqualifications based on civil court declarations under Article 62(1)(f).Elections Act, 2017, Section 232(2): Amended to define the duration of disqualifications imposed under Article 62(1)(f) as five years.---Dissenting Opinion:Justice Yahya Afridi dissented, arguing that disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) should not be viewed as lifelong or permanent but should only last as long as the legal declaration that supports the disqualification remains in effect. He supported the legal validity of the earlier decision in Sami Ullah Baloch.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)--- ----Ss. 60(10), 62(9)(ii), 63 & 140---Nomination of candidate to contest General Elections, rejection of---Tax liability, defect of---Curable or substantial?---Appellant (candidate) filed election appeal against rejection of his nomination by the Returning Officer due to being defaulter of FBR tax liability---Submission of the appellant was that he was unaware of the amount due and as per S. 60(10) of the Elections Act, 2017 ('the Act 2017') if a candidate deposits any amount of loan, tax, or government dues and utility expenses payable by him of which he is unaware at the time of filing of his nomination paper, his nomination paper shall not be rejected on the ground of default in payment of such loan (his outstanding Tax liability)---Objection raised against the appellant was that defect-in-question was not a curable one within the ambit of liability the same was actually substantial---Question whether reasons assigned by the Returning Officer were substantial or curable under S. 62(9)(ii) of the Act 2017---Held, that record revealed that when the appellant filed nomination papers there was no liability on his part vide a relevant letter, however, subsequently another letter showed that there was outstanding tax liability on the part of the appellant---These two contradictory letters were confusing as the appeal against the scrutiny order passed by the Returning Officer was of a summary nature, as Election Appellate Tribunal can pass an order within the specified period, thereafter, the proceedings stand abated and the order of the Returning Officer is deemed to have become final as under S. 63 of the Elections Act, 2017 no fact-finding inquiry is to be made and/or evidence is to be recorded which is only permissible before the Election Tribunal under S. 140 of the Elections Act, 2017 after the completion of first phase of Election, however, the qualification and disqualification of the appellant on the subject issue can also be adjudicated by the Election Appellate Tribunal as the FBR had shown certain amount outstanding against the appellant though there were two contradictory letters, however, the appellant had to sort out these things with the FBR---As such on this score alone the appellant could not be non-suited to contest the election at such stage---Since the appellant was ready and willing to cure the defect within a reasonable time, let him clear his dues within a reasonable time---Appellate Tribunal set-aside the impugned order passed by the concerned Returning Officer and he (Returning Officer) was directed to include the name of the appellant in the list of contesting candidates---Appeal was allowed accordingly. Ali Tahir for Appellant. G.M Bhuto Assistant Attorney General along with Sarmad Sarwar Assistant Director (Law) Election Commission of Pakistan for Respondents. Date of hearing: 6th January, 2024.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 70(6) & Fourth Schedule, Part I, Entry No. 50---Federal Legislative List---"Taxes on land and buildings" and "taxes on capital value of assets"---Scope---Both type of taxes are separate subjects/entries---Prior one primarily belongs to Provincial Legislature and the later subject belongs to Federal Legislature. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 270A---Interpretation of Constitution---Vires of laws---Principle---Supremacy of the Constitution has to be safeguarded---Laws which cannot with stand legislative competence must yield their way to Parliamentary and Constitutional supremacy, and laws after such scrutiny, if found transgressing such mandate, must be seen to have melted down to the frame of the Constitution---Laws made during the period mentioned in Art. 270A of the Constitution, if found violative, must be eclipsed by the supreme law, i.e. the Constitution and it cannot be vice versa---Laws in derogation of such principle are ultra vires. (c) Cantonments Act (II of 1924)--- ----Ss. 60, 80, 106 & 109---Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainments Duty) Order (P.O. No. 13 of 1979), Art. 3---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), S. 15A---Constitution of Pakistan, Fourth Sched., Part I, Entry No. 50 [as amended by Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution]---Federal Legislative List---Property tax, recovery of---Jurisdiction of Cantonment Boards---Tax, utilization of---Petitioners/owners of properties assailed tax demand based on annual rental value of property by respondents/Cantonment Boards---Validity---Taxes on immovable properties had been excluded from the domain of the Federation, the Federal Legislature and consequently respondents/Cantonment Boards could not levy, impose, charge and/or recover such taxes as levied by it on immovable properties from the date of restoration of the Constitution and more particularly after Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, either under Cantonments Act, 1924 or under Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainments Duty) Order, 1979---Such levy by respondents/Cantonment Boards had been initiated in terms of Cantonments Act, 1924---Laws on the basis of which respondents/ Cantonment Boards were recovering taxes opposed the Constitutional/ Legislative competence and was beyond their legal powers and capacity, which was ultra vires under existing frame of the Constitution on legislative competence---There is no special provision for a tax on annual rental value of immovable property to be utilized as an "expenditure" under Cantonments Act, 1924, thus general provisions of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 cannot be applied---"Tax" per se on immovable property, under S. 15A of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 can be utilized or adjusted as "expenditure"---This is a general provision for all levies on property and is not specific to any particular fee or tax and a direct nexus of subject tax can be a misapplication---Power to levy, charge, impose and recover any or all taxes separately on immovable property is an alien object under Cantonment laws in existing frame of the Constitution---Tax on annual rental value of immovable property was a tax and not a fee or any other genre of levy-- -Respondents/Cantonment Boards had no power to levy tax on immovable property including tax on annual rental value of immovable property---After revival of the Constitution, and Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, provisions of Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainments Duty) Order, 1979 had no effect on the subject---Subject law to the extent of provision of S. 3 of Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainments Duty) Order, 1979 was no longer protected---High Court declared that after Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, Entry 50 in Fourth Schedule to the Constitution was amended, consequently Federation and all Cantonment Boards lacked competence, power and jurisdiction to levy, charge, impose and recover any or all taxes on any immovable property, including but not limited to tax on annual rental value of immovable property---High Court further declared that Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution consequently restored competence and jurisdiction of Province to levy, charge, recover and legislate on subject so identified and to pursue it accordingly---High Court directed that amounts so recovered by Cantonment Boards under subject of tax in question, since Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution also called for an account---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. I.A. Sharwani and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division, Islamabad and others 1991 SCMR 1041; Haider Mukhtar and others v. Government of Punjab and others PLD 2014 Lah. 214; Khalid Mahmood and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 74 others PLD 2003 Lah. 629; Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi v. Saeed Ahmad Khan and others PLD 1974 SC 152; Mehmood Khan Achakzai and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 426; Sargodha Textile Mills v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi and 3 others PLD 2004 SC 743; Pakistan through Ministry of Defence v. Province of Punjab PLD 1975 SC 37; Messrs Gulzar Cinema v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1978 Kar. 500; Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416; Sajjad Hussain v. The State PLD 1989 FST 50; State v. Sajjad Hussain 1993 SCMR 1523; C.P. No.D-4942 of 2022; Zaka Ud Din Malik v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 PTD 268; State Bank of Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 Pesh. 46; Ghulam Musfafa Khan's case PLD 1989 SC 26; Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan 2016 PTD 2269; Mst. Nargis Moeen v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2003 Lah. 730; Mst. Sultan Jahan v. Cantonment Board Lahore Cantt. 2007 YLR 1681; Lahore Station Commander v. Col. (R) Muhammad Abbas Malik 2006 CLC 1674; Continental Biscuits Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2011 MLD 1006; Pakistan International Freight of Forwarders Association v. Province of Sindh 2017 PTD 1; Pakistan Mobile Communications Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 PTD 266; Cantonment Board's case Civil Appeal No.1363 of 2018; Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal 95 1 SCC 707; Jalkal Vibhag Nagar Nigam v. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation AIR 2021 SC 5316; Workers' Welfare Funds, Ministry of Human Resources Development, Islamabad and others v. East Pakistan Chrome Tannery (Pvt.) Ltd. and others PLD 2017 SC 28; Messrs Cherat Cement Co. Ltd., Nowshera and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and others PLD 2021 SC 327; Exide Pakistan Limited v. Cantonment Board Clifton 2012 CLC 1124; The Bank of Khyber v. Municipal Corporation Gujrat PLD 2021 Lah. 108; Raj Kumar v. Hyderabad Cantonment Board 2006 MLD 549; Civil Appeal No.1363 of 2018; Cyrus Cowasjee v. KMC PLD 2022 Sindh 106; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs Wi-Tribe Pakistan Ltd. 2020 SCMR 420; Muhammad Ayaz Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2020 PTD 2200; Federation of Pakistan v. Durrani Ceramics 2014 SCMR 1630; Azgard Nine v. Government of Pakistan 2013 PTD 1030; Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2020 SC 641; Southern Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals v. State of Kerala (1981) 4 SCC 391 and Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1983) 4 SCC 353) rel. Ghulam Musfafa Khan's case PLD 1989 SC 26 distinguished. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Fourth Sched., Part I, Entry No. 50---Levy of tax---Classification of properties according to their value---Principle---If classification is dependent upon improved facilities, it counts good but purpose could be achieved by one master/regulator i.e. the Province---If classification does not rest on good tests, then it is bound to collapse which creates discrimination and there should be one parameter/yardstick to evaluate- --Different properties in an area/common area may have different values notwithstanding the area itself is classified as a category but within that category the value of property/building may vary, depending upon its characteristics to evaluate and measure rental value it may fetch, hence the fact that property situated in a particular local body/ municipality, itself should not form basis of classification---There should be one regulator to deal with evaluation with common tools of evaluations. (e) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Constitutionality of law---Principle---Constitutionality of any law, on the touchstone of any provision of the Constitution, being opposed, could always be challenged and only because such challenge had not been thrown earlier does not amount to an acquiescence and would not be immune from a challenge in future---In enforcing Constitutional frame work, the concept of acquiescence is an alien object. (f) Cantonments Act (II of 1924)--- ----Ss. 60 & 80---Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainments Duty) Order (P.O. No. 13 of 1979), Art. 3---Sindh Local Government Act (XLII of 2013), S. 14---Constitution of Pakistan, Fourth Sched., Part I, Entry No. 50 [as amended by Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution]---Federal Legislative List---Property tax, recovery of---Jurisdiction of Cantonment Boards---Petitioners/owners of properties assailed tax demand based on annual rental value of their properties by respondents/Cantonment Boards---Plea raised by respondent/Cantonment Boards was that annual rental value on immovable properties had devolved upon local Government hence Cantonment Boards as Local Government were also empowered for the same---Validity---Cantonment Boards were excluded under S. 14 of Sindh Local Government Act, 2013, therefore, no power to levy such tax could be derived by respondents/Cantonment Boards from such law, and no powers could be drawn from any Federal law as it was a provincial subject---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (g) Cantonments Act (II of 1924)--- ----S. 80---Tax on annual rental value of immovable property---Non-payment---Effect---Tax imposed on immovable property, under S. 80 of Cantonments Act, 1924 runs on the property itself and not on the owner or occupier---As such it is a tax on immovable property and not a tax on a person's income. Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal 95 1 SCC 707 and Jalkal Vibhag Nagar Nigam v. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation AIR 2021 SC 5316 rel. (h) Cantonments Act (II of 1924)--- ----Ss. 60, 80 & 200---Constitution of Pakistan, Fourth Sched., Part I, Entry 50 [as amended by Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution]---Federal Legislative List---Tax and fee---Distinction---Principle of quid pro quo---Applicability---Petitioners/owners of properties assailed tax demand based on annual rental value of their properties by respondents/ Cantonment Boards---Plea raised by respondent/Cantonment Boards was that they were charging fee under S. 200 of Cantonments Act, 1924---Validity---For imposition of any fee, services under the principle of quid pro quo must be specified in the exhaustive list provided under S. 200 of Cantonments Act, 1924---If a particular fee claimed for a service under the principle of quid pro quo is not provided for under S. 200 of Cantonments Act, 1924, such fee cannot be imposed---Provision of S. 200 of Cantonments Act, 1924 is meant for levying fee, and an exhaustive list of all those levies against which, by applying principle of quid pro quo, a fee could be levied---If any nature of service to claim fee was not mentioned therein then it could not be imposed by respondents/Cantonment Boards at all---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal 95 1 SCC 707; Jalkal Vibhag Nagar Nigam v. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation AIR 2021 SC 5316; Workers' Welfare Funds, Ministry of Human Resources Development, Islamabad and others v. East Pakistan Chrome Tannery (Pvt.) Ltd. and others PLD 2017 SC 28; Messrs Cherat Cement Co. Ltd., Nowshera and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and others PLD 2021 SC 327; Exide Pakistan Limited v. Cantonment Board Clifton 2012 CLC 1124; The Bank of Khyber v. Municipal Corporation Gujrat PLD 2021 Lah. 108 and Raj Kumar v. Hyderabad Cantonment Board 2006 MLD 549 rel. (i) Cantonments Act (II of 1924)--- ----Ss. 106 & 109---Property tax---Cantonment Funds---Principle of quid pro quo---Applicability---Details provided under S. 109 of Cantonments Act, 1924 are neither specific nor exhaustive but rather general in nature---Principle of quid pro quo is applied when specific provision/facility as against such recovery of fee is made---Cantonment Boards have several other services which they are rendering and are also recovering amount which could have a specific purpose---Amount of tax on property recovered as a tax on annual rental value, cannot be equated to be meant for such a purpose---Purpose must be specific and must relate to a levy itself---There may not be a requirement of arithmetic precision but there must be a direct co-relation between them for applying quid pro quo. Ayan Mustafa Memon assisted by Ali Zuberi, Habibullah Masood, Amna Khalil, Nawaz Khan and Shahreen Chugtai, Khwaja Shamsul Islam along with Imran Taj, Imtiaz Ali Shah and Khalil Awan (in C.P. No. D-2603/2023), Ms. Naheed A. Shahid and Daniyal Ellahi (in C.Ps. Nos. D-71 /2022 and 848/2023), Ali John, Altamash Arab, (in C.P. No. D-6819/2022), Abdul Wajid Wyne, M. Rafi Kamboh (in C.Ps. Nos. D-6396 and 6397 of 2020), Arif Khan, M. Saad Siddiqui and Sahibzada Mubeen (in C.P. No. D-840/2022), 5861/2021, 3246/2021, 2970/2020, 1494/2019), Farhan Zia Abrar, Zain A. Jatoi, Muhammad Mustafa Mumdani (in C.P. No. D-2521/2022), Ghulam Haider Shaikh (in C.P. No. D-1251/2021), (Abid Hussain and Zahid Mehmood (in C.Ps. Nos. D-3170 and 3171 of 2021), Fahad Arif Khilji (in C.Ps. Nos. D-3763 and 3764/2021), Ahmed Mujtaba (in C.P. No. D-3803/ 2022), Naeem Suleman, Arshad Hussain Shehzad, Waseem Farooq, Tauqir Randhawa, Kashan Ahmed, Mian Mushtaq Ahmed (in C.Ps. Nos. D-4306 to 4327 of 2017 and 3532/2018), Hanif Faisal Alam, Hassan Khursheed Hashmi (in C.P. No. D-5521/2022), Salman Mirza and Ahmed Magsi (in C. Ps. Nos. D-132/2019, 3135/2021 and 3359/ 2021), Abdul Qayoom Abbasi, Raja Muhammad Safeer, Syed Maqbool Hussain Shah (in C.P. No. D-2797/2021), Syed Noman Zahid Ali, Arsal Rahat Ali, Mehmood Ali for IBA and Behzad Haider (in C.P. No. D-5459/2022), Ahmed Madni and Peer Ali, in C.P. No. D-446 of 2023), Ms.Sadia Sumera (in C.P. No. D-4184/2022), Ahmed Nizamani (in C.P. No. D-3246/2021), Dr. Rana Khan, Rajesh Kumar (in C.P. No. D-5673/2021), Malik Khushhal Khan in C.Ps. Nos. D-3987/2018 and 946/2022), Muhammad Naved, Fazal Mehmood Sherwani (in C.P. No. D-4159/2020) and Masood Ali for Petitioners. Abdullah Munshi, Shajeeuddin Siddiqui and Imdad Ali Bhatti for Clifton Cantonment Board (in C.P. No. D-4985/2018, 5391/2018, 3426/ 2018, 5166/2018, 5167/2018, 6506/2020 and 1251/2021), Farooq Hamid Naek assisted by Syed Qaim A. Shah, G.Murtaza Bhanbhro and Saad H. Ammar (in C.P. No. D-132/2019 and 1220/2023) for Respondent No.2), Dr. Farogh Naseem, Ahmed Ali Hussain, S. Zaeem Hyder, Aman Aftab, M. Aizaz Ahmed, Syed Shohrat Hussain Rizvi for Karachi Cantonment Board, Aqib Hussain, Afnan Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, Iftikhar Hussain, Zohra Ahmed for CBC (in C.P. No. D-1228/ 2019, 1949/2019 and 946/2022), Dr. Shahab Imam and Syeda Abida Bukhari for CBC (in C.Ps. Nos.D-1220 and 2603/2023), Ashraf Ali Butt, Rehmatunnisa, Sohail H.K. Rana, Ms.Huma F. Bhutto, Fahim Haider Moosvi, Zain A. Soomro for Respondent No.2 (in C.Ps. Nos. D-1661 and 249 of 2021), Akhtar Hussain Shaikh, Syed M. Ghazen, Shahid Ahmed for KW and SC, K, A. Jahangir (in C.P. No. D-3100/2023) for CBC, Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi (in C.P. No. D-4606/2020), Shahid Hussain Korejo (in C.P. No. D-6803/2022) for Respondent No.2, Saqib Soomro and Ahmed Mujtaba (in C.P. No. D-6806/2022) for Respondent No.2, Ameer Ali Soomro (in C.P. No. D-6805/2022) for Respondent No.2, Asif Amin for Respondent No.2 (in C.P. No. D-1333/2021), Fozia M.Murad for Respondent (in C.Ps. Nos. D-132/2019, 3023, 3669, 7318, 7460 of 2015), Talha Abbasi for DHA (in C.P. No. D-4985/2018) for Respondents. Zeeshan Adhi, Addl. AG, Saifullah and Sandeep Molani, Asst. A.G., Qazi Abdul Hameed Siddiqui, D.A.G., Khaleeq Ahmed, D.A.G., Malik Sadaqat Khan, Addl. Attorney General and Qazi Ayazuddin, Asst. Attorney General. Dates of hearing: 17th, 24th, 25th, 30th October, 1st, 6th, 10th, 13th, 15th, 20th, 21st, 28th November, 4th, 13th and 14th December, 2023.

Summary: ----Art. 70(6) & Fourth Schedule, Part I, Entry No. 50---Federal Legislative List---"Taxes on land and buildings" and "taxes on capital value of assets"---Scope---Both type of taxes are separate subjects/entries---Prior one primarily belongs to Provincial Legislature and the later subject belongs to Federal Legislature. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 270A---Interpretation of Constitution---Vires of laws---Principle---Supremacy of the Constitution has to be safeguarded---Laws which cannot withstand legislative competence must yield their way to Parliamentary and Constitutional supremacy, and laws after such scrutiny, if found transgressing such mandate, must be seen to have melted down to the frame of the Constitution---Laws made during the period mentioned in Art. 270A of the Constitution, if found violative, must be eclipsed by the supreme law, i.e. the Constitution and it cannot be vice versa---Laws in derogation of such principle are ultra vires. (c) Cantonments Act (II of 1924)--- ----Ss. 60, 80, 106 & 109---Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainments Duty) Order (P.O. No. 13 of 1979), Art. 3---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), S. 15A---Constitution of Pakistan, Fourth Sched., Part I, Entry No. 50 [as amended by Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution]---Federal Legislative List---Property tax, recovery of---Jurisdiction of Cantonment Boards---Tax, utilization of---Petitioners/owners of properties assailed tax demand based on annual rental value of property by respondents/Cantonment Boards---Validity---Taxes on immovable properties had been excluded from the domain of the Federation, the Federal Legislature and consequently respondents/Cantonment Boards could not levy, impose, charge and/or recover such taxes as levied by it on immovable properties from the date of restoration of the Constitution and more particularly after Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, either under Cantonments Act, 1924 or under Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainments Duty) Order, 1979---Such levy by respondents/Cantonment Boards had been initiated in terms of Cantonments Act, 1924---Laws on the basis of which respondents/ Cantonment Boards were recovering taxes opposed the Constitutional/ Legislative competence and was beyond their legal powers and capacity, which was ultra vires under existing frame of the Constitution on legislative competence---There is no special provision for a tax on annual rental value of immovable property to be utilized as an "expenditure" under Cantonments Act, 1924, thus general provisions of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 cannot be applied---"Tax" per se on immovable property, under S. 15A of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 can be utilized or adjusted as "expenditure"---This is a general provision for all levies on property and is not specific to any particular fee or tax and a direct nexus of subject tax can be a misapplication---Power to levy, charge, impose and recover any or all taxes separately on immovable property is an alien object under Cantonment laws in existing frame of the Constitution---Tax on annual rental value of immovable property was a tax and not a fee or any other genre of levy-- -Respondents/Cantonment Boards had no power to levy tax on immovable property including tax on annual rental value of immovable property---After revival of the Constitution, and Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, provisions of Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainments Duty) Order, 1979 had no effect on the subject---Subject law to the extent of provision of S. 3 of Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainments Duty) Order, 1979 was no longer protected---High Court declared that after Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, Entry 50 in Fourth Schedule to the Constitution was amended, consequently Federation and all Cantonment Boards lacked competence, power and jurisdiction to levy, charge, impose and recover any or all taxes on any immovable property, including but not limited to tax on annual rental value of immovable property---High Court further declared that Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution consequently restored competence and jurisdiction of Province to levy, charge, recover and legislate on subject so identified and to pursue it accordingly---High Court directed that amounts so recovered by Cantonment Boards under subject of tax in question, since Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution also called for an account---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. I.A. Sharwani and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division, Islamabad and others 1991 SCMR 1041; Haider Mukhtar and others v. Government of Punjab and others PLD 2014 Lah. 214; Khalid Mahmood and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 74 others PLD 2003 Lah. 629; Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi v. Saeed Ahmad Khan and others PLD 1974 SC 152; Mehmood Khan Achakzai and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 426; Sargodha Textile Mills v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi and 3 others PLD 2004 SC 743; Pakistan through Ministry of Defence v. Province of Punjab PLD 1975 SC 37; Messrs Gulzar Cinema v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1978 Kar. 500; Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416; Sajjad Hussain v. The State PLD 1989 FST 50; State v. Sajjad Hussain 1993 SCMR 1523; C.P. No.D-4942 of 2022; Zaka Ud Din Malik v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 PTD 268; State Bank of Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 Pesh. 46; Ghulam Musfafa Khan's case PLD 1989 SC 26; Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan 2016 PTD 2269; Mst. Nargis Moeen v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2003 Lah. 730; Mst. Sultan Jahan v. Cantonment Board Lahore Cantt. 2007 YLR 1681; Lahore Station Commander v. Col. (R) Muhammad Abbas Malik 2006 CLC 1674; Continental Biscuits Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2011 MLD 1006; Pakistan International Freight of Forwarders Association v. Province of Sindh 2017 PTD 1; Pakistan Mobile Communications Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 PTD 266; Cantonment Board's case Civil Appeal No.1363 of 2018; Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal 95 1 SCC 707; Jalkal Vibhag Nagar Nigam v. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation AIR 2021 SC 5316; Workers' Welfare Funds, Ministry of Human Resources Development, Islamabad and others v. East Pakistan Chrome Tannery (Pvt.) Ltd. and others PLD 2017 SC 28; Messrs Cherat Cement Co. Ltd., Nowshera and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and others PLD 2021 SC 327; Exide Pakistan Limited v. Cantonment Board Clifton 2012 CLC 1124; The Bank of Khyber v. Municipal Corporation Gujrat PLD 2021 Lah. 108; Raj Kumar v. Hyderabad Cantonment Board 2006 MLD 549; Civil Appeal No.1363 of 2018; Cyrus Cowasjee v. KMC PLD 2022 Sindh 106; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs Wi-Tribe Pakistan Ltd. 2020 SCMR 420; Muhammad Ayaz Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2020 PTD 2200; Federation of Pakistan v. Durrani Ceramics 2014 SCMR 1630; Azgard Nine v. Government of Pakistan 2013 PTD 1030; Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2020 SC 641; Southern Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals v. State of Kerala (1981) 4 SCC 391 and Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1983)4 SCC 353) rel. Ghulam Musfafa Khan's case PLD 1989 SC 26 distinguished. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Fourth Sched., Part I, Entry No. 50---Levy of tax---Classification of properties according to their value---Principle---If classification is dependent upon improved facilities, it counts good but purpose could be achieved by one master/regulator i.e. the Province---If classification does not rest on good tests, then it is bound to collapse which creates discrimination and there should be one parameter/yardstick to evaluate- --Different properties in an area/common area may have different values notwithstanding the area itself is classified as a category but within that category the value of property/building may vary, depending upon its characteristics to evaluate and measure rental value it may fetch, hence the fact that property situated in a particular local body/ municipality, itself should not form basis of classification---There should be one regulator to deal with evaluation with common tools of evaluations. (e) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Constitutionality of law---Principle---Constitutionality of any law, on the touchstone of any provision of the Constitution, being opposed, could always be challenged and only because such challenge had not been thrown earlier does not amount to an acquiescence and would not be immune from a challenge in future---In enforcing Constitutional frame work, the concept of acquiescence is an alien object. (f) Cantonments Act (II of 1924)--- ----Ss. 60 & 80---Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainments Duty) Order (P.O. No. 13 of 1979), Art. 3---Sindh Local Government Act (XLII of 2013), S. 14---Constitution of Pakistan, Fourth Sched., Part I, Entry No. 50 [as amended by Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution]---Federal Legislative List---Property tax, recovery of---Jurisdiction of Cantonment Boards---Petitioners/owners of properties assailed tax demand based on annual rental value of their properties by respondents/Cantonment Boards---Plea raised by respondent/Cantonment Boards was that annual rental value on immovable properties had devolved upon local Government hence Cantonment Boards as Local Government were also empowered for the same---Validity---Cantonment Boards were excluded under S. 14 of Sindh Local Government Act, 2013, therefore, no power to levy such tax could be derived by respondents/Cantonment Boards from such law, and no powers could be drawn from any Federal law as it was a provincial subject---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (g) Cantonments Act (II of 1924)--- ----S. 80---Tax on annual rental value of immovable property---Non-payment---Effect---Tax imposed on immovable property, under S. 80 of Cantonments Act, 1924 runs on the property itself and not on the owner or occupier---As such it is a tax on immovable property and not a tax on a person's income. Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal 95 1 SCC 707 and Jalkal Vibhag Nagar Nigam v. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation AIR 2021 SC 5316 rel. (h) Cantonments Act (II of 1924)--- ----Ss. 60, 80 & 200---Constitution of Pakistan, Fourth Sched., Part I, Entry 50 [as amended by Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution]---Federal Legislative List---Tax and fee---Distinction---Principle of quid pro quo---Applicability---Petitioners/owners of properties assailed tax demand based on annual rental value of their properties by respondents/ Cantonment Boards---Plea raised by respondent/Cantonment Boards was that they were charging fee under S. 200 of Cantonments Act, 1924---Validity---For imposition of any fee, services under the principle of quid pro quo must be specified in the exhaustive list provided under S. 200 of Cantonments Act, 1924---If a particular fee claimed for a service under the principle of quid pro quo is not provided for under S. 200 of Cantonments Act, 1924, such fee cannot be imposed---Provision of S. 200 of Cantonments Act, 1924 is meant for levying fee, and an exhaustive list of all those levies against which, by applying principle of quid pro quo, a fee could be levied---If any nature of service to claim fee was not mentioned therein then it could not be imposed by respondents/Cantonment Boards at all---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal 95 1 SCC 707; Jalkal Vibhag Nagar Nigam v. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation AIR 2021 SC 5316; Workers' Welfare Funds, Ministry of Human Resources Development, Islamabad and others v. East Pakistan Chrome Tannery (Pvt.) Ltd. and others PLD 2017 SC 28; Messrs Cherat Cement Co. Ltd., Nowshera and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and others PLD 2021 SC 327; Exide Pakistan Limited v. Cantonment Board Clifton 2012 CLC 1124; The Bank of Khyber v. Municipal Corporation Gujrat PLD 2021 Lah. 108 and Raj Kumar v. Hyderabad Cantonment Board 2006 MLD 549 rel. (i) Cantonments Act (II of 1924)--- ----Ss. 106 & 109---Property tax---Cantonment Funds---Principle of quid pro quo---Applicability---Details provided under S. 109 of Cantonments Act, 1924 are neither specific nor exhaustive but rather general in nature---Principle of quid pro quo is applied when specific provision/facility as against such recovery of fee is made---Cantonment Boards have several other services which they are rendering and are also recovering amount which could have a specific purpose---Amount of tax on property recovered as a tax on annual rental value, cannot be equated to be meant for such a purpose---Purpose must be specific and must relate to a levy itself---There may not be a requirement of arithmetic precision but there must be a direct co-relation between them for applying quid pro quo. Ayan Mustafa Memon assisted by Ali Zuberi, Habibullah Masood, Amna Khalil, Nawaz Khan and Shahreen Chugtai, Khwaja Shamsul Islam along with Imran Taj, Imtiaz Ali Shah and Khalil Awan (in C.P. No. D-2603/2023), Ms. Naheed A. Shahid and Daniyal Ellahi (in C.Ps. Nos. D-71 /2022 and 848/2023), Ali John, Altamash Arab, (in C.P. No. D-6819/2022), Abdul Wajid Wyne, M. Rafi Kamboh (in C.Ps. Nos. D-6396 and 6397 of 2020), Arif Khan, M. Saad Siddiqui and Sahibzada Mubeen (in C.P. No. D-840/2022), 5861/2021, 3246/2021, 2970/2020, 1494/2019), Farhan Zia Abrar, Zain A. Jatoi, Muhammad Mustafa Mumdani (in C.P. No. D-2521/2022), Ghulam Haider Shaikh (in C.P. No. D-1251/2021), (Abid Hussain and Zahid Mehmood (in C.Ps. Nos. D-3170 and 3171 of 2021), Fahad Arif Khilji (in C.Ps. Nos. D-3763 and 3764/2021), Ahmed Mujtaba (in C.P. No. D-3803/ 2022), Naeem Suleman, Arshad Hussain Shehzad, Waseem Farooq, Tauqir Randhawa, Kashan Ahmed, Mian Mushtaq Ahmed (in C.Ps. Nos. D-4306 to 4327 of 2017 and 3532/2018), Hanif Faisal Alam, Hassan Khursheed Hashmi (in C.P. No. D-5521/2022), Salman Mirza and Ahmed Magsi (in C. Ps. Nos. D-132/2019, 3135/2021 and 3359/ 2021), Abdul Qayoom Abbasi, Raja Muhammad Safeer, Syed Maqbool Hussain Shah (in C.P. No. D-2797/2021), Syed Noman Zahid Ali, Arsal Rahat Ali, Mehmood Ali for IBA and Behzad Haider (in C.P. No. D-5459/2022), Ahmed Madni and Peer Ali, in C.P. No. D-446 of 2023), Ms.Sadia Sumera (in C.P. No. D-4184/2022), Ahmed Nizamani (in C.P. No. D-3246/2021), Dr. Rana Khan, Rajesh Kumar (in C.P. No. D-5673/2021), Malik Khushhal Khan in C.Ps. Nos. D-3987/2018 and 946/2022), Muhammad Naved, Fazal Mehmood Sherwani (in C.P. No. D-4159/2020) and Masood Ali for Petitioners. Abdullah Munshi, Shajeeuddin Siddiqui and Imdad Ali Bhatti for Clifton Cantonment Board (in C.P. No. D-4985/2018, 5391/2018, 3426/ 2018, 5166/2018, 5167/2018, 6506/2020 and 1251/2021), Farooq Hamid Naek assisted by Syed Qaim A. Shah, G.Murtaza Bhanbhro and Saad H. Ammar (in C.P. No. D-132/2019 and 1220/2023) for Respondent No.2), Dr. Farogh Naseem, Ahmed Ali Hussain, S. Zaeem Hyder, Aman Aftab, M. Aizaz Ahmed, Syed Shohrat Hussain Rizvi for Karachi Cantonment Board, Aqib Hussain, Afnan Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, Iftikhar Hussain, Zohra Ahmed for CBC (in C.P. No. D-1228/ 2019, 1949/2019 and 946/2022), Dr. Shahab Imam and Syeda Abida Bukhari for CBC (in C.Ps. Nos.D-1220 and 2603/2023), Ashraf Ali Butt, Rehmatunnisa, Sohail H.K. Rana, Ms.Huma F. Bhutto, Fahim Haider Moosvi, Zain A. Soomro for Respondent No.2 (in C.Ps. Nos. D-1661 and 249 of 2021), Akhtar Hussain Shaikh, Syed M. Ghazen, Shahid Ahmed for KW and SC, K, A. Jahangir (in C.P. No. D-3100/2023) for CBC, Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi (in C.P. No. D-4606/2020), Shahid Hussain Korejo (in C.P. No. D-6803/2022) for Respondent No.2, Saqib Soomro and Ahmed Mujtaba (in C.P. No. D-6806/2022) for Respondent No.2, Ameer Ali Soomro (in C.P. No. D-6805/2022) for Respondent No.2, Asif Amin for Respondent No.2 (in C.P. No. D-1333/2021), Fozia M.Murad for Respondent (in C.Ps. Nos. D-132/2019, 3023, 3669, 7318, 7460 of 2015), Talha Abbasi for DHA (in C.P. No. D-4985/2018) for Respondents. Zeeshan Adhi, Addl. AG, Saifullah and Sandeep Molani, Asst. A.G., Qazi Abdul Hameed Siddiqui, D.A.G., Khaleeq Ahmed, D.A.G., Malik Sadaqat Khan Addl., Attorney General and Qazi Ayazuddin, Asst. Attorney General Dates of hearing: 17th, 24th, 25th, 30th October, 1st, 6th, 10th, 13th, 15th, 20th, 21st, 28th November, 4th, 13th and 14th December, 2023.

Summary: Election Appeal: Mr. Shoaib Shaheen nominated for NA 46 has been rejected. Hence this Appeal.

Summary: Rejected the appellant's nomination papers for PP-174. The rejection was based on the proposer Muhammad Ramzan's name not being found on the electoral roll for PP-174, as required by the Elections Act, 2017.The appellant argued that the error was inadvertent, resulting from confusion between two constituencies (PP-173 and PP-174), and requested substitution with another proposer, Waqas Tassawer. Legal precedents, including Rana Muhammad Tajammal Hussain v. Rana Shaukat Mahmood (PLD 2007 SC 277) and Sharafat Ali v. D.R.O. and others (2008 SCMR 539), were cited to support the contention that such defects are curable.However, the Election Commission of Pakistan opposed the appeal, emphasizing the foundational role of the proposer in the nomination process and arguing that defects related to proposer eligibility are not curable. The legal advisor cited relevant sections of the Elections Act, 2017, and referred to Jamshed Iqbal Cheema v. Election Appellate Tribunal (2022 CLC 463) and Ijaz v. Returning Officer PP-115, Faisalabad (W.P. No.223502 of 2018), as precedents.After careful consideration, the court upheld the Returning Officer's decision, citing the mandatory nature of proposer requirements under the Act. The court emphasized that defects related to the proposer's eligibility are of a substantial nature and cannot be cured at a subsequent stage. The appellant's argument that the defect was curable was deemed meritless, and the appeal was dismissed. The court approved the order for reporting.