Summary: (a) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)- -Ss.6 & 7-Arbitration Act, 1996 (United Kingdom), Ss.30, 32 & 70-Foreign arbitral awards-Recognition and enforcement-Arbitration governed by English law-Awards passed by Refined Sugar Association (London)-Jurisdiction and competency of Refined Sugar Association to act as arbitral forum, challenge to-Scope-Facts: The applicant filed two applications before the High Court, seeking recognition, enforcement, and decree of two foreign arbitral awards passed by the Refined Sugar Association of London (RSA), under S.6 of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011-Parties had entered into respective contracts dated 13.04.2006 which expressly incorporated RSA terms/rules and provided for arbitration under English law, disputes thereafter arose and were referred to RSA arbitration resulting in the said awards, and the respondents’ objection raised before the Court was that RSA was not competent to act as arbitrator (with a further challenge touching the award on merits)-Issue: Whether, in view of the arbitration clause/contractual incorporation of RSA rules and the limited grounds available under the 2011 Act read with Article V of the New York Convention, the foreign arbitral awards were liable to be recognized, made rule of Court, and enforced as decrees in Pakistan, or refused on any permissible ground (including alleged lack of arbitral jurisdiction/competence)?-Held: Admittedly, the agreements were subject to the RSA Rules and Rule 26thereof specified that the arbitration was to be conducted by RSA, however, notwithstanding the same and without the same ever having been controverted by the respondents, it was patently clear that the objection as to arbitrator had been escalated by the respondents and the same had been duly adjudicated per S.30 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 (UK)-Tribunal was empowered to rule upon its jurisdiction, subject to the right of appeal-The Arbitration Act, 1996 (UK) provided for exercise of the right of appeal; as seen in inter alia in Ss. 32 & 70 thereof, however, admittedly, no challenge to the tribunal’s ruling on its jurisdiction (and / or merit) was preferred by any respondent within the pale of limitation and / or at any time thereafter, therefore, High Court found the respondents’ objection to be dissonant with the law-Respondents had not even attempted to displace and / or distinguish the findings in favor of jurisdiction rendered by the tribunal-The Convention, implemented in Pakistan by the Act, contained no ground as to the invalidity of a foreign award or its being against the law of the contracting states, to refuse its recognition and enforcement and thus left no room for the courts of a contracting state to enter into the exercise of examining the merits of a foreign award on the points of facts or law-No case arose to afford any actionable credence to the assertions escalated on behalf of the respondents in such regard-No infirmity with the agreements and / or the awards could be identified, within the mandate of Article V of the Convention-The respective foreign arbitral awards were recognized as binding and enforceable against the respective respondents, hence made rule of Court-Applications filed per Section 6 of the Act, 2011 were allowed, in circumstances. Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Company (Private) Limited 2024 SCMR 640 rel. TASCO v. Franzen Landbouw C.V. HCA 115 of 2025 and MANU/SC/0655/2013 ref. (b) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)- -Ss.6 & 7-Foreign arbitral awards-Recognition and enforcement-Duty of courts-Pro-enforcement regime viz. foreign arbitral awards-Scope-The law requires the court to recognize and enforce an award in the same manner as a judgment or order of a court in Pakistan, unless precluded per S.7 of the Act, 2011-The recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award shall not be refused except in accordance with Article V of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 ('the New York Convention')-Court is required to support not supplant the arbitral process and its discretion is precluded to interfere in the merits of a case on points off act or law-Court should circumscribe opposition within the remit of Article V of the New York Convention, while emphasizing that the stipulations may be read as permissive and not mandatory.

Summary: ----Ss.6 & 7---Arbitration Act, 1996 (United Kingdom), Ss.30, 32 & 70---Foreign arbitral awards---Recognition and enforcement---Arbitration governed by English law---Awards passed by Refined Sugar Association (London)---Jurisdiction and competency of Refined Sugar Association to act as arbitral forum, challenge to---Scope---Facts: The applicant filed two applications before the High Court, seeking recognition, enforcement, and decree of two foreign arbitral awards passed by the Refined Sugar Association of London (RSA), under S.6 of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011---Parties had entered into respective contracts dated 13.04.2006 which expressly incorporated RSA terms/rules and provided for arbitration under English law, disputes thereafter arose and were referred to RSA arbitration resulting in the said awards, and the respondents’ objection raised before the Court was that RSA was not competent to act as arbitrator (with a further challenge touching the award on merits)---Issue: Whether, in view of the arbitration clause/contractual incorporation of RSA rules and the limited grounds available under the 2011 Act read with Article V of the New York Convention, the foreign arbitral awards were liable to be recognized, made rule of Court, and enforced as decrees in Pakistan, or refused on any permissible ground (including alleged lack of arbitral jurisdiction/competence)?”---Held: Admittedly, the agreements were subject to the RSA Rules and Rule 26thereof specified that the arbitration was to be conducted by RSA, however, notwithstanding the same and without the same ever having been controverted by the respondents, it was patently clear that the objection as to arbitrator had been escalated by the respondents and the same had been duly adjudicated per S.30 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 (UK)---Tribunal was empowered to rule upon its jurisdiction, subject to the right of appeal---The Arbitration Act, 1996 (UK) provided for exercise of the right of appeal; as seen in inter alia in Ss. 32 & 70 thereof, however, admittedly, no challenge to the tribunal’s ruling on its jurisdiction (and / or merit) was preferred by any respondent within the pale of limitation and / or at any time thereafter, therefore, High Court found the respondents’ objection to be dissonant with the law---Respondents had not even attempted to displace and / or distinguish the findings in favor of jurisdiction rendered by the tribunal---The Convention, implemented in Pakistan by the Act, contained no ground as to the invalidity of a foreign award or its being against the law of the contracting states, to refuse its recognition and enforcement and thus left no room for the courts of a contracting state to enter into the exercise of examining the merits of a foreign award on the points of facts or law---No case arose to afford any actionable credence to the assertions escalated on behalf of the respondents in such regard---No infirmity with the agreements and / or the awards could be identified, within the mandate of Article V of the Convention---The respective foreign arbitral awards were recognized as binding and enforceable against the respective respondents, hence made rule of Court---Applications filed per Section 6 of the Act, 2011 were allowed, in circumstances. Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Company (Private) Limited 2024 SCMR 640 rel. TASCO v. Franzen Landbouw C.V. HCA 115 of 2025 and MANU/SC/0655/2013 ref. (b) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)--- ----Ss.6 & 7---Foreign arbitral awards---Recognition and enforcement---Duty of courts---Pro-enforcement regime viz. foreign arbitral awards---Scope---The law requires the court to recognize and enforce an award in the same manner as a judgment or order of a court in Pakistan, unless precluded per S.7 of the Act, 2011---The recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award shall not be refused except in accordance with Article V of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 ('the New York Convention')---Court is required to support not supplant the arbitral process and its discretion is precluded to interfere in the merits of a case on points off act or law---Court should circumscribe opposition within the remit of Article V of the New York Convention, while emphasizing that the stipulations may be read as permissive and not mandatory. Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Company (Private) Limited 2024 SCMR 640 rel. Muhammad Ali Akhtar for Applicants. M. Salim Thepdawala for Respondents. Date of hearing: 15th December, 2025.

Summary: (a) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009) --- ----Ss.2(b), 15, 19 & 22---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Ejectment proceedings---Rejection of leave to contest, challenge to---Dispute regarding arrears/security requiring oral evidence---Effect---Final order, meaning of---Eviction order alone without deciding security/arrears adjustment not a “final order”---Briefly, the petitioner was a tenant of respondent No.1 under a rent agreement for five years at Rs.13,000/- per month with 10% annual increase, with security paid in advance; the landlord filed ejectment under S.19, Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 on grounds including expiry of tenancy and rent default, and although the tenant sought leave to contest asserting Rs.3,75,000/- security was agreed to be adjusted in rent (with Rs.1,95,000/- still outstanding), the Rent Tribunal refused leave and ordered eviction, which was upheld in appeal, leading to the filing of present constitutional petition by the tenant---Held: Upon examination of leave to contest it clearly evinced that in the light of its averments, it was disclosing sufficient grounds for production of oral evidence---In terms of S.2(b) of the Act, 2009, Rent Tribunal was obliged to pass an order with respect to dispute relating to security as well as arrears of rent, as canvassed in the ejectment application and application for leave to contest so as to culminate the proceedings---In view of clear and unequivocal mandate of law, the Special Judge (Rent) had abdicated its jurisdiction which was not permissible--- The observations, so recorded, by the Rent Tribunal itself reflected that the Special Judge (Rent) did not conclude the proceedings and the order, so passed, was not final---Leave to contest filed by the petitioner was accepted---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Haji Muhammad Latif v. Muhammad Sharif 2021 SCMR 1430 rel. Zaheer Ahmad Babar v. Additional District Judge Lahore and 2 others 2015 YLR 1617 ref. (b) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009) --- ----Ss.22 & 25---Eviction proceedings---Leave to contest---Preconditions---Scope---An application before the Rent Tribunal can only be contested by a respondent while moving an application for leave to contest in terms thereof within ten days of first appearance before the Rent Tribunal---Leave to contest can only be allowed to a respondent if his application discloses sufficient grounds for production of oral evidence---Subsection (6) of S.22 of the Act, 2009 ordains that if the leave to contest is refused or the respondent has failed to file application for leave to contest within the stipulated time, the Rent Tribunal shall pass the final order---On the other hand, S.25 of the Act, 2009 caters the situation if the leave to contest is allowed to the respondent---Like Subsection (6) of S.22, Subsection (5) of S.25 of the Act, 2009 also find mention the term “final order”. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Concurrent findings, interference in---Scope---There is no cavil that in ordinary course, High Court exercises restraint to ponder upon the issue concurrently resolved by the courts below but this cannot be treated as an inflexible rule---Being the Constitutional Court, it is obligatory for the High Court to invoke its jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution to save abuse of process of law and curb patent illegality, if committed by the lower Courts in the process of administration of justice---Writ of certiorari, no doubt, is of limited scope but when it is apparent on the record that the courts below, while forming their concurrent view, have committed patent illegality, High Court cannot shut its eyes and let the wrong to perpetuate. Agha Muhammad Ali Khan for Petitioner. Rana Zahid Ali for Respondent No.1. Date of hearing: 17th December, 2025. (b) "final order" means a final order passed by a Rent Tribunal culminating the proceedings including an order in respect of adjustment of pagri, advance rent, security, arrears of rent, compensation or costs but shall not include an order passed in an execution proceedings;

Summary: In terms of Section 2(b) of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, Rent Tribunal was obliged to pass an order with respect to dispute relating to security as well as arrears of rent, as canvassed in the ejectment application and application for leave to contest so as to culminate the proceedings. 68Civil Revision- Civil Revision (Against Decree) u/s. 115, C.P.C. 990-14 GHULAM SHABBIR ETC. VS BARKAT ALI ETC. Mr. Justice Ch. Sultan Mahmood 16- 12- 2025 2025 LHC 8294

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.115 & O.XXXVII, Rr.1, 2---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5 & First Sched., Art.159---Suit for recovery on the basis of three cheques---Leave to appear and defend filed after 40 days---Limitation---Non-service of summons owing to police custody, plea of---No separate application for seeking condonation of delay was filed---Trial Court condoned delay and granted leave---Legality---Brief facts were that through the present civil revision the petitioner/plaintiff challenged the order passed by the district court, whereby the respondent/defendant was granted leave to defend in a summary suit under O.XXXVII, C.P.C. for recovery on the basis of dishonoured cheques---Issue in the present matter was “whether the grant of leave to defend was sustainable, particularly regarding service of summons and the time/limitation for filing leave to defend?”---Held: As regards respondent’s contentions that he was in custody and notice was served in jail without a copy of plaint and he lacked means or opportunity to engage counsel, the superintendent jail’s report was placed on record which unequivocally confirmed proper service of notice---A conjoint reading of the notice and the jail report did not indicate, nor even suggested that the notice was issued without a copy of the plaint or its annexures---Assertion of incomplete service was therefore, bereft of substantive basis---Application for leave to defend was filed after a lapse of 40 days from the date of service---In the present case, no application for seeking condonation of delay was filed before the Trial Court---The indispensable statutory condition for activating the equitable jurisdiction was entirely absent---Court could not assume jurisdiction where the legislature had withheld it, not could it exercise an equitable power in the absence of the very foundation upon which that power rested---Judicial discretion could not operate in a vacuum; it must be triggered through a formal prayer, supported by reasons and material---The court below could not lawfully enlarge the limitation period for filing the application for leave to appear and defend the suit---Impugned order was set aside---Present civil revision petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.5---Condonation of delay, seeking of---Underlying purpose of the statute is to induce claimants to act promptly and assert their rights without undue delay---Unexplained delay by persons who ought to be aware of their legal position and who have access to legal assistance cannot be encouraged or condoned---The statutory framework thus obliges claimants to act within the prescribed period in order to maintain order and certainty in legal affairs. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.5 & First Sched., Art.159---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, Rr.1, 2---Leave to appear and defend a suit under summary procedure, filing of---Limitation---Application for condonation of delay, non-filing of---Significance---Article 159 of Limitation Act, 1908 mandates filing within ten days from the date of service of summons---It is well settled principle of law that where the legislature has prescribed a specific period of limitation, the same cannot be extended or enlarged by the court unless sufficient cause for the delay is demonstrated strictly within the parameters of S.5 of Limitation Act, through an independent application---The court cannot assume sufficient cause not create it on behalf of a litigant---The absence of condonation of delay application therefore, is not a simple omission; it is a jurisdictional vacuum. (d) Limitation--- ----Principles---Limitation is a strict statutory mandate and not a matter of judicial discretion---Law of limitation is a statue of repose, intended to ensure finality in litigation to quieten title, and to bar stale and time-worn claims---It regulates existing rights by prescribing the period within which they may be enforced and does not itself create substantive rights---It cannot extinguish vested rights or curtail remedies unless its conditions are satisfied strictly in accordance with the statutory text---Equitable, ethical, or moral considerations cannot be invoked to circumvent its mandatory provisions, and justice, equity, and good conscience do not override its express language---Flowing from this foundational principle, the barrier of limitation cannot be crossed on the basis of hardship, sympathy, or any assumed inherent discretionary jurisdiction of the court---Ignorance, negligence, mistake, personal hardship, or poverty of a litigant does not save limitation---The statutory time bar is absolute unless the law itself provides an exception. Gabelli v. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n 568 US 422 (2013) ref. Ch. M. Sarmad Abbas Gujjar and Rana Ghulam Murtaza for Petitioner. Ch. Jamshed Jameel for Respondent. Date of hearing: 14th November, 2025.

Summary: As the original gift in favour of petitioner No.1 by his father has not been established through cogent evidence, therefore, the subsequent transactions which are superstructures of the same transaction are also not sustainable and would collapse alongwith the base upon which the same are standing. 70Writ Petition- Service- Recruitment / Appointment 11695-24 MUHAMMAD TAHIR BASHIR VS POP ETC Mr. Justice Asim Hafeez 16- 12- 2025 2025 LHC 7713

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Punjab Urban Immoveable Property Tax Act (V of 1958)--- ----S.3---Punjab Local Government Ordinance (XIII of 2001), Ss.116 & 117---Property tax demand, challenge to---Plea that unless area was declared as rating area no levy could be demanded---Legality---Power of local government to determine/levy property tax---Scope---Facts: Though present constitutional petition petitioners assailed property tax demand notices/challan forms issued to them in respect of properties situated in various localities where property tax on annual rental value had been levied pursuant to notifications issued under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001---Moot Point: “Whether property tax demands for the concerned localities were lawful without a specific notification under S. 3 of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958 declaring the area a rating/urban area?”---Held: Notifications were issued in exercise of S. 117 of the Ordinance, 2001--Section 116 of the Ordinance, 2001 and relevant entries in Second Schedule thereto extended power to tax immovable property in terms of S. 117 of the Ordinance, 2001---Hence, power to levy and collect tax from petitioners was vested with the local government and such power was correctly exercised by raising demand to pay levy---No illegality was found in issuance of demand notices qua payment of levy in area under reference, which was a rating area for all intent and purposes, without the requirement of fresh notification under S.3 of the Act, 1958---High Court rejected the plea of exclusivity claimed or otherwise attributed to S. 3 of the Act, 1958, for the purposes of throwing challenge to the levy and demand thereof, validly made in context of local government laws---Present writ petition was devoid of any merits and the same was dismissed, in circumstances. Khawar Siddique Sahi for Petitioners. Rana Ghulam Husssain, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan. Bashir Ahmed Buzdar, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab. Ch. Saeed Akhtar Sajid for Respondents Nos.3 and 4. Muhammad Aslam Sipra, Deputy Secretary (Law) and Muhammad Aslam, Inspector, Excise, Taxation and Narcotics Department in person.

Summary: (a) Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)--- ----Ss.31, 32, 33, 53, 54 & 57---National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Functions) Regulations, 2016, Reglns.3 & 4---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Territorial jurisdiction of NIRC---Employment contract---Exclusive jurisdiction clause---Effect---Employment contract containing an exclusive jurisdiction clause conferring jurisdiction on courts at place ‘I’---Enforceability and legal effect---Where the cause of action is asserted to have arisen at place ‘Q’ and the employee institutes a grievance petition before NIRC at place ‘Q’---Maintainability of grievance petition at place ‘Q’---Scope---Brief facts were that the petitioner company challenged the NIRC Full Bench order whereby its appeal against the Single Member, NIRC was dismissed; the respondent employee was hired as ‘safety officer’ under an offer letter containing an exclusive jurisdiction clause for Islamabad; after termination notice, respondent employee filed a grievance petition at NIRC Quetta, and the petitioner’s application under O. VII, R. 10, C.P.C. for return of plaint was rejected---Question requiring determination in the present matter was as to “whether NIRC Quetta had territorial jurisdiction despite the parties having confined themselves to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts at Islamabad?”---Held: It was clear from perusal of standard-form contract furnished by the petitioner company that there existed clear inequality of bargaining power between the petitioner company and the respondent employee---Respondent employee had no meaningful opportunity to negotiate any of its terms---This lack of real choice underscored the inequality of bargaining power between the parties and assumed significance while examining the enforceability of the contractual stipulations contained therein---National Industrial Relations Commission being a federal statutory body designed the sitting of its members at different placed was to be flexible and facilitative in nature to adequately address the disputes of trans-provincial establishments---The seat of member of NIRC at Quetta, therefore, did not constitute a separate or distinct forum; it was merely a bench of NIRC through which the NIRC exercised its federally conferred jurisdiction---Proceedings conducted at Quetta remained proceedings of the NIRC itself, and the territorial jurisdiction of Industrial Relations Act, 2012 extended to whole of Pakistan---Jurisdiction flew from the statute creating the forum, not from the place where the forum happened to sit---So long as the subject matter of the dispute fell within the statutory mandate of the NIRC, the exercise of jurisdiction through any of its duly constituted seats/benches could not be questioned on territorial grounds alone---In the present case, the NIRC acting though its Quetta Bench lawfully exercised jurisdiction in the matter---Proceedings before the NIRC were directed to continue---Present constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Jurisdiction--- ----Jurisdiction is not a mere technicality but the very foundation upon which the legality of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings rests. (c) Jurisdiction--- ----Jurisdiction clause in an employment contract---Effect---Parties agreeing to jurisdiction of courts at a particular place---Circumstances where there is inequality of bargaining power between employer and employee---Scope---Where two or more forums are otherwise competent to entertain a dispute, the parties may, by mutual agreement, restrict themselves to one such forum for the adjudication of their disputes---Such clauses, when they merely regulate the choice amongst available forums and do not oust the jurisdiction of all courts, are respected in order to uphold the sanctity of contract and the autonomy of the parties---A jurisdiction clause is a contractual stipulation, where the parties to the contract choose or select one particular forum out of two or more available forums, and the same is permissible---Choice of parties regarding jurisdiction clause has been upheld by Supreme Court to maintain the sanctity of the contract---General rule of contract in common law is founded upon the principle of freedom of contract that parties are ordinarily the best judges of their own interests and that where they freely and voluntarily enter into a contract the primary function of the courts is to enforce to what has been agreed---However, it has to noted that employment contracts are often marked by unequal bargaining power because the employer generally occupies a dominant position, while employee has little or no real opportunity to negotiate the terms of engagement, and only to sign the dotted line of the contract in order to secure his livelihood---In such circumstances, courts are not confined to formal reading of contractual clauses but are required to examine the fairness and reasonableness of enforcing such clauses---However, it has also to be noted that where enforcement of jurisdiction clause would operate oppressively, unfairly, or inequitably, courts may justifiably decline to give effect to it. State Life Insurance Corporation v. Muhammad Saleem 1987 SCMR 393; Messrs Kadir Motors, (Regd.) Rawalpindi v. Messrs National Motors Ltd. 1992 SCMR 1174 and Eden Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Muhammad Aslam and others 2022 SCMR 2044 and Uber Technologies Inc. and others v. David Heller and others 2020 SCMR 1279 rel. Redtone Telecommunications Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited and 3 others v. Federation of Pakistan and 11 others PLD 2014 Sindh 601, Global Quality Foods (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Hardee’s Food Systems, Inc. PLD 2016 Sindh 169; Tahir Tariq Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others v. National Development Finance Corporation 2003 CLD 1546; Gillespie Brothers and Co. Ltd. v. Roy Bowles Transport Ltd., (1973) 1 QB 400; Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another AIR 1986 SC 1571 and Snehal Kumar Sarabhai v. Economic Transport Organisation and others AIR 1975 Gujarat 72 ref. Makhdoom Ali Khan and Khwaja Aizaz Ahsan for Petitioner. Kamran Mujrtaza and Hassan Kamran for Respondent No.2. Assisted by: Muhammad Fahad, Research Intern and Muhammad Yahya Khan Niazi, Judicial Law Clerk. Date of hearing: 16th September, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending