Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Inter alia following question of law has been put forth for opinion of this Court: i. Whether an order passed under Section 54 of the Act, by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Punjab, or his delegate (such as respondent No.7), which has not been challenged in appeal, under the Act, operates so as to bind the Civil Courts and preclude them from examining the validity of an alleged agreement to sell? Held that this Court is of the opinion that Sections 27 and 54 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 ("the Act") operate in complementary fashion: Section 27 governs internal transfers of a co-operative society after the death of a member, and Section 54 prescribes the procedure for resolving disputes, inter alia, between the members, claimants, or the society itself. The proviso to Section 54 functions as a check on the Registrar's power (purportedly delegated to respondent No.7 in the present case): where complicated questions of law and fact are involved, the Registrar is to consider suspension and allow a Civil Court to determine those issues. The nomination under Section 27 facilitates administrative transfer or payment but does not vest ownership in the nominee to the prejudice of heirs. The statutory scheme, therefore, ensures that an officer of the Punjab Co- operatives Department?whether Registrar or his delegatee like respondent No.7 should not adjudicate contested title that requires plenary evidentiary probe by a Civil Court. Further held that an order passed under Section 54 of the Act, by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Punjab, or his delegate (such as respondent No.7), which has not been challenged in appeal, under the Act, may bind the co-operative society insofar as the said society acted under Section 27(3) in good faith; but it cannot, on the material before the Courts below as also this Court, be treated as an unimpeachable determination of the title of the petitioner. 76Crl. Misc. 68529/25 Awon Muhammad Vs The State etc. Mr. Justice Muhammad Tariq Nadeem 10- 12- 2025 2025 LHC 8016

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 175E(1) [as inserted by the Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025], 184(1) (since omitted) & 199---Dispute between Governments---Jurisdiction---Misdescription of Government---Matter pertained to a dispute between an office of Federal Government describing itself as Central Government and between Board of Revenue Punjab, over a piece of land---High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction declined to interfere in the matter on the ground that it was a dispute between two Governments---Validity---Original jurisdiction in any “dispute between any two or more Governments” was vested in Supreme Court under Article 184(1) of the Constitution but pursuant to the Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025 such jurisdiction is now vested to the Federal Constitutional Court under Article 175E(1) of the Constitution---Nature of such jurisdiction had not changed and a dispute between a Federal statutory corporation, such as the Evacuee Trust Property Board, and a Provincial department did not, merely for such reason, become a “dispute between two Governments”---Misdescription of petitioner as “Central Government through Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board, etc.” and any concession made at the bar could not divest High Court of jurisdiction that otherwise vested in it under Article 199 of the Constitution---Federal Constitutional Court set aside the order and remanded the matter to High Court for deciding the same afresh in accordance with law---Appeal was allowed. Pakistan Railways v. Karachi Development Authority 2003 SCMR 563 rel. Mian Irfan Akram, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Waseem Mumtaz Malik, Additional Advocate General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 9th December, 2025.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act (XVII of 1996)--- ----Ss.35 & 36---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, R.2(3) [since repealed]---Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2020, R.21---Disciplinary proceedings, challenge to---Constitutional petition, filing of---Maintainability---Non-statutory service rules of transferred employees---Issuance of show cause notice and charge sheet, assailing of---Briefly, matter comprised of multiple constitutional petitions filed by employees of Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL), grouped into two categories: Category “A”, consisting of petitioners who were not employees of the erstwhile Pakistan Telegraph and Telephone Department and joined PTCL after the enactment of the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Act, 1991 and the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996; and Category “B”, consisting of petitioners who were originally employees of the T&T Department and were subsequently transferred first to the Corporation and then to PTCL---The petitions arose out of disciplinary proceedings initiated by PTCL, including the issuance of show-cause notices and charge sheets against the petitioners---All petitions challenged the initiation of disciplinary actions by PTCL and involved questions relating to the nature of employment of the petitioners, the applicable service framework, and the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the petitions---Held: Petitioners of category (A) petitions were neither civil servants nor were they employed as employees of T&T department and were rather appointed by the corporation, therefore, the petitions mentioned in category (A) were not maintainable since the services of these petitioners were never regulated under any statutory rules as they started their employments being employees of corporation and were then transferred to PTCL as transferred employees---After PTCL’s privatization under the Act, 1996 and subsequent amendments thereto, the petitioners’ status in both categories (A & B) seized to be that of civil servants and they were governed by the PTCL’s internal rules and regulations or standing orders---Consequently, the E&D Rules, 1973 were no longer applicable---It was settled by Supreme Court in the case reported as 2021 SCMR 1998 that an employee, who, at no point, had served in T&T department, could not claim that his terms and conditions of service were baptized by any statutory protections---Such employees could not invoke constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution for agitating the grievance pertaining to their service matters---It was the case of the petitioners in category (B) petitions that since the proceedings sought to be initiated against the them were in violations of the E&D Rules 1973, as such proceedings had either not been initiated by mentioning the E&D Rules, 1973 or where even so mentioned, the proceedings were not initiated by the ‘competent authority’, therefore, the proceedings were without jurisdiction---This ground failed for two reasons; firstly, the E&D Rules, 1973 had been repealed by virtue of R. 21 of the Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2020 (E&D Rules, 2020) and the concept or term ‘authorized officer’, as couched in sub-rule (3) of R. 2 of E&D Rules, 1973 had been done away with by the substituted/replaced Rules i.e. E&D Rules, 2020, thus the entire premise of the case sought to be built by the petitioners was without any foundation---Without prejudice to the foregoing, even sub-rule (3) of the R. 2 of E&D Rules, 1973 provided that if no officer was so authorized, the authority could proceed to perform such functions---This was beside the point that the petitioners of category ‘B’ could not insist that they could only and exclusively be proceeded under the E&D Rules, 1973 and the prescribed rules and regulations of Corporation/PTCL, could not be invoked---Mere maintainability of a constitutional petition, owing to statutory protections in terms of Ss. 35 & 36 of the Act, 1996, did not mean that the petitioners could stifle the very essence and purpose of the incorporation of the PTCL and the Act, 1996---It was concluded that the proceedings initiated by the respondent PTCL had lawfully been commenced, therefore, filing of present petitions by way of laying challenges to the mere issuance of the show cause notices and charge sheets were not tenable---All petitions, falling under categories “A” and “B”, were dismissed---Category “A” petitions being held not-maintainable for want of jurisdiction, while category “B” petitions were dismissed on merits. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited v. Muhammad Samiullah 2021 SCMR 1998; Masood Ahmed Bhatti Review judgment 2016 SCMR 1362; Asghar Ali v. PTCL and others PLJ 2025 Lah. 516 = 2025 LHC 922; Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited v. Imran Aziz and others (Civil Appeal No.1509 of 2021); Bilal Hussain v. Present National Bank of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 313 and Lal Khan v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal 1995 SCMR 1758 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Employment---Constitutional petition filed by employee---Terms and conditions of service not being governed by statutory rules---Effect---Maintainability---The alleged violations, if any, quo the terms and conditions of service, if not backed by statutory rules, cannot be redressed while exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited through Chairman v. Iqbal Nasir and others PLD 2011 SC 132; Pakistan Defence Officer’s case 2013 SCMR 1707 and Pakistan Electric Power Company v. Syed Salahuddin and others 2022 SCMR 991 rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Employment---Constitutional petition filed by employee---Maintainability---Statutory rules and non-statutory rules---Distinction--Rules of an organization if not approved by government and having been drafted, approved or adopted for internal arrangement and functioning of such organization are non-statutory. Shafique Ahmed Khan and others v. NESCOM through Chairman, Islamabad and others PLD 2016 SC 377; Ziaullah Khan Niazi v. Chairman, Pakistan Red Crescent Society 2004 SCMR 189; University of the Punjab, Lahore and 2 others v. Ch. Sardar Ali 1992 SCMR 1093; M.H. Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan and 2 others 1994 SCMR 1024 and Muhammad Rafi and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2016 SCMR 2146 rel. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Employment---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Non-statutory rules of service---Adoption of statutory rules of another organization---Effect upon service statues of the employees---Mere adoption of statutory rules does not render the rules statutory for the purpose of organization which adopts such rules. M.H. Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan and 2 others 1994 SCMR 1024 rel. (e) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act (XVII of 1996), Ss.35 & 36---Constitutional petition filed by employees in service of T&T Department---Maintainability---Petitions filed by those employees who were part of the T&T Department would be maintainable for the reason that such employees had statutory rules relating to terms and conditions of their service which were protected by S. 35 read with S. 36 of the Act, 1996---It is not axiomatic that all employees of T&T Department would have ipso facto right to challenge any/all actions, if so initiated against them, by invoking judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited v. Muhammad Samiullah 2021 SCMR 1998 rel. (f) Jurisdiction--- ----Question of jurisdiction has to be decided ahead of all other questions---Jurisdiction lies at the foundation of all legal proceedings and if it is not present, the proceeding is void. [Grahan v. Maingay (1793) RIDG.L&S.20, 72] ref. (g) Master and servant--- ----Principle---Scope---Where conditions of service of an employee of even a statutory body are not regulated by statutory rules and are governed under the terms of a contract or the rules/instructions/regulations for internal use, the relationship of the employee with such instrumentality is governed by the principle of master and servant unless the services are protected in terms of the provisions contained in labour laws. Ishtiaq A. Chaudhary, Hassan Muhammad Rana and Ahmad Fraz Lone for Petitioner. Shahid Anwar Bajwa, Abdul Rahman Bajwa, Rana Nafees, A.D. Shaid, Saad Saleem Rai Ali Shah Marth for PTCL (in W.Ps. Nos.38709, 49394, 53395, 13062, 24612, 12102, 12694 and 64364 of 2024). Barrister Umer Abdullah, Mohammad Ahmad Mughal, Zarak Zaman Khan, Sheikh Waseem Ahmad, Hussain Tahir Zaidi and Miss Zunaira Patrick for Respondents (in W.Ps. Nos.43927 and 28677 of 2023 and 30309 of 2025). Abu Zar Salman Khan Niazi, Zain Sheikh, Umar Bin Khalid Cheema and Wajid Maqsood for Respondents (in W.P. No.6522 of 2025). Syed Faisal Khurshid SM Legal for PTCL and Waqas Mehmood (Manager PTCL). Fawad Haider AM Legal PTCL. Mirza Amir Baig, Abdul Aleem Khan and Saqib Murad for Respondents. Dates of hearing: 24th November, 1st, 3rd, 5th and 9th December, 2025. KHALID ISHAQ, J.--- This judgment will decide the following Constitutional Petitions filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (the "Constitution"), as all these petitions involve common questions of law that require determination by this Court. However, the Constitutional Petitions are divided into two categories, "A" and "B", due to the distinct nature and legal status of the petitioners involved.

Summary: C.P.L.As. Nos. 2199-L and 2211-L of 2024 and 1567 to 1569 of 2025 (Against the judgments dated 29.08.2024 and 05.03.2025, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in W.Ps. Nos. 14891 of 23, 41703 of 2024, 5687 of 2025, 1133 and 5691 of 2025 respectively). and C.M.A. No. 2390 of 2025 in C.P.L.A. No. 1567 of 2025 (Stay application). (a) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)--- ----Ss. 22 (1)(b) & 22A---Old-age benefit regimes---Scope---Two distinct benefit regimes have been provided under Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Monthly old-age pension under S.22(1) of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 payable at the rate specified in the Schedule thereto--- Old-age grant is payable in lump sum at the rate prescribed under S.22A of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Insured person, under the two provisions of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 who has attained the age of sixty years, or fifty-five years in the case of a woman, is entitled to a monthly old-age pension if contributions in respect of him or her have been paid for a period of not less than fifteen (15) years; otherwise, such person is entitled only to an old-age grant. (b) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)--- ----Preamble---Provisions of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 have been enacted to provide economic security, social protection and dignity to employees in their old age, and not to deprive them of pensionary benefits on account of marginal, technical, or inadvertent deficiencies---Where an insured person has substantially fulfilled statutory requirements and has paid contributions for almost the entire qualifying period, denial of a monthly old-age pension for a negligible shortfall would result in grave hardship, arbitrariness, and manifest injustice, thereby undermining the benevolent spirit of the legislation. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Beneficial legislation---Scope---Social welfare and beneficial statutes must be construed liberally so as to advance remedy and suppress mischief sought to be remedied---Courts are, therefore, under a Constitutional and legal duty to adopt a purposive, pragmatic, and equitable interpretation which safeguards rights and legitimate expectations of individuals for whose benefit the statute has been enacted---In appropriate cases, interpretative role of Court becomes essential to prevent irreparable loss, undue hardship, and injustice that may otherwise ensue from a rigid, literal, or technical application of the law. (d) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)--- ----Ss. 22(1)(b), 22A & Schedule, Clause 1---Employees’ Old-age benefits---Duration of service---Rounding off principle---Applicability--- Petitioner of Employees’ old-age benefit institution was aggrieved of judgment passed by High Court allowing claims of respondents of retired employees whose length of service was short of a few months from the duration of 15 years---Validity---Provision of Clause 1 of Schedule to Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 does not merely prescribe a formula for calculation of monthly pension; rather, it also provides pragmatic mechanism for accounting fractional periods of insurable employment---This reflects legislative intent to avoid technical disqualifications on account of insignificant shortfalls and to ensure that substantive rights are not defeated by minor procedural deficiencies---‘Rounding off’ provision contained in Schedule to Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 must be read harmoniously with S.22 of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Any interpretation that excludes its application at the stage of determining eligibility would not only defeat the express legislative scheme but would also result in manifest injustice, thereby frustrating the social-welfare objectives underlying the statute---Acceptance of such interpretation does not create an inconsistency between Ss. 22 & 22A of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Provision of S.22A of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 operates in a distinct and separate field and is intended to cover cases where the insured person falls substantially short of the qualifying period for a pension---Respondents of retired employees did not, in arithmetical terms, complete fifteen full calendar years of employment, as defined under S.2(q) of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Upon application of the principle of ‘rounding off’ expressly provided in Schedule to Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, their period of insurable employment was deemed to have been completed up to fifteen years, as required under proviso to S.22(1)(b) of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Such deeming fiction was not judicially invented but was expressly provided by the Legislature itself through Schedule to Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Once the Schedule to Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 was applied in its proper perspective, respondents of retired employees could not be said to have fallen short of the mandatory requirement---On the contrary respondents of retired employees were to be treated as having satisfied all the conditions prescribed under S.22(1) of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976---Respondents of retired employees had fulfilled mandatory requirements of Section 22(1) of Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 through the statutorily recognized mechanism of ‘rounding off’ and were rightly found entitled to the grant of a monthly old-age pension by High Court---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court which had correctly understood the controversy at hand and made a well-founded decision based on the relevant law on the issue---High Court arrived at a sound and reasoned conclusion that was both legally correct and just and there was no illegality, perversity or misreading or non-reading of evidence in the judgment passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. 2025 PLC 38; Colony Sarhad Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi v. Government of Pakistan and others PLD 1976 SC 227; Abdus Salam Khan v. Salim-Ud-Din Ahmad Siddiqui and 2 others PLD 1979 Lah. 85; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division and another v. Abdul Rasheed Memon 2025 SCMR 532; State of U.P. and others v. Pawan Kumar Tiwari and others AIR 2005 SC 658 and Pakistan, through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Himayatullah Farukhi PLD 1969 SC 407 rel. (e) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)--- ----Ss. 22(1)(b), 22A & Sched., Clause 1---Employees’ old-age benefits---Rounding off, principle of---Fractional periods---Calculation---Where statute itself prescribes a method for dealing with fractional periods of service, such a method necessarily informs and influences determination of eligibility---Any contrary interpretation would render such rounding-off provision redundant and ineffective, which is impermissible. (f) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Schedule to an Act---Object, purpose and scope---Schedule forms an integral part of the Act and falls squarely within the ambit of its provisions---Schedule operates as an extension of the section that introduces or attracts it--- Ordinarily, material is placed in a Schedule because it is too detailed, elaborate, or lengthy, which cannot be conveniently incorporated within the body of a section---Such placement does not diminish its legal force or binding effect, which remains coextensive with the substantive provisions of the Act. Messrs MCB Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue 2014 PTD 1874 and Mars, Incorporated through Authorized Signatory and others v. the Registrar of Trade Marks and others 2019 CLD 27 rel. (g) Maxim--- ----Ut res magis valeat quam pereat---Applicability---Maxim ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’ mandates that a construction be adopted that gives efficacy to the statute rather than having it fail. (h) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art.114---Estoppel---Principle of promissory estoppel---Scope---Principle of promissory estoppel restrains a public authority from resiling from a position that has been consciously adopted and acted upon by affected persons, unless an overriding public interest so demands and such departure is sanctioned by law. Hafeez Saeed Akhtar, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Umar Riaz, Advocate Supreme Court, Abdul Ahad Memon, Director (Law) and Sukhan Ilyas, Deputy Director (Law) for Petitioners. Hassan Lateef Chaudhry, Advocate High Court (with special permission of the Court) along with Shahbaz Hussain, Respondent No. 3 for Respondents. Date of hearing: 9th December, 2025.

Summary: (a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Ss.15, 19 & 25---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Rules, 2018, Rr.3 & 4---Eexecution of a banking case---Decree holder bank seeking to sell mortgaged properties itself without intervention of Banking Court---Permissibility---Legality---Brief facts of the matter were that the execution proceedings were pending before the Banking Court, whereby, notices were issued and court auctioneers were appointed to proceed with the court auction, however, before any meaningful auction steps were taken, the decree holder bank filed an application under S.19(3) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 read with Rr. 3 & 4 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Rules, 2018, seeking leave to sell the mortgaged/charged properties itself through public auction without court intervention, while the judgment-debtors objected that once C.P.C. mode was adopted the bank could not switch---Therefore, the issue requiring determination before the Court was “whether the Banking Court was precluded to grant permission to the decree holder to sell the charged property by itself through public auction or sealed tenders after it had commenced execution proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the C.P.C. under S. 19 of the Ordinance?”---Held: The Ordinance, 2001 has endeavored to provide for multiple options regarding execution of a banking Decree so that the same is satisfied within a reasonable time---Section 19 of the Ordinance was a complete code for execution of a banking decree and granted certain definite and substantive rights to a financial institution, subject to the conditions prescribed under S. 19 read with relevant and applicable provisions of S. 15 of the Ordinance, 2001---Financial institution could sell or cause to be sold, the charged properties of the judgment debtor subject of decree either with or without the intervention of the Banking Court either by public auction or by inviting sealed tenders and appropriate the proceeds towards total or partial satisfaction of the decree---The decree constituted and conferred sufficient power and authority to a financial institution qua sale of charged assets and a financial institution could transfer marketable title subject to the remedies extended in terms of relevant and applicable provisions of Ss.15 & 19 of the Ordinance, 2001---In the present case, the sale of charged properties by the decree holder bank through public auction without intervention of the Court was likely to complete at a faster time track and could save precious time of the Court---Mortgaged properties were allowed to be sold through public auction by the decree holder bank without intervention of the Court in accordance with prescribed procedure---Application filed by the decree holder bank was allowed, in circumstances. Shahida Bibi and others v. Habib Bank Limited and others PLD 2016 SC 995 rel. (b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Ss.15 & 19---Decree holder bank seeking to sell the mortgaged properties itself through public auction without intervention of the Banking Court---Validity---Banking Court is empowered to grant permission to the decree holder at any stage of execution proceedings to exercise the option to sell charged property by way of mortgage, pledge or hypothecation without intervention of the Court either by sealed tenders or public auction subject to conditions and a conscious order passed in this respect under S. 19(1) read with S. 19(3) of the Ordinance, 2001. (c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S.19(2)---Execution of a banking decree---Modes of execution available to Banking Court stated---Section 19(2) of the Ordinance, 2001 provides three explicit modes to the Banking Court to execute a banking decree, (a) in accordance with the provisions of the C.P.C; or (b) in accordance with any other law for the time being in force; or (c) in such manner as the Banking Court may at the request of the decree holder consider appropriate, including recovery as arrears of land revenue. (d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S.19(1)---Automatic conversion of suit into execution---Requirement of instituting separate execution application and issuing notices to judgment debtor, exception to---Section 19(1) of the Ordinance, 2001 provides for automatic conversion of suit into execution proceedings without the need to file a separate application and issue fresh notice to the judgment debtors. Syed Muhammad Kaswar Gardezi for Applicant. Mughees Aslam Malik for Judgment Debtors Nos.1 to 5 (a & b).

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 177 & 214-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Audit after expiry of limitation---Condonation of delay---Scope---Petitioner / company was aggrieved of extension in time by authorities to initiate audit proceeds beyond period prescribed for the purpose---Validity---Federal Board of Revenue and its officers are duly authorized under S. 214-A of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to condone delay in performance of any act or thing for which a period has been prescribed under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and audit essentially is an act or thing to be done---Purpose of S. 214-A of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is to give a separate overriding power to the Board to permit any act or thing to be done under the statute within such time period as it may deem appropriate, which is independent of any other provision of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 that provides a time frame and an audit is plainly such an act---Federal Board of Revenue has the power under S.214-A of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to grant condonation---Show cause notice was to be issued within the prescribed five-year period, and such outer limit was absolute and could not be breached---Only five-year limit did not matter and delay after a timely notice had invalidated the proceedings---Additional statutory time limits, such as the time prescribed for issuing the order-in-original after a valid show cause notice were also mandatory and not merely directory but had created multi-layered, mandatory protections for taxpayers---Delays were not caused by any external or unavoidable impediment and Federal Board of Revenue could have proceeded within the statutory period---Benefit of such conduct rebounds entirely to taxpayer, not by operation of law but through the Authority’s own failure to discharge its obligations with diligence and integrity---If the Authority was genuinely committed to proper discharge of its functions, it could have attributed liability when called for---High Court declared condonation of time by authorities as void---High Court restrained the authorities from seeking further information pertaining to Tax Year 2019 in pursuance of such condonation of time limit---High Court declared audit proceedings under S. 177 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 as time barred---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others 2017 SCMR 1427, 2017 PTD 1756; WAK Limited and others v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax 2025 PTD 1179; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Messrs Allah Din Steel and Rolling Mills and others 2018 SCMR 1328; Additional Collector of Customs, Faisalabad v. Messrs Fatima Enterprises, Multan and another (2025 SCMR 1929; Federal Board of Revenue v. Abdul Ghani 2021 SCMR 1154; Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV, Lahore v. Messrs Panther Sports and Rubber Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2022 SCMR 1135; Sabre Travel Network Pakistan Limited v. Pakistan and others (2025) 131 Tax 456 and Dowell Schlumberger (Western) S.A in W.P. No. 1183 of 2018 rel. (b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)--- ----S. 24-A---Recording of reasons---Scope---Requirement to articulate reasons is neither a mere procedural formality nor an empty ritual rather it is a substantive safeguard designed to demonstrate that discretion has been exercised judiciously, objectively, and with due application of mind---Reasoned decision-making ensures that affected persons are apprised of the basis of the action taken, which facilitates meaningful judicial review, and acts as a restraint against arbitrariness or caprice. Additional Collector of Customs, Faisalabad v. Messrs Fatima Enterprises, Multan and another 2025 SCMR 1929 rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Judicial review---Institutional manipulation---Scope---High Court cannot and should not in the exercise of judicial review close its eyes if there is institutionalized manipulation apparent on the face of the record. Sardar Taimoor Aslam and Mudassar Abbas for Petitioner. Muhammad Asif Jadoon, A.A.G. for Respondent No.1. Osama Shahid for Respondent No.2. Assisted by: Muhammad Yahya Khan Niazi, Judicial Law Clerk. Date of hearing: 22nd October, 2025

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII o f 1990)--- ----Ss.38 & 40---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Inspection conducted at petitioner’s business premises, challenge to---Authorities cannot lawfully enter, inspect, or obtain records without first obtaining a magistrate’s warrant under S. 40 of the Act, 1990, plea of---Whether proceedings under S. 38 can be undertaken without first invoking S. 40 of the Act, 1990---‘Routine inspection’---‘Search and seizure’---Distinction---Briefly, the inspection at petitioner’s premises was carried out pursuant to an authorization issued by the Commissioner Inland Revenue, following information received from FBR Headquarters regarding an unusually large carry-forward of input tax declared by the petitioner in its sales tax return, necessitating verification of stock position and related records, and the inspection formed part of a structured desk audit and verification process undertaken by the tax authorities---Held: Section 38 facilitated routine, non-coercive inspections, whereas S. 40 governed intrusive searches justified by the statutory threshold of “reason to believe” and “relevant to any proceedings”---The statutory scheme therefore did not support the view that S. 38 was subordinated to S. 40; both provisions coexisted to serve distinct yet complementary purposes within the broader tax administration regime---In the present case, record did not disclose arbitrariness, mala fides, colorable exercise of authority or any overreach that might warrant interference in constitutional jurisdiction---No coercive action had been taken against the petitioner, nor had it been deprived of property or subjected to any measure beyond a routine inspection---Petitioner had declared an exceptionally high carry-forward adjustment of Rs.185,352,613/- against stock values declared at Rs.1,029,736,739/-, necessitating verification which constituted a reasonable and legally sufficient foundation for initiating inspection proceedings---Verification of such discrepancies was a routine and essential function of the tax administration to ensure accuracy of declarations---Proceedings under S. 38 were neither irregular nor excessive---The Commissioner had a proper factual and statutory basis for issuing the authorization; the officers acted strictly within the scope of S.38; no measure of coercion, seizure, or forced retrieval was adopted; and at no stage were the intrusive mechanisms prescribed under S. 40 invoked---The petitioner, therefore, failed to demonstrate any infringement of legal rights---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss.38 & 40---Access to business premises---Power to inspect stocks, accounts, and records---Permissibility of such exercise even in absence of pending adjudication---Whether proceedings under S. 38 can be undertaken without first invoking S. 40 of the Act, 1990---Routine inspection---Coercive search and seizures---Distinct statutory domains---Obtaining a prior magistrate’s warrant as condition precedent---Requirement---Proceedings under S. 38 can be undertaken without first invoking S. 40 of the Act, 1990---Scope, nature, and purpose of the two provisions are distinct---Section 38 empowers the authorized officer to access business premises, registered offices, stocks, accounts, and records of registered persons or those liable for registration---This power is exercisable even when no adjudicatory or penal proceedings are pending, and is intended to verify declarations, ascertain factual positions, examine stock levels, and review records maintained under federal, provincial, or local laws---In contrast, S.40 contemplates search and seizure, but only where the officer has reason to believe that documents or things relevant to proceedings exist at a place, and then only after obtaining a magistrate’s warrant---The two provisions thus operate independently: Section 38 allows routine inspections for verification and transparency, while S. 40 regulates coercive searches linked to pending or contemplated proceedings---Section 38 expressly authorizes Inland Revenue officers to access any business premises, manufacturing facility, registered office or any other place where stocks, business records or documents relevant under the Act, 1990 are kept---The authority extends not only to registered persons but also to persons liable for registration, and further, to any person whose business activities may be required to be examined for any inquiry or investigation in any tax fraud committed by him, his agent or any other person---This wide yet purpose-linked statutory mandate enables revenue authorities to identify tax evasion, detect fraudulent input adjustments, uncover unreported supplies, and generally ensure that the flow of tax to the exchequer is not impeded through concealment or manipulation---However, under S. 38, the officer may access the premises, inspect records, and obtain material voluntarily produced or found in plain sight, but cannot compel production of concealed documents or seize property byforce. Tanveer Ahmad for Petitioner. Mahmood Ahmad Bhatti for Respondents. Date of hearing: 8th December, 2025.

Summary: Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Conduct Rules, 1978--- ----R.14(2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Co-operative Societies Act (VII of 1925), Preamble---Cooperative housing society, elections of---A member challenging candidature of employees of an ‘electricity distribution company’ who were also members of the society---Premise---Trial Court and revisional court refusing to grant temporary injunction, challenge to---Brief facts of the matter were that petitioner was a member of a Cooperative Housing Society who filed a civil suit for declaration/cancellation and permanent/mandatory injunction to restrain respondent Nos.9-15,who were employees of an electricity distribution company, from contesting the Society’s Management Committee election; he sought interim suspension of the NOCs granted by the electricity distribution company; the Civil Court and District Court concurrently dismissed his application for temporary injunction, hence, the present constitutional petition was filed---Held: After amendment made in R. 14(2) of the Rules, 1978, an exception had been created with reference to MEPCO (WAPDA) Housing Societies located within the territorial jurisdiction of MEPCO---The Society was located within the territorial jurisdiction of MEPCO---The nexus of the society with MEPCO was required to be determined after recording of evidence in the pending suit of the petitioner---The overall construction and interpretation of the amended R.14(2) of the Rules, 1978 in view of exception created therein would also be determined in the pending suit since respondents Nos. 9 to 15 were admittedly members of the society and in that capacity, they prima facie had a right to participate in the election of the society at par with other members subject to NOCs issued by MEPCO as ordained by Model Election Rules---Even otherwise, any violation of amended R.14(2) of the Rules, 1978 at best attracted disciplinary proceedings under the Rules, 1978 which was the prerogative of MEPCO and the petitioner had no concern with the same---Accordingly, the ingredients of temporary injunction as ordained in O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2 of the CPC in terms of prima facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience or inconvenience did not co-exist in favour of the petitioner, as such, there was no illegality, infirmity or jurisdictional defect in the impugned orders passed by the Courts below---Present petition was devoid of any merit and the same was dismissed. Waqar A. Sheikh for Petitioner. Murid Hussain Makwal and Amir Aziz Qazi for Respondents Nos.3 and 4. Rana Ghulam Hussain, Assistant Attorney General and Bashir Ahmad Buzdar, Assistant Advocate General for Respondent No.5. Mian Nazar Muhammad Arain for Respondent No.6. Muhammad Ali Siddiqui for Respondents Nos.7 and 8. Jamshed Hayat, Abdul Samad Ali and Muhammad Ilyas Jamil for Respondents Nos.9 to 15. Date of hearing: 8th December, 2025.

Summary: Application for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was rightly declined by the Courts below since challenge to the power of the Board of Directors of MEPCO to amend Rule 14(2) of the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Conduct Rules, 1978 and the power of Chief Executive Officer, MEPCO to grant NOCs to the private Respondents to contest the election of the Management Committee of WAPDA Employees Cooperative Housing Society Limited Multan shall be decided after recording of evidence. Even otherwise, eligibility of the contesting candidates is required to be scrutinized under the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 read with Cooperative Societies Rules, 1927 and Model Election Rules adopted by the Society. 86Civil Revision 1591622.3000-